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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis argues that bioethics emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s not 
as a novel way to engage new technological or social ethical questions of life (bios), but 
rather as a late, post-Enlightenment secular phenomenon. In particular, bioethics seeks 
to adopt a methodology of theorizing on morality that is prominent in modern science, 
and this is a strategy that I contest by following Wittgenstein’s critique of scientific 
theorizing. Wittgenstein’s later exercises with language present a critical and clarifying 
way to identify the immanent and self-referential schema of principlism in bioethics. 
Additionally, I show how Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy as a skillful and 
therapeutic activity rather than a cognitive content is informative for bioethics. Hence, 
I suggest that in pre-modern, traditional eras—or even in many contemporary non-
Western global sectors—bioethics largely would be indistinct from religious and 
theological dogma and practices. I argue that the modern mind prioritizes material 
causality, leading to a moral techne that divides spirit from matter, vios from bios. Within 
such a schema, nature—and especially the medicalized human body—is managed, 
produced, and constructed. Furthermore, I argue that Wittgenstein gestures towards an 
ancient transcendent way beyond the modern division of vios and bios, and that a full 
vision of seeing life may be glimpsed through an apophatic epistemology that guides 
one towards an understanding of ethics itself as a form of apophatic and embodied 
knowledge. 
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Just because our moral philosophers knew the facts of morality only very approximately in arbitrary 
extracts or in accidental epitomes – for example, as the morality of their environment, their class, their 
church, the spirit of their time, their climate and part of the world– just because they were poorly 
informed and not even very curious about different peoples, times, and past ages – they never laid eyes 
on the real problems of morality; for these emerge only when we compare many moralities. In all ‘science 
of morals’ so far one thing was lacking, strange as it may sound: the problem of morality itself; what 
was lacking was any suspicion that there was something problematic here.  
 — Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 
 
 
 
There is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies, as 
it were. 
 
— Wittgenstein, PI 133  
 
 
 
I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really to be written only 
as a poetic composition [Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur DICHTEN].  It must, as it seems to 
me, be possible to gather from this how far my thinking belongs to the present, future or past. For I was 
thereby also revealing myself as someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do. 
 
— Wittgenstein, CV 24  
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INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF BIOETHICS—AND WHY IS 
BIOETHICS SO BORING? 
 
 
  
Thomas Kuhn’s significant work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (4th ed., 
2012), profoundly challenges the notion that science progresses in a linear, evolutionary 
manner. Kuhn instead proposes that scientific knowledge grows through a series of 
shifting “paradigms” when the accepted “normal science” of a certain time is 
questioned and then overthrown by a new theory. This alternating phase of theoretical 
progress is an era of “revolutionary science” that then in turn becomes “normal” as the 
community of participating scientists test, assess, and further explore the findings of 
the previous revolution. Perhaps what is most striking about Kuhn’s analysis is the 
inevitably human element in this progression as sociology, cultural and individual bias 
and more play vital roles in the growth of science. Far from a crystalline, pure, “other” 
process of logically testing and uncovering natural causes, Kuhn’s paradigm draws 
attention to the “nearness” of human scientific knowing.  
 
In 2015 at the 17th Annual Meeting of the American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities, Baruch Brody was awarded the Lifetime Achievement Award, during 
which he drew on Kuhn’s paradigm shifts to claim provocatively that bioethics had 
become normalized—the age of revolutionary bioethics had come to a close.1 In 
Brody’s narrative, bioethics emerged at the revolutionary moment when a segment of 
philosophy moved shop into the clinic, largely in response to the movement away from 
                                               
1 Brody, 2015. 
	 2 
physician paternalism to patient autonomy in decision making. As Klugman 
summarizes: 
Normal bioethics then has been the application of these insights and ideas to the 
world. This can be seen in the establishment of degree programs 
(undergraduate and graduate), professional societies, a code of ethics, even the 
new attestation program to professionalize clinical ethics. These are examples 
of a revolution becoming normalized. Even the work in bioethics is not earth 
shattering. Year after year at the ASBH meetings I hear colleagues say, “There’s 
nothing new here.”2 
 
 
Echoing a similar assessment—not incidentally while receiving the 1999 iteration of the 
ASBH Lifetime Achievement Award—Albert Jonsen asked “why has bioethics become 
so boring?”3 Jonsen went on to write further about the exciting early encounters of 
bioethics: 
Accusing the good doctors of evil paternalism was certainly unmannerly and 
mean, while indicating the scientific researchers, who were champions of 
American progress, for ethical misdemeanors was insulting, foolish and even 
dangerous.4 
 
On the one hand, Jonsen sees bioethics’ boring normality as stemming from its 
acceptance within the medical, scientific, and social policy worlds, but in a deeper sense 
Jonsen notes that “bioethics is boring because it has become too familiar, too 
domesticated, too much at home in accustomed places. In particular, I claim that 
bioethics has lived too long in the same neighborhood.”5 Jonsen then proposes two 
ways to shake up this over-familiarity: bioethics should expand its “disciplinary ideas” 
to engage outside the “ethics neighborhood;” secondly, bioethics “needs to travel 
abroad” beyond the issues and concerns particular to Americans. Through “intellectual 
                                               
2 Klugman, 2015.  
3 Jonsen, 1999. 
4 Jonsen, 2000: 691. 
5 Jonsen, 2000: 691. 
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travel” bioethics may discover new forms of thinking and “realize that contrasting 
customs are manifestations of distinct beliefs and values that they had not previously 
appreciated.”6 
 
On the face of it, Jonsen and Brody could be taken as veterans in their field lamenting 
generational changes with the nostalgia of old warriors. Jonsen even includes a lament 
from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s “Ulysses” where the old king muses “by this still hearth” 
on the dullness of old age where the king “doles” out “unequal laws” to those who 
know little of the past. Pausing for moment, however, it is difficult to miss the 
remarkably short time period between the “early days” of bioethics in the late 1960s to 
the time when Jonsen and Brody describe how boring and normal bioethics has 
become. What does it say of bioethics that a mere fifty or so years pass and the field 
has become boring? What sort of theoretical activity—addressing something as deep as 
human morality surrounding biological life—expires so quickly? What does this say 
about theorizing as a human activity? Why did a new term, “bioethics,” become 
popular so quickly, and why has it effectively replaced medical ethics on numerous 
fronts? In what sense do we mean bios, and how are we speaking of ethics? What do we 
mean by bioethics?  
 
These questions, alongside Jonsen and Brody’s observations, present a helpful starting 
point for this thesis that examines the history, context, and interplay of methodologies 
in bioethics. At the same time, it should be noted that this examination of the field of 
bioethics is unique in that “bioethics” itself is only half of the story. That is to say, the 
                                               
6 Jonsen, 2000: 696.	
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historical events and founding figures working in the later 20th century alongside the 
actual topics and issues bioethics confronts present only one level of engaging 
bioethics. The other half of the story invites us to look deeper to a more foundational 
level where the meta-ethical questions are primary. On this primary level, bioethics 
raises the questions of what it means to know scientifically and to know morally. 
Naturally, these are philosophical, theological and religious questions, and I should be 
clear that this latter way of approaching bioethics is more fundamental to this thesis 
than the former. In this way, this thesis on bioethics does not take up particular ethical 
questions on genetics, neurology, abortion, euthanasia, healthcare distribution, decision 
making, research ethics, etc. Rather, the focus of this thesis is on the way that bioethics 
as a field approaches such questions.  
 
In particular, Kopelman’s articulation of bioethics as a “second-order discipline” is 
helpful for identifying the approach of this thesis. Kopelman notes numerous 
approaches or understandings of bioethics: bioethics as a public discourse; bioethics as 
a single existing discipline—identified not by medicine or philosophy per say, but by its 
own content and expertise; bioethics as philosophy; bioethics as a sub-set of questions 
within medicine; and lastly, Kopelman argues for bioethics as a second-order discipline. 
Kopelman’s proposal includes two key points: (1) that bioethics does not seek to make 
its subject matter “narrower” but broader in scope; (2) that the problems of bioethics 
are complex and draw on different professions, disciplines, and academic fields.7 These 
two points are helpful for articulating the immense spread of bioethics, and the outline 
                                               
7 Kopelman, 2000: 152. 
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and progression of this thesis should be taken as a proposal for how to understand and 
“navigate” amidst this spread.  
 
Moreover, to introduce a personal note, this complicated landscape of bioethics struck 
me on a whole new level in 2013 when I began teaching a class on the foundations of 
bioethics to pre-med students at the Ohio State University. My background in moral 
philosophy and the “great books” tradition would seem a fitting preparation for this 
arena of applied ethics, and yet what I came to realize is that bioethics rarely addresses 
the broader narrative and questions of the Western moral philosophy that experienced 
the crisis of the postmodern critique. The mainstream of bioethics focused on the 
Enlightenment flavored “four principles” of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, 
and justice does not contemplate very openly the death of god and Nietzsche’s 
challenge to move beyond good and evil.8 Instead, bioethics ignores such a profound 
moral puzzle by simply promoting a scientific and theoretical discourse that is summed 
up well by the most popular textbook in the field, Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles 
of Biomedical Ethics, 7th ed. (2013).9 The more these two realizations set in, the more I 
began to realize the relevance of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy and 
Weltanschauung. 10  In particular, Wittgenstein’s persistent reminders on the different 
modes of thinking employed in scientific theorizing and the aesthetic ethical brought 
about not necessarily a “new way” to understand bioethics but rather a clarified picture 
of the confused thinking so common in bioethics. More and more, I found that 
Wittgenstein offered a deep pedagogical service in teaching pre-med students how to 
                                               
8 Anscombe, 1953; Jonston, 1999; Engelhardt, 1996. 
9 Eckenwiler & Cohn, 2007; Jones, 2016; Lee, 2011; Arras, 2009.	
10 Monk, 2005: 516. 
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differentiate between the thin language games found in the ever-changing “code of 
ethics” principlist approach and the mystery (das Mystiche) and depth of ethics realized 
in the non-theoretical, religious thinking that Wittgenstein describes as a “religious 
point of view” (RW, 94). Engaging this distinction with my students clearly does not 
lead to a simplistic new “theory” in bioethics as much as it changes the “form” of 
thinking employed in bioethics. Even more, this distinction helps to explain the boring 
normalizing that has beset bioethics within roughly fifty years; the “revolutionary” 
language has been spoken; conferences have convened, applying the principles to all 
the popular topics; the articles and books have now been written. In short, the 
theoretical language game of bioethics has been played. 
 
The structure of this thesis is organized to tell this story. In chapter one, “A Secular 
Phenomenon: The Birth of Bioethics After God,” I examine bioethics as a secular 
phenomenon, a particular application of secular philosophy that emerges from the 
modern and post-modern confusion and clashes amidst the philosophy of medicine, 
medical ethics, and more. In my view, the standard narrative of bioethics arising out of 
20th century human subjects research atrocities—most notably the Nazi Holocaust—or 
of bioethics meeting new scientific-medical technological advances (and shortages) or 
of bioethics correcting rampant physician paternalism are certainly important, and yet 
they tell only part of the story. Below the spheres of the cultural and social, we can and 
should discern important ontological differences. 
 
In chapter two, “Whose Language? Philosophers, Priests, or Bioethicists?” I trace the 
discourses of bioethics that were particularly prominent at the founding of bioethics. 
	 7 
Who is most authorized to claim bioethical expertise? Who possesses the proper 
jurisdictional authority, and to whom should or ought we affix the title of “bioethicist?” 
The earliest figures in bioethics were theologians who shortly turned—explicitly or 
implicitly—from the language and methods of traditional theology towards a more 
socially relevant posture as bioethicist. This radical move affirmed the inauguration of 
the pragmatic, principlist language of bioethics. 
 
Chapter three, “Collapsing Theory: The Limits of Scientific Thinking,” transitions to 
Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy grounded in scientific or theoretical thinking. 
Here I first lay some groundwork by arguing for the right way to understand the 
relationship between the “early” and “later” Wittgensteins; while not denying the 
different emphasis between the early Wittgenstein on logic and reality-as-representation 
and the later Wittgenstein on the limits of language, what bridges both Wittgensteins is 
a metaphilosophy or unity of purpose in seeking to uncover the errors of modern 
philosophy so “preoccupied with the method of science” that lead philosophers “to ask 
and answer questions in the way science does.” This tendency leads to errors of 
language that produce a confused and faulty metaphysics (BB 18). Despite some 
methodological similarities, Wittgenstein rejects Kant’s transcendental move and 
effectively employs language as a practice and therapy for revealing our immanent, 
finite knowing as fundamentally contingent. Grammar or the rules of language for 
Wittgenstein do not provide a pseudo-ontology but rather a way of showing the limits 
of our language as able to define or explain das Mystiche. Wittgenstein offers a way to 
change the mode of ethics from a scientific and self-referential game grounded in 
immanent human knowing to a more authentic ethics without (theoretical) philosophy. 
	 8 
 
In chapter four, “Bioethics as Modus Vivendi: Thin Possibilities,” I propose a 
Wittgensteinian reading of H. T. Engelhardt. Engelhardt is well known within bioethics 
primarily as a philosopher of difference, one who points out the fundamental 
disconnect between the claims of optimistic, content-full bioethics and the realistic 
ethical confusion that emerges from today’s pluralistic, post-modern landscape. Similar 
to Wittgenstein’s practices with language that reveal limits of immanent knowing, 
Engelhardt traces through secular bioethical reasoning the thin possibilities of 
consensus by permission. Far from exulting in the thin agreements that arise from 
secular ethical procedures, Engelhardt “laments” the limits of secular bioethics 
amongst “moral strangers” in hopes of directing others to the content rich possibilities 
of religious—and more specifically, traditional Christian—bioethics.  
 
Chapter five, “Why Bioethics Has Failed Savulescu: A Utilitarian Case Study,” explores 
Julian Savulescu as an example of someone who illustrates a self-referential, utilitarian 
language game in bioethics. Ironically, while Savulescu presents a scathing critique of 
principlist bioethics—revealing the lack of grounding for “moralist” terms such as 
autonomy and consent—he fails to note his own assumptions regarding how to rank 
the scale of goods in his own utilitarian methodology. In the end, unpacking 
Savulescu’s framework of enhancement, I argue that his moral criteria for defining the 
good stems from his implicit fidelity to the Nietzschean posthuman god. 
 
In the final chapter, “Bios & Vios: A Pedagogical Change to the Form of Bioethics,” I 
draw together the themes of this thesis, moving past a Wittgensteinian critique of 
	 9 
theorizing to ask what Wittgenstein’s thinking offers more constructively to ethics and 
bioethics. Admittedly, consistent with Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy, this conclusion 
does not offer a new theory nor a systematically constructive bioethical paradigm. 
Rather, Wittgenstein’s constructive turn is particularly relevant to the foundations of 
ethics and bioethics as a first-level metaethics. This first-level, constructive turn brings 
to light Wittgenstein’s “religious way of thinking” that embraces an anthropology and 
moral epistemology very much at odds with the modern assumptions of Cartesian 
personhood and theoretical ethical knowledge. In sum, this chapter seeks to change the 
form of ethics and bioethics by exploring two considerations from Wittgenstein: the first 
is Wittgenstein’s religious point of view (RW, 94) that recasts ethics as a mode of 
thinking and being in the pursuit of sacred and transcendent reality; the second is 
Wittgenstein’s ethical thinking as a form of apophatic and embodied knowledge. These 
considerations are far from the ordo of bioethics that functions notably through moral 
techne and rather presents an ancient mode of ethical thinking that maintains the unity 
of spirit and matter, vios and bios.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
A SECULAR PHENOMENON: THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS AFTER GOD 
It is impossible to appreciate the situation within which bioethics is now located, absent a recognition of 
the foundational disputes and changes within Western Christianity that lie at the roots of the dominant 
culture of the 21st century. H. T. Engelhardt11 
 
 
As scientists, physicians, and scholars of other disciplines have reflected on the 
remarkable cultural phenomenon of bioethics, few doubt that the inauguration of the 
term “bioethics” in the late 1960s signaled a profound change of direction from 
traditional medical ethics or philosophy of medicine. 12 One must almost intentionally 
look away to miss the connection between the birth of bioethics and the sweeping 
social and technological changes in the 1960s and 1970s that ranged from the Vietnam 
War to Vatican II, from the sexual liberation revolution to Humanae Vitae (1968), and 
from Willem Kolff’s artificial kidney to Belding Scribner’s Teflon shunt (1962) that 
soon saw ethics committees managing new dialysis technology shortages. The Hastings 
Center (1969), the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University (1971), and 
the Society for Health and Human Values (1969) were on the academic vanguard of 
this movement, and on the surface of things it may seem that these academic sources 
arose to address some genuinely new ethical need. For some, bioethics emerged to 
meet anew ethical quandaries posed through new technological possibilities. For others, 
bioethics grew out of the reaction following the atrocities of WWII, especially the Nazi 
                                               
11 Engelhardt, 2014: 21. 
12 Hauerwas, 1995; Engelhardt, 1996; Johnson, 1998; Koch, 2012; Evans, 2012. 
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National Socialists, and to be sure both of these customary narratives are important for 
understanding bioethics.  
 
In reality, however, a more nuanced historical, social, political, and theological 
explanation is required. Far from being a reaction solely to new technologies or the 
genocide and human subjects research abuses of WWII, the launch of bioethics was 
deeply related to modern cultural tides that were peaking in the mid twentieth century, 
rendering bioethics as less of a response to scientific and technological atrocities and 
possibilities and more an extension of the Enlightenment project’s secular ambition for 
a universal, canonical, morality gained through discursive reason and theorizing. To 
understand more of the change, this section explores secularism and secular theorizing 
as an essential element within the story of bioethics.  
 
The role of secularism in bioethics is not often emphasized, and yet it is vital for 
understanding the context and history of bioethics. Secularism is often first ignored 
when bioethics is introduced too simply as a sub-set of the third branch of ethics: 
applied ethics. Within this modern taxonomy of ethics, bioethics is seen as possibly 
drawing from the other two branches—descriptive ethics or metaethics—but for many 
bioethics begins simply with the challenge of applying principles, theories, analysis, and 
arguments to the ethical challenges of natural life (bios). As this narrative unfolds, 
“bioethics” is merely a new term, and yet what was new—and represented in this shift 
of language from medical ethics to bioethics—was a move from engaging morality 
from within the trade and profession of medicine to seeking universal moral principles 
and theories from a newly formed academic discipline or “demi-discipline” that makes 
	 12 
authoritative pronouncements on practical, moral matters traditionally belonging to the 
family, professions, or particularly to religious bodies.13 This secularist turn creates a 
puzzling scenario, for academic, modern moral philosophy seems hardly the place to 
look for clear, coherent answers on questions of morality. In 1958 Elizabeth Anscombe 
doubted the very possibility of moral philosophy in the current culture and academy, 
and she questioned if the moral “ought” should be kept in light of the fact that modern 
ethics no longer had any substantive grounding for the term (“Modern Moral 
Philosophy,” 1958). In a similar vein, others such as Paul Johnston have pointed out 
that modern moral philosophy is inherently confused and cannot agree on the 
existence or possibility of correct moral judgments.14   
 
Hence, at the starting point for bioethics, we are confronted with the predicament of 
the modern secular order where philosophy seeks (1) to exist in a mode of “neutrality” 
enacting a “view from nowhere” and (2) to further this philosophical posture by 
distancing “theory” from “praxis.” Both of these features are innovations of modernity 
that Pierre Hadot contrasts with the dogma and methodological principles of ancient 
philosophy. In that era: 
Theory [was] never considered an end in itself; it is clearly and decidedly put in 
the service of practice…to philosophize is to choose a school, convert to its 
way of life, and accept its dogmas. This is why the core of the fundamental 
dogmas and rules of life for Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and 
Epicureanism remained unchanged throughout antiquity. Even the scientists of 
antiquity were always affiliated with a philosophical school: the development of 
their mathematical and astronomical theorems changed nothing of the 
fundamental principles of the school to which they claimed allegiance.15 
 
                                               
13 Solomon, 2005. 
14 Johnston, 1999. 
15 Hadot, 1995: 60. 
	 13 
Hadot’s point on theory and conversion to schools is one example in passing regarding 
some ancient assumptions on integrating spirituality and nature. The tendency in 
secular modernity, however, is to associate spirituality with major religions, distancing 
philosophy and other “neutral” disciplines from spiritual and perceived “personal” 
biases, and yet with any reasonable exposure to the Epicureans, Stoics or other ancient 
schools, one does not glimpse any essential discord between spirituality, theology, and 
the physical universe. As John Milbank notes, “even the antique materialists were not 
trying to adjust their spiritual outlooks to awkward natural facts, but rather were 
searching for an account of nature that would allow for an experience of beatitude for 
the individual in this life – omitting the more political, relational, and hyper-cosmic 
perspectives of the Academic tradition which Christianity later greatly augmented.”16 
The idea of a purely rational approach to nature or materiality was foreign to antique 
philosophy, and Milbank further contends that it was ironically after the point when 
Jews, Muslims and Christians rediscovered and appropriated Aristotle and fragments of 
Neoplatonism that a separation between human reason and religious faith began to set 
in. Antique philosophy could serve as a “legitimate” albeit “problematic” source when 
understood as a rational project, but certainly “pagan religious reflection” was 
unacceptable. Reason was hence separated from spiritual practice, and this isolation of 
one aspect in antique philosophy may be taken as one early source of secular thinking, 
inciting a division between dogma and praxis, theory and theoria.  
 
This contrast between antique spiritualist-materiality and modern secularity is helpful 
for this thesis in that bioethics presents a genuine puzzle when oriented simply as a 
                                               
16 Milbank, 2014, 21. 
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project within modern applied ethics. To place bioethics this naïvely within “ethics” or 
“philosophy” assumes that the history, context, methodology and core questions of 
ethics are significantly settled when the exact opposite is the case. Far from being 
settled securely within the secular order, bioethics is a unique puzzle of ethics that 
requires answers to the same questions MacIntyre asked: whose justice and which 
rationality?17 Regardless, the standard approach to bioethics in the West proceeds as 
though the secular order is the norm even when the reality remains that the majority of 
non-Western contemporary societies such as Islamic countries, India, and Africa are 
distinctively religious, to say nothing of the overwhelmingly non-secularity of human 
history. For these countries and in the past, the line between ethics and religion was 
vague and/or even non-distinct. 
 
Such a posture from the modern West to the current non-secular spheres of the globe 
may rightly be seen as a dismissive condescension, and this attitude can be seen as 
something of a self-projection or asserted universalist narrative grounded in the 
secularization of the post-Christendom West. Particularly in the wake of the 
Renaissance and the French Revolution, the West has intentionally shaken off its 
Christian roots and remains Christian in name only, and that perhaps only in select 
regions. The Christian European and North American West is a thing of the past, 
                                               
17 MacIntyre, 1988. Engelhardt picks up this same line of thinking by asking which 
value-order should one affirm? “To determine that, one needs a higher-level value 
sense, ad infinitum. There is no way to choose among such rankings without begging 
the question. A secular bioethics with content becomes only one among many, thus 
recapturing the diversity and plurality that characterizes religious bioethics. Recasting 
Alasdair MacIntyre, one must ask: which morality, whose bioethics? Depending on the 
choice one makes, one can receive radically different moral guidance and advice” 
(Engelhard, 2000: 3). 
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despite—as a lingering historical circumstance—any framework assumptions in the 
West that retain Christian influence.18 However, the West’s post-Christian nature is 
historically undeniable, and hence Louis Dupré argues that the essential core of 
modern culture can be traced through the secular fragmentation of nature and grace set 
in motion by nominalist theology near the end of the fourteenth century. Dupré 
articulates a strong genealogical argument that the new modern order—one of secular 
space to moderate amidst religious and moral pluralism—was authorized particularly at 
the 1648 peace Treaties of Westphalia that ended thirty years of European religious 
bloodshed. These Treaties “froze into a definitive political and spiritual condition what 
until then had appeared a reversible process. Its cultural, religious, and political division 
of a common heritage had continued to define the spiritual outlook as well as the 
political attitudes of European nations.”19 Christendom as a spiritual bond and identity 
that had formed Western Europe for over a millennium came to a shattering halt. 
Hence, we must pause with Nietzsche to note that we have slain god, and as 
Engelhardt has staunchly argued, any consideration of bioethics must begin with the 
honest reality that we are engaging morality after God.20   
 
 
1.1 Roots of Liberal Politics 
 
Secularism is an immense topic, and within this thesis it is important to 
describe further some of the Reformation and Enlightenment roots within secular 
thinking. Following Jeffery Stout, we can see that what emerges primarily in the 
Reformation and Enlightenment eras is a fundamentally new way of viewing authority 
                                               
18 Engelhardt, 2000: 4. 
19 Dupré, 1993, 12. 
20 Engelhardt, 2018. 
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within European culture. Stout has identified this “crisis of authority” in the late 
sixteenth to early seventeenth centuries as the central problem of the Reformation 
where competing authorities entered the social and intellectual spheres in radically new 
ways, depleting the traditional means of Western Christendom for resolving disputes. 
Where “probability” once was a matter of “what the authorities approve,” following 
the Reformation there were no authorities to speak with any unified voice, and “it 
becomes anything but clear which opinions one should accept…the domain of opinio, 
no less than that of scientia, had entered the sphere of the doubtful.”21 At stake was the 
nature of European religious consciousness, and the Reformation served in the 
unraveling of the unity of this consciousness. Lest we underestimate the implications of 
these changes, we should note the loss of how people within Christendom imagined 
themselves cooperating and living in unity. As Emmanuel Katongole describes it: 
Not only would the Reformation reveal that the ecclesial tradition had become 
deeply fractured, the inability by Christians of different persuasions to agree on 
any authoritative text, conciliar ruling, or papal decree caused a special 
challenge to the possibility of cooperation. This lack of agreement turned into 
polemical and eventually violent confrontations within the furor of the religious 
wars.22 
 
Stout rightly notes that reformers such as Martin Luther ironically were bolstered in 
challenging the Roman Catholic Church’s authority by the fact that Rome had 
increasingly been changing its own dogma and traditional positions, leaving Luther 
with scant security in appealing to tradition as new papal decrees and rulings could be 
cited against older ones.23 Luther’s “strategy of contraction” narrowed down the chief 
                                               
21 Stout, 1981: 41. 
22 Katongole, 2000, 8. 
23 “Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses were not grounded in full-fledged critique of the 
traditional hierarchies of authorities. In fact, Luther’s early arguments lean heavily on 
appeals to papal decrees and conciliar rulings” (Stout, 1981: 41). 
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source of authority to sola scriptura, and such a move shifted the debate from which 
ecclesial texts, rules, and decrees to the question of whose reading and which sacred texts? 
As Lutherans, Calvinists, and Zwinglians, and further reforms within reforms revealed, 
the reformation was unified against Rome while remaining divided within.24  
 
Responding to the Reformation, the Council of Trent (1545-1563) was convened, and 
amidst the ensuing back-and-forth of dogma arose the remarkable bloodshed and 
violence of the religious wars. Yet, as Stout demonstrates, what cannot be missed in 
these religious wars is the secularizing conclusion amongst the European states in 
turning to civic powers to enact peace amidst the fractured authority and consciousness 
of Christendom. Hence emerge two key features that help to summarize the birth of 
nation states within modernity: (1) “a new political legitimation” arises that is framed 
within the secular and no longer within a religious or theological framework; (2) as 
European identity is further located within political arrangements, the “very conception 
of Christian faith” became inscribed within a secular society. The first point is 
significant in that a new politics of “liberalism” was born apart from the previous half-
millennium of Western Christendom’s unity of prayer, liturgy, and life. Of this 
fragmentation, we do well to note that “the product of the Western Middle Ages was 
not simply moral diversity, but a political and cultural diversity no longer united in 
                                               
24 The reformers position on the “inner conscience” conceivably could have served as a 
provocation for Rome to return to ancient conciliarity of the pre-schism Christian 
Church in the Orthodox East; in different ways, the Orthodox and the Reformed stand 
against Papal supremacy, but as the 16th century Lutheran-Orthodox dialogues between 
Tübigen theologians and the Patriarch of Constantinople (1573-1581) revealed, the 
Reformation would yield little fruit in terms of seeking to return to a tradition Christian 
ecclesiology. The reality is that the Reformation further led away from catholic unity to 
the individual conscience as an autonomous authority. 
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principle under the pope of Rome and the Western emperor.”25 On the second point, 
what emerges is an “internalization or privatization” of religious convictions whereby a 
secular politics takes precedence and subsumes religion into a category understood in 
terms of this new secular space. In short, ethics assumes a role previously held by thick 
theological and religious tradition, and as Katongole argues, this ethical pursuit places 
emphasis on the central power of the state and a “science of mores” as an 
“autonomous sphere within the university curriculum.” This shift leads to a procedural 
definition of morality where the end goal is to manage dissidence while dealing with 
“concerns for cooperation” that are set into play by the new European crisis of 
authority.26  
 
Moreover, within this procedural framework, religious traditions and institutions 
become relevant as mere tools and agents for manufacturing a peaceful liberal politics. 
As Milbank notes, this categorical inversion is accepted over time, and hence Peter 
Berger claims that “sociology” provides a “scientific and humanistic critique of 
religion” as though a “fiery brook through which contemporary theology must pass.” 
What is acceptable for consideration is deemed so on secular, neutral terms, and 
theologians who step into this mold enact a redefined (neo)orthodoxy and 
(neo)Christianity whereby the traditional, sublime mysteries of faith are judged on 
liberal grounds. Hence,  
This sort of neo-orthodoxy is itself but a variant of liberal Protestantism: a 
revealed word of God which speaks only of itself, which does not really 
penetrate the realm of human symbolic constructions without getting tainted 
and distorted, must continue to be without impact upon the world, and 
                                               
25 Engelhardt, 2000, 61, nt. 79. 
26 Katongole, 2000, 11. 
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therefore remains locked in a category of the specifically religious, just as much 
as the liberal Protestant notion of ‘religious experience.’27 
 
Framed within the secular, religion becomes a mere “functionality” and a subservient 
presence within a social setting of rival forces balanced by the mechanisms of the state. 
Hence, what emerges is far from neutral or non-biased but rather is an affirmation of 
“the particular and historically contingent origins of the liberal socio-political order.” 
The positivist social theorist will seek to articulate “liberal social arrangements” as the 
“culmination of universal history” when such affirmations are indelibly linked to 
particular and historic moments.28 
 
For Engelhardt, this narrative of the Reformation’s crisis of authority highlights a vital 
aspect in the birth of secularism and secular bioethics, and the Enlightenment serves as 
a scientific and theoretical extension of—or complement to—the Reformation’s 
upheavals. “As the Reformation broke the unity of European religious consciousness, 
the Renaissance gave strength to secular rational aspirations. These aspirations were 
then fortified by the success of science.” Paralleling the new scientific accounts of 
astronomy, physics, and anatomy that seemed to promise access to the very “secrets of 
nature,” secular rationality also seemed to offer hope of a common morality.29 This 
emphasis on secular, discursive rationality, moreover, can be seen as a significant thread 
woven much farther back into the West than simply the Enlightenment. Engelhardt 
draws out that the line from the Reformation and the Enlightenment to secular 
bioethics ought to be traced at least to the philosophical promises of the Western 
                                               
27 Milbank, 2006: 109-10. 
28 Katongole, 2000, 13. 
29 Engelhardt, 2000, 20. 
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Middle Ages that assumed a unity of faith, discursive reason, and society.30 Following 
this line of reliance on independent, discursive reason, Engelhardt sees three ruptures 
and moments of fragmentation in Western moral consciousness: the first being the 
divisions between East and West culminating in the Great Schism of 1054, dividing the 
unified Church of the first millennium; the Reformation serves as the second great 
fragmentation, and the third moment emerges with the post-Enlightenment full-on 
secularism of Modernity where Western Europe entirely embraces a secular moral 
consciousness.31 As the 17th century came to a close, so the beginning of the “end of 
Christendom” or established Christianity was in full swing, and within this new vacuum 
Kant can be seen as a special representative of the massive maneuver to recast 
Christian morality in rational moral terms. Jesus Christ is no longer the macrocosmic 
Messiah of Israel and the Son of God Who trampled down death by death but is recast 
as a virtuous teacher within human history. Beyond Kant’s rationalism, Engelhardt 
points equally to additional moments such as the French Revolution’s Declaration of 
                                               
30 “The Middle Ages assumed a unity of faith, discursive reason, and society. As the 
history of the high Middle Ages showed, this unity required coercive force and 
inquisitional supervision. Western Christianity was united under a Western Christian 
emperor and Christian kings. In addition, discursive rationality could disclose a moral 
fabric that all could share, even heretics. A morality grounded in discursive rationality 
offered the promise of a four-fold successful unity. First, morality and rationality would 
be materially equivalent: those who disagreed with the fabric of morality (and thus 
bioethics) would be making irrational claims in the sense of claims that could not be 
rationally justified. Second, since rational argument buttressed the fabric of morality, 
morality (including bioethics) could carry with it the authority of reason in addition to 
the authority of God. Third, coercive force (e.g., imposing a rationally justified health 
care policy) against contrary to right reason would not be alien to those subject to it. 
Rather, such coercive force would restore true autonomy. The behavior imposed would 
not be heteronomous, but in principle congenial to the true nature of those who were 
thus reformed. Finally, all would be shown to be bound in a single moral community 
defined not just by Western Christian morality, but also disclosable through rational 
reflection. All of these assumptions with regard to rationality and morality would later 
be embraced by Kant” (Engelhardt, 2000: 19-20).   
31 Engelhardt, 2000: 21. 
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the Rights of Man (1789), the celebration of the official Cult of Reason (1793) with its 
Feast of Reason celebrated in the Notre Dame cathedral (Nov. 9, 1793) as markers of 
the new era. Much more could be said of the 18th and 19th centuries Enlightenment 
aftermath with the Napoleonic wars, Hegel’s placement of Protestant Christianity 
within rationalized historic horizons, Marx and Engels’ vision for liberal progress, etc.  
 
In gesturing to such broad historical narratives, the challenge is to avoid caricatures and 
straw men, and, admittedly, the story of secularism that so informs bioethics requires 
that one share something of the starting presumptions or philosophical hypothesis at 
work here. Some will contend, for example, that Engelhardt’s historical narrative is 
painted with broad strokes that miss meaningful distinctions. Whereas Engelhardt 
points to the wholesale Western Medieval “faith in reason,” Louis Bouyer would seek 
to navigate amidst the puzzles of Medieval scientific theology to distinguish the 
Scholasticism of Albert, Aquinas, and Bonaventure from the “ambiguous paths” of 
Scotus, Okham, and others who effectively reduce Christian truth to hyper-rationalized 
syllogisms. Bouyer recommends differentiating between Anselm’s “blatantly off-
course” Monologion and his “reverent and spirited” Proslogion,32 and it does seem worthy 
to note the shades of ambition between thinking exercises within “the framework of 
Christian contemplation” verses the Abelardian move “to explain” the Creed 
thoroughly,33 hence reducing the Christian faith to smoke. Even while seeking these 
distinctions, Bouyer does not downplay the “rationalizing frenzy” after Scotus34 and 
                                               
32 Anselm, 1996. 
33 Abelard, 1995.  
34 Scotus, 1987.	
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Okham,35 nor does he shrink from attributing the birth of modern science to the 
innovative metaphysics of Scholasticism.36 For Bouyer, the “science of divine things” 
pursued by all the scholastic thinkers enacted a “coherent and logical interpretation of 
the contents of biblical revelation” as a pattern for freeing science from “abstract” and 
“aprioristic” Aristotelian metaphysics.  
 
In a way that seems highly problematic, Bouyer sees it as advantageous within 
scholastic thinking to extract an interpretive “content” from biblical revelation, one 
that Bouyer sees will serve to “combine contingency and rationality” principally under 
the transcendent God. This theological extraction parallels the natural scientific 
extraction of the cosmos “as it is” to become the “object of what we call science.”37 
For all of Bouyer’s desire to see “creativity” emerge from the study of an objectified 
cosmos free of antique mythos, one is left to wonder how the “systematization of 
biblical and Christian revelation” alongside the “emergence of rational science” will in 
any way lead to a healthy, essential contingency upon the Triune God? Bouyer seems to 
have a thin view of “mythic assumptions” and a lofty view of the possibilities in 
rationally aligning the processes of knowing nature and knowing God. The comparison 
is stark for theology “as in Newtonian science” whereby a common “methodology” is 
assumed to reveal a correlation between the physical structure of the world and the 
workings of the human mind to glimpse the orderly and rational mind of the Creator 
who has left His stamp within creation. Bouyer’s assumption is simple yet dangerous. 
                                               
35 Okham, 1990. 
36 Bouyer, 1988: 108-13. 
37 Bouyer, 1988: 111. 
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His correlationist move 38  depends on the faith that “science is not to be 
meaningless”—assuming that the meaning of the demythologized cosmos will surely 
reveal the mind of the Author—and yet what is one to think when science itself is 
ambiguous? Does Lobachesvkian or Riemannian geometry reveal a complex, 
paradoxical Creator, or might it leave one to wonder what or who “above” might 
correlate to the ambiguities within this horizon? Even more, Bouyer appeals positively 
to “what Aristotle called noesis” as a “thought whose first object is itself and thinks 
everything within itself.”39 This is surely one way to understand the important term 
noesis, and yet this view seems incomplete to capture the Platonic sense of noesis as non-
mediated apprehension from the Analogy of the Divided Line (Republic 509d-511e). In 
short, it seems Bouyer’s challenge for Scholasticism’s rationalization folds back upon 
his own efforts to explain the value in modern science as a removed or distanced 
gazing upon nature, and once again a space is created for the secular to intervene. After 
positing this Aristotelian “noesis,” Bouyer does recall again the “ambiguity” of the 
Scholastic view of theology as a science, and he calls on a “ceaseless apophatic 
correction to kataphasis” and an acknowledgment of modes of knowledge beyond the 
discursive rationality of today’s science.40 These distinctions, however, do little beyond 
furthering secondary details within the overarching narrative and mirroring relationship 
between secularism and discursive reason. 
 
                                               
38 Cf. Meillassoux, 2009. Meillassoux defines correlation as “the idea according to 
which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and 
never to either term considered apart from the other (5). 
39 Bouyer, 1988: 112. Cf. Metaphysics XII (Lambda).7-10. 
40 Bouyer, 1988: 115-16. Cf. Republic 509d-511e. 
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What is important to note for now is the way in which the Reformation and 
Enlightenment periods highlight developments already well underway to establish 
scientific or theoretical thinking as the critical mode of ethical knowing. Moreover, this 
scientific thinking is picked up notably in the Reformation and Enlightenment periods 
as a way to navigate the epistemological crisis of authority and the religious wars of 16th 
and 17th century Europe. Nor are these historical and cultural aspects of secularism 
distant from ethics and bioethics. The moral questions surrounding science and 
medicine have always been deeply philosophical and theological such that it is not 
possible to grasp much regarding science, medicine, and bioethics without an 
understanding of secularism and the theoretical approaches to morality within 
secularism. These theoretical approaches, however, face strong challenges when 
seeking to codify morality from within a neutral framework or liberal polis. 
 
 
1.2 Philosophy of Medicine, Medical Ethics & Bioethics 
  
 The above narrative of the secular roots of modernity is necessarily brief and 
selective, and other historical or genealogical themes could be emphasized. Naturally, 
the most common approach when reflecting on bioethics is to begin with some aspect 
of the Hippocratic canon (460-70 BC). Tom Koch’s Thieves of Virtue: When Bioethics Stole 
Medicine (2012), for instance, emphasizes the professional ethics that emerged from 
communal practices in the ancient Greek era. Koch rightly notes the communal, 
geographic, and historical particularity of Hippocratic ethics such that far from 
presenting an universal ethic intended to span vast eras, the Greeks rooted themselves 
	 25 
in their particular city states.41 The Hippocratic oath, therefore, represents the interest 
of patients and physicians embedded within particular communities under the 
cosmological worship of particular gods and goddesses such as Apollo, Asclepius, 
Health, Hygeia, etc. The ethical covenants arising from the Hippocratic tradition bound 
physicians within particular philosophical schools, and the commitments of these 
schools informed the ways of life that included caring for the sick “irrespective of 
income or standing.”42 Appeals to the Hippocratic tradition today must be carefully 
considered and argued rather than claimed as a storehouse of universally accepted 
bioethics. 43 Medical and ethical practices are rooted in particular societies, and hence 
Koch notes that the Hippocratic oath is notable primarily for its “plasticity” that allows 
it to be changed through reinterpretations within Greek, Roman, Jewish, and Christian 
cultures respectively. Far from being a secure or settled storehouse of ethical content, 
the Hippocratic tradition represents the grounding for ethical debates and difference.44 
 
This point is significant for many secular renderings of the history of bioethics. When 
bioethics is described in a secular and neoliberal fashion, what often emerges is an 
                                               
41 Hippocratic Writings, 1984. 
42 Koch, 2012: 25. 
43 Against the trend of superficially grounding modern codes of medical ethics and 
professionalism in “the” Hippocratic tradition, we may discern rather a Hippocratic 
corpus that examines a complexity of the ethos ancient physicians encountered with 
the body, disease, and the environment. Very little is known of Hippocrates himself as 
well as to which of the sixty or so anonymous Hippocratic texts from the third century 
B.C. we may rightly assign his name. As Robert Bartz argues, “the ethical 
considerations of the Hippocratic treatises should be read as concerns derived directly 
from the practice of medicine, and preceding and influencing the more structured 
subsequent philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.” The “social structures” that the 
Hippocratic physicians engaged reveal a wide range of topics—reading bodies, 
discerning signs and prognostic omens, sacrificing animals, etc.—that modern 
biomedicine would predominately shun as taboo (Bartz, 2000: 18, 3-18).   
44 Koch, 2012: 21-34. 
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impersonal, a-historical, and culturally blank rendering of medical ethics or bioethics. 
No doubt, much of this stems from the chronological, modernist move that places 
technological mastery at the heart of medical knowing such that older medical methods 
are studied for merely historical or archeological reasons. The medical past is 
ontologically and epistemologically insignificant compared to today’s technological 
supremacy. Others, however, seek to understand the contemporary philosophical and 
theological significance of past approaches to medicine, the body, and ethics. For 
example, drawing particularly from Michel Foucault’s genealogy of modern medicine, 
Jeffrey Bishop argues that contemporary medicine follows a metaphysical disease, a 
metaphysics of efficient causation stemming from the modernist move to gloss final 
causes and theological thinking. This triumph of techne over telos then leads to a view of 
the dead body as epistemologically normative for medical knowing. 45  What is 
instructive in such a genealogy is the challenge to think on medicine and ethics from a 
place of cultural and historical contingency. This is not to promote ontological relativity 
but rather to note the historical and cultural grounds upon which ontological and 
theological suppositions are engaged.  
 
Kimbell Kornu enacts such an approach, arguing creatively that modern medicine 
reduces patients from persons to causes to be mastered, and this tendency can be 
traced clearly within the origins of Western medicine. 46 Moreover, Kornu suggests that 
medical practice and philosophical rationality are reciprocal activities centered on what 
may be called “anatomical rationality.” Anatomical rationality works within philosophy 
and medicine alike, and hence the roots of modern, efficient, technological medicine 
can be traced through anatomical dissection as a chosen philosophical viewpoint within 
Greek medicine. Whereas the modern viewpoint tends simplistically to accept 
anatomical, dissective medicine—and rationality, à la the logical positivists—as 
                                               
45 Bishop, 2011. 
46 Kornu, 2016.  
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normative, Kornu argues that such a viewpoint stems from chosen metaphysical 
assumptions regarding how both man and God are known truly.  
A key dimension to the anatomical rationality is that “anatomy” – Greek 
anatome meaning “to dissect or cut up” – is not restricted to the methodological 
practice of cutting up human bodies to further knowledge of natural 
philosophy and medicine but takes on a broadened semantic range that applies 
to the methodological practice of cutting up philosophical concepts for the 
sake of metaphysical and theological knowledge, culminating in the anatomia 
entis, the anatomy of being. In this anatomical rationality, to know something, 
bodies and ideas included, entails cutting up the object of inquiry into its 
parts.47 
 
 
Moreover, a critical implication of this anatomical rationality is that the conventional 
view—where philosophy precedes medicine in conceptual development—does not 
present the whole truth; the argument and implication of anatomical rationality, rather, 
is that medicine itself “directly influenced and transformed philosophy in its 
metaphysics and epistemology.”48 Hence in looking to the Hippocratic medicine of the 
fifth century BC, Kornu argues that the primary contribution from the Hippocratic 
tradition is not Hippocratic ethics but a Hippocratic epistemology that specifically gives 
rise to anatomical rationality. Because epistemology leads to ways of being, and ways of 
being are distinctively ethical, this analysis of Hippocratic medicine can be seen to 
transform philosophy in three specific ways: (1) by proclaiming a regularity in nature 
that can be explained solely through natural causes for disease—hence, birthing a 
“rational medicine;” (2) by placing the human being at the “methodological center of 
knowing”—hence birthing the human sciences; (3) by positioning medicine as a techne 
                                               
47 Kornu, 2016: 15.	
48 Kornu, 2016: 15. 
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of power exercised over nature—hence inaugurating a “proto-Baconianism” aiming to 
relieve the human condition.49  
 
The point in noting these rich layers of integrated medicine and philosophy within the 
Hippocratic canon is to avoid the trap of thinking that the relationship between 
medicine and philosophy is ever simple. It is naïve to appeal to the Hippocratic 
tradition as a patient-centered “do no harm” ethic that is universal and cosmopolitan. 
The Hippocratic tradition rather reveals an intense debate over whether medicine or 
philosophy possesses primacy over the other: is philosophy primary such that 
“speculative cosmological theories” may regulate medical practice? Or, is medicine 
autonomous from philosophy? Kornu argues beyond this latter position that medicine 
proceeds not only to claim autonomy but to alter and transform philosophy.50  
 
In short, we should avoid naïve readings of Hippocratic ethics as well as superficial 
assessments of medicine’s role at the onset of secular modernity.  Medicine is not a 
techno-scientific, therapeutic practice that simply appears or comes of age around the 
19th century as antibiotics, vaccines, and pharmacology become prominent. The reality 
is more complex such that as a field of study, the “philosophy of medicine” has always 
been marked by certain ambiguities. What do we mean by medicine? Medicine is not a 
precise term or domain as it often refers to practices of internal medicine, surgery, 
psychiatry, dentistry, ophthalmology, nursing and physical therapy in addition to other 
allied health services. Even within these sub-practices, we can consider medicine in 
                                               
49 Kornu, 2016: 31. Cf. Novum Organum, 1994. 
50 Kornu, 2016: 36. 
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terms of basic sciences that address the biological and organic nature and functions of 
the body, or in terms of theoretical models of health and disease, or in terms of clinical 
procedures and “best practices” of medicine. The result of this ambiguity is that 
deliberations on medicine may include questions and theories of function and disease 
(e.g., physiology and pathology), theories of treatment (e.g., pharmacology), as well as 
theories of clinical application.51 Additionally, some call for a distinction between 
“philosophy of medicine” and “philosophy of health care” as medicine may be taken in 
a specific sense that does not include nursing or physical therapy. Despite these 
ambiguities, and while not ignoring them, the general use of “philosophy of medicine” 
accepts the term as a broad grouping of bodily, social, and theoretical health concerns. 
 
Moreover, this broad use of the term aligns with the metaphors on medicine that 
philosophers have pursued from ancient to contemporary times, notably in Pythagoras 
and Plato through Spinoza and Wittgenstein. Galen is known for his treatise That the 
Best Physician is also a Philosopher, and both Newton’s work on dynamics and Descartes’ 
distinction between body and mind have arguably contributed to the shaping of clinical 
or applied medicine as a primarily mechanistic bodily endeavor.52 This question of 
medicine as a productive or technical science can be seen in Aristotle (Parts of Animals i 
1.639b17-19), and yet in addition to medicine as an art, as Polansky argues, Aristotle 
also connects medicine to theoretical science (Metaphysics ii 1.993b20-21) and to the 
practical wisdom of oikonomia and phronesis (Nichomachean Ethics vi 12.1144a36-b1).53 
Regardless how narrowly or broadly we construe the field of medicine, the greater 
                                               
51 Engelhardt, 1980: 365. 
52 Engelhardt, 1980: 364-367. 
53 Polansky, 2000: 31-48. 
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questions of the good are manifest even if it is only through questions of when, where, 
how, and for whom medical aid will be given. Medicine may be seen fundamentally as a 
technical art, but it is an art that is inseparable from theoretical and practical sciences.54 
 
Naturally, within these broader questions of medicine and the good, we discern many 
of the questions of contemporary bioethics that have always been present within the 
ethical aspects of philosophy of medicine. Amongst other cultural contexts and goals, 
the Hippocratic corpus explicitly engaged medical epistemology and ethics as did 
Plato’s comments on physicians in the Laws. In the Politics Aristotle commends early 
abortion as a means of population organization (VII, 16,1335b20). These are but a few 
philosophical examples, and naturally one could explore the Jewish medical ethics 
tradition, or that of Maimonides, or the extensive manualist Roman Catholic tradition. 
Additionally, we might look to works from the 15th and 16th centuries such as Giovanni 
Codronchi’s De Christiana ac tuta medendi ratione (1591), Rodrigo Castro’s Medicus politicus 
sive de officiis medicoopoliticis (1614) that reveal growing secular influences under the rubric 
of Medicus politicus.55 In the 18th century, figures such as Wolfgang Thomas Rau (1721-
1772) and Johann Peter Frank (1745-1821; System einer vollständigen medicinischen Polizey, 
1977) emphasized public health including measures for training and professionalizing 
health practitioners as a duty to the state.56 The focus on professionalized physicians 
continued in Great Britain and the United States but with an emphasis on individual 
practitioners and guilds of practitioners as detailed by John Gregory’s Lectures upon the 
                                               
54 Polansky, 2000: 48. 
55 Engelhardt, 1980: 369. 
56 Rosen, 161-62. 
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Duties and Qualifications of a Physician (1772).57 American physician Benjamin Rush (1745-
1843) wrote an influential paper—“Observations on the Duties of Physicians and the 
Methods of Improving Medicine” (1789; 2015), and British physician Thomas 
Percival’s (1740-1804) classic Medical Ethics (1803; 2016) spoke of the physician’s 
“office” within the “public trust” and brought together a focus on traditional virtues 
and physicians’ conduct amongst themselves. Percival’s Medical Ethics was influential in 
the early work of the American Medical Association (1847), particularly as “the regular 
profession” of medicine was further defined in the “Code of Medical Ethics” (1847) by 
seeking to separate from “sectarian” medicines such as homeopathy, naturopathy, and 
hydropathy.58 As the AMA renamed and revised the “Code of Ethics” as “Principles of 
Ethics” 1903, and then again in 1912, 1957, and 1966, it was notable that each revision 
shortened the code and increasingly focused on vague recommendations for physicians 
to be professional, skillful, and confident physicians and citizens. As these codes are 
defined and redefined, the general understanding of ethics is less obviously a 
philosophical and theological discourse as it is manifest primarily within the profession. 
As Jonsen points out, the general trend of medical ethics by the first half of the 20th 
century led to ethics being “almost synonymous with rules for professional cohesion 
and respectability.”59 
 
On the one hand, this placement of medical ethics within the profession could be seen 
as a fragmenting of ethics as those in places of authority and expertise within the field 
solely govern the conversation in a perceived paternalistic manner. On the other hand, 
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ethics within the medical profession makes more sense when the medical profession is 
less of a trade and more of a socially accepted guild. To be clear, medicine has long 
maintained its guild status in terms of licensure to practice, but when medicine moves 
away from a guild mentality where inherent moral standards are abandoned in favor of 
meeting as a “provider” whatever the “consumer” demands, the craft of medicine is 
deprofessionalized. Consider the “trade” difficulties of physicians today who 
conscientiously refuse to prescribe abortifacients versus a guild approach within the 
Hippocratic Oath that overtly refused to associate the craft of medicine with the 
ceasing of life. As healthcare increasingly moves in the direction of a trade mentality,60 
we do well to note the relation between a secular space that favors a more neutral trade 
framework over some greater moral particularity within a guild system.61 
 
What is clear through the 19th and 20th centuries is that the traditional patterns were 
changing notably with strong implications for furthering secularization in medical 
ethics. Jonsen points to Dr. Richard Cabot (1869-1939) and Dr. Chauncey Leake 
(1896-1978) as two “unconventional figures” who introduced “novelty” into American 
medical ethics. For Cabot, the character of the physician mattered little. Hospitals and 
managed care teams, not personal physicians, were the growing emphasis, including 
within care teams “ancillary professions” such as social workers. What mattered most 
for Cabot was the technical scientific and medical knowledge of each practitioner, in 
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essence focusing ethics on clinical skills. “The list of ethical duties initiates what might 
be called ‘an ethic of competence.’”62 Within this framework, avoiding errors of patient 
care was ethics, and the end measure of this ethics was the physical health and benefit 
of the patient. 
 
Chauncey Leake represents another turn within traditional medical ethics, but Leake 
had in mind a return to moral philosophy—understood as a broad humanities focus—
that would restore the “ethos” of medicine as a healing “art.” Clinical competence 
mattered, but Leake saw medical humanism as the main pedagogical need for all 
involved in healthcare. A pharmacist by professional training, Leake edited an edition 
of Thomas Percival’s classic Medical Ethics (1803; 2016) while remaining critical of 
Percival as furthering an “etiquette” in place of an “ethic” that engages greater 
philosophical questions affecting the whole of society. Exactly what Leake intended by 
“humanities” in medical ethics is up for debate, but we may take hints from his 
signature on the Humanist Manifesto II in 1973. 
 
One of the most significant changes in medical ethics arose following the spread of 
insurance in the time surrounding WWII. As Jonsen notes, this financial modeling for 
healthcare is significant as the “ancient duty”—and the primary model of the medieval 
hospitalis—to provide freely for the sick morphed through a new insurance medium. 
The first and second editions of the AMA Code assume the duty of physicians to 
provide “liberally” and “gratuitously” for all regardless of means, while the 1957 edition 
“passes over this duty in silence,” and by the advent of US Medicare and Medicaid in 
                                               
62 Jonsen, 1998: 8. 
	 34 
the 1960s “charity medicine” as part of the physician’s ethic had all but dissipated.63 
The net of these changes led to a “tranquil” medical ethics where the public accepted a 
medical marketplace characterized by specializations, state licensing, certifications and 
credentialing. In short, medical care became an establishment marked by a 
“professional decorum” and an “aura of science,” satisfying the public that “doctors 
were decent, responsible, and competent.”64 
 
These shifts should in no way be seen as mere historical developments. These changes 
should be viewed in light of new abilities and conceptions of medicine itself. Edmund 
Pellegrino (1920-2013) experienced this new medicine first hand surrounding his 
medical school years. 
In 1941, specific treatments that effectively changed the natural history of 
disease were scant in number. The list was a small one: arsenic for syphilis, liver 
extract for “pernicious anemia,” quinine for malaria, insulin for diabetes, 
digitalis for heart failure, and a few others. Medicine’s dramatic and 
unprecedented power to alter the human condition was still a promissory 
note.65 
 
As Jonsen notes, further explosive developments in 20th century medicine include the 
discovery of penicillin (1928) and methotrexate (1947), a drug that initiated the era of 
cancer chemotherapy. Polio vaccines emerged in the mid-50s along with lithium 
treatments for manic disease, chlorpromazine for schizophrenia, and 1952 witnessed 
the first open-heart surgery. Soon came the electrical defibrillator and full 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (1958). “These [and other] clinical changes were at the 
surface of a boiling sea of research in which the secrets of metabolism, the endocrine 
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system, the mechanisms of immunity and wound healing, the biology of reproduction 
and, most exciting of all, the secrets of the genetic code were revealed.”66 
 
For Pellegrino, though, amidst these remarkable advances in scientific and medical 
discoveries, the ethics of the day hardly received needed attention. As a Roman 
Catholic medical student, dilemmas with obstetrical practice were expected, but 
otherwise “for the most part it was assumed that we would discover what was right on 
our own.” Amidst such striking medical and technological breakthroughs, the 
metaphysical and ethical implications seemed largely ignored, or, as Pellegrino states, 
were left to “discussions in a medical history club.” Situated within the Aristotelian-
Thomistic realist tradition, Pellegrino chaffed at the lack of critical philosophical 
inquiry he saw within the field. On the whole, medical ethics functioned as “medical 
morality,” a set of assertions and precepts lacking “a formal groundwork of ethical 
justification or argumentation.”67 Such a thin ethic that continued through the 1950s, 
however, gave way in the 1960s to a period Jonsen describes as the “decade of 
conferences.” These conferences—assembled primarily at leading US and European 
universities—explicitly addressed questions of science and humanism in “modern 
medicine.” Recent medicine had fundamentally altered humanity’s engagement with 
infectious disease; what would the effects be upon global populations, especially 
amongst the impoverished? Questions regarding the numerous possibilities with 
eugenics were discussed, alongside global issues of “agricultural productivity, world 
resources, and environmental degradation.” Nobel Prize winner William Shockley and 
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Princeton professor Paul Ramsey debated Hermann Muller’s advocacy of sperm banks 
and other eugenics techniques such as sterilization, cloning, and artificial insemination. 
For Jonsen, this confrontation between Ramsey and Shockley marks a key moment in 
the birth of bioethics as two scholars openly engaged in “analytic” reflection on an 
issue of the day.68 
 
Amidst these developments, what clearly emerged in the ’60s was an increasing reality 
of ethical quandaries with no unified methodology for addressing them. The various 
traditions of medical ethics prior to the 1950s at least had some remnant of cultural 
frameworks within which to address questions of morality. Regardless of how well or 
poorly these questions were addressed, at the least there was some sense of clarity that 
these questions belonged within the medical guild, and that such a guild was accepted 
within the broader social fabric. With the “decade of conferences,” however, one can 
note the growing uncertainty over what constitutes an “ethical authority” amidst mid-
20th century medical ethics. Even while Anscombe was questioning the very legitimacy 
of her own discipline,69 professional philosophers were entering the medical ethics 
scene in a new way. As Pellegrino and Jaspers note, philosophers in the past ranging 
from Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and even philosopher-physicians such as John Locke, 
Karl Jaspers, or William James had not seen fit to specifically address medical ethics 
extensively. Medical analogies and parallels were frequently drawn to illustrate 
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philosophical arguments, but the project of a “philosophical treatise” on medical ethics 
itself was a novelty.70  
 
Regardless, through the 1960s as philosophers and theologians joined the fray, much of 
their initial work consisted in applying already existing philosophical or theological 
systems to medicine. For Pellegrino, this was problematic as these “applied” or 
“superimposed” systems failed to look upon the nature of medicine itself—i.e., the 
“philosophy of medicine”—as an ontological relationship between “the person who is 
ill” and the “person who the ill person seeks for help.” This foundational relationship 
entails its own “special mutual moral duties” and avoids the “deleterious” pathway the 
new medical ethics sought by seeking social conventions and democratic consensus.71 
Pellegrino’s desire to root medical ethics in a philosophy of medicine reflects his 
commitments to the realism of existential Thomism and phenomenology and led to his 
notable work A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1981) that 
argued for three phenomena as the starting point for the clinical encounter: (1) the 
existential reality of sickness or disease; (2) the physician’s act/promise to help the 
patient amidst sickness or disease; (3) the multi-faceted act of “medicine” itself to make 
“technically right” and “morally good decisions” in caring for the patient. Pellegrino 
deserves attention if for no other reason than he represented a pre-modern 
methodology amidst the newness of bioethics that neglected any traditional moral 
philosophy. Further, for Pellegrino, a comprehensive moral philosophy requires an 
“account of religious and theological sources of moral authority,” and from such a 
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vantage point he decried the “new ethics” that actively sought a “professional” 
authority. Within professionalism, virtues become “values” and “choices” are 
privatized steps within an “atomized morality.”72 In contrast, Pellegrino’s Aristotelian-
Thomist natural law tradition is pre-modern in its “belief in the capacity of reason” 
engaged with faith to arrive at objective truth. This approach puts Pellegrino outside 
Anscombe’s critique of the contemporary landscape of moral philosophy, and yet while 
remaining largely out of step with his professional ethicists peers, Pellegrino finds 
common ground with the theoretical and rationalist strand of principlism that will be 
discussed further below. The so-called four principles of bioethics can be justified 
within Pellegrino’s phenomena of medicine, and in this way Pellegrino stands as 
someone seeking strands of harmony—or natural law common ground—amidst 
strands of discordant modern moral philosophy.  
 
Pellegrino notwithstanding, the question of some cohesive methodology amidst the 
turn to bioethics remained far from settled. According to Robert Veatch, in the mid-
1960s there was no “formal theory of medical ethics” but rather bits and pieces of 
medical ethics drawn from the Hippocratic oath, the AMA Code of Ethics, various 
“theologically based stances,” and some “volumes by secular and religious authors” on 
medical ethics topics. Believing the Hippocratic oath in particular to be sorely outdated, 
Veatch set about to create a “systematic account” of medical ethical theory through a 
“top down” approach influenced by his mentor John Rawls. Veatch’s top down 
theoretical approach symbolizes neatly the new authoritative theoretical and secular 
maneuver at the core of bioethics. Seeking to move beyond the religious and cultic 
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Hippocratic corpus as well as the religious versus secular divisions from “external 
traditions,” Veatch sought to look “within” medical ethics itself to find answers to 
“fundamental metaethical questions” such as: “what is the meaning of ethical terms? 
What is the ultimate foundation of ethical norms? And how do humans know what 
those norms are?” 73  Veatch drew upon his empirical background in research 
neuropharmacology, his studies under Rawls, and his Wesleyan covenantalism to devise 
a “triple contract theory” that surfaced in A Theory of Medical Ethics (1981).74 As the first 
staff member hired by the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences (The 
Hastings Center) in 1970 while completing his PhD from Harvard, Veatch may in a 
way be considered the first professional bioethicist, and yet the nature of this 
“profession,” “discipline,” or simply “field” remained to be settled. 
 
 
1.3 Bioethics as Applied Secular Philosophy 
 
As with most developments in language, the birth of the term “bioethics” is 
instructive. According to Warren Reich, “the field of bioethics started with the word 
bioethics because the word is so suggestive and so powerful; it suggests a new focus, a 
new bringing together of disciplines in a new way with a new forum that tended to 
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neutralize the ideologic slant that people associated with the word ethics.”75 To grasp 
the significance in this new term, it is helpful to recall some of the prominent 
individuals and organizations involved in the birth of bioethics. By the end of the 
1960s, Jonsen notes that the focus on medical ethics conferences shifted to three 
nascent bioethics centers: The Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences (The 
Hastings Center, 1970), the Kennedy Institute of Ethics (1971), and The Society for 
Health and Human Values (1969). Dan Callahan, protestant theologians Paul Ramsey 
and James Gustafson, and Robert Veatch were influential in the launching of The 
Hastings Center. Formed within Georgetown University, The Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics benefitted notably from André Hellegers’ vision and the support of Eunice 
Kennedy Shriver and the Joseph P. Kennedy Foundation. By medical training, 
Hellegers was an obstetrician and gynecologist, but given his interests in philosophy 
and theology, Hellegers found “the atmosphere of the Jesuit university congenial,”76 
and as with The Hastings Center, theologians were influential in these early years. In 
1971, the Kennedy Institute’s first two research scholars were Mennonite theologian 
LeRoy Walters and Warren Reich, formerly a moral theologian at Catholic University. 
Other theologians soon followed, including Charles Curran, Richard McCormick, Gene 
Outka, John Connery, and in 1975 James Childress, also a theologian by training, came 
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from the University of Virginia.77 In 1998, The Society for Health and Human Values 
(SHHV) merged with the Society for Bioethics consultation to form the American 
Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH). As with the Kennedy Institute and the 
Hastings Center, ASBH’s roots were theological and religious as the SHHV first 
originated in the mid-60s as a collaboration of Methodist and Presbyterian Churches’ 
efforts in medical education and theology.  
 
Within Jonsen’s widely referenced history of bioethics (Birth of Bioethics, 1998), the 
founders and scholars of these three institutes figure prominently, and Jonsen’s 
narrative implies a natural transition of a new medical ethic within these structures for a 
new, post-WWII medicine, significantly marked by the new term “bioethics.” 
Reflecting almost two decades after the advent of bioethics, Engelhardt notes: 
A new word often allows us to name elements of reality in a way that conveys 
new control over our cultural environment. It is often not the precision of a 
word that is the source of its power and usefulness. In fact, it is often the 
imprecision, the lack of clarity, that allows us to name and bring together at one 
time many areas of interest. An apt word can assemble a rich set of images and 
meanings and thus help us to see relations between elements of reality that 
were previously separated in our vision and thought of only as disparate.... This 
has been the case with 'bioethics.'... The word 'bioethics' [has done] brilliant 
service in bringing together a wide cluster of important cultural concerns. The 
term [is] profoundly heuristic.78  
 
 
The popular viewpoint represented by Jonsen is that the term bioethics had a “bi-
located birth” between 1970-1971, with two notably different visions for what the term 
bioethics would entail.79 Jonsen points to research oncologist Van Rensselaer Potter as 
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the first who began writing of bioethics in a 1970 article80 that was followed by a book 
in 1971, Bioethics: Bridge to the Future. Potter’s vision should be seen as an extension of 
Aldo Leopold’s land ethic to include all elements of human environment, and the 
opening of Bioethics: Bridge to the Future quotes from Leopold on three modes of ethics: 
the first between individuals (e.g. the Decalogue); the second between individuals and 
society (e.g. the Golden Rule); the third consists of an extension of this sequence to 
ecological considerations. Bioethics as Potter envisioned should focus on much more 
than medical ethical questions by rather taking into consideration all biological, 
communal, relational issues of man within the ecology of the natural world. Pursuing 
such a harmony, Potter sought to unite the “two cultures” of science and the 
humanities. This involved both an expansion beyond both mechanistic interpretations 
of biology and immaterial views of ethics. Biology and wisdom hence are intimately 
connected for Potter, and he did not shy away from connecting these pursuits to the 
survival of humanity currently hell-bent on technologically and economically 
consuming the finite resources of the physical world. 81  Potter weaves together 
observations from 30 years of oncology research alongside environmental philosophy 
and spiritual-scientist philosophers such as Teilhard de Chardin. For many familiar only 
with bioethics literature from the last decade, it is likely that Potter’s “Bioethics Creed 
for Individuals” will seem entirely disjointed from contemporary bioethics. Potter’s 
credo integrated five statements of belief and commitments regarding: (1) personal 
acceptance of global, ecological crises; (2) mankind’s role in these crises; (3) the 
uniqueness of the individual-society relationship; (4) the inevitability of human 
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suffering with the commitment to not passively accept further suffering caused by 
humanity; (5) acceptance of finitude and finality of life as necessary to further 
generational life.  In short, for Potter: 
[Bioethics] would attempt to generate wisdom, the knowledge of how to use 
knowledge for social good from a realistic knowledge of man’s biological 
nature and of the biological world. To me, a realistic knowledge of man is a 
knowledge that includes his role as an adaptive control system with built-in 
error tendencies. This mechanistic view, which combines reductionist and 
holistic elements, would be totally incapable of generating wisdom unless 
supplemented with both a humanistic and an ecological outlook…the present 
world is dominated by military policy and by an overemphasis on production of 
material goods. Neither of these enterprises have given any thought to the basic 
facts of biology. An urgent task for Bioethics is to seek biological agreements at 
the international level.82 
  
 
Further within Jonsen’s narrative, André Hellegers was the second figure to inaugurate 
the term bioethics, and, not surprisingly, his use of the term is the one that gained 
recognition within the field. Rather than viewing ethics as a broad, inclusive term that 
addresses ecology, biology, philosophy, and spirituality as did Potter, Hellegers and 
others at Georgetown saw ethics as “a rigorous examination on the grounds for moral 
norms.”83 The Hellegers/Georgetown model became such the assumed framework, 
moreover, that many of the early essential works in bioethics—including Reich’s 
Encyclopedia of Bioethics (1978), Daniel Callahan’s Bioethics as a Discipline (1973), LeRoy 
Walters’ Bibliography of Bioethics (1975), Beauchamp and Walters’ Contemporary Issues in 
Bioethics (1978)—all but fail to mention Potter’s vision for bioethics.84 The difference 
between the two visions is strong, and it is easy to focus on Potter’s vision as a 
cosmological or global ethics while Hellegers/Georgetown focuses on narrow medical 
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ethics, but as Reich demonstrates, the matter is more complicated. First, Potter used 
the term “global” bioethics in an ambiguous way that could: 
(1) relate to or involve the whole earth: a worldwide ethic for the good of the 
world; (2) entail the comprehensive inclusion of all ethical issues in the life 
sciences and health care (both the “biomedical” and the “environmental” issues 
of this classic debate); and (3) utilize a comprehensive vision of methods for 
approaching these issues: expansively incorporating all relevant values, 
concepts, modes of reasoning and disciplines.85 
 
 
Potter seems to have emphasized all three of these aspects of global bioethics as 
bioethics at difference times while the Hellegers/Georgetown model unmistakably 
treated medical ethics as bioethics, narrowing the focus considerably.  Further, Potter’s 
experience in oncology no doubt influenced his desire to look for preventative 
measures, environmental health, agricultural policies, as well as global, health education, 
and broadly speaking these aims align with Hellegers’ work on “the worldwide 
disequilibrium between the powerful and the powerless” as well as global human 
infertility amidst social and economic problems in developing countries.86 Reich argues 
that Hellegers’ overarching message addressed much more than surface, procedural 
questions and that the developing ways of formulating bioethics debates “begged the 
question of why we are in medicine in the first place.” In short, “implicitly and 
indirectly,” Hellegers acknowledged “shortcomings” in the Georgetown model of 
bioethics even while “enthusiastically taking part in it.”87 No doubt in part due to the 
strength of the Georgetown University name and the funding grants Hellegers 
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successfully secured, bioethics became a neologism primarily associated with the 
problems of biomedicine.  
 
Beyond Jonsen’s history that speaks primarily of Hellegers and Potter, we may see an 
even earlier use of the term bioethics in a 1927 publication from Protestant pastor and 
philosopher Fritz Jahr, “Bio-Ethics: A Review of the Ethical Relationships of Humans 
to Animals and Plants” (Kosmos: Handweiser für Naturfreunde 24:1, 2-4). Hans-Martin Sass 
sees Jahr’s message as a third possible direction for bioethics. Hellegers, Potter, and 
Jahr all sought a renewed vision “for ethics and morality in times of new technologies 
and changing cultures,” 88 but Jahr differs from Potter and Hellegers in following a 
distinctly theological and philosophical path to address the ethical implications inherent 
within all forms of life. Sass transposes Jahr’s language, “using Reich’s wording,” to 
articulate Jar’s view of “Bioethik” as “the systematic study of human conduct in the area 
of the life sciences and the personal, professional, and public moral commitment and 
conduct towards all forms of life, in as far as this conduct is examined in the light of 
moral values and principles.”89  
 
This transposed language may sound familiar to contemporary bioethics, and yet what 
emerges primarily in Jahr is a close relationship to nineteenth-century thinking in the 
life sciences that could not be more distant from contemporary bioethics. Sass points 
to figures such as Wilhelm Wundt (Lectures on the Soul of Humans and Animals, 1863, 6th 
ed. 1919) and Theodor Fechner (Nana or the Soul Life of Plants, 1848; Elements of 
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Psychophysics, 1860) as examples of a turn away from Cartesian body-soul dualism, 
focusing instead on teleological aims and interactions “of and between living and 
sensing environments and living and sensing beings.”90  Alongside biophysics and 
biochemistry, Rudolf Eisler (Workings of the Soul: Ideas Towards an Organic Psychology, 1909) 
proposed “Biopsychics” as a way to comprehend the willing activity of all forms of life.  
 
Similar to these Austro-German figures, one may think of the French “spiritualist” 
Félix Ravaisson (1813-1900) who traced an ontological phenomenon of “habit” as a 
way to grasp the intimate relationship between being and virtue within nature. As 
things or subjects change, the familiarity of habits diminish resistance, while passivity 
(non-habitual activity) increases resistance. This seemingly simple observation in nature 
reveals much as Ravaisson seeks to further Aristotle’s search for “the immaterial reality 
of individual, particular things.” The goal is to see in all organic nature the “essence” of 
these things in their respective “noien thought,” and in this identification of spiritual or 
intellectual intuition within all organic-sense activity, the goal is to uncover the genuine 
unity of all being.91 Within such a framework, any hard distinction between ontology 
and ethics is meaningless as the essence of a thing, in one way, inherently manifests or 
reveals its virtue, and, conversely, the virtue of a thing directly influences the 
ontological. Jahr’s bio-ethik hence may be seen as a fusion of biology and psychology, 
leading Jahr to gesture towards examples as varied as St. Francis of Assisi’s love for 
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animals and Rousseau’s enthusiasm for nature. Such a context for bioethics is certainly 
far from contemporary bioethics literature, but Jahr emerged from this context into 
more familiar terrain by promoting Kant’s categorical imperative into a “bioethical 
imperative” founded on the a priori premise that all of creation is sacred. This bioethical 
imperative draws upon a love and compassion for all things, the Golden Rule (Matt. 
7:12; Luke 6:31), and inherent moral duties to oneself under the banner of “personal 
health responsibility.” 92 Jahr draws heavily from Kant and yet differs from much of the 
Kantianism in contemporary bioethics by embedding his Kantian-spiritualist 
methodology within an ontological unity and continuum of all things.  
 
When comparing and contrasting Hellegers, Potter, and Jahr, more of a similarity can 
be drawn between Jahr and Potter’s broad implications of the term bioethics, and yet 
both visions have fallen to the wayside. A “new” ethic drawing together cosmic 
harmonies of the quadrivium has not emerged with the term bioethics.  Hellegers’ 
biomedical focus for bioethics, rather, has gained supremacy as evidenced by Potter’s 
vision later rebranding under “global bioethics” (Global Bioethics: Building on the Leopold 
Legacy, 1988). There are, no doubt, other ways to analyze further the legacy of this 
neologism, but it is imperative to note the secular and theoretical order that 
accompanied Hellegers’ use of bioethics, regardless of his intentions. As noted above, 
the secular dilemma with bioethics is parallel to the dilemma of modern moral 
philosophy as Anscombe had identified some two decades past—the dilemma of 
moving forward in modern moral philosophy as though analysis of moral concepts and 
presuppositions can take place when the fundamental existence of those concepts and 
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presuppositions remains in question. Such a maneuver reduces modern moral 
philosophy to an examination or analysis of justice or virtue in light of certain “facts” 
that remain unexamined, and the whole endeavor operates on the level of thin 
theoretical analysis while suspending judgment on the “facts” undergirding such 
analysis. In other words, modern moral philosophy and bioethics are postured as tools 
of analysis amidst a neutral environment with suspended values. Hence Anscombe 
notes in such arguments that “‘wrong’ of course is explained as meaning ‘morally 
wrong’ and all the atmosphere of the term is retained while its substance is guaranteed 
quite null.”93 To this we may consider Engelhardt’s description of what occurred when 
bioethical visions such as Jahr’s and Potter’s were abandoned: 
For the most part, the term bioethics has been taken to identify the disciplined 
analysis of the moral and conceptual assumptions of medicine, the biomedical 
sciences, and the allied health professions. As such, it has become a special area 
of philosophy of ethics, even though all of its practitioners have not been 
formally trained in either area.94  
 
Enframed within secular and theoretical modern moral philosophy, bioethics proceeds 
not due to its “factuality” but due to its “acceptance,” an acceptance based on what 
Koch describes as bioethics’ “foundational myth.” The myth more or less follows 
Jonsen’s narrative as described above that from the 1960s and 1970s bioethics arose as 
a capable replacement for traditional ethics of medicine that failed to keep up with new 
technological and scientific realities. Bioethics then exists primarily as a set of analytical 
tools “accepted” or selected by the powers that be, and the context for this acceptance 
is a “neoliberal, modernist order.” By modernist, Koch means turning from “worship” 
of past traditions and authorities to a future pursuit of projected goods, pleasures, and 
                                               
93 Anscombe, 1958: 17. 
94 Engelhardt, preface to Potter, 1998: x. 
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freedoms. By neoliberal, he means an order “in which consumerism and transactional 
thinking are advanced, in the name of individual autonomy, over values of community 
and communal responsibility. The result is not morally rich but instead ethically blank, 
a bookkeeper’s recording rather than a moralist’s recording.”95 Bioethics in this way 
becomes a mere transaction and interchange of theories intended to guide and regulate 
scientists, physicians, and others engaging matters of bios.  
 
Moreover, supporting the foundational myth of bioethics are select deep roots within 
Western philosophy promoting the simplistic notion that reason guides the will 
towards a set of applicable moral laws that are “out there.” Mark Johnson calls this 
“the Moral Law folk theory,” and the poster child for this is inevitably Immanuel Kant 
given his arguments for the autonomous, rational individual who may through reason 
perceive the moral law. 96 What emerges is not necessarily Kant himself but rather a 
Kantian move to place moral authority in autonomous reason removed from cultural, 
social, and religious traditions. Such a narrow approach to bioethics as a neutral, 
theoretical analysis ignores numerous layers of complexity, not to mention the 
fundamental insight from figures such as Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Charles Taylor that 
there is no direct line of rationality between the transcendent and the immanent or 
mundane. The complexity of cultures, psychology, religious belief and more create a 
scenario that calls for much more in bioethics than simplistic Moral Law folk theory or 
                                               
95 Koch, 2012: 9.  
96 Koch draws from Mark Johnson’s Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for 
Ethics (1993) to articulate Johnson’s Moral Law folk theory: “Moral reasoning is thus 
principally a matter of getting the correct description of a situation, determining which 
moral laws pertain to it, and figuring out what action that moral law requires for the 
given situation” (as quoted in Koch, 2012: 10, 10-15). 
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thin appeals to the four principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and 
justice. Appealing to these few theoretical tools assumes some “pure humanity” 
existing within a supposedly neutral moral space or domain, and, hence, in effect 
bioethics is seeking to exist within a secular sociology when what we have forgotten is 
that “the secular is a domain that had to be instituted or imagined, both in theory and in 
practice.”97 Every person physically stands “somewhere” as every person necessarily is 
begotten by parents, even if the parenthood is purely biological. To suppose otherwise 
is farcical, and so, too, secular, autonomous rationality is not the summit of an 
ascending moral chain of rational being, finally free from cultural, social, and religious 
trappings.  
 
In short, drawing these themes together, this chapter has argued that bioethics arises as 
a particular phenomenon—a historical, cultural, and philosophical phenomenon. 
Historically, bioethics emerges from an era marked by remarkable changes in the ‘60s 
and early ’70s in terms of new medical technologies and possibilities. This era 
experienced seismic shifts and upheavals ranging from the Vietnam War to Vatican II 
to the Civil Rights movement and more. Academic centers and institutions dedicated to 
bioethics sprang up amidst this era, launching bioethics as a neologism. Medical ethics 
remains a term employed by some who wish to distinguish from the ambiguity of 
“bioethics,” and yet the very ambiguity of bioethics has allowed for a gathering of 
institutional and academic resources around this field imbibed with new energy. 
Culturally, medicine and healthcare remain at the heart of contemporary political 
deliberations, public policy, techno-scientific research, and more. Hellegers’ vision of 
                                               
97 Milbank, 2006:9. 
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bioethics focused on this thriving technological biomedical era has won the day over 
Jahr and Potter’s cosmological and spiritual visions of bioethics. Thirdly and most 
importantly for this thesis, bioethics should be seen as a late post-Enlightenment 
phenomenon of secular philosophy. In this way, the story of bioethics is a retelling of 
the transition in modern moral philosophy towards moral theorizing and principlism as 
opposed to foundational moral theoria. As the ancient schools of philosophy attest, or 
as a traditional religious bioethics exemplifies, epistemological ways of knowing are 
united to our way of being, and such a being is distinctively ethical. The transaction and 
interchange of theories in bioethics reflects an ideological marketplace that presupposes 
philosophy as a secular, neutral, cosmopolitan endeavor. Hence bioethics is confronted 
with the predicament of the modern secular order where philosophy seeks (1) to exist 
in a mode of “neutrality” enacting a “view from nowhere” and (2) to further this 
philosophical posture by distancing “theory” from “praxis.” 
 
Inevitably, this thin transactional approach to moral theorizing within the modern 
secular order takes bioethics ever more into the sphere of biopolitics where the only 
meaningful understanding of the ethical is the political, a theme that will be explored in 
the following chapter. For now, a fitting parallel to summarize the phenomenon of 
bioethics can be drawn from Hervé Juvin’s depiction of a great novelty in the 21st 
century: the creation of new body. Juvin traces the effects of raw capitalism within 
medicine, and within this nexus and malleable marketplace what emerges is a 
redefinition of what it means to be human. The body is no longer the fleshly product 
of physical efforts and toil with the soil, burdens, and other struggles to live. The body 
is not something that decays amidst the natural journey from birth to death; it is rather 
	 52 
a new entity that seeks fundamentally to resist “need, suffering, and the effects of 
time.” The body is a thing that resists nature and external destiny as it seeks to will a 
new destiny.  
Life is managed. Life is produced, and is constructed in the world of 
technology and method to such an effect that nature is a taskmaster no longer, 
having become a mere argument; to such effect too that after a world of nature 
and destiny, we are discovering the world of choice: the world of the market.98 
 
 
According to Juvin, the “absolute novelty” of the early twenty-first century is that we 
now face the challenge of “managing” a body as a “product” that we have created.  
This body is new, and amidst this new vision of the body—and a medical practice that 
ever challenges the line between therapy and enhancement—transactional, theoretical 
bioethics is well suited to adapt and promote whatever desired end-goals that arise 
within these new parameters. Ethical language and ethical theories are malleable to the 
desires or “rules” of the game at hand as Wittgenstein would note. The end goal may 
be a transhumanist vision of perpetual life, a view of eugenics for all that effectively 
removes all disabilities, or the end goal may be Juvin’s prophecy of the “cult of the 
body beautiful” that creates a new morality of health applied in fitness centers, dieting, 
analysts, cosmetic surgeons, etc.99 The possibilities are manifold, and the language of 
bioethics becomes all the more critical as the principlist model of autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice morphs to fit various world pictures as 
defined by the one who speaks. When such principles and language float freely, 
dystopian and violent goals for human life need not worry about bioethical safeguards 
                                               
98 Juvin, 2010: x. 
99 Juvin, 2010: 95. 
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concerns; bioethics will be well suited for theoretical adaptation as a defense of those 
very goals.  
	 54 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
WHOSE LANGUAGE? PHILOSOPHERS, PRIESTS, OR BIOETHICISTS? 
Nietzsche’s admonition that all of philosophy is in the end “involuntary and unconscious memoir” 
should be considered in relation to all bioethics texts. The choice of an impersonal narrator is simply an 
attempt to put on a mask that conceals how personal the narrator truly is. Tod Chambers1 
 
  
All books on ethics or bioethics inevitably begin with a number of core 
philosophical assumptions, and a discerning reader will quickly ask for clarity regarding 
the ground rules. When first opening a popular textbook such as Lewis Vaughn’s 
Bioethics, Principles, Issues, and Cases, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2016), the reader will 
learn of three basic aspects of bioethics: (1) that bioethics is identified first and 
foremost as an offspring discipline of philosophical ethics; (2) that grave moral issues 
of life, death, health, illness, pain, relief, hope, and despair are at stake; (3) that 
bioethics holds out the possibility of “answers” for such questions. This may seem well 
and fine, but how is the discerning student to understand these three tenets in light of 
philosophy’s modern history, methods, and meta convictions? How does bioethics 
align within the history of philosophy? This thesis has argued above that bioethics must 
be understood within the context of modern moral philosophy, and that entails that the 
possibilities regarding any firm moral standards must be addressed before seeking 
answers. Another way of approaching this is to ask what philosophical methods are 
employed within bioethics, and why have those been chosen or gained prominence? 
Bioethics proceeds primarily through theoretical arguments, and yet what systematic 
context surrounds these arguments? Why is theory so prominent in bioethics over 
                                               
1 Chambers, 2007: 286. 
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other systematic, analytic, or existential philosophical methods? Or, most critically, 
what metaphilosophical assumptions undergird bioethics?  Bioethics is committed to 
the pursuit and wellbeing of life (bios), but is it too much to ask “why life?” or “whose 
life?” Nietzsche, for instance, is hardly a philosopher widely quoted in bioethics, and 
yet at the very least bioethics should recognize the need to confront Nietzsche’s 
particular views of sickness, suffering, desolation, indignity, self-contempt, and more. 
 
The above critical questions belong within the language of philosophy, which is the 
starting point for most bioethics textbooks. A more nuanced consideration for the 
language and issues of bioethics, however, is needed. As we will see below, bioethicists 
do not speak solely in the language of philosophers—pondering and reflecting upon 
the Good by seeking to know what is right and just.2 The language of philosophy, 
moreover, is distinct from the language of religion where priests will offer degrees of 
imperative instruction through canonical teaching.  The language of priests may follow 
a distinct authority structure such that, for example, within the ancient Christian 
tradition, there are Church Canons that provide an authoritative touchstone. This is not 
to ignore relational application within the spiritual life of Christians under a spiritual 
father, nor to reduce the language of priests to a collection of holy principles, rules, or 
conclusions. In the ancient Christian tradition, ethics could not be considered apart 
from seeking “the kingdom of God and His righteousness” not of “this world” (Matt. 
                                               
2 Some may reasonably contest that the methodology of bioethics has much at all in 
common with ancient philosophy. Plato, Aristotle, and many others naturally speak the 
language of philosophers—inquiring after the unity, difference, and meaning in various 
forms of bios—and while their ascetic and pedagogical approaches are far from today’s 
bioethics, this is a finer distinction on “what is philosophy” than exists for bioethics 
today. The point for now is to note that bioethics sees itself as existing broadly “within 
philosophy” as a subgroup of applied ethics.  
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6:33; John 18:36). The point for now, however, is to note the possibility of bioethics 
within spiritual and ecclesial traditions that operates within a transcendent logic and 
spiritual ordo beyond modern theorizing. Here we can point to the Church Canons 
within both the Christian East and West as well as the manualist writings present 
within Roman Catholicism until Vatican II.3 For Muslims, Islamic bioethics takes shari’a 
and the jurists’ fatwas as authoritative while Jewish bioethics draws upon the halakhah as 
rabbinic law.4 The language of secular, theoretical bioethics seems far removed from 
these examples, and, indeed, the “Moral Law folk theory” described above would have 
us think that autonomous reason guides the will to the moral law apart from any 
theological transcendence. Within the Moral Law folk theory, secular ground is neutral 
ground, and any religious bioethics is necessarily irrational, superstitious, and hence an 
aberrant presence amongst theories that are acceptable at the table of democratic 
deliberation. More will be said about of such claims between scientific theorizing and 
religious thinking later in this thesis with the help of Wittgenstein.  
 
Beyond the standard narrative that bioethics is a neat subset of applied philosophy, 
bioethics should be examined in light of a produced and institutionalized formal 
rationality that deserves its own analysis—in short, an analysis of bioethics as 
biopolitics. To understand the need for such an analysis, we should begin by noting 
                                               
3 McDermott, 2014.  
4 It would be easier in some ways to understand bioethics if the language and system of 
philosophy or religion were the consistent norm. Indeed, when one proceeds “to do” 
bioethics within the structure of a Jewish, Christian, or Muslim ethics, one can expect 
many shared presuppositions and practices relating to ecology, health, and life. 
Mainstream contemporary bioethics, however, speaks through an “impersonal 
narrator” and often claims jurisdiction beyond a religious or theological bioethics, 
seeking to impart a “pure” philosophical reflection on moral issues.  
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that one of the most prestigious voices in bioethics is the United States National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) and that the moral deliberations and 
sentiments of this commission inevitably change every four to eight years as a new 
president enters the White House. What does this say of morality and ethics when one 
of the leading voices in bioethics changes its position as political regimes change? To 
be sure, the Commission may be viewed as a platform for philosophical debate where 
robust ethical differences are aired, and yet the Commission is a body of appointed 
scholars, lawyers, physicians, etc. The stated goal of each Commission is to speak 
democratically, and yet what does that mean? The NBAC may speak in the lingua franca 
of philosophical principles, but the real system and workings of power within the 
NBAC—and, by extension, much of bioethics on the whole—incorporates social, 
cultural, institutional, and political power dynamics.  
 
 
2.1 Biopolitics: Bioethics as Jurisdictional Techne 
The supervision of [propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity] 
was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the 
population. The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles 
around which the organization of life was deployed. Michel Foucault5 
 
The language and terminology of bioethics is revealing. John Evans has argued 
that the language system of bioethics can be understood perhaps best by following the 
“cultural production” and “institutionalization” of key bioethics texts and documents.6 
An example of this can be seen in the dialogue on human genetic engineering, a 
dialogue that has changed significantly since the 1960s when—as Robert L. Sinsheimer 
                                               
5 Foucault, 2010: 262.  
6 John Evans uses human genetic engineering as a lens to trace the sociological power 
structures in bioethics. In the section below, Evans’ analysis forms the core of my 
argument on bioethics and biopolitics. Cf. Evans, 2002.  
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has pointed out—the debate was open for questions on the perfection of species. By 
the 1990s, however, the “ends” that directed such a debate were narrowed and directed 
to operate within “a very constrained list of universal, commensurable ends that [had 
become] institutionalized by the dominant profession in the debate.”7 Not surprisingly, 
autonomy had become the assumed primary end directing the HGE debate, leaving 
those yet to be born ironically as the presumptive agents needing to give informed 
consent for any genetic modification. The number of possible ends and other issues 
that can be debated with HGE are manifold, and Sinsheimer’s “new eugenics” is hardly 
the only option amidst possible “thick” ends. What is important now is not analyzing 
Sinsheimer’s position, but rather to note the blatant turn in bioethics towards “thin” 
ends that arose as institutionalized values.  
 
Drawing from Weber, Evans traces the establishment of bioethics’ “thin” formal 
rationality—a rational calculation seeking the most efficacious ends towards 
“predetermined or assumed ends”—over a “thick” substantive rationality—one that 
asks if means of HGE are “consistent with ultimate ends or values.”8 The difference 
between these two rationalities is significant as “calculation” within “predetermined or 
assumed ends” clearly follows a more efficient mode of instrumental rationality 
whereas seeking “consistency” within ultimate ends remains open to transcendence 
beyond theoretical and political edifices. Within the structure of bioethics’ 
predetermined ends, however, arguments and positions can be first “produced” then 
“selected” and then “institutionalized.” Articles and books are produced and published 
                                               
7 Evans, 2002: 11. Cf. Sinsheimer, 1969. 
8 Evans 2002: 13. 
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somewhere within the field of bioethics before being selected “by the environment,” an 
environment in ethics that includes people who are perceived as authorities both on 
judging HGE as well as rendering tenure decisions for writers. Finally, after an 
argument has been to some degree sifted or evaluated by the field, it becomes “reified” 
as “common sense” or perhaps dubbed “factual,” hence taking on an autonomous and 
authoritative “life independent of its creator.” 
Within this perspective, the rise of formally rational forms of argumentation 
can be seen as the cumulative result of the actions of many individuals who 
create competing arguments to extract resources from their environments. 
Explaining in a cumulative sense why the supporters of formal rationality 
“won” in this competition and why the supporters of substantive rationality 
“lost” requires examining the factors that allowed some actors to disseminate 
their arguments, while others could not.9 
 
 
What such a schema presents is a way to trace the influences on how bioethical 
arguments are acknowledged and valued, and hence why the language of bioethics is 
distinctly political. Evans identifies within the genre of bioethics itself a three-fold 
division into foundational, clinical, and public debates. Foundational bioethics engages 
issues and topics related to “broader societal concerns” such as HGE, health care 
reform, and transhumanism while clinical ethics addresses the bedside dilemmas of 
clinical medical care. Public bioethical debate, however, moves beyond both the 
foundational-societal and clinical levels as this is where the societal elites or 
professionals engage the foundational and clinical issues within their specialized 
domain. In principle, there is no real line between the public spheres and foundational 
or clinical, and yet ironically the way the public most often interfaces with bioethics is 
through the medium of specialized, social elites. Hence “the purpose of the public 
                                               
9 Evans, 2002: 26.  
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bioethical debate amongst professionals is to influence the beliefs and values of the 
public, to come to some modicum of consensus, or in some cases to represent public 
opinion to policy makers.”10 Naturally, within this framework, the question to ask is in 
what way is specialized, academic bioethicists to function as a neutral medium and 
representative presence? Or, is it not more accurate to note that the bioethicists in 
question actually serve to screen and direct the debate towards their desired ends, 
whatever those may be? If we accept Evans’ analysis of institutionalized, formal 
rationality, bioethics may be presented philosophically, but its essential impulse and 
trajectory will be a politics motivated by power. 
 
To rephrase this slightly, if we define a bioethicist as one who navigates primarily 
amongst the profession’s form of argumentation, this entails that the bioethicist must 
learn the “principlist” lingua franca, and appeals to autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence, justice, and the like will henceforth constitute the center of all ensuing 
bioethics discourses. Existing within bioethics’ principlist “system of argumentation” is, 
for Evans, what sets one apart as a professional bioethicist as contrasted with 
philosophers, theologians, scientists, and/or physicians who interact with the topics 
and issues of bioethics. Moreover, Evans suggests that we ought to envision the 
bioethics profession as one amidst other competing professions within a “competitive 
ecological system.” Here we can begin to the see the raw calculations and power games 
that characterizes the “thin” systems of institutionalized, formal rationality. The 
competition centers on whom exactly has primary “jurisdiction” to influence significant 
policies such as regulating HGE, transnational pharmaceutical research, or perhaps 
                                               
10 Evans, 2002: 34. 
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mandating participation in human subjects research as a part of US citizenship as 
Rosamond Rhodes argued in 2005.11 Tracing such jurisdictional strands then leads us to 
consider further the nature of power and the powerful. Beyond “mere” public opinion, 
the implications of this power include certificates of authority via state licensing for 
physicians, nurses, healthcare practitioners, as well as institutional affiliation, and access 
to grant funding, and more.12 Moreover, following “market research” and a “role 
delineation study” that ran from Oct. 2016 – Feb. 2017, the American Society of 
Bioethics and Medical Humanities (ASBH) has launched Healthcare Ethics 
Consultation Certification (HCEC) as a “voluntary, professional certification program 
that will validate the professional knowledge and legitimacy of individual healthcare 
ethics consultants.”13 This certifying body has yet to determine its criteria for ethics 
credentialing, but the jurisdictional terrain clearly is being marked and claimed. Here we 
are quite a way from the language of philosophers deliberating on the Good or of 
priests offering words of pastoral counsel. The language of bioethics in this purview 
becomes a positional platform and agency of action—this language is a techne that 
grants authority amidst moral questions of bios. 
For example, the rising legitimacy of scientific thinking in society due to the 
efforts of scientists and others has worked to the benefit of medicine—whose 
form of argumentation presupposes science—and against folk healers of 
various types, whose arguments are not based on science. In the case of the 
HGE debate, in the late 1960s people who were not involved with the HGE 
                                               
11 Rhodes, 2005: 5, 7-28. 
12 Evans, 2002: 28-32. Evans is not blind to shades of jurisdictional control when 
speaking of different domains such as medicine and ethics. Medicine typically seeks 
“full jurisdiction” where state-issued licensure regulates the profession whereas 
bioethicists have taken an “advisory jurisdiction” primarily within the domain of 
medicine and the sciences. Regardless, the transition from substantive to formal 
rationality yields a malleable body of reason that can be maneuvered amidst 
jurisdictions.  
13 American Society of Bioethics and Medical Humanities, 2017. 
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debate successfully institutionalized a generalized questioning of authority by 
the public, and specifically the idea that scientists do not always work in the 
people’s interest. The institutionalization of this idea among the general public, 
who were the empowered decision-makers of that era, led to a delegitimation 
of scientific authority (i.e., jurisdiction) in general—leaving scientists open to 
challenge in the peripheries of their jurisdiction (such as HGE).14 
 
 
Evans’ example of HGE is one amongst numerous cases that illustrate discourses, 
practices, and institutions within the workings of bioethics. Evans’ analysis, moreover, 
traces a sociological pattern, and within this pattern the broad parallels to Foucault’s 
biopolitics are hard to miss.15 Foucault’s analysis and focus on the material reality of 
bodies within medicine (“biomedicine”) is well known, particularly in Birth of the Clinic 
(1963), and bioethics is a natural consideration alongside biomedicine. One can see in 
Foucault a Kantian search for the conditions of possibility of knowledge, for to identify 
issues rightly in the present time, as Bishop notes, “we must first take a good look 
around at how the problems present themselves…[given that] solutions emerge in 
particular historical and political circumstances and are instantiated in practices.”16 In 
                                               
14 Evans, 2002: 31. 
15 Therese Lysaught notes that Evan’s Webberian account supports biopolitical 
thinking but that Evans would need to engage Foucault directly to move specifically 
into biopolitics. Lysaught clarifies that Evans does not “attend to the obvious 
relationships…between the human genome project and the management/production 
of human bodies.” Also, Evans does not note the important relationship between “the 
reconfiguration of bioethics and growth of the biotech industry.” Whereas Evans 
critiques the reduction of the four principles in bioethics down to one primary end, 
autonomy, hence diluting the bioethics debates, Lysaught suggests that autonomy 
furthers the “internal logic of the profession of bioethics” to further the desired ends 
of the profession.  Lysaught, 2009: 404, fn. 19. Further, the point here is not to 
articulate an in-depth Foucaultian analysis of bioethics but rather to consider 
biopolitics as a key touchstone for understanding the role of institutions and politics 
when analyzing the ethics of the body as bios. This section builds generally upon 
Foucault’s biopolitics and yet does not seek to present a full reading of Foucault’s 
biomedicine applied to bioethics. 
16 Bishop, 2011: 32. 
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other words, our knowledge and practices arise from concrete historical realities and 
political spaces. Moving away from Kant, however, Foucault traces the practices and 
powers shaping medicine, psychiatry, and other human sciences not for a Kantian hope 
of “discovering” transcendent knowledge as much as discerning the social and cultural 
elements involved in “creating” knowledge. Hence Bishop points, for example, to the 
National Health Service that followed in the wake of Francis Galton’s statistical 
medicine that was so influential in the nineteenth century. 
The modern idea of evidence-based medicine is an attempt to obtain 
statistically well-grounded reasons for acting, but it still remains, not a medicine 
of individuals (despite its claims), but a medicine of populations dispersed in 
space. Foucault eventually names these forces at work in society “biopolitics,” 
in which life itself is ruled and conditioned, not only in the sense of a power 
that oppresses by naming and normalizing life, but also in the sense of creating 
the possibility of new vitalities and new freedoms for citizens.17 
 
 
Lysaught argues for transnational research ethics as a compelling example of bioethics 
as biopolitics, and a gripping example of this can be seen in scandalous pharmaceutical 
trials conducted by Pfizer in war-torn Kano, Nigeria in the late nineties. Lawsuits 
totaling nearly $7 billion (U.S.) were brought by Nigerian families and government for 
major ethics violations including withholding proven therapies for children, failing to 
inform families of the trial’s risks, etc. What is key here is how inept a “four principles” 
                                               
17 Bishop, 2011: 43. On the matter of power functioning as a possibly “oppressive” and 
“creative” force, Bishop and Jotterand note that Foucault’s understanding of the role 
of power in biopolitics shifted from his earlier and later works. In his initial lectures on 
biopolitics, “Foucault articulates a notion of power contrary to that of his earlier works 
(Madness and Civilization, and Birth of the Clinic) where power is primarily a restraining and 
oppressing force. His new use of the notion of power in biopolitics takes on the 
character of the sustenance offered by politics to create structures that enable 
populations to achieve new freedoms and vitalities. The state comes to wild power over 
life, but now an enabling power that is not just repressive, creating instead the 
conditions for new capacities” (Bishop & Jotterand, 2006: 206). 
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line of institutionalized bioethics thinking is to address such a case that includes 
conflicts of interest, massive corporate profits, and the humanitarian questions of 
international research on third-world children. To be sure, it might be helpful to discuss 
autonomy and degrees of informed consent in a non-Western environment where such 
terms may or may not remotely mean the same thing, but what matters more 
concretely is tracing the lines of power and control over bodies. Honesty and openness 
regarding the means of financial profit, influence, and health of populations, not the 
“four principles” of bioethics, are more fitting points of focus. Lysaught’s central 
argument is that tragedies such as Pfizer in Nigeria cannot be adequately measured 
through the “standard narrative” of bioethics that focuses on a “rhetoric of freedom, 
public discussion of goods, protecting and advancing pluralism, and simply being about 
procedures rather than goods notwithstanding.” 18  In place of such ambiguous, 
procedural language—a language that is hardly easily translated into Sub-Saharan West 
Africa —bioethics as biopolitics brings to light the various social strategies “of policing 
and controlling populations” that are wrought under the banner of furthering the 
goods of the social order.  
 
In a striking irony, moreover, by clinging to the standard narrative of autonomy, 
freedom, and pluralism, bioethics can bring about harm, and this harm may do worse 
than muddy the waters via ambiguous principles. Bioethics itself can serve to veil the 
true intentions of institutions, governments, and others seeking “advantages for the 
general social good” at the expense of the weak and powerless who become “docile 
bodies” employed as needed for the betterment of (select) public health. Hence 
                                               
18 Lysaught, 2009: 396. 
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bioethics becomes an agency “to produce, organize, and manage the bodies of real, 
human persons—to police and control populations—toward the ends of larger 
institutional agents such as the state or, more recently, the biotech industry.”19 Lysaught 
contrasts this unpopular assessment with the “conventional wisdom” that describes 
bioethics as a protecting agency for the rights of persons in human subjects research. 
Following more or less forty-years (1932-1972) of research atrocities—both known and 
unknown at respective times—in Nazi Germany, Tuskegee, Guatemala, and more, The 
Belmont Report was produced in 1979 with the intent to preserve individuals’ 
autonomy and rights of liberty. In the case of the Willowbrook State School scandal 
(circa 1947-1987), however, Saul Krugman (New York University), Robert McCollum 
(Yale University), and others intentionally infected scores of disabled and 
institutionalized children with hepatitis while seeking a hepatitis vaccine for the broader 
population. The justification for infecting these children came from the assumption 
that they would almost certainly come down with hepatitis anyway as a result of the 
poor conditions already present at Willowbrook. This atrocity can become mired and 
confused in theoretical, utilitarian discussions about which measure of social good ought 
to be employed when all the while the material reality of persecuted bodies is being 
ignored. 
 
Agreeing with Evans, Lysaught sharply challenges the standard narrative of bioethics 
growing “nobly” out of reflections on the Nazi holocaust and other human subjects 
research travesties. That is one part of the story, but what is missing is the story line of 
bioethics emerging as a “mechanism for shaping and controlling the hoi polloi so that 
                                               
19 Lysaught, 2009: 387. 
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the growing Leviathan of biomedical research could quietly continue to pursue its own 
ends behind the scenes.”20 One of those ends turns out to be that bioethics has selected 
research itself as a chief “good,” and this means that in countries lacking clean water 
and other basic resources, international research from large corporations is often 
valued above bringing aid and relief to those in need.21 Or that sickly, institutionalized 
children who are “doomed already” are hence viable subjects for some of the most 
undesirable forms of research.22 Within this assessment, it is easy to see how something 
such as The Belmont Report becomes canonical within bioethics—a true source of Evans’ 
formal rationality that is then further cemented as a touchstone in Beauchamp and 
Childress’ Principles of Bioethics (1st ed., 1979 – 7th ed., 2013). All the while, what is glossed 
or lost entirely amidst the “rhetoric of freedom and autonomy” is the “surveillance and 
control” of individuals and populations as docile bodies by institutions and 
                                               
20 Lysaught, 2009: 393. 
21 Given the new political economy of globalization, one could argue that, although 
states remain proximate ends of disciplinary power, a new agent and end of disciplinary 
power are transnational corporate entities and that individual states now sere as 
intermediary agents of this power-mobilizing bodies in service of transnational social 
order (Lysaught, 2009: 397). 
22 Naturally, this line of thinking can extend to research on embryos that can be ranked 
from non-viable to viable yet “unselected.” If the assumption is that embryos are 
merely material cells that exist in a pre-personhood state, they are perfectly suited for 
research on whatever ends desired. This is not to equate embryonic research—before 
the “morally appointed” day 14 cut-off—with research at Willowbrook, but rather to 
point out the materialistic logic common in both instances. Few today see materialistic 
logic with embryos as problematic, but such materialistic logic in service of the greater 
social good as is dominant with embryonic research leads neatly to justify Willowbrook, 
the Pfizer trials, or even to the Nazi holocaust. The only difference between these cases 
stems from where or when one decides that material life is meaningful. Other questions 
of inherent meaning within research, or inherent value in certain types of knowledge 
(i.e., playing God via limitless knowledge of the body) are not given space within 
materialistic logic. 
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governments all participating in what amounts to nothing less than a new 
“transnational economic order.”23 
 
Additionally, we may glimpse another, complementary critique of the common 
bioethics narrative by considering the role of deliberative democracy in bioethics. As 
Griffin Trotter has argued, bioethics is fundamentally centered on “cognitively higher-
order things like rational consensus, human rights, and social justice,” and yet there is 
more to be explored behind this cognitive domain.24 Humans are not purely cognitive 
beings with rational access to absolute truth. Human beings are “moral, believing, 
narrating animals—as opposed to both rational, acquisitive, exchanging animals and 
genetically adaptive and governed animals.”25 Moreover, humans desire and seek after 
forms of power to gain dominance such that rationality itself may serve as the vehicle 
or foil for accomplishing what is believed or desired on a deeper level. 
Rationality is certainly an important weapon in our arsenal and, as with our 
other weapons, we experience pleasure in wielding it skillfully. For human 
beings, there are no pure instrumentalities. But rationality is always mixed with 
other affections such as anger, greed, pride, lust, and prejudice (to name a 
few)—and typically it is employed, at least in part, to serve them.26 
 
 
                                               
23 Lysaught, 2009: 402. 
24 Trotter, 2006: 236. Trotter defines “deliberative democracy” as a democracy focused 
on “the legitimizing role of deliberation among citizens” as contrasted by a democracy 
emphasizing “aggregate” or “vote-centric” modes of democracy. Trotter draws this 
distinction from W.  Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed., 
2002) while arguing that “the convergence or consensus-oriented school has held sway 
[in bioethics] for well over a decade.” The degree of consensus may vary amongst 
different parties, but the point to note here is the commitment of bioethics towards the 
“deliberative process and the goal of moral consensus” (Trotter, 2006: 237-38). 
25 Smith, 2003: 118. 
26 Trotter, 2006: 236. 
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Trotter points out that bioethicists possess a strong tendency to seek political influence 
as an expected means towards advancing their respective positions, and that “waxing 
eloquent” about rational consensus, human rights and more disguises their political 
ambitions pursued through deliberative democracy. The focus on institutions and 
power struggles aligns well with Foucault, but Trotter directs our attention to Hobbes’ 
five-fold critique of democratic deliberation. This critique and alignment with bioethics 
is worth summarizing briefly given the way that Hobbes’ five theses align with 
bioethics as biopolitics: 
 
First thesis: participatory democracy tends to devolve into aristocracy. Because participatory or 
deliberative democracies allow free expression, the natural result is that “contenders 
and public personalities” rise to the surface, and ultimately the “most adroit 
manipulators of public sentiment” will hold power. Likewise, in bioethics, the 
influential experts gain political connections. For example, in the United States, the 
National Commission, the President’s Commission and the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (NBAC) are notably filled with appointments from academic 
bioethics positions. Trotter states: “the ostensible rationale for these appointments 
seems to include the dubious supposition that bioethicists’ extensive training in a 
diversity of philosophical systems was sufficient to ensure an objective, non-partisan 
approach to the issues at hand—despite the fact that the appointees leaned uniformly 
leftwards towards the Democratic Party.”27 The notion of non-partisan politics and 
bioethics are equally mythical, and this is advantageous to those who would enact the 
aristocracy.  
                                               
27 Trotter, 2006: 239; 238-39.  
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Second thesis: participatory democracy begets unproductive disputes. For Hobbes, much of the 
discourse within politics distracts one’s focus from more meaningful activities of life 
with family and friends. “Profitless subjects” are those matters of disputation where 
individuals should simply “go their own ways.” Numerous issues in bioethics fall within 
this concern. Where variant “fundamental moral beliefs” beget citizens with little to no 
moral common ground, what consensus should we expect on issues such as abortion, 
physician-assisted-suicide, embryonic stem cell research, and more? Bioethics dialogue 
on these matters may influence legislation to varying degrees, but the central moral 
controversies remain. “For Hobbes, public advocacy of this nature is profitless, not 
merely because it cannot succeed in producing a robust moral consensus, but more 
importantly because liberty and individual felicity would be enhanced by allowing 
opposing individuals and groups to establish their own practices, free from government 
interference and from each other.”28 
 
Third thesis: participatory democracy begets excessive government power and dominion. This thesis 
confronts the difficulty of balancing power and dominion. Trotter suggests that power 
may be understood as the “ability to enforce obedience” while dominion is the “scope 
of things enforced.” The challenge Hobbes sees is that within a deliberative democracy 
where all participate in its rule, dominion is easily confused with power. As “the many” 
are involved in ruling through deliberation, all bring various interests and backgrounds, 
and political power becomes but another means towards securing one’s own interests 
against others. Trotter quotes Hobbes’ remarking that in a popular democracy, “there 
                                               
28 Trotter, 2006: 240; 239-40. 
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may be as many Neros as there are orators who soothe the people,” and a likely result 
of this is that political trade agreements are perpetually forged, seeking quid pro quo 
amidst committees, commissions, agencies and more. An enormous “hyperplasia” of 
political power becomes the norm in place of a minimal system of laws existing only to 
provide basic conditions of peace. Not surprisingly, bioethics falls easily within this 
conflagrated power structure as bioethicists seek federal grant money focused largely 
on research projects aimed at regulations and protections run by the government itself. 
As such, “bioethics is largely in the business of enhancing the dominion of 
government, even as it enhances its own.”29 
 
Fourth Thesis: participatory democracy breeds excessive collective aspirations. Building upon the 
previous theses, the fourth thesis stresses the “suffocating profusion of collective 
thinking” that emerges when citizens “conjure grand visions” of what might be 
achieved with political allies. Differences may be held lightly in favor of pacts forged 
on compromised positions, all with the idea of gaining some common shared ground. 
Yet, Hobbes argues that these collective aspirations can exceed human capacities, 
effective political control, as well as what is needed for peace. As a fourth critique, 
these collective aspirations can be based on irrational fears, which is an especially 
dangerous tactic of inciting irrational public hysteria.  
 
These elements of excessive collective aspiration align strikingly with bioethics as a 
field strongly characterized by aims for universal, common morality. Hence Trotter 
points us to Beauchamp and Childress’ claim that common morality is comprised of 
                                               
29 Trotter, 2009: 241; 240-41. 
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“core tenets in every acceptable particular morality that are not relative to cultures, 
groups, or individuals.” Literally, “all persons living a moral life” know this moral 
code.30 Within such a vision of morality, bioethics fundamentally exists as a project of 
public, national, political morality. Hence, we can see bioethics as a collective 
governmental campaign seeking: (1) “a degree of national moral consensus that is 
unworkable;” (2) “inordinate political influence over matters that cannon be controlled 
by national governments (for instance, elimination of health disparities);” (3) to 
champion “projects that have little or nothing to do with securing peace;” (4) to stoke 
“exaggerated public fears (for instance, by constantly portraying America’s 45 million 
uninsured citizens as lower income individuals desperately in need of healthcare.”31 
 
Fifth thesis: rational consensus will never be the primary motive in public deliberation. Hobbes’ 
fifth thesis brings to attention political power as the driving motive within deliberative 
democracies. People act politically to gain political power, and this political power is 
“useful instrumentally as a means to living well,” despite authentic, foundational 
differences. Moreover, for some, political compromises and pacts may stem negatively 
from fear of others. Equally then, we should wonder what most motivates bioethics? 
How do assertions of moral consensus from leading bioethicists differ from other 
political strategies? 
Moral consensus is not a desirable pursuit, at least in the political realm, 
because political processes aimed at moral consensus exacerbate each of the 
aforementioned dangers of participatory democracy. Founded as it is, on the 
false claim that extensive moral consensus is possible, the quest for consensus 
requires multiple layers of deception. Citizens must be deceived into believing 
that the opinions of statesmen or moral experts are morally authoritative for 
                                               
30 Beauchamp and Childress, 2013: 2-3.  
31 Trotter, 2006: 242; 241-42. 
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the whole group (Hobbes’ sovereign would never pose such a ludicrous claim). 
They must be deceived into believing that their well-being is enhanced by 
acquiescing to the purported moral consensus. And they must be deceived into 
believing that this acquiescence is in important respects autonomous and 
voluntary (despite the obvious fact that it is coerced).32 
 
 
In sum, the language of bioethical consensus has less to do with moral consensus than 
it does with the reality of political power and processes. The language of bioethics can 
and does function significantly as a moral techne within a greater system of preselected 
and predetermined ends. The scope of bioethics language as moral techne naturally can 
shift from blatant examples of abuse such as Willowbrook and the Pfizer trials in 
Nigeria to more veiled national democratic processes of manipulation evidenced in the 
NBAC. Yet even more can be discerned under the heading of biopolitics by looking to 
the integral role of theologians in the early days of bioethics.  
  
                                               
32 Trotter, 2006: 243; 243-44. 
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2.2 Shifting Language Games: From Theology to Bioethics 
An ethicist is a former theologian, who does not have the professional credentials of a moral 
philosopher. James Gustafson33 
 
With a few exceptions, the theologians and the philosophers, who were partners in the early medical 
ethics, merged into one—the bioethicist. Albert Jonsen34 
 
 
Jonsen’s well-known The Birth of Bioethics devotes a chapter to introducing the 
role of academic theologians who presented as a “pioneering” presence in the new field 
of bioethics.35 The primary contribution of these theologians, for Jonsen, was simply to 
bring “a sharper concept of ethics” stemming from the “classical discipline” of 
theology, and in this way he rather simply compares theologians to philosophers, both 
of whom began to address the “new medicine” of the 20th century from their respective 
disciplines.36 Jonsen’s narrative unfolds with a textbook-styled, objective voice, and yet 
even Jonsen’s neutral tone cannot ignore the lack of stability in the 20th century 
affecting theology and bioethics. Hence Jonsen mentions that Roman Catholic moral 
theology did not address bioethics from a place of traditional theological security. The 
aggiornamento that marked Pope John XXIII’s papacy and the innovations of Vatican II 
(1962-1965) represent a significant reexamination of traditional formulations affecting 
the whole of the Roman Catholic tradition and many surrounding cultures influenced 
by Roman Catholicism. Within this context, Roman Catholic theologians in bioethics 
encountered the “turmoil” and “inner debates about methods” and “dissensions” 
                                               
33 Gustafson, 1978: 386. 
34 Jonsen, 1998: 58. 
35 In this section, I use the term “theologian” primarily in the sense of an academic 
discipline and not in the holistic sense often summarized by Evagrius Ponticus’ “a 
theologian is one who prays” (Evagrious, 2006; Treatise on Prayer, 61). 
36 Jonsen, 1998: 34-64. 
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regarding central doctrines, particularly as issues of masturbation, abortion, 
contraception, in vitro fertilization, euthanasia and more gained attention. Jonsen 
particularly mentions Richard McCormick (1922-2000), Charles Curran (1934-), and 
Bernard Häring (1912-1998) as Roman Catholic theologians who sought to nuance and 
challenge “pronouncements of the magisterium” on issues newly identified under 
bioethics.37 Similarly, protestant theologians were hardly removed from such shifting 
methodologies and allegiances, particularly in the wake of the early 19th century Social 
Gospel movement and the 1960s ecumenical movement between protestants and 
Roman Catholics.  
 
To exemplify the role of theologians at the beginnings of bioethics, Jonsen highlights a 
“trinity” of theologians: Joseph Fletcher (1905-1991), an Episcopal minister who later 
would reject Christianity;38 Richard McCormick, a Jesuit moral theologian; and Paul 
Ramsey (1913-1988), a Methodist professor. Few would differ that these theologians 
were active founders amidst the “golden age” in the 1970s when bioethics was 
launched, and more will be said particularly of Ramsey below.39 What is most notable 
                                               
37 Jonsen, 1998: 37.  
38 Fletcher eventually exchanged his post in a divinity school for one in a medical 
school, and he made explicit his turn to secular ethics by declaring himself an act-
utilitarian. Jonsen, 1998:42-47. 
39 Engelhardt, 2014: 1. As further evidence of the role of theologians early in bioethics, 
we can note that theologians such as Paul Ramsey, James Gustafson, Richard 
McCormick, and Karen Lebacqz served on national policy groups such as The 
National Commission on the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research (1974) and the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1979). Additionally, as 
noted in chapter 1, academics with theological training were influential in the launch of 
organizations such as The Institute of Religion at the Texas Medical Center in Houston 
(1954); the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences (1961; now named The 
Hastings Center); The Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University (1971). 
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for this thesis, however, comes at the end of Jonsen’s chapter where he mentions the 
“strange happening” for Christian ethicists “on their way to bioethics.” Namely, 
theological and denominational identities and discourses “faded” amidst the migration 
to bioethics. James Gustafson and Stanley Hauerwas were among the first to point out 
the significance and impact of this change in identity and language. Gustafson wrote in 
1978 (“Theology Confronts Technology and the Life Sciences”) that the growing 
interest between theology and technology and the life sciences was clearly evident, and 
yet the actual theological interaction between these spheres was highly suspect. Many 
of these “ethicists” were theologically trained, and yet their explicit appeals to a 
particular theological or religions “outlook” were thin and “opaque.” Gustafson 
commends Paul Ramsey as an exception to this trend in that he ardently described 
himself as a “Christian ethicist” who did not write with “some hypothetical common 
denominator,” and yet Gustafson’s student Hauerwas is less convinced that Ramsey’s 
“execution matched his candor.”40 Hauerwas jests that all of the theology in Ramsey’s 
The Patient as Person (1970) is in the Preface, and yet the concern is less with the 
“amount” of Ramsey’s theology than it is with the kind of theology being presented, a 
theology methodologically enacting the social gospel movement.  
But why should [Ramsey’s] understanding of the ethics of the Gospel be called 
protestant liberalism? Quite simply, it allowed Ramsey to think that the nicer 
issues of theology, such as Trinitarian and ecclesiological issues, were largely 
tangential to ethics…I am not accusing Ramsey of the kind of reduction so 
characteristic of much of Protestant liberal theology, e.g. Christ means love of 
the neighbor. Rather his position, in a sophisticated way to be sure, accepts the 
presumption that the gospel has a moral upshot. The Christian essence can 
therefore be known without the frills.41 
 
 
                                               
40 Hauerwas, 1995: 15. 
41 Hauerwas, 1995, 20-21. 
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While Ramsey states his firm commitment to being a “Christian ethicist,” his ethics 
may or may not appeal explicitly to a Christian vision of the good, and in this way, 
Ramsey’s ethic can be seen in a way as deontological.42 In a 1990 letter to Hauerwas 
regarding the charge of “inadequate theological warrant,” Ramsey maintains that his 
ethics shares less with “the humanists’” commitments but rather stems from a 
commitment to the “giftedness” of life. Hence, Ramsey saw his foundational 
commitments—even when theologically tacit—on par with those of Hauerwas, 
intimating a difference in style not substance. Hence to Ramsey’s thinking, in pursuing 
an ethics translated from a Christian into a neutral discourse, he maintains “that 
Christian special ethics would still come to the conclusions I do.”43 Such ardor aside, 
Ramsey’s assumption that Christian ethics and natural reason will align remains 
suspect. Hence, agreeing with Hauerwas, Engelhardt identifies Ramsey as part of the 
early Christian bioethics presence that was “amphibious” in maintaining a Christian 
label without “affirming any essentially Christian understandings.” 44  This was a 
bioethics that “had insufficient resources to show how Christian practice might make a 
difference for understanding or forming the practice of medicine,” and this leaves 
Hauerwas to ask in what way Jesus’ preaching of the kingdom was at all needed for 
“such an ethic?”45 
 
In what sense can we identify Ramsey’s ethic as a Christian approach to medical ethics? 
                                               
42 “I am aware that Ramsey’s position is more complex than the description 
deontological can comprehend, but I find it hard to see how Ramsey takes us beyond 
what John Milbank has identified as deontological liberalism” (Hauerwas, 1995: 25).  
43 1990 letter from Ramsey to Hauerwas. As quoted in Hauerwas, 1995: 18. 
44 Engelhardt, 2014: 3; 2-5. 
45 Hauerwas, 1995: 16, 24-25. 
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Is his commitment more to a neutral rationality or to the Christian message? Or, 
perhaps it is best to identify his work as that of a believing Christian who employed a 
moral discourse that could be understood and appropriated by others without requiring 
any Christian belief on their part.46 What emerges from Ramsey is an ambiguous and 
debatable approach regarding what sort of discourse Christian theology should adopt 
when addressing bioethical issues within the public square.  
 
As has already been intimated, the question of how committed Fletcher was to a firm 
theological discourse is easier to answer. Fletcher’s legacy is that of a situational ethicist 
who after twenty-six years as a professor of social ethics at Episcopal Theological 
School in Boston explicitly exchanged his role as priest and theologian to become a 
secular medical ethicist. Whereas his early reflections on bioethics such as Morals and 
Medicine (1960) were situated within a theological context, the conclusions of his moral 
thinking remained significantly at odds with the majority within traditional 
Christianity.47 Fletcher “eschewed any prohibitive ethical claims that might halt or 
hinder research or treatment options, often embracing moral positions that most 
traditional Christian theologians would reject.” 48  As Evans summarizes, Fletcher 
“begins the [1970s] era as a theologian and ends up a bioethicist,”49 and Kass decried 
Fletcher as a progressive “theologian-turned-technocrat [who] … with the dead God as 
                                               
46 Engelhardt, 2014: 3. 
47 In 1968 Fletcher appeals to a Kantian mode of personhood in addressing the 
desirability of euthanizing Down’s syndrome babies. “[There should be no guilt] about 
putting a Down's syndrome baby away, whether it's "put away" in the sense of hidden 
in a sanitarium or in a more responsible lethal sense. It is sad; yes. Dreadful. But it 
carries no guilt. True guilt arises only from an offense against a person, and a Down's is 
not a person” (Bard & Fletcher, 1968; 59-64).  
48 Bishop, 2014: 303. 
49 Evans, 2002: 241, fn. 88.  
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his co-pilot, is set to fly off into the wild blue yonder of limitless self-modification.”50 
 
In the case of Richard McCormick, we encounter a Jesuit ethicist entrenched within the 
natural law tradition, and yet McCormick frequently sought to reframe traditional 
Catholic natural law positions in a more liberal or pluralistic way seeking to accord with 
a democratic society. Jonsen quotes McCormick referring to his “classicist 
mentality…[of which he remained] conscious of both its strengths and weaknesses—
and the need to correct or modify the latter.”51 McCormick sought to be a moderate 
and a committed Catholic theologian, and he was explicit that “an ethic that claims to 
be theological will root itself in God—God’s actions and purposes.” Furthermore, “a 
Christian theological ethic is founded on the fact that something has been done to and 
for us, and that something is Jesus.”52 For McCormick’s moderate, middle-ground 
stance, the question remains in what way he understands natural law as a way to defend 
positions on strictly philosophical grounds apart from doctrine. Whether or not such a 
neutral stance is consistent or logically feasible is a matter relevant to bioethics,53 and 
yet for now it is primarily important to note the role McCormick played in the 
                                               
50 Kass, 1972: 60. 
51 Jonsen, 1998: 52; 52-55. 
52 McCormick, 1989.  
53 The question of natural law discourses in bioethics—specifically if natural law may be 
rightly understood within the Christian tradition—is taken up further in chapter 6 of 
this thesis. It is also worth noting Sulmasy’s argument that “proponents of natural law 
like McCormick and Ramsey” were eventually dismissed in the face of “a progressively 
secularizing bioethics” that determined natural law as an “inherently religious 
(specifically, Christian)” method that could not accord with the official secular 
methodology of bioethics (Sulmasy, 2014). Such a reading of the history of bioethics 
may be persuasive to some, but the question remains as to the grounding of natural law 
itself. If, as Fr. Charles Curran argues, “the natural law by its very nature does not 
depend primarily on revelation and God's word, but on human reason,” this internally 
seems a relatively compatible form of theorizing within the secular (Curran, 2014).  
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transition from theologians to bioethicists. Even given Jonsen’s neutral voice that 
presents Ramsey—in contrast to Gustafson, Hauerwas, and Engelhardt—as a “heavy 
theologian” who “plunges” into scripture and doctrine, Jonsen admits that the 
transition to bioethics was “a strange thing” for these Christian ethicists who were 
“educated in theological traditions, and sometimes clergy in their denominations.” At 
the same time, however, Jonsen casts aside this oddity by remarking “there were good 
reasons for this fall from faith.” In short, within secular logic, historic religious 
communities with thick, particular doctrinal commitments are seen as “divisive” given 
that such “ruminations about human nature and destiny” call for “transcendent 
references of theology.” Instead, Jonsen imagines a neutral space for “the practical 
problems of bioethics” that can be “carried out quite satisfactorily in more mundane 
terms.”54  Within this view, the theological language of early bioethics can—even 
should—be abandoned for a bioethical analysis outside faith, and yet this thin, 
presumptive analysis entirely misses the significance of such a change in discourse. As 
Evans staunchly argues, the strength of theological discourse is an explicit examination 
of “ends” whereas secular science subverts the question of ends amidst its disciplinary 
enthusiasm for progressive, technological means. Moreover, as these theologians-
turned-bioethicists exemplify, the translation of rich, theological ends were naively 
translated into secular language in a non-commensurable manner: 
The richness of the theological end could generally survive translation to 
secular language because, at [an early] point in the debate, any end that could be 
expressed in English could be used. Commensuration of theological ends, 
which would occur later on, involves the throwing away of information that 
does not fit into predetermined ends. To use a spatial metaphor, the 
theologians could create any (theological) shape they wanted and put it through 
a (secular) hole of the same shape. Later, theological square shapes would of 
                                               
54 Jonsen, 1998: 57-58.  
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necessity be stuffed into (secular) circular holes, losing part of their form as 
they passed through. These secularly stated ends were not assumed to be held 
by the population; the point was to convince the population to adopt them.55 
 
 
In a related way, Engelhardt decries this transition into the “neutral” language of 
bioethics, and yet he addresses not theological bioethics but more concretely Christian 
bioethics. For Engelhardt, not just Fletcher but all three of Jonsen’s “trinity of 
theologians” became “marginalized” amidst the “secularization of the public fora and 
public spaces of the West.” For Engelhardt, the deeper critique is that these Christian 
ethicists turned bioethicists “due to a form of self-demolition tied to a failure to be 
authentically Christian.” 56  Hence, the shift from theology to bioethics is certainly 
related to the cultural shifts and context of secularism, and yet particular individuals 
and voices speaking in Christian bioethics in the 1970s can and should be challenged 
on the grounds of what it means to speak as Christians. Engelhardt’s critique aligns 
closely with Hauerwas, particularly as he distinguished his Christian message from 
principlist discourses: 
For by speaking from a theological perspective I do not pretend to speak from 
principles that are or should be shared by everyone in our society. You should 
also know that my own methodological presuppositions in this respect are not 
widely shared among those that work in theological ethics. Rather the 
assumption is that theological ethics must develop arguments that should 
compel consent from all rational subjects irrespective of their religious 
convictions or lack of religious convictions. Of course, that results in the 
somewhat ironical state of affairs that committees such as this one invite 
representatives of religious communities to show how their communities' 
particular convictions throw light on an issue only to be told that Christian 
                                               
55 Evans, 2002: 66. Evans further points to the particular proclivity of Protestant 
theologians to differ and change amidst their debated theological ends. In short, 
Protestantism tends to follow a methodology of appropriating disparate biblical themes 
and this then enables multiple theological debates around different ends (Evans: 2002: 
65-66). 
56 Engelhardt, 2014: 2. 
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views on the subject are not necessarily related to their religious convictions. 
Christian ethicists therefore say what any right thinking moral philosopher or 
person would say.  Well I simply do not believe that. It will be the heart of my 
argument that theological beliefs do make a difference for how in vitro 
fertilization is understood.57  
 
 
The import of this ethically is that traditional religious convictions do not equate 
essentially to secularist or democratic principles. Much can and will be lost in 
translation, and this is not a call to despair for all communication but rather to point 
out the need for a closer understanding of the ontological realities that must be 
acknowledged. The point in challenging Fletcher, Ramsey, and McCormick’s main-
stream bioethics language is to note the vast difference ethically between theorizing 
about the “right or wrong” of some bio-technological possibility and determining what 
we are to be. The thickness of Christian ends places a different ordo on ethics that directs 
us to questions of being and ontology—of what and who we are—as an essential step 
before seeking the relative goodness of an action or bio-technology. In this vein, 
adding to Hauerwas and Engelhardt’s critiques of theologians turned bioethicists, 
Bishop reminds us that such an ontological viewpoint is necessary to grasp the 
“metaphysical moral claims implicit in medical technology” that rival the Christian 
ontological worldview. 
The medical establishment insisted that theology thin out its language before 
they were permitted at the table; and they did so precisely because these voices 
threatened the implicit ontologies and teleologies of medical science. Put 
differently, the ontology and teleology of medical science are not thin. It is in 
fact robust; however, it is couched in a very different sort of language.58 
 
 
                                               
57 Hauerwas, 1979. 
58 Bishop, 2014: 306. 
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In other words, Bishop furthers the biopolitics of Engelhardt and Evans by holding 
that the transition of “theological ends” into “thin secular ends” was not merely a 
conforming to “formal reason” but actually was a robust clash of the ontologies and 
teleologies between secular medical science and the Christian tradition. Moreover, as 
Hauerwas notes, the motivations for shifting from theology and Christian particularity 
are not difficult to imagine, and these motivations are the biopolitical elements that 
should be unpacked within the story of rival ontologies: 
So medical ethicists, being the good priests they are, went to where the power is 
in liberal societies—medical schools. Kings and princes once surrounded 
themselves with priests for legitimation. Likewise, politicians today surround 
themselves with good social scientists to give those they rule the impression 
that they really know what is going on and can plan accordingly. Physicians, in 
an increasingly secular society, surround themselves with medical ethicists. God 
no longer exists, the sacred universe of values has replaced God, and allegedly 
ethicists think about values and decisions that involve values.59 
  
 
These words from Hauerwas may seem harsh—for Ramsey and McCormack, if not for 
Fletcher—and yet Hauerwas’ primary aim seems less a personal accusation and more 
an identification of the role of power that will serve as a default framework when 
unwittingly navigating from one robust ontology (the Christian tradition) into another 
(the secular, scientific medical system). Hence, what Hauerwas rightly critiques is the 
simplistic narrative that bioethics in the 1970s was strongly inclusive of Christian 
theology, and that this early inclusion of a theological discourse was largely phased out 
after Fletcher, McCormack, and Ramsey. Such a narrative misses the biopolitical and 
cultural reasons why theology was displaced amidst a growing secularism and the 
                                               
59 Hauerwas, 1995: 14. 
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dynamics of America’s morphing claims to be a “Christian nation.”60  
 
In addition to the narrative and critiques of theologians-turned-bioethicists, another 
helpful biopolitical viewpoint may be considered by examining the history of the 
phrase “sanctity of life.” Here it is instructive to follow David Jones’ assessment of the 
“sanctity of life” as a frequently employed “principle” that differentiates from a 
purportedly rival “quality of life” (QOL) position. The “sanctity of life” (SOL) position 
is typically associated with conservative or traditional ethics, and for some the “sanctity 
of life principle clearly has religious origins.”61 On the contrary, however, Jones draws 
from Leon Kass and others to point out that “sanctity of life” does not occur either in 
the Hebrew Bible or in the New Testament. Within the Roman Catholic document on 
assisted reproduction, Donum Vitae (1987), there is mention that “human life is sacred 
because…it involves the creative action of God” (Donum Vitae intro. 5), and yet Jones 
nuances the way sacra is employed rather than sanctitas.  
It may be noted that while Donum Vitae and John Paul II refer to life as ‘sacred’ 
(sacra), they do not speak of the ‘sanctity’ (sanctitas) of life and it may also be 
noted that even in these very recent documents the predominant language is 
not one of sacredness but of ‘respect’, ‘inviolability’ and the ‘right to life’.62 
 
                                               
60 “Ramsey and McCormack surely took their Christianity as having been heuristic for 
them. However, given the seduction of the time, they did not place their reflections on 
bioethics within a distinctively Christian discourse. Instead, they tried to place 
Christianity and Christian bioethics within an idiom they hoped would be open to all. 
They did not invoke insights open only to Christians, for that would have appeared too 
sectarian and countercultural. Given America’s having renounced its previous de facto 
if not de jure establishment of Christianity, it would have appeared un-American” 
(Engelhardt, 2014: 6). 
61 Jones includes Keyserlingk, Otlowski, Kuhse, and Baytertz as examples of those who 
directly assume that sanctity of life “obviously” stems from a religious provenance 
based on the “vocabulary” alone. Jones, 2016: 186. 
62 Jones, 2016: 187. 
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The use of sacra seems not to indicate a principle against killing or some inherent, 
essential nature of life itself possessing sanctity (sanctitas). Rather, sacra indicates a 
quality of life within some other context. A life should not be wrongfully taken as life is 
sacred (sacra), but the further move to proclaim an essential sanctity of life qua life is a 
different claim.  
The recent provenance of this phrase has been demonstrated by George 
Khushf (1996) after an exhaustive literature survey covering 4,800 libraries 
including libraries of congress in 26 countries. He was only able to find two 
significant references to the use of this phrase in its modern sense prior to the 
twentieth century, and ‘nearly all citations’ were from after 1948. A distinct but 
related attempt by Andi Sullivan to find journal articles using the terms ‘sanctity 
of (human) life’, ‘sacredness of (human) life’ and ‘human dignity’ also found no 
references before 1893 and only 239 citations before 1939 in comparison to 
8,475 from 1940 to the present. Indeed, the great majority of references (6,467) 
were from 1970 onwards.63 
 
 
Jones is clear that exceptions do surface. It is possible to find quotations regarding the 
sacredness of life, and yet the significant point is how rare such exceptions are. 
Moreover, the argument here does not entail that theological accounts of the sanctity 
of human life against wrongful killing should not be made. Rather,  
It should be noticed that neither the fathers of the Church of Latin West or 
Greek East nor the scholastic theologians of the High Middle Ages did in fact 
develop such an account. They did not relate the Commandment against killing 
human beings to the sacredness of life. Understood as the name of a well-
established ‘principle’, ‘the sanctity of (human) life’ is virtually an invention of 
the late twentieth century.64 
 
 
So then, if not from within the Christian tradition, from where does the now-popular 
                                               
63 Jones, 2016: 187.  
64 Jones, 2016: 189. 
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“sacredness of human life” principle arise? According to Jones and John Keown, it was 
Glanville William who popularized the phrase in his monograph The Sanctity of Life and 
the Criminal Law (1957), and it is pertinent to note that Williams does not preface his 
use of “the sanctity of life” by appealing to any previous citations, nor does he define 
the phrase. 65  Instead, the phrase is employed as a way to suggest that killing the 
innocent is wrong on the grounds of a “feeling” or “general opinion” stemming from a 
“religious heritage.” Williams writes that “even the modern infidel tends…to regard all 
human life as sacred,” and that this “feeling” is a “legacy of their religious heritage” and 
a profession within a society and religious tradition that “is likely to be coloured by that 
religion.” Moreover, he notes that “this general opinion, whether religious or secular” 
might justify the punishment of a mother who kills her “monster or idiot child.”66 
Clearly, for Williams, the prohibition on killing such infants stems—as a purportedly 
weak argument—from a religious legacy in the West, and hence Jones rightly aligns 
Williams with Peter Singer and others who focus on non-voluntary euthanasia of 
intellectually disabled children as “idiots” or “monsters.” What is particularly notable in 
this move to defame “sanctity of life” as a “religious” thing is how this negative 
conception of religion aligns so neatly within the imagination of the secular. As 
Milbank has noted, when the secular is accepted, an ensuing “desacralization” is to be 
expected as it is specifically not religion but rather the cosmos itself—including, 
inevitably, “the political, the social, the economic, the artistic – the human ‘itself’’—that 
is the source of “sacral allure.”67  
                                               
65 Keown and Jones, 2008: 85-126. 
66 Glanville Williams (The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 1957) as quoted in Jones, 
2016: 190. 
67 Milbank, 2006: 9. 
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In the aftermath of Williams’ inauguration of “the sanctity of life” as a dated religious 
vestige, the phrase came to be assumed as more conservative others sought to counter 
Williams.68 In reality, however, the phrase remained subtly derogatory. The sanctity of 
life phrase and pseudo-principle arose from a secular source and remains ensconced in 
ambiguity given the lack of history, context, or definition for the phrase. Without a locus 
classicus, the possibilities for clear communication with the phrase require one to 
stipulate a new definition, and the primary connotation is dismissive. Jones explains:  
The connotations of this language are part of a deliberate attempt to distract 
from fundamental issues of justice, solidarity, and human rights and falsely to 
imply that the legal protection which is due to vulnerable human beings is 
based only on religious sentiment…A direct consequence of the recent 
emergence of this language, and of its origin as a description of an approach 
that is being rejected, is that there is no agreement as to the definition of this 
‘principle’...the description is external and alien to the intellectual tradition 
being criticized.”69 
 
 
In short, without any legitimate definition for “sanctity of life” that actually matches 
the nuanced and layered reasoning of many who are concerned with wrongful killing, 
the phrase exists primarily as a straw-man fallacy for the sake of marginalizing the other 
position. “Sanctity of life” is inherently reductionistic when employed to argue for the 
worth of mere physical existence. Such vitalism allows Fletcher, Singer, and others to 
maintain that there is more value in “life” beyond biological existence, and hence it 
becomes very reasonable to practice non-voluntary euthanasia for “idiot” Down’s 
                                               
68 “It was only after Williams’s book, and in opposition to it, that some prominent 
religious thinkers [including, amongst others, Norman St. John-Stevas (1964), Paul 
Ramsey (1968) and Daniel Callahan (1968)] took up the language of the ‘sanctity of life’ 
with a view to defending this ‘principle’.” Jones, 2016: 190. 
69 Jones, 2016: 191. 
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children who are not deemed persons. Personhood is a value that exists beyond merely 
being alive, and hence Down children do not possess the requisite “quality of life” 
needed to be persons. Within this reduced debate, the clash between “sanctity” and 
“quality” becomes a territorial dispute between antiquated, religious reasoning and 
modern, secular enlightenment. The winner of such a stacked debate is no surprise. 
 
Moreover, Jones rightly notes the background philosophical assumptions—
assumptions arising in 20th century moral theories—behind this reductionist schema as 
moral philosophy is limited to a dichotomy between deontological or teleological 
viewpoints. In this case, deontological thinking is associated with Kantian duties and 
rules while teleological ethics does not mean final causality but rather utilitarian 
calculations in the wake of Bentham and Mill. If and when this simple dichotomy is 
posited as the bioethical status quo, Fletcher is furthered in positing “sanctity of life” 
ethics as the deontological mode where (outdated) religious rules and vitalistic 
principles are rightly abandoned in favor of teleological theories that take into 
consideration “goods, needs, or values” of actual persons. The needs both of the 
“idiot” Down child and the conflicted parents align in favor of non-voluntary 
euthanasia. Quality of life rationally and theoretically trumps sanctity of life, and yet 
this is an ethical paradigm limited only within the limited logic of secular modernity. 
Jones points to Aristotle and Aquinas as two immense opponents to this dichotomy of 
modernist logic, and yet ironically when “virtue theory” is added as a simplified third 
option for moral theories, we can reduce virtue into simply another theoretical choice, 
yielding an oversimplification that moves from two to three “options.”  
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The debate over meanings of “sanctity of life” is ongoing, and the above discussion is 
hardly exhaustive. The point for now is to note the language systems that inevitably 
emerge amidst the landscape of bioethics particularly when secularism is the assumed 
common ground upon which ethical theories are employed. The presumption that 
language or philosophy can be neutral practices within the secular falters before the 
critiques of biopolitics. Allen Buchanan supports this point by calling for a more 
honest evaluation of the role of bioethicists from the standpoint of social moral 
epistemology. Looking back upon the eugenics movements of the late nineteenth and 
middle of the twentieth centuries, Buchanan notes the limited “conventional ‘ethical 
autopsy’” that views the chief error of eugenicists as being too willing to ignore 
individual “rights” for the broader social “good.” The correction for this presumably 
now blatant error is “more Kant, less Bentham!” Buchanan rightly critiques this limited 
moral spectrum and turns to the biopolitical question of the expertise of a bioethicist. 
The distinction between rights-based and consequentialist moral theories and 
principles does little to illuminate such a subversion of conventional morality 
[when eugenics was naïvely, socially accepted]. We need to understand why so 
many well-educated laypeople, across the political spectrum, trusted the wrong 
“experts.” In social moral epistemological terms, we must explain the 
phenomenon of unwarranted epistemic deference—showing how it came to be that 
certain individuals managed to present themselves to the public as scientific 
experts on human heredity and why the public was ready to accept what they 
said…We need an account of the epistemic vices of the supposed experts.70 
 
 
Are there epistemic vices of bioethics as a field? What is the expertise of a bioethicist? 
Is the bioethicist a philosopher? An ethicist? At one point, bioethicists were primarily 
theologians. Now, in what sense is bioethics a distinct discipline or profession? Is the 
more fitting title for a bioethicist actually a biopolitician? As Carl Elliott has pointed 
                                               
70 Buchanan, 2007: 292; 288-96. 
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out, what is new is “ethics as a position of bureaucratic authority staffed by trained 
professionals.” Ethics has been professionalized, which is to say that it has gained a 
corporate, bureaucratic structure, and while some may contend that this profession 
offers a service of critical thinking skills and certain expertise with regulatory policies, 
Elliott reminds us: “this position of authority…has been given, usually by virtue of 
their place in a particular bureaucracy.” We live in an “age of expertise” empowered by 
“virtue of efficiency and a claim to truth,” and bioethicists stand as such “experts” who 
are “acculturated into a standard view of the world…[and] it is because of their power, 
not just their credentials, that experts are so difficult to challenge.”71 
 
 
 
2.3 Tar-Baby Principlism: The Pragmatism of Shifty Language 
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. PI 115 
 
 
In conclusion, it is fitting to reflect briefly on the language of principlism that 
has doubtless become more professionally normative than any other in bioethics. 
Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1977; 2013) has been published 
in seven editions and in the eyes of many is seen as the bible of bioethics. The “four-
principles” or “principlism” approach advanced in this text is widely employed within 
the field. Principles of Biomedical Ethics exhibits “a cool detached writing style that is 
expressed by an impersonal narrator” and is such a classic in the field that it is “often 
referred to not by title but by its authors: ‘Do you have a copy of Beauchamp and 
                                               
71 Elliott, 2007: 45-46; 43-46. 
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Childress?’” 72  Amidst such popularity within the field, it is instructive to view 
Beauchamp and Childress’ (B&C) articulation of “common” or “universal” morality 
and to observe how explicitly they position their moral analysis within a flexible social 
and historical framework that begs for a biopolitical analysis. While B&C maintain on 
the one hand that the nature of the common morality is “not relative to cultures, 
groups, or individuals”—and they list examples such as “do not kill; do not cause pain 
or suffering to others; prevent evil or harm from occurring; rescue persons in danger; 
tell the truth; obey just laws, etc.—they simultaneously admit that common morality is 
not “ahistorical or a priori” but rather is “a product of human experience and 
history.”73 For B&C, this is a proper clarification and nuance on what exactly is 
universal or common: namely, the commonality in morality is something that arises “as 
a product” of a shifting and historically-bound cosmopolitanism, and in their view the 
human experience of morality remains the same regardless of the shifting social and 
historical features that may arise. As Arras summarizes: “moral normativity is 
established historically and pragmatically through the success of these norms at all 
times and places in advancing the cause of human flourishing. Their account is thus 
historicist, but unlike most historicisms it does not embrace moral relativism.”74 
 
This formula for claiming universality and historicity in B&C is furthered by their 
distinction between thin “common” morality and a more concrete or “particular” 
morality. Particular morality extends from common morality and is not necessarily 
“shared by all culture, groups, and individuals.” Particular moralities may be Jewish 
                                               
72 Chambers, 2007: 286; 281-87. 
73 Beauchamp & Childress, 2013: 3-4. 
74 Arras, 2009: 13.  
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moral norms located in the Talmudic tradition, or even professional moralities 
maintained, for example, in certain physician codes, and yet these particular moralities 
stem from what is common in morality.75 Moreover, the balancing act between these 
two spheres presents B&C with a tension and space in which they can (and do) appeal 
to contradictory poles within the same formula; hence, appeals to particular or 
common morality equally may be used to address moral tensions in either direction. 
Here B&C turn to John Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium” as a type of coherentism that 
starts with “a body of beliefs…initially accepted without argumentative support” and 
balances this assumed foundation with more concrete, practical instances. The goal 
here is “equilibrium” between specific beliefs of an individual or community within the 
broader commitments of universal, common morality. For instance, when balancing 
organ donation (1) according to “the expected number of years of survival” with (2) a 
waiting list that grants equal opportunity to all individuals, B&C advocate for a 
“pruning and adjusting of beliefs” that accounts for moral norms behind both of these 
needs. An ideal state of reflective equilibrium is not possible B&C posit, and hence 
they argue for a limited goal of “trimming, repairing, and reshaping” beliefs in a 
realistic, “non-utopian” process focused on “progress, rather than finished products.” 76 
 
Similarly, in the classic case of a Jehovah’s Witness couple who refuses a medically 
needed blood transfusion for their 2 year old child, the clash between individual, 
religiously-motivated autonomy and the physician’s (or society’s) beneficence is clearly 
evident. Typically, ethicists seem to approach this case as though the religious rationale 
                                               
75 Beauchamp & Childress, 2013: 5-6. 
76 Beauchamp & Childress, 2013: 404-05; 390-24. 
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is “out of the norm” and various strategies leading to a court order are offered to 
override the Jehovah’s Witness’ autonomy. However right or wrong one deems the 
Jehovah’s Witness position on blood transfusion to be, what is interesting is the 
inevitably “majority appeal position” that common morality employs in approaching 
this case. As Lee notes, “what ethicists seem to be doing under the banner of common 
morality is evaluating or judging the minority culture of Jehovah’s Witnesses from the 
perspective of the mainline culture in the West (e.g., liberal individualism, humanism 
and mainline Christian denominations).”77 In a passage that has been edited and re-
edited in each of B&C’s 5th, 6th, and 7th editions, they address this matter through a 
middle ground: 
Recognition of legitimate diversity, by contrast to moral violations that warrant 
criticism and perhaps even punishment, is vital when we evaluate the actions of 
others. One person’s conscientious assessment of his or her obligations may be 
different from another’s when they confront the same moral problem. Both 
evaluations may be rooted in the common morality. Similarly, what one 
institution or government determines it should do may differ from what 
another institution or government determines it should do. In such cases, we 
can assess one position as morally preferable to another only if we can show 
that the position rests on a more coherent set of specifications and 
interpretations of the common morality.78 
 
 
In effect, common morality remains something “out there” regardless of the two 
differing sides involved with the blood transfusion. The focus then turns towards 
whomever can articulate the best argument to demonstrate which party has the best 
claim to accord with common morality. This “solution by a better argument” procedurally 
or practically seems productive in a case such as the Jehovah’s Witness, but it must be 
noted that the impetus for judging the best argument stems from the current social 
                                               
77 Lee, 2010: 526.  
78 Beauchamp & Childress, 2013: 25. 
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majority. Hypothetically, if Jehovah’s Witnesses were the majority population in an 
authoritatively ruling state, the common moral foundation B&C promote would shift 
to support withholding blood transfusions. 
 
Likewise, when B&C anticipate examples critical of common morality such as the 
“Pirates Creed of Ethics or Custom of the Brothers of the Coast” (1640), they can 
reject this on the grounds that such is a “particular morality” that does not accord with 
what is universally normative. The Pirate’s Creed meets the need of “bare coherence” 
in that it is internally consistent, and yet for B&C the Creed fails the test of universality. 
The rhetoric of pirates may seem ideal given that few if any consider it desirable to be 
robbed, pillaged, or murdered. The reality, however, as Arras reminds us, is that Rawls’ 
process of reflective equilibrium is “maximally inclusive” such that all particular 
possibilities should be considered as the commonness of morality is being realized.    
If you do not like the way the process of reflective equilibrium is going, if you 
think that it currently overlooks some crucial pieces of the moral picture—such 
as a different moral outlook or a background theory of social stability—then 
this method simply asks you to toss it into the mix alongside all our other 
beliefs. Although the initial moral data of reflective equilibrium, i.e., our 
considered moral judgments, could conceivably be overturned—think, for 
example, of recent attitudes towards homosexuality—it is hard to imagine that 
most of them would or could be overturned in our lifetime; and if they are 
overturned, then it would no doubt be for the sort of good reasons that would 
lead Beauchamp and Childress to expand the scope of the norm of equal 
treatment within the common morality.79 
 
 
In short, B&C seem optimistically to envision common morality as an ethical space in 
which one may navigate progressively ever more towards a realization of human moral 
flourishing, whatever that may be. However, “whatever that may be” is no small 
                                               
79 Arras, 2009: 20. 
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assumption. As Lee points out, B&C offer an ethical approach that is “thick in status 
and thin in content” as it offers suggested practical solutions that are easily confused as 
metaphysical truths. In the case of the Jehovah’s Witness scenario, we are offered a 
“prescriptive” common moral solution, and yet the background for this prescription 
largely remains vacant. “To validate their theoretical position of recognizing the 
legitimate moral diversity is consistent with the prescriptive common morality, they still 
need to come up with another backup, if there is one.”80 Hence Lee’s critique is correct 
in identifying that B&C offer a “thick” solution that is aimed at practical answers and 
yet “thin” in that it may support a multitude of different traditional and individual 
answers. Autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice as B&C present them 
are less suited to be ethical “answers” as much as the actual “grounds” for ethical 
debate. In the 2009 6th edition (p. 25), B&C referred to the four principles first as the 
“thin set of four clusters of universal principles” but then expressed certainty that 
“near-complete agreement in moral judgment” will arise from the common morality 
methodology. For the 2013 7th edition, however, the promise of principles was qualified 
yet firm: “Principlism, then is not a mere list and analysis of four abstract principles. It 
is a theory about how principles link to and guide practice.”81 Given this confusion 
over the thick and thin status of principlism, Lee calls upon B&C either to assert (1) 
the Western or American “liberal individualist common moral intuition” that 
undergirds the application of principlism (“come take counsel with us!”), or (2) the real 
possibility that “no culture/tradition’s usage of the four principles and conclusions 
based on them is better or worse” (“use our big four to your own taste!”). Can 
                                               
80 Lee, 2010: 527. 
81 Beauchamp & Childress, 2013: 25. 
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principlism be considered as anything else but “the method of common morality 
(moral objectivism) de jure but of moral relativism de facto”?82 
 
In other words, B&C fail to identify their own rationale—or, perhaps more aptly, 
principle/s—for selecting universal principles of common morality. What is the measure 
for commonality amongst principles? Here it is clear that B&C wish to avoid entirely 
such a metaethical question and to remain in a quasi-foundational middle sphere. Their 
emphasis is on common morality as “a basic starter kit of abstract moral norms [is] 
meant to provide justificatory ballast to subsequent moral reflection.”83 B&C seek a 
pre-theoretical, quasi-foundationalism built upon presumably-universal starting points, 
and consistent with this they dedicate chapter 9 of Principles to surveying moral theories 
such as Kantianism, utilitarianism, rights theory, virtue ethics, etc.—all this as an 
explicit attempt to avoid inaugurating another “comprehensive ethical theory.” 
Intending to limit their scope, B&C seek rather “to construct a coherent body of 
virtues, rights, principles, and rules for biomedical ethics.”84 In this way they bypass the 
essential foundational question and instead focus on principles relevant for biomedical 
ethics “drawn from the territory of common morality.” Their goal is not to survey the 
boundaries of common morality itself—“however large or small it may be [is] a matter 
we do not try to solve in [Principles of Bioethics].” Hence the thesis of Principles “is merely 
that the principles and rules are a reasonable formulation of some vital norms of the 
common morality and that the principles we analyze are particularly suited to 
                                               
82 Lee, 2010: 528. 
83 Arras, 2009: 29. 
84 Beauchamp & Childress, 2013: 351; 351-89. 
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biomedical ethics.”85 
 
For some, this vague degree of foundational particularity may seem well and fine, but 
what remains in practice amidst this shifty language is a system of professionalized 
language that can morph and bend at will, and the will behind this moral schema 
should not be ignored. This chapter has argued thus far that the morphing and shifting 
of principlist language will inevitably fall in line with whatever political power schema is 
currently en vogue. Rather than pursue explicitly a traditional or content-rich vision 
and habitus of the good, B&C enact a “pragmatic” process that adopts select terms and 
language such as autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice as thin threads 
dangling from past Enlightenment thinking. Discerning exactly what these terms entail 
and how they are employed is not easy. Articulating this point, Arras strikingly 
compares B&C to the character Borg in the science fiction series Star Trek, The Next 
Generation.  
The Borg, a hive of cybernetically-enhanced humanoid drones, explore the 
universe in search of interesting new cultures and technologies, which they 
promptly conquer and incorporate into their neural network en route to their 
goal of ultimate perfection. On encountering an alien culture, the Borg 
ominously announce, “Resistance is futile, you will be assimilated.” Many of 
Beauchamp and Childress’s critics know the feeling. No sooner do they launch 
a seemingly crippling broadside against the juggernaut of PBE from a casuist, 
narrativist, feminist, or pragmatist perspective than their critique is promptly 
welcomed with open arms, trimmed of its perceived excesses, and incorporated 
into the ever-expanding synthesis of the next edition.86 
 
 
Beyond such a descriptive analysis, the fact remains that Beauchamp and Childress are 
“drawing from the territory of common morality” from within a secular vision of reality. 
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In this way, B&C quintessentially represent the tendency in bioethics Engelhardt 
identified: the tendency to disregard the “difficulties that lie at the very roots of 
modern thought…[namely, proceeding] with the task of applying ethics as if it were 
obvious which secular ethic ought to be applied.” Such a secular vision ignores the 
inevitable pluralism of postmodernity and the reality that “there is more than one 
vision of the cosmopolis and of the cosmopolitan.” B&C are cosmopolitan liberals 
who must believe that they themselves possess the secular touchstone for what is 
“canonical, content-full, secular morality (and bioethics),” and hence the whole of their 
endeavor is “justifiable” independent of any “particular moral history and tradition.” 87 
 
Considering B&C’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics as something of a representation of 
bioethics itself, what emerges is a professionalized, easily-accessed language capable of 
employment within various shades of liberal secularism. B&C may not intend to speak 
with “bioethical expertise” when “expertise” entails a biopolitical claim to power, and 
yet the effect of their shifty language is to leave a vacuum that inevitably will be filled. 
This vacuum, moreover, is a presence Milbank identifies within the “formal openness 
of liberalism which is designed to mitigate conflict, and an arbitrariness of content on 
the other hand – a ‘positivism’ which always threatens to overwhelm even the peace of 
mere suspended hostility which is the best that the civitas terrena can ever manage.” The 
options for content within liberalism can be  
either ‘scientific’ as in the case of eugenicism and the extermination of the 
supposedly weak (which happens in far more modes than we usually 
acknowledge) or it can be ‘religious’ as in the case of recently emergent 
‘fundamentalisms’ which usually trade off, and theologically confirm, socio-
economic liberalism, while also in certain strategic ways surpassing and 
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opposing it.88  
 
 
Milbank’s broader thesis on liberalism is fitting for a biopolitical understanding of 
bioethics as he contends that the secular is “complicit” with an “ontology of violence.” 
The civitas terrena is fundamentally a matter of force and counter-force, and in the 
absence of any transcendent, ontological vision and habitus of the good, the expertise of 
a bioethicist is naturally rendered as a mechanized cog within some “arbitrary content.” 
As Elliott warned the “figure of the ethicist” may play a key role within Christopher 
Lasch’s “culture of narcissism” bent on feelings or illusions of “well-being, health, and 
psychic security.” This role will be “uniquely late-modern” in the turn away from 
priests or rabbis as the representatives of God. Those traditional “external figures” 
mean less today as the postmodern moral compass is directed “internally.” Ironically, 
amidst this inward turn, bioethics draws us “to look outward again…to figures who 
derive their authority not from God but from a special kind of training. The authority 
of ethicists comes from their claim to expertise.”89 
 
In short, the discourses of bioethics reveal a pragmatic, principlist system of language 
that possesses its own self-referential rules, and those who master the language of 
bioethics gain the authority of being a “bioethicist” even while the foundation or 
grounding for this claim remains unclear. At this point, Wittgenstein’s critique of 
philosophy grounded in theoretical or scientific thinking is strikingly appropriate, and 
the following chapter examines the life and philosophy of Wittgenstein to show how 
                                               
88 Milbank, 2006: XI-XII. 
89 Elliott, 2007: 44. 
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the prominent philosophical thinking employed in bioethics tends “to ask and answer 
questions in the way science does” (BB 18). The confusion of such language evidenced 
in bioethics and modern, theoretical philosophy produces a confused and faulty 
metaphysics that the following chapter aims to uncover through Wittgenstein’s critical 
and therapeutic practices with language.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
COLLAPSING THEORY: THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC THINKING  
 
 
In the following, I describe Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy, a metaphilosophy 
that challenges the modern viewpoint that philosophy will provide “fundamental 
insights into the human condition and the ultimate character of the universe, leading to 
vital conclusions about how we ought to arrange our lives.” 1  Wittgenstein’s 
metaphilosophy may also be called his critique of philosophy, a critique of philosophy 
as a theorizing endeavor that I contend is employed within prominent discourses of 
bioethics. This theme in Wittgenstein is complex, and, naturally, interpretive “camps” 
abound following different readings of Wittgenstein. This chapter does not purport to 
engage all of the vast secondary literature on Wittgenstein but rather to home in on 
Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy, and this entails a focus not on secondary arguments 
regarding tractarian insights that may be drawn for discourses of analytical positivism. 
The goal rather is to understand, for example, what Wittgenstein means by stating the 
most important (and unwritten) point of the Tractatus is ethical and how the Tractatus 
may be seen as an “ascetical exercise in learning to acknowledge what may be said in 
order to respect that which is unsayable.”2 Further, my goal is to give an exposition of 
                                               
1 Horwich, 2012: 2. 
2 Writing to Ludwig von Ficker regarding publishing the Tractatus, Wittgenstein stated: 
“I am pinning my hopes on you. And it will probably be helpful for you if I write a few 
words about my book: For you won’t—I really believe—get too much out of reading 
it. Because you won’t understand it; the content will seem really strange to you. In 
reality, it isn’t strange to you, for the point of the book is ethical. I once wanted to give 
a few words in the forward which now are actually not in it, which, however, I’ll write 
to you now because they might be a key for you: I wanted to write that my work 
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Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy that I argue is consistent throughout his early and later 
works and yet reaches a fuller maturity in the Philosophical Investigations. I do not aim to 
critique or defend every part of his view but rather to describe it and then to 
demonstrate how Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy informs the discourses of moral 
epistemology in bioethics. The first step in articulating Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy 
will be to describe the cohesive (though nuanced) unity of early and late Wittgenstein. 
Bridging the Wittgensteins is a needed step for at least two reasons: (1) key to 
Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy and work on the whole, one should clarify how the 
structure and claims of the Tractatus do or do not accord with the Investigations; (2) more 
significantly, I argue that the turn from the Tractatus’ emphasis on crystalline logic to 
therapeutic language in the Investigations3 may be informative for bioethics. 
 
 
3.1 Bridging the Wittgensteins 
The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling recollections for a particular purpose (PI 127). 
 
Reading Wittgenstein can be a trying experience, not unlike following an alpine 
path suspended in fog. From the concise, analytical precision of the Tractatus to the 
cryptic aphorisms of the Investigations, Wittgenstein is puzzling, and he himself is hardly 
                                                                                                                                    
consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have not 
written. And precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is 
delimited from within, as it were, by my book; and I’m convinced that, strictly 
speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this way. In brief, I think: All of that which 
many are babbling today, I have defined in my book by remaining silent about it. 
Therefore the book will, unless I’m quite wrong, have much to say which you want to 
say yourself, but perhaps you won’t notice that it is said in it” (Wittgenstein, 1979b: 94). 
3 By “Investigations” here I mean Part I. I am following the practice of the revised 4th 
edition of Anscombe’s translation of Philosophische Untersuchungen in describing Part I as 
Philosophical Investigations (1-693), Part II as Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment 
(Philosophical Investigations, 4th ed. P. M. S. Hacker & J. Schulte, trs. G. E. M. Anscombe, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2009). 
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immune from being puzzled as evidenced by his lecture notes and letters to friends that 
reveal the dynamic process and formation of his thoughts. Amidst Wittgenstein’s 
questions and puzzles over logic and language, however, we unquestionably glimpse a 
luminous mind at work. Bertrand Russell accepted Wittgenstein as a student poorly 
read in philosophy in October of 1911 only to announce in March of 1912 that he had 
nothing left to teach the prodigious Austrian. The protégé and master quickly swapped 
places, and such a keen intellect is likely one reason behind Bennett’s comment in 1975: 
“Wittgenstein is long dead, and philosophers have recovered their nerve.”4 
 
The challenge of reading Wittgenstein is something he himself acknowledged. “[The 
Tractatus] is written for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit. This spirit is 
different from the one which informs the vast stream of European and American 
civilization in which all of us stand” (PR 7). He thought his work and culture “foreign” 
to the predominant scientific and progressive modes of his contemporary culture (CV 
7), and he looked to figures as varying as Beethoven, Goethe, and Nietzsche who 
confronted “problems of the intellectual world of the West” in a prophetic way akin to 
his own (CV 9).5 In a similar vein, the preface of the Tractatus opens with Wittgenstein’s 
remark that only those “who have themselves already thought the thoughts” expressed 
in the Tractatus will “perhaps understand it” (T, p. 27). What is this “spirit” readers 
                                               
4 Quoted in Edwards, 1982: 2. 
5 “If I say that my book is meant only for a small circle of people (if it can be called a 
circle), I do not mean that I believe this circle to be the elite of mankind; but it does 
comprise those to whom I turn (not because they are better or worse than others but) 
because they form my cultural milieu, my fellow citizens as it were, in contrast to the 
rest who are foreign to me.” (CV 10) 
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must share to grasp Wittgenstein?6  Doubtless, such statements shed light on the 
questioning reception of Wittgenstein in many philosophical circles committed 
primarily to analytical and discursive rationality. Or, likely even more troubling to many 
philosophers is the notion that a right end of philosophy is mystical silence: “There is 
indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical (T 6.522). Whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (T 7). One must wonder also if the difficulty 
in reading Wittgenstein should be connected to Wittgenstein’s difficulties in finishing 
his writing projects, especially later in his career. These respective difficulties, however, 
seem far removed from “prosaic obscurity” or from “writers block” and more due to 
the nature of philosophy itself and the ineffable to which Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
points. Wittgenstein’s understanding of philosophy as an activity, not as a series of 
philosophical propositions or theories, fundamentally makes it difficult to write a book 
articulating his method.7 
 
The polarization of “younger” and “later” Wittgensteins is almost certainly the 
standard response to the puzzle of reading Wittgenstein, and often those who heavily 
lean on this distinction seem to cling primarily to but one of these poles, dismissing the 
other pejoratively as (early) “positivism” or (later) “mysticism”. 8  Bertrand Russell 
                                               
6 Frege puzzled over Wittgenstein’s statement that the Tractatus would only be 
understood who have already “thought the thoughts which are expressed in it.” Frege 
commented: “The pleasure of reading your book can therefore no longer be aroused by 
the content which is already known, but only by the peculiar form given to it by its 
author. The book thereby becomes an artistic rather than a scientific achievement; what 
is said in it takes second place to the way in which it is said” (as quoted Monk, 1990: 
174). 
7 Monk, 2005: 63. 
8 John Verdi’s wit renders this flat summary: “Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was 
two of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century” (Verdi, 2010: 10). 
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exemplifies this latter tendency as he remarked of the later Wittgenstein: “…[he] seems 
to have grown tired of serious thinking and invented a doctrine which would make 
such an activity unnecessary.”9 Whether or not Wittgenstein ever genuinely followed in 
the steps of Russell seeking to emulate his method and positivist ambitions is a strong 
matter of debate, yet it is clear that many see the Wittgensteins of the Tractatus and of 
the Investigations as seeking quite different goals.10 Or, as Moyal-Sharrock proposes, a 
third Wittgenstein may be discerned primarily via the post-Investigations notes published 
now as On Certainty. 11  Such distinctions may be helpful amidst some types of 
Wittgensteinian scholarship, and yet for this thesis it is more pertinent to look to the 
overarching unity of Wittgenstein. Admittedly, such an unity is likely for some the very 
point of contention in arguing for one or the other of the Wittgensteins, and yet I 
argue that the distinctions and reforms in Wittgenstein’s thought that lead to the 
“early” and “later” labels exist within cohesive, overarching concerns including (1) 
                                               
9 From Russell’s My Philosophical Development, quoted in Horwich, 2012: 3.  
10 Engelmann recounts Wittgenstein’s “depression” after reading Russell’s introduction 
to the Tractatus, the inclusion of which Engelmann thought was essential to getting the 
Tractatus published. That Wittgenstein was misread by one of his respected mentors 
likely contributed to his decision to take up elementary teaching, foregoing philosophy 
as a profession. See Engelmann, 1967: 116-17. The New York Review of Books (July 10, 
1969) printed an interesting encounter between Allan Janik and D.F. Pears on the 
question of Wittgenstein’s alignment with Russell. Janik calls on Engelmann’s Letters 
from Ludgwig Wittgenstein with Memoirs (1967) to question Pears’ “mythical Wittgenstein, 
which was conceived by Russell, nurtured by the Vienna Circle, and sustained by a 
segment of Anglo-Saxon philosophers for the last forty-five-odd years.” Janik and 
Engelmann see Wittgenstein in the tradition of language-mystics, utilizing tools of 
physics and logic to pursue “the same task as the language-mystics who maintained that 
language was incapable of expressing any sort of meaningful discourse concerning 
values.” The review and reply exchange is available: 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1969/jul/10 /wittgensteins-strategy-2/ 
(accessed 1/22/15). Furthermore, Monk identifies “the most important cause of 
[Wittgenstein’s] depression as his failure to find a publisher for the Tractatus – or even a 
single person who understood it” (Monk, 1990: 173). 
11 Moyal-Sharrock, 2004. 
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understanding the limits of philosophy and (2) seeking a moral vision of the “healthy 
human life.”12 Within this holistic view, Wittgenstein’s admission in the Preface to the 
Investigations of “grave mistakes” in the Tractatus represents Wittgenstein’s move from a 
representational theory of language that emphasizes logical necessity to a view of 
language defined by its activities and uses, but the change of emphasis from logic to 
language, however deeply significant, does not alter his overall goal of contesting 
abstract theorizing. The metaphilosophical concerns present in Wittgenstein’s tractarian 
thinking change in form but not in toto as he moves to the Investigations.13 Moreover, this 
reading accords with Wittgenstein’s desire to publish the nearly completed Philosophical 
Investigations side-by-side with the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as he considered that the 
Investigations would only make sense in light of the Tractatus. Certainly, this was due in 
part to the corrections he wished to make but equally to the “continuities between the 
two.” After all, Wittgenstein never denied or “repudiated” the philosophy of the 
Tractatus. He seemed, rather, to grasp more what was required in order “to do justice” 
                                               
12 Edwards, 1982: 4. 
13 More will be said below regarding Wittgenstein’s self-criticism. For now, it is helpful 
to note that Horwich identifies eight theses from the Tractatus that are rejected in the 
Investigations (Horwich, 2012: 96-104), and all are variations on Wittgenstein’s transition 
from logic as the mirror-image or “reflection” of the world (T 6.13, kiene Lehre, sondern 
ein Spiegelbild der Welt) with language simply representing this mirroring to his later 
acceptance of the complexity and inter-relatedness of language as the more accurate 
way to see the world. Despite the critical transition from the earlier to later 
Wittgenstein, a core relatedness unites Wittgenstein’s emphasis on crystalline logic and 
then with language for logic, language and the world stand in line to one another: 
“Other illusions come from various quarters to join the particular one spoken of here. 
Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture of the world. 
These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the 
other, each equivalent to each” (PI 96, cf. 97). 
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to the philosophy of the Tractatus: namely, “that there can be no such thing as a 
philosophical proposition, and that philosophy was entirely different to science.”14 
 
If we do not restrict Wittgenstein’s thought to static modes in two or three distinct 
periods, each with its respective masterpiece, we are more in agreement with Paul 
Engelmann, Wittgenstein’s confidant and publisher, who points to the question of 
philosophy itself as key:  
We do not understand Wittgenstein unless we realize that it was philosophy 
that mattered to him and not logic, which merely happened to be the only 
suitable tool for elaborating his world picture. This the Tractatus accomplishes 
in sovereign fashion, ending up with implacable consistency by nullifying the 
result, so that the communication of its basic thoughts, or rather of its basic 
tendency—which, according to its own findings, cannot on principle be 
effected by direct methods—is yet achieved indirectly. He nullifies his own 
world picture, together with the ‘house of cards’ of philosophy (which at that 
time at least he thought he had made collapse), so as to show ‘how little is achieved 
when these problems are solved’. What he wants to demonstrate is that such 
endeavors of human thought to ‘utter the unutterable’ are a hopeless attempt to 
satisfy man’s eternal metaphysical urge.”15  
 
 
Engelmann’s summary of Wittgenstein’s consistent life-long goal is striking: how little is 
achieved when these problems are solved and when theoretical philosophy has reached its end. 
Engelmann is not alone in reading a unified Wittgenstein. Horwich grants critical 
distinctions between the early and later Wittgenstein while advocating an overall 
coherence through Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy, which may be defined as the 
investigation into the aims, methods, and boundaries of philosophy itself. Pointing to 
                                               
14 Monk, 2005: 64. 
15 Engelmann, 1967: 96. Cf. PI 118: “Where does this investigation get its importance 
from, given that it seems only to destroy everything interesting: that is, all that is great 
and important? (As it were, all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and 
rubble.) But what we are destroying are only houses of cards, and we are clearing up 
the ground of language on which they stood.”  
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PI 109—“philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the 
resources of our language”—Horwich argues that key to Wittgenstein’s message is the 
assertion that “a priori theories and sophisticated arguments” in support of “realms of 
phenomena” belonging to philosophers simply do not exist as most philosophers 
assume. “Philosophy cannot deliver the sort of knowledge that is usually regarded as its 
raison d'être” nor can philosophy “provide fundamental insights into the human 
condition and the ultimate character of the universe, leading to vital conclusions about 
how we ought to arrange our lives.” 16  Given the modern expectations of what 
philosophy can and cannot do, Horwich reads Wittgenstein as something of a pessimist 
who receives a “curl of the lip” in many philosophical circles because of his claims that 
theoretical metaphysics is not substantive in itself but rather exists primarily as a 
perpetual conflict between the “required ideal” and the actually real (PI 101-106). 
The more we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of 
course, not something I had discovered: it was a requirement.) The conflict 
becomes intolerable; the requirement is not in danger of becoming vacuous.—
We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain 
sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to 
walk. We want to walk: but we need friction. Back to the rough ground! (PI 107). 
 
 
In the end, for Horwich, Wittgenstein is a “demystifying” philosopher concerned with 
“virtues of clarity and truth” as language problems are deflated, and the expectations 
for theoretical philosophy are lifted, chief amongst them being the “expectation that 
philosophy can and should deliver a priori theories that—like good scientific 
                                               
16 Horwich, 2012: 1-2. 
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theories—are simple, unifying, and explanatory.”17 This summary of Wittgenstein’s 
project is drawn primarily from the Investigations that in Horwich’s eyes stands as the 
culmination of a “series of improvements” from the Tractatus to his writings in the ’30s 
and beyond. “Therefore, we might well say that he produced one philosophy preceded 
by a variety of drafts.”18 
 
For Hacker, an unified Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy may be seen by 
turning to the radical non-cognitivism of the Tractatus and Investigations, and he points 
out that there is “no philosophical knowledge” in either work as philosophy should be 
an “activity of elucidation by analysis.” The Tractatus accepted ordinary language as 
standing in good logical order, allowing Wittgenstein to pursue facts and atomic facts 
as conceptions of the world within the effable necessity of logic. Even granting the 
crystalline purity of effable logic, however, Wittgenstein’s overarching tractarian goal 
was not Frege’s or Russell’s positivism. Wittgenstein’s move beyond categorical or 
formal concepts—i.e., object, property, relation, fact, proposition, color, number, 
etc.—leads to logical forms that stand before metaphysical pronouncements, such as, 
one is a number, red is a color, etc. The point is made explicit in PI 114 & 116: 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (4:5): “The general form of propositions is: This is 
how things are.” – That is the kind of propositions one repeats to oneself 
countless times. One thinks that one is tracing nature over and over again, and 
one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it. 
 
                                               
17 Horwich, 2012: 211, 15. Here it might be helpful to point out that Horwich focuses 
primarily on Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophical metaphysics at the expense of 
Wittgenstein’s significant—albeit undeveloped—points on aesthetic and ethical 
reasoning (Edwards, 1982: 75-103). Wittgenstein’s aesthetic reasoning will be discussed 
below as an apt transition from his critique of theoretical philosophy to his support of 
apophatic and integral knowledge that assume a hierarchy in modes of knowledge.  
18 Horwich, 2012: xi-xii. 
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When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”,  
“proposition/sentence”, “name” – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one  
must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the  
language in which it is at home? – What we do is to bring words back from their  
metaphysical to their everyday use. 
 
“Tracing round the frame” in PI 114 is Wittgenstein’s way of reminding us that the 
pronouncements of categorical or formal concepts already assume a necessary logical 
form that enables such pronouncements in the first place. Hence, Hacker points out 
that what such “pseudo-propositions” aim to state is actually “shown by genuine 
propositions that contain number words, color names, or other names of objects.”  
It is shown by features of the expressions in such propositions—namely, by the 
forms of the expressions—their essential combinatorial possibilities. These are 
represented by the variable of which the meaningful names are substitution-
instances. An immediate consequence of this is that most of the propositions 
of the Tractatus that delineate the necessary forms of language and reality are 
nonsense. Hence Wittgenstein’s penultimate remark in the book: ‘My 
propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used 
them—as steps—to climb up beyond them.’19 
 
 
In short, a core ambition in the earlier and later Wittgensteins is a non-cognitive 
conception of philosophy that for Hacker identifies philosophy’s contribution not with 
human knowledge but with human understanding. Philosophy cannot be an empirical 
science, nor an a priori science as “philosophy is no science” tasked with the challenge 
of new discoveries, let alone “arcane” truths, proofs, or “recherché ‘entities’ like 
universals.” Philosophy is “a quest for understanding, not for knowledge.”20 Regarding 
his work on the whole, Wittgenstein wrote: 
                                               
19 Hacker, 2001: 12.  
20 Hacker, 2013: 9-10.  
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It is all one to me whether or not the typical western scientist understands or 
appreciates my work, since he will not in any case understand the spirit in 
which I write. Our civilization is characterized by the word ‘progress’. Progress 
is its form rather than making progress being one of its features. Typically it 
constructs. It is occupied with building an ever more complicated structure. 
And even clarity is sought only as a means to this end, not as an end in itself. 
For me on the contrary clarity, perspicuity are valuable in themselves. I am not interested 
in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous view of the 
foundations of possible buildings. So I am not aiming at the same target as the 
scientists and my way of thinking is different from theirs (CV 7, emphasis added). 
  
 
Drawing together the above assessments, what emerges in Wittgenstein is a 
metaphilosophy that contests theoretical and scientific philosophy, and here it is 
worthwhile to illustrate some of the context of such scientific philosophy. Hacker 
points to two holders of the Wykeham Professor of Logic Chair at Oxford, Michael 
Dummet and Timothy Williamson. Dummet claimed in 1978 that “philosophy has only 
just very recently struggled out of its early stage into maturity: the turning point was the 
work of Frege…”21 Likewise, in 2005 Williamson remarked that we have just now 
come to the “end of the beginning” of philosophy.22 Such remarks seem to claim a 
lineage with modern pursuits of modes and methods of analysis to uncover 
“indubitable” foundations of knowledge. Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant, each in 
his own way, can be seen pursuing such human knowledge, which for Kant entailed 
placing metaphysics “upon the true path of science.”23 This path of science, according 
to Lacoste, is inevitably a reduction of something, such as the fragmenting of ancient 
theoria and ethos solely to “theoretical work,” a path that leads to scientific visions of the 
world where “phusis is handed over to the cares of physical science; logic alone remains. 
                                               
21 Dummet, 1979: 457. 
22 Williamson, 2005: 187. 
23 Hacker, 2013: 8. 
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Logos alone remains, then, and it is no longer anything but the logos of logic and the 
surveillance that it exercises over scientific procedures. All philosophy faithful to its 
origins ought to protest against its reduction to the state of Wissenschaft: its proper rigor 
does not have to be that of the sciences, even if it ought not to be any less.”24 The 
natural question, then, to ask of scientific philosophy seems clear: where are the results 
of this philosophical knowledge? Bertrand Russell surveyed the state of philosophy and 
opined rather ambitiously that “philosophy, from the earliest times, has made greater 
claims, and achieved fewer results, than any other branch of learning [such that] the 
time has now arrived when this unsatisfactory state of affairs can be brought to an 
end.”25 Is philosophy a cognitive, theoretical discipline? Can philosophical questions, 
pursued via discursive a priori theories and analytical arguments, decipher knowledge 
from “realms of phenomena” whose study belongs specifically to the philosopher?  
 
These are the sorts of notions and directions of thought that Wittgenstein seeks to 
challenge in both his early and later works. His concern is the “tendency,” “attitude” 
and “craving” in philosophy for “generality” or commonality within entities that, in 
other words, manifests, for Wittgenstein, a wrongfully “contemptuous attitude towards 
the particular case.”   
Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the 
method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural 
phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in 
mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a 
generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science 
does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher 
into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to 
                                               
24 Lacoste, 2014: 11-12. 
25 As quoted in Hacker, 2013: 8. 
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reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely 
descriptive.’ (Think of such questions as “Are there sense data?” And ask: What 
method is there of determining this? Introspection? (BB 18). 
 
 
 
3.2 Wittgenstein’s Neo-Kantian Grammar?  
Thinking is surrounded by a nimbus. – Its essence, logic, presents an order: namely, the a priori order 
of the world; that is the order of possibilities, which the world and thinking must have in common (PI 
97). 
 
‘Language (or thinking) is something unique’—this proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!), itself 
produced by grammatical illusions. And now the impressiveness retreats to these illusions, to the 
problems (PI 110). 
 
 
An important question in reading Wittgenstein concerns the relationship 
between his critique of language and Kant’s critique of reason. Much is at stake in this 
question given the significance of the Kant’s constructive method upon all philosophy, 
and while it is clear that Wittgenstein is not an explicit follower of Kant, the question 
remains to what degree Wittgenstein works within a Kantian space.26 In general, the 
Tractatus asserts that language is meaningful only through the representation of simple 
objects, and only by way of facts are propositions able to function rightly. Seemingly, 
                                               
26 P. M. S. Hacker has engaged in detail the relationship between the thought of Kant 
and Wittgenstein, and I am indebted to him on this topic. Following Hacker’s survey of 
Wittgenstein’s published and unpublished writings as well as personal interactions with 
others, we cannot discern much regarding Wittgenstein’s familiarity and engagement 
with Kant’s work. Wittgenstein mentions Kant once in the pre-Tractatus notebooks 
(NB 19.10.14) and once again in the Tractatus 6.36111 regarding Kant’s problem of 
right and left hands. Kant is mentioned twice in the Nachlass, the first time perhaps 
significantly stating “we’re concerned with the Kantian solution to the problems of 
philosophy” (TS 211, 173; cf. MS 107, 183, TS 209). Wittgenstein specifically listed in 
1931 Schopenhauer as an influence, yet Kant was not mentioned (MS 154, 16r). Hacker 
comments: “The catch from the trawl is meager. It does not suggest any significant 
Kantian influence on Wittgenstein nor even any evident Kantian inspiration.” Hacker, 
2013: 31-32. 
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these are “a priori conditions of the possibility of logic and language—of thinking 
(reasoning) and representing. And is that not a transcendental argument?”27  
 
Hacker identifies at least six areas of convergence between Kant and Wittgenstein. 
1) Metaphilosophy: both philosophers reflected heavily on the nature of 
philosophy itself; both agreed that philosophy (Kant’s “pure philosophy”) 
is distinct from natural or mathematical sciences. 
2) Dialectic: both philosophers engaged the Dialectic of Reason—the “logic of 
conceptual illusion”—agreeing to certain systematic patterns of 
philosophical error and the “unquestioned assumptions underlying 
philosophical controversies.” 
3) The bounds of sense: both Kant and Wittgenstein engaged the bounds of 
sense; Kant sought ‘deduction’ of a priori concepts, seeking the “conditions 
and limits” of their use in “judgments and experience” respectively. 
Wittgenstein investigated the conditions for the meaningful use of language. 
4) Rationalism and empiricism: both philosophers “repudiated foundationalist 
epistemology of the Cartesian or Lockean kind—our knowledge of how 
things are in the world around us is not inferred from how things sensibly 
seem to us to be.” 
5) The nature of necessity: Kant maintained that the “necessary truths of logic are 
‘entirely without content’” while Wittgenstein argued that the “tautologies 
of logic are ‘senseless’ (i.e. have ‘zero sense’). More generally, “both located 
                                               
27 Hacker, 2013: 31. 
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the roots of non-logical necessity in us—albeit for different reasons and in 
a very different sense.” 
6) Rational theology: Kant and Wittgenstein alike “repudiated” rational 
theology.28 
 
Crystallizing much of the above six confluences are phrases from Wittgenstein such as: 
“Men have always thought that there must be a sphere of questions whose answers – a 
priori – are symmetrical and united into a closed regular structure” (T 5.4541). From 
Kant: “How else can we account for our inextinguishable desire to find firm footing 
somewhere beyond the limits of experience? Reason has a presentiment of objects 
which possess a great interest for it” (A 796, B 824).29 Cunningham in particular 
suggests that Wittgenstein parallels Kant even to the point that “‘language game’ may 
well be a metaphysical term.” 
The operational a priori nature of the concept of language game comes further 
to the fore when Wittgenstein refers to the ‘framework on which the working 
of our language is based (for example in giving descriptions)’, or declares that 
‘the common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of 
which we interpret’; meanwhile radical human concurrence ‘is agreement not in 
opinion but in way of life’ (PI 240; 206; 241).30  
 
 
Cunningham contends that such an “a priori centrality of language” follows from 
Wittgenstein’s description of the workings of language that enable “signification, 
intelligibility, and does so by regulatively demarcating sense from nonsense in whatever 
guise.” Key for Cunningham’s reading is that grammar is “structural” and provides 
                                               
28 Hacker, 2013: 33-34. 
29 Kant, 1965: 629-30 (A 796, B 824). Cf. Kerr, 1998: 241-43. 
30 Cunningham, 1999: 76. 
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rules that constitute sense, and the benchmark of grammar is the grammar itself: “The 
very fact that Wittgenstein stipulates that grammar is also non-arbitrary illustrates the a 
priori formalism of the term: ‘If we could justify a rule, it could be violated.’ It is the 
transcendental nature of rules that renders justification unintelligible.”31 In short, for 
Cunningham, rules and grammar, alongside forms of life and language games (PI 656) 
all function for Wittgenstein in a mode quite similar to Kant’s categories. In seeking to 
validate human knowledge, the a priori is relocated in “meaning rather than experience,” 
and while Wittgenstein’s “semantic relativisation” seems non-metaphysical, 
Cunningham instead sees in the later Wittgenstein an “ad hoc transcendentalism” where 
(1) certain constitutive categories or concepts are posited and yet (2) an “indeterminate 
actuality” questions the veracity of categories and instead resides only ever “in what is 
shown (zeigen), that which comes out.”32 Despite the challenge of alternate statements 
from Wittgenstein such as “no part of our experience is also a priori…there is no order 
of things a priori” (T 5.634) and  “when someone else wished to say something 
metaphysical…demonstrate to him that he has given no meaning to certain signs in his 
propositions” (T 6.53), Cunningham’s Wittgenstein employs a neo-Kantian grammar in 
support of an ad hoc transcendentalism. 
 
Drawing back from Cunningham’s neo-Kantian reading of Wittgenstein, we can see 
pre-modern, theological commitments against philosophical metaphysics—“the positing 
of reality other than God”—as the primary framework for Cunningham’s arguments 
such that, broadly speaking, the Kantian discourse is most problematic in that it is non-
                                               
31 Cunningham, 1999: 76.  
32 Cunningham, 1999: 77. 
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theological and immanentized, finding its only point of possible stability within 
finitude.33 Such commitments against philosophical metaphysics further raise the stakes 
for the ways we understand Wittgenstein aligning with Kant. Does Wittgenstein 
advocate—intentionally or unintentionally—a “philosophical metaphysics?” What is 
the extent of Kerr’s claim that Wittgenstein’s critique of language (TLP 4.00431) is a 
“radicalization of Kant’s critique of reason?”34 It will be important to return below to 
Cunningham’s broader reading of Wittgenstein advocating “transcendental vitalism” 
and “philosophical metaphysics”35 where I will make the case that Wittgenstein actually 
supports in part Cunningham’s main thesis by contesting transcendental and metaphysical 
theorizing. First however, further groundwork is needed regarding the way 
Wittgenstein and Kant employ transcendental arguments. 
 
For all the above points of convergence and similarities, vitally important differences 
can be discerned between Kant and Wittgenstein’s use of transcendental arguments. In 
one sense, much of the way one reads Wittgenstein will turn on discerning these 
nuances, hence rendering Kerr’s statement on Wittgenstein’s “radicalization of Kant” as 
either an assertion of Wittgenstein’s remarkable Kantian consistency or of his remaking 
and actual critique of the Kantian horizon. 
 
The first point to recall is Wittgenstein’s emphasis upon philosophical methodology 
that serves as a critical backdrop for grasping Wittgenstein. “Philosophy is a struggle 
against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language” (PI 
                                               
33 Cunningham, 1999: 86. 
34 Kerr, 1997: 37. Cf. Kerr, 1998: 241-43. 
35 Cunningham, 1999: 85-86.  
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109). Likewise, Wittgenstein stated plainly: “[w]hat I am opposed to is the concept of 
some ideal exactitude given to us a priori, as it were. At different times we have different 
ideals of exactitude; and none of them is supreme” (CV 37e). Systematic philosophy 
seeks advances through theories or theses, and this is directly opposed by 
Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy. “If someone were to advance theses in philosophy, it 
would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them” (PI 
128). What concerned Wittgenstein were not “realms of phenomena whose study is the 
special business of a philosopher and about which he or she should formulate 
profound a priori theories and sophisticated arguments in support of them.”36 Such 
philosophical discoveries or the “unearthing of something” signifies the confusion that 
Wittgenstein was motivated to deflate. In seeking to deflate confusion amidst 
philosophical theories, however, Wittgenstein navigates amidst such theories that may 
lead to misreading him as favoring the very metaphysical conundrums he seeks to 
remedy. 
What is metaphysical there is not the content of some belief but the laying down 
of a requirement, the requirement of logical analysis. We do make sense, our 
propositions do stand in logical relations to each other. And such-and-such is 
required for that to be so. The metaphysics there is not in something other than 
language and requiring that it be like this or like that; that sort of metaphysics 
the Tractatus uses only ironically: it uses apparently metaphysical sentences, but 
in a way which is disposed of by the sentences which frame the book, in the 
Preface and the final remarks. The metaphysics of the Tractatus—metaphysics 
not ironic and not cancelled—is the requirements which are internal to the 
character of the language as language, in their being a general form of sentence, 
in all sentences having this form. The metaphysics of the Tractatus is a kind of 
metaphysics that does not involve what is unsayably the case outside 
language…37 
 
 
                                               
36 Horwich: 2012, 1. 
37 Diamond, 1999: 19. 
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Reading Wittgenstein in such a light, we are able to discern more accurately how 
Wittgenstein employs the term “a priori” amidst a “philosophical Weltanschauung” at 
odds with Kant. Whereas Kant’s essential concern is to investigate the possibility both 
of synthetic a priori judgments (B 19) and metaphysics as a science (B 22), Wittgenstein 
contested the “theorists of the past cultural period [who sought] to find the a priori 
where it isn’t” (MS 183, 81). As Hacker has argued, the propositions of mathematics 
and logic for Wittgenstein are a priori, meaning that “apparently synthetic a priori 
propositions” such as “nothing can be red and green all over” or “time-travel is 
impossible” are a priori. Such a priori propositions are non-analytic, however, and are 
not “correctly characterized as knowing the truth of a description of how things necessarily 
are in nature” as proper “a priori descriptions of the scaffolding of the world.” To the 
contrary, no such scaffolding exists—“neither original (traditional metaphysics), nor 
constructed and imposed (Kantian metaphysics of experience). Such (apparently 
synthetic a priori) propositions constitute the scaffolding FROM which we describe the 
world.”38 At stake are two different visions of knowledge: Kant’s synthetic a priori 
knowledge of the world purports to describe necessarily how things are whereas 
Wittgenstein’s knowledge is “knowledge of rules of representation.” 
Consequently, Kant’s question: ‘How is synthetic a priori knowledge of nature 
possible?’ crumbles in Wittgenstein’s hands…For, in Wittgenstein’s view, what 
appear to be necessities of nature, and what Kant argued to be a priori 
principles that the understanding imposes upon intuitions to constitute nature, 
are no more than shadows cast upon nature by the grammar of our language.39 
 
 
                                               
38 Hacker, 2013: 35. 
39 Hacker, 2013: 36. 
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Beyond these considerations of philosophical worldview and intent for Wittgenstein’s 
thought, a deeper consideration of transcendental arguments is in order, especially to 
engage a reading such as Cunningham’s where Wittgenstein’s ad hoc transcendentalism 
may be implicitly present. Looking first to the Tractatus, if we understand 
transcendental arguments in the general, logical sense of a modus tollens, then most 
certainly the Tractatus is transcendental—as would be Plato’s or Aristotle’s metaphysics 
and all other philosophers who have argued “from the nature of language or thought to 
the nature of the world.”40 This common and generalized form of transcendental 
argument, however, does not accord with Kant’s specific notion of ‘transcendental 
proof.’ Kant’s deduction relies above all upon “the mode in which the manifold of 
sensible representation (intuition) belongs to one consciousness precedes all knowledge 
of the object as the intellectual form of such knowledge, and in itself constitutes a 
formal a priori knowledge of all objects, so far as they are thought (categories)” (A 129-
130). Hence, for Kant, any transcendental proof necessarily requires the existence of 
transcendental idealism, whereas the Tractatus denies the possibility of Kantian “pure” 
and “necessary” concepts of understanding emerging “only in ourselves” (A 130). 
Hence, Hacker summarizes: 
(i) [The Tractatus] is not an attempt to vindicate the possibility of synthetic 
a priori knowledge. In fact, it denies that there is such thing, since it 
holds that all expressible necessity is logical necessity. Insofar as there is 
metaphysical necessity it is inexpressible in propositions with a sense, 
and so cannot be the content of propositional knowledge. 
(ii) The Tractatus does not link independent concepts by reference to 
possible experience and the a priori conditions of its possibilities. 
(Rather, it links material concepts with the formal concepts that are in 
effect variables of which the meanings of the material concepts are 
values.) 
                                               
40 Hacker, 2013: 45.  
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(iii) The Tractatus does not attempt to prove that the world of appearances 
(outer experiences) is a condition of the possibility of inner experience. 
That objects exist and that there are states of affairs is a presupposition 
of logic, not of experience.41 
 
 
Wittgenstein’s explorations in logic do not equate in the Tractatus to systematic reliance 
upon transcendental ideals in the precise Kantian sense. The opening factual claims of 
the Tractatus alongside the closing reminders of the ineffable and “what can only be 
shown” render a vital context for understanding the form of Wittgenstein’s arguments: 
in a Kantian way, logic and language do present a necessary structure or scaffolding, 
and yet contra Kant this structure is not something to be scaled for knowledge of the 
truth of how things are in nature but rather for identifying our norms of description, our 
propositions from which we describe the world. The world and all its facts are 
contingent for “there are no rules or necessities in the natural world.”42 Hence the 
Tractatus states: 
A necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened does not 
exist. There is only logical necessity (T 6.37). 
 As there is only a logical necessity, so there is only a logical impossibility (T  
6.375). 
 
 
As these quotes intimate, the world and all its facts are not necessary in their states nor 
is it impossible for them to exist in another way. “‘Strange coincidence, that every man 
whose skull has been opened had a brain!’” (OC 207). Likewise, “I know = I am 
familiar with it as a certainty” (OC 272). This contingency opens the possibility for 
Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy to clarify and seek understanding verses articulating first 
                                               
41 Hacker, 2013: 46. 
42 Garver, 1996: 159. 
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principles as knowledge. Wittgenstein’s concern is not foundationalist; his goal, rather, 
is to identify necessity and impossibility where it is present in the human sphere of logic 
and language. The “scaffolding of our thoughts” that forms our way of looking at 
things arises from our inherent experience in the human realm; Wittgenstein notes 
obviously that just as every human being has parents, so, too, thoughts grow from 
within the context of experienced life (OC 211). Such conceptual scaffolding naturally 
bears a Kantian reminiscence, and yet such forms arise from communal experience and 
hence lack a true transcendental origin. 
 
To better understand Wittgenstein’s focus on necessity from within human experience 
and logic, we can look to his developing thought around the year 1929 when he was 
engaging Schlick, Waismann, and others within the Vienna Circle regarding how the 
Tractatus may or may not align with their positivism. According to Monk, Wittgenstein 
began during this time to attend to “a more comprehensive syntax” that functioned 
amidst the inner connections of logical propositions, and he saw this syntax exemplified 
in the geometry of a circle. Imagine someone posits that a “circle” has a length of 3cm 
and a width of 2cm. The natural response of course is to ask what one means then by a 
circle?  “These rules are provided by the syntax, or, as Wittgenstein also says, the 
‘grammar’ of our language, which in this case establishes an ‘internal connection’ 
between something’s being a circle and its having only one radius” (VC 78). 43 
Wittgenstein’s point was that the rule for a circle having only one radius arises from the 
syntax or the “grammar” of our language and not some other presumed a priori necessity 
of “what is” a circle. By thus turning the question, Wittgenstein sees inference emerging 
                                               
43 Monk, 1990: 285.  
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from the syntax of systems of propositions agreed upon within the human realm just as 
the syntax of human agreement regarding colors distinguishes between, say, red and 
blue. Were someone to call a red ball “blue,” the natural response would be to question 
this statement based on the agreed upon definition of the two colors. Why make this 
distinction? What is, in effect, the real difference between the syntax of agreed upon 
propositions and “necessary properties of space, time, and matter?” Wittgenstein’s answer 
addresses contingency—and demonstrates his phenomenological approach 
(distinguishing sense from nonsense) verses one of physics (determining true or false): 
“Physics does not yield a description of the structure of phenomenological states of 
affairs. In phenomenology it is always a matter of possibility, i.e. of sense, not of truth 
and falsity” (VC 63). Wittgenstein’s thought was very much in development at this time, 
and yet, contra the positivists, he landed firmly on the necessity of determining the 
syntax and sense of things. Monk draws attention to Wittgenstein’s distancing himself 
from a positivistic “dogmatic application” of a theory of meaning: 
I used at one time to say that, in order to get clear how a sentence is used, it 
was a good idea to ask oneself the question: ‘How would one try to verify such 
an assertion?’ But that’s just one way among others of getting clear about the 
use of a word or sentence. For example, another question which it is often very 
useful to ask oneself is: ‘How is this word learned?’ ‘How would one set about 
teaching a child this word?’ But some people have turned this suggestion about 
asking for the verification into a dogma – as if I’d been advancing a theory 
about meaning.”44 
 
 
Implicit within Wittgenstein’s aim to uncover the syntax and sense of things is a certain 
givenness in language, evidenced empirically, that differs notably from Kant’s ideal 
language. Hence in Garver’s reading, Wittgenstein can be seen presenting a 
                                               
44 Monk, 1990: 287-88; cf., 283-85. 
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generalization of Aristotle’s categories, especially where Aristotle indicates varieties in 
truth-claims. Wittgenstein picks up significantly on puzzling variations in language—
jokes, orders, exclamations, etc.—that constitute a phenomenon to be experienced and 
reflected upon.45 This givenness of language is not that it has to exist but that it does as a 
“feature of human life” and a “very general fact of nature.” Wittgenstein assumes no 
“ultimate or metaphysical value” in the rules of grammar à la transcendental reasoning 
but rather that these rules are social facts simply given to us.46  
Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to regard the facts as 
‘proto-phenomena’. That is, where we ought to say: this is the language game 
that is being played. The point is not to explain a language-game by means of 
our experiences, but to take account of the language-game. What is the purpose 
of telling someone that previously I had such-and-such a wish? – Regard the 
language-game as the primary thing (PI 654-56). 
 
 
The Tractatus has been the primary emphasis to this point, and yet Wittgenstein’s 
transition from logic to grammar in the Investigations further clarifies the nature of 
Wittgenstein’s Kantian radicalization. The turn to grammar in the Investigations—
Wittgenstein’s Copernican revolution—can be seen as a transition from “necessary, but 
ineffable, truths of metaphysics…presupposed by logic” to a “grammar of discourse 
concerning events.” This transition can be visualized by recalling Wittgenstein’s puzzles 
with color: to admit that red is darker than pink is to know a rule of inference, and that 
inference itself plays a role in how we conceive of “red” and “pink.” To acknowledge 
that “red is darker than pink is not to know a synthetic a priori proposition about 
                                               
45 At one point (1929-?), Wittgenstein seemed to ponder phenomenology as a parallel 
to his methods with grammar. Spielgelberg, 1968: 244-56. Cf. Garver, 1996: 146-47. 
46 Garver, 1996: 156-57. Cf. OC 211. 
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nature, but rather to know a rule.”47 The grammatical rule of naming colors functions 
via consent amidst a community and differs significantly from propositional knowledge 
about nature. In a similar way, the law of causality is not, for Wittgenstein, an absolute 
necessity existing autonomously in nature awaiting cognitive discovery; causality is the 
wrong question and approach if we accept Wittgenstein’s critique of synthetic a priori 
propositions as norms of representation. 
If the law of causality is indeed part of our form of representation, then to 
know that every event has a cause is just to know that if something is described 
as being an event, if may be inferred that it had a cause. If the inference from 
‘E is an event’ to ‘E was caused’ is a priori legitimate, that would be because it 
is partly constitutive of the meaning of ‘event’. What Kant thought to be 
synthetic a priori truths describing necessary constraints upon reality are merely 
what Wittgenstein called ‘grammatical propositions’ seen through a glass darkly. 
A grammatical proposition is a rule of representation in the guise of a 
description of how things necessarily are.”48  
 
 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on “how things necessarily are” is a key assumption and 
demonstration of his willingness to ignore forms of skepticism that seek to prove the 
existence of anything. Rooted in grammar, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is 
methodological, an “empirical project based on use.” Whereas Kant’s critique can be 
described as “an ideal language project based on analysis of propositions or 
judgments,” Wittgenstein’s empirical and descriptive method follows the phenomenon 
of language to uncover components of life within natural history. In this way, the 
critical theme of Wittgenstein’s grammatical philosophy emerges again as he shuns 
speculative or dogmatic metaphysics in favor of a more “humble moral achievement” 
                                               
47 Hacker, 2013: 47. 
48 Hacker, 2013: 48. 
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where philosophy may be pictured as a servant of the sciences seeking “conceptual 
clarity and argument” rather than an epistemic discipline undergirding them.49 
 
Are there transcendental arguments in the Investigations? The form of generalized 
transcendental arguments are discernable in the Tractatus, and yet Wittgenstein’s later 
explorations with language make clear that he employs a Kantian form even as a 
critique of Kant.50 Wittgenstein’s task with philosophy is not constructive in terms of 
theory or metaphysics but rather critical in the sense of clarifying confusions amidst 
how our questions are phrased. Kant asks: ‘How is synthetic a priori knowledge of 
nature possible?’ The assumption behind this question is that prior to or independently 
of experience the natural world necessarily is conceivable. Hence, if this question itself 
is unquestioned, Kant’s correlation between knowledge of metaphysical judgments and 
the necessary conditions of this judgment seems “ingenious” and “profoundly 
compelling.” Countering such a correlationist move, Wittgenstein turns the question of 
what seems to be a natural necessity. “Essence is expressed in grammar. Consider: ‘The 
only correlate in language to an objective necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only 
thing which one can milk out of this objective necessity into a proposition’” (PI 371 & 
372). Hacker comments: 
What appear to be necessary and universal truths about the world are norms of 
representation. They are not expressions of knowledge of necessities 
constitutive of the realm of nature, but rather rules for the use of words in the 
guise of descriptions. They are not rules for nature, but rules for the description 
of nature. They are grammatical propositions. Wittgenstein’s account of the 
nature of such propositions is wholly independent of his account of the 
                                               
49 Garver, 1996: 167. 
50 Wittgenstein may critique Kant most directly on the concepts of apperception, 
consciousness, and self-consciousness. Cf. “Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: A 
Wittgensteinian Critique” in Hacker, 2013: 54-77. 
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conditions of the possibility of self-ascription of experiential predicates (or, 
more accurately, of avowals of experience). This is of capital importance. So, 
Kant and Wittgenstein take different paths through the conceptual jungle.51 
 
 
The answer to the question of how Wittgenstein relates to Kant is nuanced, requiring 
careful qualifications for possibly describing Wittgenstein’s arguments as 
transcendental. I have argued for a reading of Wittgenstein that sees his radicalization 
of Kant as a qualified employment of Kant’s method that importantly rejects 
transcendental arguments aimed at constructing philosophical theories. Doubtless, 
Wittgenstein has aligned logic, language, and the world as though “equivalent,” and yet 
his project is far from seeking metaphysics as a science of being (PI 96-97).52 What 
seems more important to Wittgenstein than transcendental arguments is the possibility 
of the transcendent, which lies beyond philosophy as a discipline of limiting reason and 
deflating superstitions (PI 110). Writing to Engelmann in 1919, Wittgenstein stated 
regarding the Tractatus: 
The book’s point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a 
sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here 
because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, 
then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all 
that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important 
one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it 
were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those 
                                               
51 Hacker, 2013: 64. 
52 Kerr, 1998: 242. The first part of PI 97 intimates a correlation between logic, 
language, and the world, and yet the latter half of PI 97 explains the nature of this 
correlation: 
We are under the illusion that what is particular, profound, and essential to us 
in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of 
language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, 
inference, truth, experience, and so forth. This order is a super-order between – 
so to speak – super-concepts. Whereas, in fact, if the words “language”, 
“experience”, “world” have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the 
words “table”, “lamp”, “door”.  
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limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have 
managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. 
And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great 
deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won’t see that it is said in 
the book. For now, I would recommend you to read the preface and the 
conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the 
book.53 
 
 
These are significant words for reading Wittgenstein, especially for anyone who seeks 
to place Wittgenstein within the context of logicians such as Frege and Russell or the 
Vienna Circle positivists. Employing tools learned from his studies in physics and logic, 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a discipline of critique for the sake of transcendent or 
higher values. In this sense, pace Wittgenstein’s qualified Kantian paradigm, the more 
apt final context for his project lies with the tradition of language-mystics who see the 
shortcomings of language before the ineffability of the mystical (T 6.522). 
Wittgenstein’s via negativa is hence based on a posture of humility as he seeks to map 
the “boundaries of language,” and, paradoxically, such a boundary is discovered in part 
through language: “the inclination, the running up against something indicates 
something. St. Augustine knew that already when he said: What, you swine, you want 
not to talk nonsense! Go ahead and talk nonsense, it does not matter!” (VC 69).54  
                                               
53 Engelmann, 1967: 143-44. The similarity between this letter to Engelmann and the 
letter to von Ficker quoted at the opening of this chapter further verify Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis on seeking the ethical transcendent rather than transcendental metaphysics.  
54 During Wittgenstein’s “verificationist phase” (circa 1929), Monk describes 
Wittgenstein’s interest in writing an autobiography and the role his words would play as 
a discipline or practice of enhancement: “Any autobiography he might have written 
would almost certainly have more in common with St. Augustine’s Confessions than 
with, say, Bertrand Russell’s Autobiography. The writing of it would, that is, have been 
fundamentally a spiritual act. He considered Confessions to be possibly ‘the most serious 
book ever written’. He was particularly fond of quoting a passage from Book I, which 
reads: ‘Yet woe betide those who are silent about you! For even those who are most 
gifted with speech cannot find words to describe you’, but which Wittgenstein, in 
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Moreover, it is precisely amidst this approach of speech emgaging the boundaries of 
language that we uncover an important insight regarding Wittgenstein’s view of 
philosophy in relation to theology. Wittgenstein’s Galilean “kink” in the history of 
philosophy questions a view of theology that seeks metaphysical support from 
philosophy. Fergus Kerr maintains that such natural theology may be seen in 
theologians from Origen to Thomas Aquinas, and Kerr hence suggests that theologians 
from Luther to Barth who see philosophy as a threat may find Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy advantageous.55 Kerr’s point is that from 1930 Wittgenstein sees philosophy 
consumed with assumptions and problems of language. Kant’s prime question—“how 
is synthetic a priori knowledge of nature possible?”—enacts numerous language errors 
and theoretical constructs that need to be disassembled. “The problems are solved, not 
by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar 
with. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the 
resources of our language” (PI 109). Likewise, “philosophy, as we use the word, is a 
fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us” (BB 27). 
Wittgenstein’s rhetoric of “bewitchment” and “fascination” arises from philosophical 
conundrums with unquestioned questions such as “what is time?” or “what is 
knowledge?” or “what is a number?” Questions such as these are normally asked with 
an expectation that the answer will conform to “strict rules” as the philosophically 
                                                                                                                                    
discussing it with Drury, preferred to render: ‘And woe to those who say nothing 
concerning thee just because the chatterboxes talk a lot of nonsense’ ... [Such] free 
translations, even if they fail to capture Augustine’s intended meaning, certainly capture 
Wittgenstein’s view. One should put a stop to the nonsense of chatterboxes, but that 
does not mean that one should refuse to talk nonsense oneself. Everything, as always, 
depends on the spirit in which one does it.” Monk, 1990: 282. 
55 Kerr, 1998: 250. 
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puzzled man “sees a law in the way a word is used” and yet finds ambiguity and 
paradox in the question’s answers (BB 27, emphasis added). Hence the mistakes that 
Kant would attribute to reason, calling for philosophical critique, would for 
Wittgenstein be more rightly seen as superstitions and “grammatical illusions” (PI 110) 
rooted in misused similes (PI 112), propositions (PI 114), and/or everyday 
conversational language (PI 117) that needs to be reclaimed “from their metaphysical 
to their everyday use” (PI 116).56 
 
 
3.3 Language as Therapy 
The ideal, as we conceive of it, is unshakable. You can’t step outside it. You must always turn back. 
There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe. – How come? The idea is like a pair of glasses on our 
nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off (PI 103). 
 
To speak of therapy is to assume a disease or illness, and in the context of 
Wittgenstein, language as therapy applies to the sickness of misplaced expectations for 
what theoretical philosophy can offer. Language as therapy, then, is another way of 
describing Wittgenstein’s critique of a particular type of theoretical philosophy (PI 133). 
In this section, I seek to move deeper into Wittgenstein’s overarching goal and 
metaphilosophy by articulating the therapeutic critique that stems from his view of 
language. Language in the Investigations does not guide us from one theory or science to 
another deemed more suitable; the goal is, rather, to remove the glasses of theory from 
our nose entirely. Wittgenstein seeks to turn our Weltanschauung (PI 122) away from a 
                                               
56 Cf. BB 25-28; Kerr, 1998: 250-54. 
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fascination in “that order, the ideal” (PI 105) that floats above reality. 57  Actual 
language, for Wittgenstein, is the way to draw us to firm ground once again (PI 107). 
 
Drawing a summary sketch of Wittgenstein’s critique via language is not easy, but 
following the lead of Fogelin, we can trace at least two key themes that speak well for 
the whole: referentialism and logical perfectionism.58 These may be taken as core 
aspects of Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy, and I will turn first to referentialism. 
Defined simply, referentialism is the presumptive view that words necessarily refer to 
things. Fogelin points out that referentialism is presumptive because it seems naïve on the 
one hand to think that all words stand for things or objects, and that all sentences 
represent the arrangement of things with one another, and yet this presumptive move 
marks Wittgenstein’s choice “to ignore the obvious truth” by associating names with 
objects.59  Undoubtedly, this critique is aimed at the philosophical confusion that 
Wittgenstein himself succumbs to in the Tractatus, and the opening of the Philosophical 
Investigations contains two classic examples of this first from Augustine’s Confessions and 
then with shopkeeper’s five apples, both of which make a point regarding the essence 
of language (PI 1). Wittgenstein contemplated opening the Investigations with an allusion 
to Goethe—“what an intelligent man knows is hard to know”—via a description of 
nature (CV 11) or with the difficult line “all is in flux” (CV 8), and yet in the end he 
                                               
57 For Wittgenstein, a fascination with ideals inevitably affects one’s life. According to 
Monk, “…this is especially clear when we consider that in the case of a philosophical 
Weltanschauung the consequences of a ‘change of aspect’ might be a change of life. In 
Wittgenstein’s case, the consequence—‘the outward criteria’—that he earnestly hoped 
for was a culture which treated music, poetry, art and religion with the same respect 
and seriousness with which our present society treats science” (Monk, 2005: 516). 
58 Fogelin, 1996: 34-58. 
59 Fogelin, 1996: 37. Cf. Monk, 2005: 73.  
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could not but open with a reference from his beloved Confessions.60 This passage from 
Confessions I, 8 needs little introduction as Augustine traces the infant’s process of 
connecting words to things as well as intentions to bodily expressions, sounds, and 
movements. Kerr takes the Confessions’ opening as an “egocentric perspective” where 
the self is depicted as “inside,” a sort of Cartesian posture Wittgenstein is critiquing. 
“Thus…Wittgenstein was placing his explorations of the epistemological predicament 
of the self in the context of a narrative which, as it interweaves biblical language with 
metaphysical dualism, autobiography with doxology, establishes the sense of the ‘I’ in 
the sight of God which remains the paradigm for the self even where the theology has 
been abandoned.”61  
 
Kerr persuasively traces the theological epistemology of the self specifically through 
Wittgenstein, and yet arguably the main question hinges on what point exactly the 
Confessions passage makes regarding referentialism. According to Monk, it is sometimes 
thought that the Confessions quote reveals Augustine’s theory of language that 
Wittgenstein then challenges.62 Rather than positing a theory, however, Augustine’s 
autobiographical Confessions may be seen as revealing a dynamic process of learning 
language, a system where definitions and rules are learned through gestures and 
expressions. Wittgenstein certainly takes Augustine’s picture of language as an 
introduction to referentialism—“the words in language name objects—sentences are 
                                               
60 Kerr, 1997: 39. Cf. von Wright’s comment regarding Wittgenstein’s appropriation of 
Augustine’s style in the Confessions: “The philosophical sections of St Augustine’s 
Confessions show a striking resemblance to Wittgenstein’s own way of doing 
philosophy.” Additionally, cf. Monk 1990: 282.  
61 Kerr, 1997: 42. 
62 Monk, 1990: 364. 
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combinations of such names” (PI 1)—and yet the passage is not simply something 
Wittgenstein critiques. After all, Augustine does not refer solely to language in the 
abstract but rather “we might say, does describe a system of communication” (PI 3, 
emphasis added). Augustine is describing the way that he learned to talk, and this paints 
for us a picture or metaphor (cf. PI 115). Further, Wittgenstein never states openly any 
disagreement with the Confessions passage, even while critiquing the issue of 
referentialism that the passage effectively brings to light.  
 
What is clearer is the second example of the shopkeeper’s five, red apples where we are 
reminded in an extremely simplified way that the use of words such as “red” and “five” 
surpass explanations. In PI 2, Wittgenstein states explicitly that “use” of words is a 
“philosophical notion of meaning [that] is at home in a primitive idea of the way 
language functions.” Furthering Augustine’s picture of language, we should imagine 
builder A and an assistant B who are passing along stones that need further names: 
A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B 
has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. 
For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, 
“pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he learnt to 
bring at such-and-such a call. –Conceive of this as a complete primitive 
language (PI 2).   
 
 
In short, two core claims or strategies of language as therapy are present in the opening 
paragraphs of the Investigations that are then developed and described through the rest 
of the work. Firstly, the referentialist picture where individual words name objects —
without noting “differences between types of words” (PI 1)—leads to philosophical 
confusion as words are used uncritically. Secondly, Wittgenstein’s pictures of pre-
philosophical, or primitive, language are intended as ways to help “dig out 
	 133 
philosophical confusion by its pre-philosophical roots.” The emphasis here is on the 
phenomenon of learning language rather than purportedly intuiting language 
abstractly—as though one could eat the fruit of a tree that had no roots. Wittgenstein 
describes instruction in language unfolding through a process where “the learner names 
the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points at the stone. –Indeed, 
there will be an even simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the teacher—
both of these being speech-like processes” (PI 7). This educating (ēdūcō: to lead, 
conduct) process, Wittgenstein calls “language-games,” a term generally parallel to 
primitive language. Some may object that Wittgenstein’s primitive language 
oversimplifies the matter, and that the referentialist picture of language (PI 2) and the 
builder-slab language-game (PI 8) examples “consist only of orders” and hence are 
selective examples. The point, however, seems to be that these examples indicate the 
roots of the problem and solution such that if we grasp these opening overtures, it will 
be possible to move beyond simple examples to the further complications and systems 
added into our language even such as “the symbolism of chemistry and notation of the 
infinitesimal calculus.” Wittgenstein compares language to “an ancient city: a maze of 
little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from 
various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight 
and regular streets and uniform houses” (PI 18).  
 
Moreover, the dynamic configurations of language seem to help indicate two problems 
particularly with the referentialist picture of language in regards to naming. Naming 
does not account for all uses of language, and referentialism does not rightly account 
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for naming itself. 63   “Think just of exclamations, with their completely different 
functions [than referring to things]: Water! Away! Ow! Help! Splendid! No! Are you still 
inclined to call these words ‘names of objects’?” (PI 27). Likewise, in PI 39 and 40, 
Wittgenstein ponders what happens when the simple object “behind” a name is 
fundamentally altered or lost. The sword named “Nothung” represents parts combined 
in a particular way, and yet when the sword is shattered and lost the name Nothung 
maintains a “sense.” Likewise, when Mr. N.N. dies, it is only right to say that the “bearer” 
of the name has died and not the “meaning.” In short, Wittgenstein seeks to chip away 
at the notion that the philosophical analysis of language could reveal the underlying 
order within both logic and the world (T 5.5563). Much of the Tractatus fell into this 
error, and yet even amidst such analytical philosophizing (T 4.002), Wittgenstein was 
not seeking transcendental a priori truths of the world in the traditional sense, but rather 
even through and amidst such “grave mistakes” (PI, preface) he was seeking the 
“something that pervades everything sayable—something itself unsayable.”64 Hence 
Wittgenstein’s later investigations clarify his metaphilosophy that critiques metaphysics 
seeking “complete exactness” and purporting to penetrate theoretically into the essence 
of things (PI 91). 
This finds expression in the question of the essence of language, of propositions, 
of thought. – For although we, in our investigations, are trying to understand 
the nature of language—its function, its structure—yet this is not what the 
question has in view. For it sees the essence of things not as something that 
already lies open to view, and that becomes surveyable through a process of 
ordering, but as something that lies beneath the surface. Something that lies 
within which we perceive when we see right into the thing, and which an analysis 
is supposed to unearth. ‘The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our 
problem now assumes. We ask: “What is language?”, “What is a proposition?” 
                                               
63 Fogelin, 1996: 39. 
64 Kerr, 1998: 242. 
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And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all, and 
independently of any future experience (PI 92). 
 
The analytical and theoretical questioning “what?” is an illusion. “Thought, language, 
now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture of the world,” and the assumption is 
that “proposition, language, thought, [and] world” all stand in line as equivalent each to 
each. But something is missing: what are these words “to be used for now?” The 
language-game as a “loose set of descriptions” is missing (PI 96).65 
 
Wittgenstein’s critique of referentialism is perhaps clearest in terms of talk about 
imaginative or mental thoughts, especially when imagining someone else’s pain (PI 293-
315). “Could someone who had never felt pain understand the word ‘pain’?” (PI 315). 
The difficulty lies in assuming mental processes can connect person A’s physical pain 
with person B’s. This may lead to statements such as “I can only believe that someone 
else is in pain, but I know it if I am” (PI 303) because it is difficult “to imagine 
someone else’s pain on the model of one’s own.” Wittgenstein continues: 
Yes: one can resolve to say “I believe he is in pain” instead of “He is in pain”. 
But that’s all. – What looks like an explanation here, or like a statement about a 
mental process, in truth just exchanges one way of talking for another which, 
while we are doing philosophy, seems to us more apt. Just try—in a real case—
to doubt someone else’s fear or pain! (PI 303). 
  
 
The mental transition from knowing to believing pain illustrates the puzzle. If we treat 
all language the same, assuming that it “always functions in one way,” serving the same 
“purpose” be it language about houses, pains, good and evil, or whatever, then we tend 
to be forced into a paradox by grammar.  
                                               
65 Fogelin, 1996: 41. 
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“But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain behaviour 
with pain and pain-behaviour without pain.” – Admit it? What greater 
difference could there be? – “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion 
that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” – Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not 
a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the 
same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. We’ve only 
rejected the grammar which tends to force itself on us here (PI 304). 
 
 
For Wittgenstein, to generalize from one case—my experience of pain—to the claim 
that I know what the word “pain” means is a great irresponsibility. “Well, everyone tells 
me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!” (PI 293).66 Wittgenstein 
compares this conundrum to everyone holding a box with “something in it which we 
call a beetle.” No one can peer into the other boxes, and all claim to know what a 
beetle is by virtue of his box’s contents, despite the possibility that all have something 
different in their respective boxes. The point is clear that “the thing” in the box evades 
the grounding of a language game, perhaps most so if the box is empty, for then the 
thing would not even be a “Something.” “That is to say, if we construe the grammar of 
the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of 
consideration as irrelevant” (PI 293). Hence, building upon these examples, 
Wittgenstein argues that philosophical problems evolve from treating mental processes 
                                               
66 If “pain” is not clearly a representational thing, Wittgenstein suggests that words may 
“refer” to sensations. Hence, stating one is “in pain” is an “expression” but not a 
“description” of pain. “How do words refer to sensations?...How does a human being 
learn the meaning of names of sensations? For example: the word “pain”. Here is one 
possibility: words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of sensations 
and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; then adults talk to him 
and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-
behaviour. “So are you saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?” –On the 
contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying, it does not describe it” (PI 244). 
	 137 
and states in the same way as that of speaking about tables, buildings, etc.67 In a key 
passage, Wittgenstein depicts this picture of referentialist language: 
How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviourism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes 
notice. We talk of processes and states, and leave their nature undecided. 
Sometime perhaps we’ll know more about them – we think. But that’s just what 
commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a certain 
conception of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive 
movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that 
seemed to us quite innocent.) – And now that analogy which was to make us 
understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet 
uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if 
we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them (PI 
308). 
 
What is your aim in philosophy? – To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle 
(PI 309). 
 
 
At this juncture, it is natural to ask: how does one reasonably move from simple 
puzzles over color, pain, and mental processes or states to a critique of philosophy? 
Answering such a question requires the right spirit of reading Wittgenstein (T p. 27), 
seeking to discern therapeutic “connections” amidst the pictures and images he paints 
(RF 133). Kerr, for instance, addresses language games by pointing to a connection 
between metaphysics and magic in Wittgenstein’s thought.68 As quoted above, PI 308 
speaks of the “conjuring trick” of moving undiscerningly from objects to mental 
processes, and in PI 109 “philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our 
                                               
67 Fogelin, 1996: 43. 
68 Kerr, 1998: 240-58. According to Rush Rhees’ intro to Remarks on Frazer’s Golden 
Bough, Wittgenstein contemplated including these statement in the text but later edited 
them out: “I now believe that it would be right to begin my book with remarks about 
metaphysics as a kind of magic. / But in doing this I must not make a case for magic 
nor may I make fun of it. / The depth of magic should be preserved.— / Indeed, here 
the elimination of magic has itself the character of magic. / For, back then, when I 
began talking about the ‘world’ (and not about this tree or table), what else did I want 
but to keep something higher spellbound in my words?” (RF 116-17). 
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understanding by the resources of our language.” Hence arises the analogy of 
metaphysics as a kind of magic that Wittgenstein in part succumbed to in the Tractatus 
by seeking “to keep something higher spellbound in my words” (RF 116-17; cf. PI 105 
& 106). Kerr draws attention to Wittgenstein’s comments on Plato’s Theaetetus (201e-
202b) where Socrates speaks of primary elements of which “we and everything else are 
composed,” and there can be no further explanation or account for primary elements 
other than its name. Wittgenstein aligns both his own tractarian “objects” and Russell’s 
“individuals” to such primary elements (PI 46). The counter to simple, primary 
elements, however, in the Investigations is to question the baseline. What are the simple 
constituent parts of reality? What are the simple constituent parts of a chair? The 
wood, molecules, or atoms (PI 47)? The point is that “simple” means “not composite,” 
and hence the baseline is set inevitably through the language game between users of 
these terms. Missing this feature of language contributes to significant problems of 
metaphysics.  
[Metaphysics is problematic] in the sense that certain words are allowed to call 
things ‘of a higher order’ into existence, like an enchanter’s spell. ‘The idea’, he 
says, is ‘that one can beckon a lifeless object to come, just as one would beckon 
a person’. The principle at work, in metaphysics as in magic, is that of 
‘personification’ – animism, as we might say. We have a magical conception of 
our signs.69 
 
 
The conjurer’s trick is perhaps most evident in demonstrable pronouns such as “this” 
or “that.” The natural impulse, it seems, to avoid confusion is to claim that “this” or 
“that” do not name anything. “Yet, strange to say, the word ‘this’ has been called the 
real name; so that anything else we call a name was one only in an inexact, approximate 
                                               
69 Kerr, 1998: 248. 
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sense” (PI 38). Wittgenstein critiques “this odd conception” as a sublimation of the 
“logic of our language,” and he suggests that demonstrative pronouns must be 
distanced from names. We call “very different things ‘names,’” and the word “name” 
summarizes the process of associating terms with those things, but the words “this” or 
“that” do not align in the same way with names for Wittgenstein.  
It is quite true that in giving an ostensive definition, for instance, we often 
point to the object named and utter the name. And likewise, in giving an 
ostensive definition, we utter the word “this” while pointing to a thing. And 
also, the word “this” and a name often occupy the same position in the context 
of a sentence. But it is precisely characteristic of a name that it is explained by 
means of the demonstrative expression “This is N” (or “That is called ‘N’”). 
But do we also explain “That is called ‘this’”, or “This is called ‘this’”? (PI38). 
 
The point seems to be to note a difference in ourselves—the way we view things—
when we move across the boundary between naming an object and characterizing an 
object as a “thing.” The former we recognize as naming, but do we see the latter as 
thinging? Do we magically invoke “some kind of direct hook-up between thought and 
thing?” Little seems more powerful or “extraordinary” than giving things names.70  
This is connected with the conception of naming as a process that is, so to 
speak, occult. Naming seems to be a strange connection of a word with an 
object. –And such a strange connection really obtains, particularly when a 
philosopher tries to fathom the relation between name and what is named by 
staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name, or even the word 
“this”, innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes 
on holiday (PI 38). 
 
 
The phrase “language goes on holiday” is well known, and in context here 
Wittgenstein’s aim is to recall language to its practical “workday” routines amidst 
relational networks and concrete language games. When on holiday, our language runs 
the risk of “imagining naming as some remarkable mental act, as it were the baptism of 
                                               
70 Kerr, 1998: 249. 
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an object” (PI 38). Wittgenstein’s metaphor is striking for Christian baptism is a ritual 
re-creation with the deepest ontological significance. Likewise, the conjuring-baptism-
creating imagery is deeply significant in light of the Logos in Genesis 1 and John 1 who 
speaks creation into existence. Here it would be a grave mistake to misread 
Wittgenstein as promoting a demythological and flattened view of language that 
proposes grammatical “facts,” a grounding for all reality within language games. 
Language games are not modes of creating meaning as much as therapeutic methods 
for correcting misplaced, presumed “remarkable mental acts.” Wittgenstein does not 
seek to replace a theory of metaphysical meaning with another theory via constructive 
language games (PI 103). We must look elsewhere for a more constructive 
understanding, and in no way does it seem that Wittgenstein is critiquing magic or 
ritual as such. The metaphor of magic is employed to critique mentalist meaning, a sort 
of Kantian idealist71 approach to language: “But in doing this I must not make a case 
for magic nor may I make fun of it. / The depth of magic should be preserved” (RF 
116-17). In this way, we might see Wittgenstein speaking of conjuring, occultish 
metaphysics as a dark invocational magic that calls into existence something solely from 
out of the powers of the mind rather than an incantational magic that sings within 
harmony of tangible, mythological nature. Wittgenstein’s targets are cognitivism, 
scientism, and theorizing, while his acerbic critique of Sir James Frazer’s The Golden 
Bough explicitly reveals his openness to the magic of religious ritual.72 
 
                                               
71 “Kant’s purpose could be described as an ideal language project based on analysis of 
propositions or judgments, rather than [a Wittgensteinian] empirical project based on 
their use.” Garver, 1996: 154-53. Cf. PI 81. 
72 Cf. Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough (RF). 
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Turning to logical perfectionism we are not departing to an entirely new theme, but 
rather a closely related counterpoint in Wittgenstein’s critique of language. 
Referentialism and logical perfectionism (or logical form) are inseparable. In addition to 
a name representing an object within a proposition (T 3.22), a “proposition is a picture 
of its state of affairs, only in so far as it is logically articulated” (T 4.032). This is the 
case for the tractarian Wittgenstein because “in the proposition there must be exactly as 
many things distinguishable as there are in the state of affairs, which it represents. They 
must both possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity (cf. Hertz’s Mechanics, 
on Dynamic Models)” (T 4.04). For Wittgenstein, both the semantic-representational 
and the structural-logical constitute the essence of language itself. As Edwards notes, 
“names name objects” and “configurations of names depict the possible configuration 
of objects.”73 Hence, referentialism and logical perfectionism are two sides of the same 
coin, and both necessarily constitute propositions, the totality of which is language (T 
4.001; cf. T 5) and even thought (T 4).  
 
As referentialism and logical perfectionism are co-joined, Wittgenstein’s critique must 
address them both, and in logic we can see again the magical misunderstanding of 
seeking—even demanding the reality of—“what” is hidden. 
We want to say that there can’t be any vagueness in logic. The idea now 
absorbs us that the ideal ‘must’ occur in reality. At the same time, one doesn’t as 
yet see how it occurs there, and doesn’t understand the nature of this “must”. 
We think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there (PI 
101). 
 
Even beyond demanding crystalline purity in logic (PI 107), the question of logic as a 
fixed requirement or “normative science” arises (PI 81). Logic seems inevitable and 
                                               
73 Edwards, 1982: 14. 
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necessarily present to some degree, yet Wittgenstein is not settled on fixed perfection 
of logic, as though “what we were talking about in logic were an ideal language” and 
that only a logician is able “to show people at last what a proper sentence looks like” 
(PI 81). Again, the analogue centers on the notion of games, and Wittgenstein 
compares logic in language to rules within a game and words as objects, say, as pieces 
in chess (PI 108). The comparison is dangerous, however, if it leads us down the path 
of assuming there exist perfect rules or calculi for games. The tendency then is to think 
of our language as only an “approximate” of an ideal language (PI 81), or even that our 
actual language may indeed embody such an ideal but only in a way that is mysteriously 
internal and hidden from us.74 Either way, we fall into confusion by assuming the 
“strict and clear rules” of logic are “unshakable,” governing absolutely and ideally as a 
priori realities to be discovered (PI 102-103).  
When we believe that we have to find that order, the ideal, in our actual 
language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called “sentences”, 
“words”, “signs”. The sentence and the word that logic deals with are supposed 
to be something pure and clear-cut. And now we rack our brains over the 
nature of the real sign. – Is it perhaps the idea of the sign? Or the idea at the 
present moment (PI 105)? 
 
 
The burden of seeking such crystalline purity with the means at our disposal seems too 
much: “We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider’s web with our fingers” (PI 106). 
For Fogelin, Wittgenstein’s “assault” on the presumed purity, sublimity, or perfection 
of logic “cuts deeper than his attack on naïve referentialism.” Wittgenstein’s points on 
logic are more nuanced for language is a logical and rule-based activity, and much of 
the issue hangs on our views and expectations with logic. Logic is inevitable, and yet 
                                               
74 Fogelin, 1996: 49. 
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for Wittgenstein logic is not a scientific theory to be discovered but rather more of an 
active practice. “For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not something I 
discovered: it was a requirement” (PI 107; cf. PI 112). Philosophy then is an activity, a 
struggle against the “bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our 
language” that is held captive amidst considerations deemed necessarily to be 
“scientific” (PI 109). The point of this philosophical activity is to diffuse this scientific 
logic, reclaiming the use rather than the abstracted explanation of words.  
When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, 
“proposition/sentence”, “name” – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one 
must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the 
language in which it is at home? – What we do is to bring words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use (PI 116). 
 
 
Language in its everyday use will follow rules, but the rules are contingent. In place of 
some unnamed, ideal essence hidden behind language, language games more accurately 
depict the activities and phenomenon of our language where we see “a complicated 
network” of affinities, relationships, and “similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
similarities in the large and in the small” (PI 66). Fogelin describes such rules as 
working satisfactorily while remaining “indeterminate” in the sense of not conforming 
to the “logician’s demand for rigor.”75  For Wittgenstein, theoretical logicians and 
philosophers meet confusion by embracing essentialism to the point where even games 
themselves must have some common essence. Wittgenstein’s challenge is “don’t think, 
but look!” at the games to observe differences, relationships, and family resemblance in 
the activities rather than the so-called essence (PI 66). Or, Wittgenstein ponders: “What 
does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean to know it and not be able to 
                                               
75 Fogelin, 1996: 51. 
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say it?” Would this awareness be an unformulated definition that would be 
recognizable to the mind if it were formulated? Such questions inevitably place the 
“meaning” of the game outside of the game in abstraction. Hence Wittgenstein 
counters: “Isn’t my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the 
explanations that I could give? That is, in my describing examples of various kinds of 
game, showing how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of 
these, saying that I would hardly call this or that a game, and so on” (PI 75). 
 
Closely tied to indeterminacy, Fogelin points to underdeterminacy and incoherence as 
features of the rules or logic governing language. 76  Underdetermination is not 
vagueness, but rather the recognition of the inevitable gaps in our understanding of 
many things.77 Similarly, the rules of language may at times present contradictions, as in 
a game where one rule indicates a move while another rule prohibits the same. 
Regardless of indeterminacy, underdeterminacy, or incoherence as sub-types, 
Wittgenstein’s goal is to deflate the myth of logical purity to which language must aim. 
Scientific definitions are not fixed per se, but rather exist in flux: “what today counts as 
an observed concomitant of phenomenon A will tomorrow be used to define ‘A’” (PI 
79).78 As another way to describe this, Rhees speaks of “the hardness of the logical 
                                               
76 Fogelin, 1996: 52-56. 
77 PI 80 presents the example of a chair that seems for whatever reason to disappear, 
reappear, and then disappear again. Do the rules of “chair” address such an illusion? 
Likewise, Fogelin speaks of “the concept of personal identity” that may or may not 
always fall clearly within determined rules. Within the field of bioethics, the rare and 
challenging instances of intersex ambiguous genitalia may serve as an instance of 
underdeterminacy. 
78 As an ironic example, consider OC 106 (written between 1949-1951) where 
Wittgenstein imagines the difficulty of speaking realistically—imagine a scientist in the 
1940s—with a child who has been told by an adult that the adult had traveled to the 
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‘must’” that stems from talking of what can and cannot be said rather than what is and is 
not said.79  Hence the phrase “logical impossibility” is problematic because of the 
associations therein that imply or presuppose some kind of pure system. What then is 
the system that determines what is or is not logical? This is akin to the child’s Sunday-
school riddle: can God build a rock so large that he cannot lift it? The riddle is entirely 
different if we were to substitute can or cannot for will or will not. The question turns on 
the assumption of an abstracted system beyond the actual use or practice in language 
and logic. Rhees suggests that “if you spoke of something as ‘logically established’ or 
‘logically certain’ – it would mean nothing then to speak of the principles of logic as 
logically certain.”80 To allow the criteria within a logical system or language game to 
validate something in the abstract beyond the system is a confusion of language. “A” is 
a physical object, and yet the statement “there are physical objects” is nonsensical (OC 
35). 
 “A is a physical object” is a piece of instruction which we give only to someone 
who doesn’t yet understand either what “A” means, or what “physical object”  
means. Thus it is instruction about the use of words, and “physical object” is a 
logical concept. (Like colour, quantity…) And that is why no such proposition 
as: “There are physical objects” can be formulated. Yet we encounter such 
unsuccessful shots at every turn (OC 36). 
 
 
In terms of the crystalline purity of logic, Wittgenstein challenges the mentalist 
framework or theoretical grounding for where logic begins. Is there then no objective 
                                                                                                                                    
moon. “No one has ever been on the moon; the moon is a long way off and it is 
impossible to climb up there or fly there.”  Naturally, the child will insist, even pointing 
to a “way of getting there” unknown to the scientist. What reply can be made to that? 
79 Rhees, 2003: 50.  
80 Rhees, 2003: 50. 
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truth (OC 108)? Far from it.81 As I will argue below, Wittgenstein’s aim is not a 
deconstruction of ultimate meaning or reality per se but rather a clarification regarding 
our faculties of perceiving such meaning. The issue concerns our mistakes with logic 
and language that lead us to inaugurate magically theoretical realities that are not there. 
Here as an example we may imagine in a Wittgensteinian way some empirical 
impossibility such as a man flying unaided like a bird, something that contradicts our 
system of physics and our understanding of gravity. We question such, but what if we 
meet this reply: “we don’t know how unaided, human flight is possible, but those who 
have experienced such flight know they are flying; and even you can’t explain 
everything.” To this, Wittgenstein comments: “we should feel ourselves intellectually 
very distant from someone who said this” (OC 108). We long to test things—
empirically and logically—to seek an autonomous scientific certainty that Wittgenstein 
maintains our language will not support. Rather than remaining suspended in theory, 
Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy continually calls us back to embodied, tangible, 
ways of life. 
What counts as its test? –“But is this an adequate test? And if so, must it not be 
recognizable as such in logic?”—As if giving grounds did not come to an end 
sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an 
ungrounded way of acting (OC 110). 
  
                                               
81 Within Wittgenstein’s world, is every statement or thesis doomed to nihilism? “If 
someone were to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate 
then, because everyone would agree to them” (PI 128). Clearly, we must look deeper 
into Wittgenstein. As Schönbaumsfeld comments regarding PI 128: “…this doesn’t 
mean that we are left with nothing—as one might fear—but rather with a change in 
perspective that will no longer make us succumb to certain kinds of temptation. The 
result of philosophy, if Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein are correct, is therefore not 
philosophical propositions, but, as the Tractatus famously puts it, ‘seeing the world 
aright’ (T 6.54)” For the sake of comparison, one might also think of Climacus’ 
reminders in Concluding Unscientific Postscript that anything is possible in “pure thought,” 
including foregoing the principle of contradiction (Schönbaumsfeld, 2007: 42, cf. 47). 
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3.4 Ethics Without (Theoretical) Philosophy 
Now I’m afraid you haven’t really got a hold of my main contention to which the whole business of 
logical propositions is only corollary. The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by 
propositions, i.e., by language (and, which comes to the same thing, what can be thought) and what 
cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt); which I believe is the cardinal problem of 
philosophy.  Wittgenstein writing to Russell, 191982 
 
The main point of Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy is not always easy to 
discern, and, as Wittgenstein’s correspondence with Bertrand Russell intimates, there is 
much to be read between the lines. For this reason, tracing Wittgenstein’s metaphors is 
paramount, particularly connections such as that between metaphysics and dark magic 
that reveal something of the depth that Wittgenstein sees in language.83 It is no secret, 
for instance, that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein saw ethics as his main contention 
embedded within logic and language. Edwards speaks of logic and ethics as the “twin 
stars” of the Tractatus, and without an understanding of both twin concepts the book 
lacks coherence.84 This question of coherence is either a glaring fault in Wittgenstein 
for assembling such “disparate topics,” or it brings to light the problem with Russell’s 
analytical-only reading. Conceivably, one may attempt to read Wittgenstein solely for 
insights into theoretical logic and positivism, but to do so is akin to stopping short and 
focusing exclusively on pedagogical exercises that are intended to lead one further onto 
                                               
82 Wittgenstein, 1974: 71. 
83 Indeed, we may speak of the transition from the tractarian methodology to that of 
the Investigations as a movement from seeking to map the span or breadth of language—
seeking the propositional and formal essence of language (PI 65)—to an examination of 
the poetic depth in persons manifest in the ambiguity of language. “The problems 
arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of 
depth. They are deep disquietudes; they are deeply rooted in us as the forms of our 
language, and their significance is as great as the importance of our language. – Let’s 
ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And that is what the 
depth of philosophy is.) (PI 111). 
84 Edwards, 1982: 19. 
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something of greater importance and beauty.85 Simply put, the analytical-only reading 
of the Tractatus struggles greatly to account for key concluding propositions: “Not how 
the world is, is the mystical, but that it is” (T 6.44); “There is indeed the inexpressible. 
This shows itself; it is the mystical” (T 6.522). Surmounting the tractarian propositions, 
having climbed the ladder, one is more enabled to see the world rightly, and the ladder 
may (should?) be thrown away (T 6.54).  
 
Once the twin stars are acknowledged as distinct yet cohering, Edwards suggests we are 
penetrating to the core of the Tractatus that paints a picture of a disease in the 
metaphysical self-understanding of Western philosophy: rationality-as-representation.86 
Spanning broadly from the Greek Sophists to Socrates to Descartes to Kant and more, 
the capacity for thinking—as conceiving accurate representations of the real—stands 
arguably as the definition of philosophical self-consciousness in the West. This 
reductivist understanding identifies the intellect primarily with discursive rationality and 
leads to a solipsistic anthropology of the modern “self” that Kerr identifies as the 
central target of Wittgenstein’s critique. Wittgenstein’s goal through language games is 
to seek freedom from something akin to the “absolute conception of reality.”87 Hence 
Edwards speaks of the Tractatus as essentially a “transcendental critique of the concept 
of representation” that examines the necessary “conditions of representation” and 
                                               
85 To read Wittgenstein only to be immersed in the logical-mathematical puzzles he so 
enjoyed personally is to be led astray, and he was aware of this propensity and potential 
shortcoming in his own work as a philosopher-guide: “Wittgenstein himself often felt 
that he had a bad influence on his students. ‘The only seed I am likely to sow’, he said, 
‘is a certain jargon.’ People imitated his gestures, adopted his expressions, even wrote 
philosophy in a way that made use of his techniques – all, it seems, without 
understanding the point of his work.” Monk, 1990: 499. 
86 Edwards, 1982: 19-32. 
87 Kerr, 1997: 26; c.f., 3-27 (emphasis added). 
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thereby seeks to reveal the boundaries of thinking itself. One need tread carefully in 
describing this goal of Wittgenstein; on the one hand, he freely admits the possibility of 
thinking or discursive rationality in the realm of natural science while limiting discursive 
rationality where “pregnant silence” is more fitting.88 At the boundaries of thinking and 
language Wittgenstein’s doctrine of showing arises: “That which mirrors itself in 
language, language cannon represent. That which expresses itself in language, we 
cannot express by language. The propositions show the logical form of reality. They 
exhibit it” (T 4.121). In other words, “what can be shown cannot be said” (T 4.1212). Or, 
as Wittgenstein later states: “Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and 
am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has 
its meaning” (CV 16e). 
 
Out of context, Wittgenstein’s comments seem remarkably Kantian, and though 
perhaps less so in terms of opposing the conceptual and the empirical, the limiting of 
the bounds of sense is clearly present as argued above. This Kantian maneuver, 
however, stands to be informed by the context of influences such as Schopenhauer, 
Tolstoy, and especially Kierkegaard whose unscientific thinking clears the way for the 
vital work of apophatic silence.89 Comparing Kierkegaard with Wittgenstein here is 
particularly helpful for explicating both Wittgenstein’s view of language as therapy and 
his metaphilosophy. Schönbaumsfeld highlights the similar conceptions both 
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein shared regarding philosophy as an activity seeking clarity 
                                               
88 Edwards, 1982: 12. 
89 Edwards, 1982: 30-32. 
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amidst metaphysical confusions.90 Both philosophers point to the essential importance 
of the methodological “how” before the “what” of content and philosophical 
authorship. The newness and originality of philosophical answers are less important 
than the way in which one proceeds to frame the questions. Profundity for these 
philosophers is less a “function of the novelty of the philosophical claims advanced, 
but is rather a result of the way in which existing problems are addressed.”91 In short, 
profundity belongs not to philosophical theories but to Weltanschauung (PI 122) and to 
the accompanying philosophical practices that both enable and emanate from such a 
perspective. This emphasis on methodology, moreover—philosophy as an activity of 
clarity and understanding rather than a mode of constructing knowledge—leads 
naturally to a grounding ethical point of reference. As theoretical philosophy lacks a 
“clear view” of knowledge and a sound methodology, Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein 
turn to the ethical will more than the reasoning mind. 
Tolstoy: a thing’s significance (importance) lies in its being something everyone 
can understand. – That is both true and false. What makes a subject hard to 
understand – if it’s something significant and important – is not that before you 
can understand it you need to be specially trained in abstruse matters, but the 
contrast between understanding the subject and what most people want to see. 
Because of this the very things which are most obvious may become the 
hardest of all to understand. What has to be overcome is a difficulty having to 
do with the will, rather than the intellect (CV 173e). 
 
One who is ignorant and must be given some knowledge…and one who is 
under delusion that must first be taken away…direct communication 
presupposes that the recipient’s ability to receive is entirely in order, but here 
this is simply not the case—indeed, here a delusion is an obstacle. That means a 
corrosive must first be used, but this corrosive is the negative, but the negative 
in connection with communicating is precisely to deceive.92 
                                               
90 Schönbaumsfeld, 2007: 38-59. 
91 Schönbaumsfeld, 2007: 39. “Amongst Jews “genius” is found only in the holy man. 
Even the greatest of Jewish thinkers is no more than talented. (Myself for instance.) I 
think there is some truth in my idea that I really only think reproductively (CV 18e).”  
92 Kierkegaard, 1999 (1858):53-54. 
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The ethical issue lies not with the intellect but more with the resistance of the will. This 
leads Wittgenstein to see in “a Copernicus or a Darwin” not the discovery of a “true 
theory but of a fertile new point of view” (CV 18e), and in the same spirit 
Wittgenstein’s own work, seeking to “see the world aright” (T 6.54), is one of 
“clarification with COURAGE: otherwise it becomes just a clever game” (CV 19e). Both 
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein thus turn from theses (PI 128), propositions, and 
metaphysical speculations to attend to more tangible practices, to “what is actually going 
on, rather than in what the metaphysician hopes to see.”93 Moreover, this turn back to 
concrete reality (PI 107) is a further connection to ethics as thinking and language are 
rooted in forms of life (Lebensformen) for Wittgenstein and the existence-spheres—
aesthetic, ethical, and religious—for Kierkegaard.94 In Schönbaumsfeld’s apt phrasing, 
                                               
93 Schönbaumsfeld, 2007: 42-43. Schönbaumsfeld draws attention to the focus both 
philosophers place upon the philosophical activities that determine and form persons 
rather than philosophical speculation. Schönbaumsfeld points to similar passages from 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript and Philosophical Investigations: 
It is from this side [from the side of existence] that an objection must first be 
made to modern speculative thought, that it has not a false presupposition but 
a comic presupposition, occasioned by its having forgotten in a kind of world-
historical absentmindedness what it means to be a human being, not what it 
means to be a human being in general, for even speculators might be swayed to 
consider that sort of thing, but what it means that we, you and I and he, are 
human beings, each one on his own (Kierkegaard: 1992 (1846): 120).  
 
When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, 
“proposition/sentence”, “name” – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one 
must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the 
language in which it is at home? – What we try to do is to bring words back 
from their metaphysical to their everyday use (PI 116). 
94 Schönbaumsfeld, 2007: 43. Schönbaumsfeld follows Stanley Cavell in aligning forms 
of life with existence-spheres, and Sandra Laugier connects Hadot’s reading of both 
ancient philosophy and Wittgenstein to one’s way of living: “…in Hadot’s search for a 
definition of stoicism and more generally of ancient philosophy the idea appears that 
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the point of philosophy free of scientific thinking and theorizing is to guide persons 
towards what is needed rather than what is wanted, and, despite the half-century gap 
between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, both were concerned with “scientism” and 
“system building” amidst a “progress-worshipping, technological culture” that shapes 
the desires of persons in accord with a diseased Zeitgeist. It hardly needs to be stated, 
moreover, that Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein place philosophers squarely in the middle 
of this social critique. Philosophers above all face the intellectual temptations and 
diseases of scientism and theory through metaphysics.95 
In other words, Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein are at one in their aim of trying 
to expose the fraudulence of metaphysics. Both want to show that it constructs 
edifices in which no one can dwell using only the appearance of building 
blocks. But it is not that metaphysical speculation doesn’t agree with common 
sense and this is why we have to reject it—that is, Kierkegaard and 
Wittgenstein are not advocating a form of pragmatism, as some commentators 
have supposed. Rather, what they are trying to show is that metaphysics’ 
pretensions are fantastical and confused by exposing (amongst other things) the 
speculative philosopher’s tendency to disregard practice and context, confuse 
conceptual with factual questions and cleave to the false idea of the ‘God’s eye’ 
view of the world.96 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
philosophical change can be accomplished in daily life, through the understanding of 
the everyday, the down-to-earth (Hadot often quotes Kierkegaard), the ordinary (as 
Marcus Aurelius describes the beauties of everyday life). The rehabilitation of daily 
existence is a new type of exercise, and ordinary language, as in Thoreau and 
Wittgenstein, is the new space of transformation-conversion demanded by philosophy” 
(Laugier, 2011: 325). 
95 Wittgenstein’s engagement and tenure with academia was always hesitant and 
intentionally interrupted as he doubted even that “a normal human being” could 
remain honest while being a university professor. He often encouraged his students to 
seek common professions outside the university where, in Edwards words, they were 
less likely to succumb to the “disease of understanding which produces the nonsense 
of literalization.” As a “form of life” particularly ensconced in “metaphysical thinking,” 
the modern university served as “a place of ease and affection, where the self-enclosure 
of abstract thinking is encouraged, [breeding] the hubris that despises or patronizes the 
common lot of most men and women (Edwards, 1982: 218).   
96 Schönbaumsfeld, 2007: 39, 46. 
	 153 
In light of this critique, Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein pursue philosophy as a clarifying 
practice tied to the ethical work of self-formation. Philosophy is not a matter of 
external discourses removed from persons as though one were to participate—or 
simply observe—an external didactic or “metaphysical system-building.” Wittgenstein 
states: “Working in philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really 
more a working on oneself. On one’s own interpretation. One one’s way of seeing 
things. (And what one expects of them.)” (CV 16e). At the heart of philosophy for 
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein lie practices of working on oneself, and hence 
Schönbaumsfeld argues that both philosophers see themselves as “physicians of the 
soul who attempt to cure the ailments (confusions) of understanding by presenting a 
new perspective that will dissolve the philosophical problems.”97  
 
Moreover, the unique writing styles Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein both employ play 
critical roles in philosophical therapeutics. Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms create space to 
allow for prophetic voices to speak to the writer as well as the reader, and 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations explicitly seek to induce in each reader the “trouble” of 
thinking “thoughts of his own” (PI, preface 4e).98  One of the first to introduce 
Wittgenstein to the French, Hadot was carefully attuned to the rhetorical dynamic of 
Wittgenstein’s work. 
It is therapeutics that is offered to us. Philosophy is an illness of language…The 
true philosophy will therefore consist in curing itself of philosophy, in making 
                                               
97 Schönbaumsfeld, 2007: 58, 47-59. Cf. Kierkegaard, 1992 (1846): 155.   
98 “Consequently, the indirect form of communication that Kierkegaard and 
Wittgenstein employ respects the ethical integrity of the reader by giving the ‘self-
activity of appropriation’ pride of place. For it is this which will in the end decide 
whether what we see in the looking-glass is the image of an ape, or the image of an 
apostle. The mirror itself is silent on this point” Schönbaumsfeld, 2007: 59. 
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every philosophical problem completely and definitively disappear… 
Wittgenstein continues [from the Tractatus to the Investigations]…to devote 
himself to the same mission: to bring radical and definitive peace to 
metaphysical worry. Such a purpose imposes a certain literary genre: the work 
cannot be the exposition of a system, a doctrine, a philosophy in the traditional 
sense…[Philosophical Investigations] wishes to act little by little on our spirit, like a 
cure, like a medical treatment. The work therefore does not have systematic 
structure, strictly speaking.99 
 
 
In Hadot’s reading of Wittgenstein, philosophy’s task is to grasp sense and beauty in 
the ordinary things of everyday existence. This emphasis on the down-to-earth and the 
ordinary is wed to language because spiritual exercises are manifest through the 
“habitual and repeated practice and usage of language including speech (the Socratic 
dialogue, seen by Hadot as a spiritual exercise), writing (considered as well as an 
exercise), and reading. In short, spiritual exercises reveal the privileged space of the 
ethical relationship to language.”100 Language is situated as a clarifying exercise within 
everyday life, and, far from offering a metaphysical magic, language serves as a 
therapeutic practice to uncover “the idea of a silent ethics, inscribed in the 
understanding of the limits of meaning and that of a simple naïve and ordinary 
relationship to the world…philosophy is not a theory or a body of doctrines but the 
clarification of our thoughts.” 101  Within this framework, ethics can never exist 
authentically as a philosophical theory or system of thoughts but functions rather as a 
philosophical activity and way of life.  
 
                                               
99 As quoted in Davidson’s “Introduction” to Hadot, 1995: 17-18. 
100 Laugier, 2011: 325. 
101 Laugier, 2011: 326. 
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Like Edwards, Hadot broadens the implications of Wittgenstein—in line with ancient 
philosophy grounded in modes of theoria and episteme—to the history of thought in 
general, defending “a model of spiritual exercises ‘independent of all theory.’” 
However, perhaps most striking in Hadot’s exposition of Wittgenstein is the way 
language-exercises—even amidst the immanence and limits of what language can say—
can guide one to experience “the wonder of the world” or the “oceanic feeling.” Not 
theory, but everyday life stands to offer a path of formation, and hence the transition 
from the Tractatus to the Investigations represents Wittgenstein’s growing desire to move 
from “clarifying” ordinary language to actually following language. Rather than seeing 
logic or language as a “normative science” (PI 81) that leads one into metaphysical 
certainty and normativity, language is better seen as a formative experience or exercise. 
Laugier sums up Hadot on this point: 
An undeniable link between the Tractatus and the Investigations is the immanence 
of language. It is nonsense to wish for an exterior view or approach. We are 
always inside a ‘form of life’ in language. Spiritual exercises are not a counter-
example to, but a confirmation of, this immanence. They are always explicit, 
spoken: they are language exercises. This is why the idea of spiritual exercise is at 
least as close to the ‘second’ Wittgenstein as the first, and helps us understand 
the continuity between the two. In the Investigations as in the Tractatus there is 
the aim to de-sublimate philosophy, the desire to bring it down to earth (to 
‘bring the words home from their metaphysical to their ordinary use’, PI 
116)…For Wittgenstein and Hadot, language is always ‘ours’; we are born with 
it. This is an ethical truth, difficult to accept: all words are learned, belong to 
others, have already been said, and we cannot rise, except in illusion, above or 
outside.102 
 
 
The “difficulty” of language as spiritual exercise lies in the humility to realize the 
immanence and contingency of the mortal and human “situation in language,” and yet 
the point of addressing this radical finitude is hardly to suggest an ontology of finitude. 
                                               
102 Laugier, 2011: 327. 
	 156 
Rather, more akin to the Stoics, Hadot’s Wittgenstein seeks a form of wisdom in 
“training for death and for the life whose limits are those of my world.” The 
contingency of language moves beyond the misguided search for the “authentic” or 
“original” meaning in words to an emphasis and valuation on the language that is 
present. As Laugier states, “there are only other words. Language is there, before 
me.”103 Hadot’s point, then, is to see language as praxis, as methodology, and as an 
ethical “point of access to the ordinary in our lives.” Following language means that 
language becomes a guide and a way to explore the contingency and particularity in 
human existence. Language is a social act, a communal practice, and a formative 
“doing” that is no mere game we play, but rather, as James Smith describes, functions as 
a practice to provide “an account of how we embodied, finite, contingent, dependent 
creatures make our way in the world.” Smith then points to PI 89 where Wittgenstein 
quotes Augustine’s Confessions: “What then is time? Provided that no one asks me, I 
know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know.”104 The practice of 
admitting such contingency is far from fideism or the abandonment of content.105 
Rather, as a sort of apophatic methodology, the difficult exercises of clarifying language 
point towards a different and higher knowledge beyond philosophical theory. 
Wittgenstein extrapolates from Augustine’s words: “Something that one knows when 
nobody asks one, but no longer knows when one is asked to explain it, is something 
                                               
103 Laugier, 2011: 329. 
104 Smith, 2014: 59. In PI 89 Wittgenstein quotes Augustine in the Latin. Smith cites 
Henry Chadwick’s translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 11.14.17.  
105 “One might be tempted to believe that a sensibility that sees the world’s existence as 
a miracle, and that acknowledges the presence of mystery as such, would despise 
thinking altogether. On a quick reading such a form of life as I have described might 
sounds like anti-intellectual religious enthusiasm, or a strange variant of Zen. But this is 
a total misconception. Wittgenstein does not despise thinking; he despises attempts at 
magic that pass themselves off as thinking” (Edwards, 1982: 247).  
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that has to be called to mind. (And it is obviously something which, for some reason, it is 
difficult to call to mind.)” (PI 89).  
At this juncture, it is fitting to ask if Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy leaves room 
only for silence? Are the difficult things “called to mind” to be spoken, and is that 
Wittgenstein’s primary contribution to the discourses on and within philosophy? In 
terms of metaphysical theorizing without roots in any fertile, rough ground (PI 107), 
Wittgenstein’s message is clear that such philosophy is diseased and deceptive. Hubris 
and confusion are the fruits of such mental theorizations. Wittgenstein sees this and 
gives over the whole of his life to the prophetic, deconstructive task of clarity.106 
Philosophy is an activity, even a “struggle against the bewitchment of our 
understanding by the resources of our language” (PI 109) for the simple reason that 
“philosophy cannot deliver the sort of knowledge that is usually considered as its raison 
d'être.”107 Put in such a light, Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy is the antithesis of a 
systematic metaphysics or natural theology, and this is perhaps where Wittgenstein is so 
maddening—even toxic—to many philosophers. Wittgenstein stubbornly refuses to let 
go of the point that long before we seek to enumerate what it is that we know—
particularly if we are seeking to name some essence or supposed natural, ideal being—
we must attend to the methodological ways of knowing that enable of disable any such 
knowledge. 
 
                                               
106 Sontag, 1995: 131. Sontag argues that Wittgenstein’s critique of theoretical 
philosophy must be understood within the context of Wittgenstein’s ascetic life. To 
grasp rightly Wittgenstein’s primary message on simplicity and love, readers must 
confront Wittgenstein’s “life and work” as a whole. 
107 Horwich, 2012: 1. 
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Hence, in the face of philosophy pursued as theoretical science, Wittgenstein 
commands silence, and yet that silence has to do with our inability to proclaim 
scientific statements about mystical and ultimate reality and is no agnostic gesture 
towards the mystical itself (T 6.522). Our inability to say (rightly) anything does not 
void a positive, constructive value in showing.  
That which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent.  
That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language.  
The propositions show the logical form of reality.  
They exhibit it (T 4.121). 
 
From the Tractatus through the later writings, this distinction of saying/showing is ever 
present, and while other formulations, systems, or critiques of philosophy certainly 
make their normative claims on philosophy, Wittgenstein’s legacy is a call to action, 
practices, and ways of life. We can imagine a sort of poetic language, an iconic 
manifestation where the mystical expresses itself in language, but for the most part 
Wittgenstein is only able to gesture and hint at such a breakthrough of transcendence 
to the immanent. Rather than seek to address directly the mystical, Wittgenstein points 
instead to the problem that in Monk’s phrasing could only “have an existential, never a 
theoretical solution.” The problem stemmed from a misplaced trust in metaphysical 
theorizing and it was tragically embodied for Wittgenstein in the scientific and 
technological “progress” that enabled fire-bombs at Dresden, genocidal concentration 
camps, and atomic bombs dropped on Japan.  
A picture that intruded upon him he wrote, was of our civilization, ‘cheaply 
wrapped in cellophane, and isolated from everything great, from God, as it 
were.’ The houses, cars, and other trappings of our environment struck him as 
‘separating man from his origins, from what is lofty and eternal, etc’. It was as 
though life itself was coming to an end, suffocated by the trappings of our 
industrial age. And, of course, it was futile to expect to alter this course by 
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pointing it out...Yet Wittgenstein continued in his work of undermining the way 
of thinking that, he thought, lay at the root of the whole disaster.108 
 
 
Above all, Wittgenstein longed for “a change of spirit” that would tear off the 
cellophane to reveal the “living world.” Against the colourlessness of theories—and, as 
he saw it, cold, “grey wisdom” vs. the “passion” of faith (CV 56e)—Wittgenstein 
yearned for the life and the passion he saw in religious practices. Hence Monk draws 
attention to key phrases from Culture and Value that may help to illumine the whole of 
Wittgenstein’s thinking: 
I believe that one of the things Christianity says is that sound doctrines are all 
useless. That you have to change your life. (Or the direction of your life). 
It says that wisdom is all cold; and that you can no more use it for setting your 
life to rights than you can forge iron when it’s cold. 
The point is that a sound doctrine need not take hold of you; you can follow it 
as you would a doctor’s prescription. –But here you need something to move 
you and turn you in a new direction. –(I.e. this is how I understand it.) Once 
you have been turned round, you must stay turned round.  
Wisdom is passionless. But faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion. 
Religion is, as it were, the calm bottom of the sea at its deepest point, which 
remains calm however high the ways on the surface may be.— (CV 53e). 
 
 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is intended as nothing less than an “ethical deed” and an 
attempt “to incarnate a vision of the healthy human life; the transmission of a moral 
vision—the attempt to reveal its character and make it potent—is the true burden of all 
[Wittgenstein’s] philosophical work.”109  As the sign of an arrow à is only truly 
meaningful when one turns direction or acts upon the sign, so, too, is Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy an applied philosophy and “not a hocus-pocus that can be performed only 
by the mind” (PI 454). In the Tractatus, a healthy human life means the “sense of life” 
                                               
108 Monk, 1990: 489-90. 
109 Edwards, 1982: 203, 219. 
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has been clarified as the limits of thought are acknowledged and such a philosophical 
act in essence gestures to the ineffable (T 6.52), and in Wittgenstein’s later works, the 
“sense of life” is abandoned as a “metaphysical fantasy” or self-referential, magical 
theorizing. The sense of life is never a given. As Kerr notes:  
It is neither objective metaphysical realities (whether forms or atoms) nor 
subjective states of consciousness (raw feels, mental pictures, innate ideas) but 
Lebensformen that are ‘the given’. What is given is the human world: neither 
meanings in the head, accessible by introspection, nor essences in the objects 
around us, yielding to analysis, but the order that human beings establish by 
their being together.110  
 
 
To be clear, Wittgenstein’s call to stability in everyday customs and practices is no naïve 
claim to a “moral panacea.” Returning to particular actions and concrete realities will 
not eliminate the vices and proclivities of human nature. Competing ideals of character 
and conflicting modes of life are inevitable, and yet what Wittgenstein’s “sound human 
understanding” pursues is an anthropology free of the diseased trappings of rationality-
as-representation that produces a “metaphysical gaze.” Hence Edwards notes that 
“vision becomes the fundamental metaphor for one’s relation to reality, with the view 
sub specie aeternitatis as the apotheosis of such seeing; and because the sense modality of 
vision always incorporates distance between seer and what is seen, reality always lies 
apart from the thinker.”111 Lebensformen and Wittgenstein’s whole critique of theory is 
first and foremost a methodological acknowledgement that every individual’s sense of 
self depends essentially on “being with others…being in touch with others” in both a 
physical and psychological way. Kerr again summarizes:  
                                               
110 Kerr, 1997: 69. Cf. PI 7. 
111 Edwards, 1982: 221. 
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Nothing is more fundamental to the whole human enterprise than the 
community that we create in our natural reactions to one another as they have 
been cultivated and elaborated in a very contingent historical tradition. 
‘Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our 
natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing’ (PI 25).112 
 
 
To some, Wittgenstein’s philosophy may seem narrow, even reductivist, for refusing to 
forego its stringent method of critiquing theoretical philosophy. Throughout the depth 
and richness of Wittgenstein, the whole of his thought is centered arguably on this one 
critique of metaphysical theses in philosophy (PI 128).  So be it, for in one sense such 
critics are correct.113 But if Wittgenstein is right in gesturing—sometimes madly—to 
the false magic of metaphysics, such a corrective and clarifying claim is profound in its 
simplicity and powerful in that all philosophers must confront it. Wittgenstein himself 
seemingly was never surprised by negative reactions, nor did he assume that his 
philosophy would out-debate others. This is due precisely to his lack of content—as 
content is normally understood in philosophy. Seeking to avoid the trappings of theory 
himself, his philosophical “content” was the ordo of clarity amidst the constant 
reminder that to understand his works means that one is following a guide and the 
whole life of a person, however imperfect he may be.114 Despite the limitations of 
                                               
112 Kerr, 1997: 76. 
113 “…I was thinking about my philosophical work and saying to myself: ‘I destroy, I 
destroy, I destroy—’ (CV 21e). 
114 Monk recounts two of Wittgenstein’s students, D. A. T. Gasking and A. C. Jackson, 
stating the difficulty in understanding Wittgenstein’s lectures that contained so may 
inter-connected examples and “repetitive concrete detailed talk.” Of this, Wittgenstein 
commented: “I am showing my pupils details of an immense landscape, which they 
cannot possibly know their way around” (CV 56e). “In teaching you philosophy I’m 
like a guide showing you how to find your way round London…Of course a good 
guide will take you through the more important streets more often than he takes you 
down side streets; a bad guide will do the opposite. In philosophy I’m a rather bad 
guide” (as quoted in Monk, 1990: 502).  
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Wittgenstein in going beyond silence or—employing in some way his own 
understanding of religious thinking—to “soften his own dissolution” enough to 
pray115—what Wittgenstein means for fields of applied philosophy such as bioethics 
should not be ignored. Wittgenstein’s legacy of critique needs to be recovered not as a 
new anti-theory theory but for the way it changes the moral perspective of 
individuals.116 Hence even as Wittgenstein himself fails to move past silence, his silence 
is meaningful as it furthers a view of the world not governed by scientific, rationalistic, 
technocratic ontologies of power. In a Wittgensteinian way, the lines are drawn 
between a view of the world as a possession under the guise of rationality-as-
representation and a view of the world as miraculously “there.”  
 Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is. 
The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a 
limited whole. 
 The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling (T 6.44 &  
6.45). 
 
 
This position on wonder forms the backbone of Wittgenstein’s “Lecture on Ethics,” a 
lecture that summarizes numerous points of Wittgenstein’s thought on the whole. The 
experience “par excellence” that defines what Wittgenstein means by absolute or ethical 
value is “best described [by saying that]…I wonder at the existence of the world” (LE 11). To 
look upon the world through the theoretical, scientific lens is to see facts and similes; 
the facts are relative judgments of value—i.e. “this man is a good runner” or “this is 
                                               
115 “I cannot kneel to pray because it’s as though my knees were stiff. I am afraid of 
dissolution (of my own dissolution), should I become soft” (CV 56e). 
116 “One must start out with error and convert it into truth. That is, one must reveal the 
source of error, otherwise hearing the truth won’t do any good. The truth cannot force 
its way in when something else is occupying its space. To convince someone of the 
truth, it is not enough to state it, but rather one must find the path from error to truth” 
(RF 119). 
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the right way to Granchester” (LE 6)—and the similes are the modes of language that 
carry relative judgments. To say “this is a good fellow” and then note “this is a good 
football player” seems to imply some common sense of goodness, and yet for 
Wittgenstein the point we must notice is the use and meaning we gain out of the 
relationship between the two “goods” as similes of relative judgment.  
In ethical and religious language we seem constantly to be using similes. But a 
simile must be the simile for something. And if I can describe a fact by means 
of a simile I must also be able to drop the simile and to describe the facts 
without it. Now in our case as we try to drop the simile and simply to state the 
facts which stand behind it, we find that there are no such facts. (LE 14-15). 
 
 
These statements on wonder move us beyond seeing scientifically to seeing the world 
as a miracle. “The truth is that the scientific way of looking at a fact is not the way to 
look at it as a miracle. For imagine whatever fact you may, it is not in itself miraculous 
in the absolute sense of the term (LE 17). For Edwards, these passages on wonder 
illustrate the “characteristic recognition” of a Pathos that is inherent in the existence of 
something, as well as “a particular response to that Pathos.” In place of scientific 
curiosity regarding facts, one becomes open to a miracle; “the recognition that ‘the world 
is there’ will produce wonder and humility, properly ethical sentiments…”117 
  
In sum, as a way of drawing numerous themes together, it is worth reflecting on what 
we may identify less as Wittgenstein’s constructive but rather redemptive view of 
language. Namely, while the experience of humility in seeing the world as a miracle—
something there as a gift, an occasion for love that occludes the will to power—is not 
conjured through language, language itself in manifold ways bears witness to something 
                                               
117 Edwards, 1982: 234. 
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greater. “Now I am tempted to say that the right expression in language for the miracle 
of the existence of the world, though it is not any proposition in language, is the 
existence of language itself” (LE 17). Immediately after suggesting that, however, 
Wittgenstein admits that some will see the shift from expressing the miraculous “by 
means of language” to the expression “by the existence of language” is merely 
Wittgenstein’s way of saying again “that we cannot express what we want to express 
and that all we say about the absolute miraculous remains nonsense.” The answer for 
such pundits will likely seem clear: when such experiences arise that “tempt” us to 
attribute a quality “which we call absolute or ethical value and importance,” what we 
are seeing is that such words are not indeed nonsense. The experience we are seeking 
to describe has absolute value just as “a fact like other facts,” and that the remaining 
problem is to find the “correct logical analysis of what we mean by our ethical and 
religious expressions” (LE 18). In other words, has Wittgenstein merely failed through 
language to speak properly of what he maintains is unsayable? 
Now when this is urged against me I at once see clearly, as it were in a flash of 
light, not only that no description that I can think of would do to describe what 
I mean by absolute value, but that I would reject every significant description 
that anyone would ever suggest, ab initio, on the ground of its significance. That 
is to say: I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical 
because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their 
nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just 
to go beyond the world and that is to go beyond significant language. My whole 
tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk 
Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running 
against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it 
springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the 
absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. But it is a document of 
a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting and I 
would not for my life ridicule it (LE 17-19). 
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The passage above is lengthy, yet notably summarizes Wittgenstein and in particular 
speaks to the question of the relationship between language and the mystical.118 At one 
point, in the clear propositions of the Tractatus, the mystical lay beyond language. After 
discerning his explorations with language games and Lebensformen, however, 
Wittgenstein’s position is more nuanced as he came to see through language—the 
existence of language itself—something of the miraculous and mystical. Yet 
Wittgenstein hesitates to overstate this. In the passage above, he is “tempted” in saying 
as carefully as he does that the miraculous is presenced in the existence of language, 
and amidst this tension it seems that we glimpse both the greatest relevance of 
Wittgenstein to ethics as well as the limit of what he offers. On the one hand, 
Wittgenstein’s constant emphasis on methodology leads to philosophy as an activity of 
clarity, not a system or paradigm that constructs theory. Wittgenstein’s “running against 
the walls of our cage” is propaedeutic for the revelation of ultimate meaning and 
absolute value. For an applied field of ethics such as bioethics that exists under the 
metaphysical gaze of principlism and scientific theories, this insight is remarkable. 
Moreover, the ascetic practice of seeking clarity shifts the focus from an external drive 
to uncover or possess knowledge as an almost technological object to an internal 
process that prepares one for “the possibility of ekstasis.” As Kallenberg notes, 
Wittgenstein never sought to refute the metaphysicians but to discipline their use of 
                                               
118 Indeed, this relationship between language and the mystical enacts a pre-modern, 
theological move against philosophical metaphysics as the “positing of reality apart from 
God” that would seem directly applicable to Cunningham’s broader thesis 
(Cunningham, 1999: 77). Far from supporting an ad hoc transcendentalism, 
Wittgenstein’s embodied practices with language as described in the Philosophical 
Investigations and Lecture on Ethics stridently contest transcendental and metaphysical 
theorizing. Pace Cunningham, Wittgenstein works within a neo-Kantian framework 
while soundly refuting Kantian a priori metaphysics (Kerr, 1997: 37; Cunningham, 
1999:85-86). 
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language. The nature of language “[prevents] direct talk about the mystical” such that 
the “cardinal problem in philosophy for Wittgenstein was the problem of becoming 
skilled enough to perceive what can be shown, but not said.”119 
 
On the other hand, for all the critical advantages of Wittgenstein’s methodology, by his 
own recognition, ultimate meaning remains beyond reach. What remains is the ascetic 
practice of clarity, the “trouble of thinking” that others must undertake on their own 
(PI, preface 4). Frederick Sontag takes on that trouble, and in seeking to explicate 
Wittgenstein’s gesturing Sontag suggests a “Gospel according to Wittgenstein” where 
Wittgenstein’s lived-pursuit of “philosophy, intellect, simplicity, ascetic practice and the 
search for love” forms a life-work as a “good news.” Unlike Tolstoy who wrestled 
explicitly (dangerously?) with the Gospels, however, Wittgenstein’s “good news” is 
“intended essentially only for philosophers” as it remains an activity of clarity for 
thinking. 120  As such, Wittgenstein becomes something of a religious thinker by 
examining the phenomena of human logic and language that frees him of metaphysical 
theorizing and of any pretense that language may depart from engagement with the 
world (PI 90). The mystical that lies no longer beyond language may be realized in some 
way through language, and yet this is surely a limited gain. Wittgenstein’s deep respect 
for the thick meaning of rituals (cf. Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough) testifies to other 
modes of knowing and experiencing religious meaning beyond the philosophical 
practices of clarity. Philosophy for Wittgenstein may be clarified entirely through the 
analysis of ordinary language, but as Sontag notes: “if we released the fly of perplexity 
                                               
119 Kallenberg, 2001: 170-71. 
120 Sontag, 1995: 126, 126-31. 
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from the fly bottle of intricate metaphysics, we know that Wittgenstein never found 
release or knew the gift of love…In fact, freedom from his intellect as a taskmaster—
this is precisely what he never knew. It was, as he says, at the same time his single talent 
and his most perplexing demand.”121 
 
Given the limits of Wittgenstein’s method, what can we say the method may 
accomplish? The answer this thesis proposes is nuanced for good reason. The field of 
bioethics is ripe for the philosophical practices of clarity that Wittgenstein lived and 
preaches, and such a critique is no small accomplishment for Wittgenstein’s method. 
The method of the Investigations considers all language games, and the sections below 
will demonstrate how language games bring clarity to controversial issues in 
contemporary bioethics. The ethical norms and principles employed commonly in the 
field enact a scientific and metaphysical magic that should be decried. Moreover, 
employing Wittgenstein’s method we find the space for honest engagements of 
difference not amidst metaphysical conjuring but within the clarity of language rooted 
within Lebensformen. This is the work of shunning disembodied language that floats in 
abstraction and turning rather to a different conception of how human beings mesh 
with the world more “instinctively” and ritually as embodied persons. Both of the 
following chapters are explorations of how bioethics should move beyond such 
abstracted theorizing.  
 
At the same time, while engaging Wittgenstein’s method with bioethics, it would be 
disingenuous to assume that the limits of (only) gesturing towards absolute value can 
                                               
121 Sontag, 1995: 129. 
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solve the perplexities of applied ethics. In this regard, as Sontag comments, the method 
of Wittgenstein’s later writings “shuts nothing from being voiced in words” and raises 
the question: can his method “take away nothing, leave everything as it was, except 
remove our perplexity, bring us into agreement and make further speculation in 
philosophy unnecessary?”122 For all the value in practices of clarity, at the end of the 
pursuit, how does one find rest? Or, to follow Wittgenstein’s strong metaphor, might 
there be and where is the book on Ethics that would, with an explosion, destroy all 
other books in the world (LE 9)? The final sections of this thesis will take steps toward 
this question of Ethics, ultimate value, and the ultimate good. Within the following 
chapter, however, it is informative to trace the parallel between Wittgenstein and H.T. 
Engelhardt as one who critically examines the foundations of bioethics. 
 
 
                                               
122 Sontag, 1995: 129.
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CHAPTER 4  
 
BIOETHICS AS MODUS VIVENDI: THIN POSSIBILITIES  
 
The goal of this chapter is first to reflect upon a notable figure in the field of 
bioethics, H. T. Engelhardt, who engages bioethics both critically yet with a therapeutic 
aim. These two aims are ripe for comparison with Wittgenstein, and aligning 
Engelhardt and Wittgenstein in this way is the second goal of this chapter. It would not 
be accurate to place Engelhardt directly in Wittgenstein’s tradition, and yet a strong 
family resemblance can be discerned, particularly in the way that Wittgenstein and 
Engelhardt both present a critical mapping—of logic/language and bioethics 
respectively—as a way to argue towards something that necessarily transcends 
theoretical and secular reason. In this way, both call for an ethics and bioethics beyond 
the thin possibilities of secular philosophy. Moreover, notwithstanding their general 
similarities, Engelhardt clearly moves beyond Wittgenstein’s silence in a way that points 
to a constructive engagement with ethics and bioethics from a particular theological 
perspective.  
 
 
4.1 Engelhardt’s Narrative of Thin, Secular Bioethics 
Christianity is not based on a historical truth; rather, it offers us a (historical) narrative and says: now 
believe! But not, believe this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative, rather: 
believe, through thick and thin, which you can do only as the result of life. Here you have a narrative, 
don’t take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives! Make a quite different 
place in your life for it. – There’s nothing paradoxical about that! (CV 32). 
 
H. T. Engelhardt is known predominantly as a philosopher of difference, and 
the differences he points out carry strong implications for the possibilities of a peaceful 
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or orderly existence.1 One of his primary tactics is to point out the subtle or not so 
subtle violence that can stem from our reason, a reason that can trick us into “seeing 
the sameness and the unity in our facile ideas.”2  A number of his works carry 
references to MacIntyre and Hauerwas, and yet Engelhardt remains less optimistic than 
either regarding the possibilities of reason and dialogue across different narratives.3 
Bioethics, for Engelhardt, is rightly placed within the family tree of the Enlightenment 
project that believed in a common rationality able to deliver universal conclusions. 
Such optimism in theories and common rationality for Engelhardt amounts to an 
idolatry of reason, and hence his challenge steps broadly in rhythm with established 
critics of modernity such as Nietzsche, Derrida, Foucault, and Wittgenstein, etc.—all 
who demonstrated that the presumed triumph of reason in the Enlightenment project 
is vapid, and that the reality behind such idols of reason turns out to be little more than 
will to power. For Engelhardt, the Enlightenment hope for a secular morality—a way 
of accounting “in general of what individuals owe each other and ought to do”—stems 
from a characteristic attempt in Western history “to see reality from the anonymous 
                                               
1 Though Engelhardt’s scholarly focus is predominantly bioethics, he sees the way to 
address bioethics rightly as necessarily running through the deepest philosophical and 
theological questions. The Preface to The Foundations of Christian Bioethics opens with 
these statements: “This book is as much about a philosophical puzzle as it is about 
bioethics. This book is more about a religious quest than it is about a philosophical 
puzzle. Yet, it is directed to a philosophical puzzle which it approaches through 
philosophical reflection and analysis. The philosophical puzzle is this: if we are trapped 
in immanence, can moral truth be anything but ambiguous?” (Engelhardt, 2001: xi). 
Moreover, in addressing these significant philosophical puzzles, Engelhardt does not 
hesitate to see political or social implications of foundational philosophical or 
theological commitments. Engelhardt often points to the power struggles and violence 
in the bloody 20th century that stems on many points from “real evil” a “hatred and 
pride” that is beyond mere “intellectual mistakes” in philosophy (Engelhardt: 1997, 
272-81).      
2 Bishop, 2014: 301. 
3 Lucie-Smith, 2007, 47. 
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perspective of reason,” and such a normative “view from nowhere and outside of 
particular history” seeks nothing short of “the rational account of being and morality.”4 
Faith in reason has replaced faith in God, leaving bioethics to flounder in the moral 
ambiguity of life after God.5 Abstract, universal principles are purportedly deduced 
apart from any embodied, communal tradition, and such principles are deemed to be 
self-evident, self-authenticating exceptionless norms. Here amidst these modern ruins 
of the Enlightenment project, the best we can hope for is some degree of honesty that 
admits that bioethics currently exists primarily on the thin level of the procedural as a 
modus vivendi. 
 
For Engelhardt, the procedural ethic described in The Foundations of Bioethics (1996, 2nd 
ed.) is far from the ideal of a “content-full morality” offering substantive guidance on 
what is right or wrong; rather, his procedural ethics is founded merely on the consent 
or permission of rational persons. In a secular society, these rational persons meet as 
“moral strangers” who engage with one another on the thin moral grounding of 
consent, whereas “moral friends” are those who share a transcendent authority and 
guidance for a canonical, content-full morality. Further, Engelhardt differentiates 
between “communities” of those who are bound by a common moral tradition and/or 
practice based on a common moral vision of the good life and “societies” of those 
individuals “who find themselves in diverse moral communities.”6 Embedded within 
these communities and societies, our encounters with moral strangers and strikingly 
different moral visions exemplify the “postmodern philosophical predicament” 
                                               
4 Engelhardt, 1996: 4. 
5 Engelhardt, 1996: 6; Engelhardt, 2017; Bishop, 2014; Cherry, 2014. 
6 Engelhardt, 1996: 7. 
	 172 
resulting from the failed “modern philosophical project to discover a canonical 
content-full morality.”7  
 
Surveying Engelhardt’s overarching philosophical narrative and theological critique of 
secularism—pointing out the disorder and violence in secularism, as well as its implicit, 
inevitable theological structure—one can easily see why he is frequently misread and 
often controversial within bioethics.8 Few, however, contest the scope and influence of 
his scholarship within bioethics, especially given his participation alongside figures such 
as Robert Veatch, LeRoy Walters, Alasdair MacIntyre, Tom Beauchamp, and James 
Childress in composing the Belmont Report and for his early involvement at the 
Kennedy Institute for Ethics at Georgetown University. Despite Engelhardt’s long 
standing place within bioethics, his methodology or style has proved a perpetual 
challenge to many in that he insists on first examining the possibilities for bioethics 
from within immanent, procedural ethics before venturing into any ideal, content-full 
morality. In short, Engelhardt’s ordo insists on exploring the current reality of today’s 
immanent, procedural ethics, a reality that exists despite prominent claims to common 
morality and universal rationality. This choice to attend first to the malady before 
framing the treatment aligns well with Wittgenstein’s notion that “the philosopher 
treats a question; like an illness” (PI 255). This point is critical, for numerous readers 
have mistaken Engelhardt’s assessment and critical description of secular ethics as his 
ideal prescription, supposing that his strategy of stridently carrying postmodern 
                                               
7 Engelhard, 1996: 8. 
8 Bishop, 2014; Nash, 2014.  
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thought to its logical fruition is his proposed philosophical position.9 To be sure, 
Engelhardt engages first from within the logic of secular bioethics, but the engagement 
is intended as a pedagogy of repulsion, revealing how little is accomplished from within 
the logic of secular consensus: 
[The Foundations of Bioethics] does not celebrate the chaos, or even much of the 
diversity, and surely not the moral perversity and vacuity of this landscape. 
Instead, this volume offers secular means for coming to terms with the chaos 
and diversity of postmodernity. The means are meager and offer no 
transcendent fulfillment. But they are all that is available in general secular 
terms.10 
 
Engelhardt’s focus on procedural ethics is no ideal prescription but rather a description 
of one way—the inevitable way, as Engelhardt argues—to navigate bioethics amidst 
the secular aftermath of the failed Enlightenment project.11  
 
Admitting such shortcomings in modern philosophy and noting the limits of 
procedural ethics as merely “all that is available” is bleak. In his words, “the failure of 
the modern philosophical project to discover a canonical content-full morality 
constitutes the fundamental catastrophe of contemporary secular culture and frames 
the content of contemporary bioethics.”12 Yet amidst this fragmentation, Engelhardt 
points to the startling disconnect many bioethicists make between this philosophical 
                                               
9 Nash, 2014: 275-77. 
10  Engelhardt, 1996: 10. This point is stressed earlier in the Preface (xii): “[The 
Foundations of Bioethics] is not a presentation of my concrete moral ideals, my concrete 
morality, or my concrete bioethics. Quite to the contrary, I regard this book as 
exploring the possibility for morally authorized collaboration with moral strangers in 
the ruins of the Enlightenment project. It examines the failure of moral philosophy to 
deliver a canonical, concrete rationality. It explores the implications of this failure for 
bioethics. It gives justification for the hope of salvaging something from the wreckage 
of the project of establishing a secular morality that can bind all. It does not provide a 
concrete moral vision.” 
11 Engelhardt, 1996: 13-14.  
12 Engelhardt, 1996: 8.  
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disunity and their work in bioethics, proceeding with the task of applied ethics as 
though “it were obvious which secular ethic ought to be applied.”13 Dialogue on the 
proper physician-patient relationship, professionalism, justice in health-care 
distribution, biotechnology, and countless other topics all proceed within the plurality 
of postmodernity as though all shared a common moral core. Bioethics, in Engelhardt’s 
paradigm, reenacts the Tower of Babel for while no one shares the same language, all 
carry on building whatever extension is desired to the morphing project of bioethics. In 
challenging and questioning the grounding for morality in modernity, Engelhardt’s 
argument seeks to convert others away from the trappings of secularism by “exploring 
the consequences” of secularism and the “irremedial plurality of postmodernity.”14 One 
can think of this maneuver as being simultaneously pessimistic and realistic, for in 
starkly describing and exploring secularism, the goal is not to remain within the 
problematic, postmodern throws of secularism, but rather to turn and flee from such 
undesirable ethics of procedure.  
 
In short, bioethics functions amidst moral controversies that appear irresolvable in a 
secular society. The second chapter of The Foundations of Bioethics (“The Intellectual 
Bases of Bioethics”) chronicles the struggle to discern amongst various and competing 
ethics ensconced in ambiguity. Here, for Engelhardt, there is no bioethic; there are only 
bioethics for we have not “one sense of ethics, but a family of senses.”15 The term 
“ethics” in modernity is ambiguous as it will vary from community to community (e.g., 
the Hassidim and the Amish), or in its purpose for rules of conduct amidst professions 
                                               
13 Engelhardt, 1996: 9.  
14 Engelhardt, 1996: 9. 
15 Engelhardt, 1996: 33. 
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(e.g., lawyers, accountants, physicians and nurses, etc.). Furthermore, as a way of 
organizing various approaches to settling moral controversy, Engelhardt surveys 
appeals to intuition, casuistry, consequentialism, hypothetical-choice theory, Rawlsian 
social good, Habermas’ rational discourse, game theory, natural law, and mid-level 
principlism (e.g., Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Bioethics).16 Regardless of the 
criteria from rival sociological communities or from other communities of empirical 
scientific investigators—working in the modus operandi of appealing to “facts” as decisive 
regardless of the evaluation of “facts”—the attempts to justify a content-full secular 
ethics all fall short, and we are left at the brink of nihilism.17  
One must appreciate the enormity of the failure of the Enlightenment project 
of discovering a canonical content-full morality. This failure represents the 
collapse of the Western philosophical hope to ground the objectivity of 
morality. This failure bears against theories of justice and accounts of morality 
generally. It brings all secular bioethics into question. If one cannot justify a 
particular morality, then one cannot justify claims of immorality. All appears to 
become a matter of taste. Indeed, if one cannot disclose some lines of conduct 
as canonically immoral, then the health care provided by Albert Schweitzer and 
the Nazi death camps will be equally defensible and indefensible. If one cannot 
discover an objective method to decide when the morally deviant are also the 
morally wrong, then the action of the morally heinous and the saint will be 
equally justifiable or lacking in justification, at least in secular terms. One stands 
on the brink of nihilism.18 
 
 
Engelhardt’s exploration of moral ambiguity in secular bioethics leads to a strong 
conclusion: any attempt to make bioethics more than an “exegesis” of particular moral 
traditions almost inevitably leads to struggles amidst the will to power. The 
presumptive strategies listed above for solving moral controversy lack authenticity for 
                                               
16 Engelhardt, 1996: 40-64 
17 Engelhardt, 1996: 42.  
18 Engelhardt, 1996: 65-66. 
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“each presupposes exactly what it seeks to justify: a particular moral content.”19 To this, 
we might align Wittgenstein’s comment: “If someone were to advance theses in 
philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree 
to them” (PI 128). Within the secular schema that lacks a valuation standard, any 
imposition of a moral perspective creates “consensus by coercion.” Here in the face of 
this threat, Engelhardt surveys possible ways out of this seemingly inevitable nihilism; 
moral legitimacy from the secular may exist on the basis of (1) force, (2) conversion of 
one party to the other’s viewpoint, (3) sound rational argument, and (4) agreement.20 
To be clear, appeals to and applications of force—authorized or brute—do not provide 
aspirational answers to moral dilemmas as much as resolutions of one sort or another. 
Conversion to one’s way of thinking or to membership within a moral community (or 
way of life) is a peaceable goal, and yet Engelhardt is not naïve that such appeals accord 
naturally within today’s secular society.21 Lastly, as discussed above, sound rational 
argument offers little hope as a moral perspective—the thing in question—is assumed 
in drawing moral conclusions, and this leads Engelhardt to the fourth possibility of 
“agreement.” This is an arrangement functioning as “a minimal condition relying on 
what it is to resolve issues among moral strangers with moral authority: consent. It 
establishes a secularly acknowledgeable authority for its conclusions: agreement.”22  
 
                                               
19 Engelhardt, 1996: 42. 
20 Engelhardt, 1996: 67. It is worth remembering that Engelhardt’s primary purpose is 
to describe the actual (and not ideal) state of affairs. In stating force is a “moral 
legitimacy” within secular bioethics, Engelhardt acknowledges force is not an answer to 
moral questions, but merely a resolution; hence, “a goal of ethics is to determine when 
force can be justified.” Cf. 67-74. 
21 Engelhardt, 1996: 68. 
22 Engelhardt, 1996: 68-69. 
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Key to Engelhardt’s claim that agreement is a secular means is the assumption that 
permission has no value per se; it is rather an authoritative commitment amongst 
strangers who share no common values. In place of morals that stem from some 
shared ontological grounding, this limited curb at the brink of nihilism seeks a sort of 
administrative parlay without clear values. The meeting of two sides in such a scenario 
can be pictured as two hands shaking in formal agreement on whatever ethical matter 
at stake. This secularly acknowledgeable authority is a means for peaceable negotiation, 
and hence Engelhardt sees this as a sort of immanent, transcendental grounding.23 It is 
“a game, a grammatical possibility that cannot be avoided and which comes with 
inescapable rules but no content.”24 The arguments of The Foundations, hence, can be 
recognized as “a disclosure, to borrow a Kantian notion, of a transcendental condition, 
a necessary condition for the possibility of a general domain of human life and of the 
life of persons generally…this account can be regarded as a transcendental argument to 
justify a principle of freedom as a side constraint, as a source of authority.”25 
 
Here, at the edge of modern, moral nihilism, Engelhardt traces in a Kantian and 
Hegelian spirit26 a procedural ethic through agreement. However thin and threadbare, 
                                               
23 Appealing to Klaus Hartmann (1966), Engelhardt explicitly extends Kant’s 
transcendental claims in the area of theoretical knowledge into claims about morality 
(Engelhardt, 1996: 94-95, fn. 82). 
24 Engelhardt, 1996: 69. 
25 Engelhardt, 1996: 70. 
26 Engelhardt defines “transcendental” as “an argument that lays out conditions for the 
possibility of a major domain of human experience or action. As defining conditions, 
transcendental arguments are a priori. Here I borrow from Kant, who underscores 
morality’s presupposition of freedom” (Engelhardt, 1996: 94, n. 82).  On drawing from 
Kant and Hegel: “Though my account of the categorical conditions for knowledge and 
morality has a highly Kantian accent, it can in principle be recast with benefit in more 
Hegelian terms. A Hegelian categorical account places the argument within the terms 
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this procedural ethic, the “principle of permission,” functions as a secular moral fabric 
woven to bring together moral strangers as peaceably as possible. Engelhardt maintains 
that as with the workings of any scientific reasoning, certain working conditions are 
assumed as “major, unavoidable elements of the lives of persons.”  Hence, permission 
and consent does not equate to a grand theory or proposal for content-full virtue but 
rather has the “character of unpacking a tautology.” At the base of this arrangement, 
the possibility of permission is an “intellectual insight” on what may be disclosed and 
uncovered as secular morality outside of a “particular proper concrete view of the good 
life and of content-full moral obligations.” 27 In a real sense then, at the heart of 
Engelhardt’s principles of bioethics we can discern a negative structure that follows 
along the lines not of claim rights but of forbearance.28 This focus on rights of 
forbearance further explains Engelhardt’s primary principles of permission and 
beneficence. Permission at its simplest stands as a non-violent source of authority for 
secular morality that will not be forced upon someone outside of consent, and 
beneficence serves as a highly qualified guide for directing the agreement towards 
securing the best interests of persons. Together, these principles function not as 
content rich ideals but as thin procedural steps—or, “chapter headings,” “clusters,” 
and “principia”—that “indicate the source, beginnings, commencements, or origins of 
particular areas of the moral life. They are principles in the sense of indicating two 
                                                                                                                                    
of reason and avoids the Kantian difficulty of mediating between the sheer givenness 
of the object and the predicament of the infinite knower (Engelhardt, 1996: 95, n. 83). 
27 Engelhardt, 1996: 70-71. 
28 “The morality that can bind moral strangers hinges on the authority that individuals 
convey through permission. This morality has a negative structure. It discloses rights 
and duties of forbearance. The requirement to use individuals only with their consent 
sets limits. On the one hand, this morality justifies morally content-full join endeavors 
through agreements to collaborate. The morality of strangers is the focus of [The 
Foundations of Bioethics]” (Engelhardt, 1996: 102). 
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different roots for the justification of moral concerns in health care.”29 The principle of 
permission may be organized under the carefully worded maxim: “do not do unto 
others that which they would not have done unto them, and do for them that which 
one has contracted to do.” Permission is balanced by the similar maxim for 
beneficence: “do to others their good.”30 
 
 
 
4.2 Modus Vivendi & The Therapeutic Aims in Wittgenstein & Engelhardt’s 
Critical Mapping 
Now what makes it difficult for us to take this line of investigation is our craving for generality. This 
craving for generality is the resultant of a number of tendencies connected with particular philosophical 
confusions (BB 17). 
 
More could be said of Engelhardt’s secular, procedural morality, but at this 
juncture it seems helpful to recall the broader purpose of Engelhardt’s methodology. 
Without such a context, it is likely that the above analysis and framework for secular 
ethics will appeal only to a few, limited audiences. One such audience could be 
Kantians and Hegelians who would appreciate the direction of the argument whereby a 
certain presumed transcendental reality discloses a condition of life for securing a 
peaceful existence. Those who reject any application of the dualistic Kantian horizon, 
however, and seek other strategies or means beyond transcendentals to navigate the 
immanent and transcendent “spheres” may not find Engelhardt’s minimalist paradigm 
persuasive. Likewise, those who do not agree with a libertarian focus on forbearance 
will be troubled by permission as the cluster of negative rights that allow persons to co-
exist in peace. Perhaps most critically, others may question if Engelhardt’s presentation 
                                               
29 Engelhardt, 1996: 103. 
30 Engelhardt, 1996: 123-24. 
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of rationality itself is developed enough to function well within his critique of 
discursive rationality.31  
 
To be sure, those who favor or oppose these strategies and assertions in Engelhardt 
will react accordingly, but for the purposes of this thesis it is important to note the 
exploratory aim of The Foundations of Bioethics. Not unlike Wittgenstein’s explorations 
with the phenomena of language, Engelhardt explores “the possibility for morally 
authorized collaboration with moral strangers” which by Engelhardt’s own admission 
may more likely function as a “confession” and “lament” more than a “libertarian 
manifesto celebrating the value of freedom.”32 Hence these explorations are indeed on 
one (minimalist) level pursued for what is possible within secular ethics, but the 
perpetual reminders from Engelhardt on the limitations of these explorations surely 
direct the focus to something greater. As Wittgenstein noted of solving problems of 
logic in the Tractatus “how little has been done” (T, p. 28), so Engelhardt seems to 
delineate the possibilities within the secular not for the sake of a secular construction 
but for what the lamentable thinness of the secular indicates. With this central idea in 
mind, Engelhardt’s secular paradigm can be valued for providing a moral lingua franca in 
the midst of diversity—an acknowledgement of “common ground as battle 
ground”33—and, if this reading is correct, it is not too much to say that the strategic 
maneuverings within the internal logic of the secular are contingent upon—and on a 
deeper level, inseparable from—the content-full moral meaning that Engelhardt 
confesses from within traditional Christianity. On this deeper level, the question 
                                               
31 Cf. Hauerwas, 1997.  
32 Engelhardt, 1996: viii-xii. 
33 Engelhardt, 2014: 295-408. 
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concerns how far away one may step from one’s own ontological commitments, or, 
how exactly thick or thin is the “sliver of Enlightenment hope” that can be salvaged in 
Engelhardt’s minimalist principles of permission and beneficence? This is a puzzle, for 
while Engelhardt decries and laments the thin possibilities of the secular, he sees in this 
“sliver” a possible “limit to the nihilism that challenges us: general canons of secular 
morality can indeed be articulated. A limit can be given to what appeared to be an 
unrestricted relativism: the canons of secular morality, although they possess no 
content, allow for morally authoritative collaboration.”34 These are strong claims, but 
can such a secular moral collaboration actually exist in the secular apart from 
Engelhardt’s robust ontological commitments? Can the secular essays into “what is 
possible” function independently of Engelhardt’s thick, theological particularity?  
 
In effect, the above question centers on the foundations of the Foundations for it seems 
clear that the “game” or the “grammatical possibility” in his principle of permission is 
not motivated entirely or primarily by a conviction in the certainty of transcendental 
claims.35 Rather, Engelhardt navigates amidst the framework of a priori transcendental 
conditions but with a number of strong qualifications, and it is clear that Engelhardt 
draws on the “possibility of intersubjective moral coherence and collaboration without 
presupposing the objectivity of secular morality in the sense of its corresponding to 
                                               
34 Engelhardt, 1996: 83. 
35 Hauerwas expresses a similar point: “I admire what I can only describe as the 
monkish intellectual austerity that governs Engelhardt’s development of the contours 
of his peaceable society. I have my doubts whether he can in fact show that the 
principle of permission is the “core” of the morality of mutual respect (Engelhardt, 
1996: 117) because such an account seems too close to Kant for someone who has 
disavowed the Kantian deduction” (Hauerwas, 1997: 39).  
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particular content-full moral truths.”36 Here it seems key to note that it is from the 
assumption of seeking moral authority within secular ethics that Engelhardt reasons to 
content-less moral agreement apart from empirical facts or metaphysical claims.37 
Moreover, within this reading, we may further see Engelhardt operating within a 
Wittgensteinian mode—where philosophy is employed demonstrably within a greater 
context, or where it functions in a contingent or therapeutic service.38 Wittgenstein and 
Engelhardt both employ a method of philosophizing that is conditional and not 
aspirational.  Both pursue philosophy as a therapeutic cure (PI 133)—or where 
philosophy addresses questions “like an illness” (PI 255)—aimed at disarming scientific 
                                               
36 Engelhardt, 1996: 69, 67-72. See also pp. 94-97 (fn. 82, 83 & 87) for an example of 
how Engelhardt qualifies his Kantian position. In particular: “Whatever strengths or 
weaknesses transcendental arguments may possess in other areas, at least here they 
offer a means for understanding how the conditions of moral reality are grounded in 
our character as persons” (p. 97; fn. 87). 
37 Engelhardt, 1996: 95; fn. 82. 
38 Like Engelhardt, Wittgenstein challenged the dominant theoretical paradigm of his 
time, and as a result he, too, was frequently misunderstood. He once spoke of this 
disconnect, commenting that one of his works, Philosophical Remarks, “is written for 
such men as are in sympathy with its spirit. This spirit is different from the one which 
informs the vast stream of European and American civilization in which all of us 
stand” (PR 7). There are layers and conditions involved in reading Engelhardt and 
Wittgenstein, and both must be approached in a certain spirit. Edwards speaks of this 
spirit in Wittgenstein as “prophetical and evangelical,” both terms that may be ascribed 
as well to Engelhardt. Moreover, to grasp Wittgenstein and Engelhardt’s therapeutic 
similarities, we should recall the need for a meta-reading of Wittgenstein and 
Engelhardt. As has been argued above, to read the early apart from the later 
Wittgenstein is to misunderstand enormously important developments in his 
methodology and thinking. At the same time, to ignore the bridge and commonality of 
probing the mystical between the two Wittgensteins can lead to polarized notions that 
the later Wittgenstein explicitly contradicts the earlier. A more nuanced meta-reading is 
required. Similarly, those who highlight only Engelhardt’s libertarian aspects will come 
away thinking that his principles of permission and beneficence are the main points or 
purpose of his work. This is a mistake on both accounts when we look to the way that 
both Wittgenstein and Engelhardt explore essential conditions of immanent reality as 
something akin to pedagogical exercises for the sake of encountering a greater 
transcendent reality.  
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theorizing, and what is embedded within such a philosophical method is the 
assumption of a content-less philosophy. Such a content-less philosophy, moreover, is 
an inside-out maneuver that reverses secular logic against itself, rendering its own 
claims for objective theories or norms vacuous. Though Engelhardt does intend to 
offer some tools of consensus and a limited moral lingua franca, his framework 
demonstrates on a deeper level the staunch limitations of secular ethics and bioethics. 
Within secular theoretical thinking, the best one can hope for is some extension of 
content-less, transcendental conditions whereby moral strangers can agree to form an 
intersubjectival ethic of non (or “lesser”) violence. To examine further this common 
spirit of philosophy, it is helpful now to examine two main parallels between 
Wittgenstein and Engelhardt: (1) their use of philosophical investigations as a heuristic 
or as a pedagogical exercise that enables us to better grasp (2) the parallel between 
Engelhardt’s modus vivendi and Wittgenstein’s forms of life (Lebensformen).  
 
Regarding the first parallel, it is helpful to further note the therapeutic aim for 
Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigations and Engelhardt’s analysis of bioethics.  As 
intimated above, Engelhardt’s minimalist and lamentable procedural ethic stands to do 
something in an age of demoralized and deflated morality, and what it does has a two-
sided ambition both to produce some procedural possibility for peace and to direct one 
to imagine greater transcendent possibilities beyond the sphere of the immanent and 
finite. Within the secular investigation of permission (The Foundations of Bioethics 2nd ed., 
1996) and the cultural narrative explaining our postmodern moral predicament (After 
God, 2017), Engelhardt follows a heuristic technique of examining the possibility for a 
consistent bioethics methodology before turning to broader philosophical and 
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theological matters. Conclusions on bioethical issues certainly matter, but a deep, 
pedagogical theme within Engelhardt’s work is to investigate even more the 
groundwork for any and all possible moral understanding within the assumptions of 
postmodernity. 
 
Here the family resemblance with Wittgenstein is strong, for he, too, seeks through 
grammatical investigation first to uncover the possibilities—within our theorizing and 
scientific age—for knowing as a heuristic exercise that directs one towards “what is 
higher” (das Mystiche). Wittgenstein also cares deeply for final conclusions even while he 
insists first on examining possible methodologies—through logic and language—for 
knowing. These two poles are key for understanding Wittgenstein, and as Edwards has 
noted, the Tractatus is a book of “radically divided sensibility” between Wittgenstein’s 
technical explorations with logic and his appeals to step beyond that pedagogical ladder 
towards “what is most important” and “what is higher” in das Mystiche.39 Certainly, we 
must note the clear difference between Wittgenstein’s aphoristic gestures towards das 
Mystiche and Engelhardt’s explicit confession in Jesus Christ. Wittgenstein takes on the 
exercises of “rationality as representation” in the Tractatus and is reduced to a nameless 
mysticism given the sharp lines he has drawn between “rational” thought and 
“mystical” will. In contrast, Engelhardt issues the radically Christian call for moral 
knowing through the ascetic life of putting on Christ (Rom. 13:14), and this is a 
disciplined, ecclesial, prayerful, liturgical, and iconic way of life. Much more could be 
said of these critical differences, and yet the point for now is to identify the common 
spirit of philosophy in Wittgenstein and Engelhardt. 
                                               
39 Edwards, 1982: 7. 
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Moreover, in addressing this relationship between philosophical thinking and “what is 
higher,” it is important to note that both philosophers place an emphasis on 
philosophical investigations that are suspended from mystical conclusions, and this 
suspension is a mark against those wishing to place (finally) Wittgenstein and 
Engelhardt’s philosophical exercises on a divided plane or Kantian horizon. Rather, the 
relationship between their philosophical exercises and “what is higher” is hierarchical 
and more dynamic than some hard divide to be spanned via Kantian transcendentals. 
Engelhardt and Wittgenstein rather examine bioethics and logic/language respectively 
as pedagogical tools that should direct one above towards transcendence (or, for 
Engelhardt, to know the transcendent God in Three Persons), but neither seeks a 
higher plane of transcendentals. In this way, Engelhardt’s permission follows a Kantian 
(and Hegelian) spirit, but not for the sake of furthering permission as a transcendental 
or as a dialectical rationality. Similarly, as argued above, while Wittgenstein’s thinking 
matured notably over the course of his life, there is an unity between the “early” and 
“later” Wittgenstein(s) in that all his writings, including the Tractatus, were concerned 
with philosophy as a formative tool that clarifies and humbles human attempts at 
discursive rationality to extend beyond what it can do. Speaking of Wittgenstein’s 
“Lecture on Ethics,” Edwards describes an apophatic form within Wittgenstein’s 
ethical thinking: 
The task of ethics is the restoration of meaning to my problematic world, a 
meaning that lies outside the world, in the philosophical self which is my 
world’s limit…[this ethical] sense of life cannot be talked about, nor can it be 
said what exactly is the nature of good willing that makes it clear. These things 
belong to the realm of das Mystiche: they show themselves. The Tractatus, by 
demonstrating clearly what can and cannot be said, makes it clear how 
impotent thought (language) is when it comes to the really important things in 
life. Silence, the silence in which das Mystiche shows itself is the paradigmatic 
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response of the enlightened philosopher who has kicked away the ladder of 
philosophy after he has climbed up it.40 
 
 
Edwards proceeds to highlight the importance of Wittgenstein’s “doctrine of showing” 
to reinforce that the “unsayable” is communicated not through an “intellectualist 
conception of rationality” but through other modes such as the willing self, again 
reminiscent of Kierkegaard. In short, what emerges from both is a therapeutic 
distinction between immanent philosophical investigations (or exercises) and other 
modes of knowing that embrace transcendence, and this in turn opens the door to 
mystical methods of knowing beyond discursive rationality or theorizing. Neither 
Wittgenstein nor Engelhardt employs philosophy as a constructive, systematic way for 
authentic knowing but rather as a critical exercise in mapping the thin possibilities that 
can be discerned within the immanent systems of logic/language and bioethics. 
 
With this heuristic and therapeutic methodology in mind, we are better able to 
understand the frequent appeals to modus vivendi, particularly in After God (2017). First 
and foremost we should note how modus vivendi accords within Engelhardt’s critique of 
immanentized bioethics. After God traces a narrative of secular morality as a deflated 
endeavor grounded solely within the rights and wishes of individual sovereigns, and 
hence morality departs from any substantive vision of harmonious communal life or 
bodily-corporate unity and exists solely within an individual’s life-style choice. Political 
structures framing the morality of the polis become mere arrangements, a modus vivendi 
                                               
40 Edwards, 1982: 49. 
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within which one is “willing to live for at least the time being.”41 This modus vivendi 
possesses a law and public policy that reflect “one among a plurality of freestanding 
accounts” of morality.42 In short, within the strict limits of secular morality after God, 
modus vivendi emerges as a mere “political life-style choice,” and the “authority” of the 
political state exists within the machinations of the market. Following Buchanan and 
Tullock (The Calculus of Consent, 1965), Engelhardt points out that when “enough” of a 
consensus surfaces, a particular political order arises not as a contract or other 
reasonably clear agreement but as a “temporary resting point accepted by enough 
persons so as to be stable.” Hence, a population (as “we”) agrees “as long as there are 
enough to impose an ‘agreement’, a modus vivendi.”43 
 
Engelhardt also points to George Tsai’s definition of a modus vivendi as:  
a strategic compromise among contending groups in a society none of whom is 
in a position to impose its preferred way of life on the others without 
unacceptable costs and each of whom as a result adopts a policy of mutual 
accommodation as the best that it can hope to achieve under its circumstance.44 
 
Even beyond Tsai, however, Engelhardt sees the possibility of a modus vivendi where 
subjects of a state do not have genuine interests in the state’s continued functioning. 
The motivations and realities facing citizens may be complicated to a point where they 
await the opportunity for a regime change, even a civil war. Clearly, this understanding 
of modus vivendi underscores the minimalist nature of such a politic, and yet this is the 
reality that Engelhardt admits in an age where moral differences are as stark as they are. 
The implication of Engelhardt’s modus vivendi is that subjects who recognize the true 
                                               
41 Engelhardt, 2017: 18. 
42 Engelhardt, 2017: 20. 
43 Engelhardt, 2017: 192. 
44 Tsai, 2013: 794. Cf. Engelhardt, 2017: 193. 
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nature of postmodern moral diversity may often face a complicated calculus of 
citizenship where “one can prudently support constitutions that can constrain the 
tyranny of the majority, not merely the tyranny of the few.” One can easily envision 
scenarios where one must distinguish not between ideal options but “among more or 
less onerous more-than-minimal states.” In short, modus vivendi is a wake-up call for 
“the proponents of liberal agendas of equality, human rights, and human dignity that 
often resolutely hold ‘these truths’ to be either self-evident or rationally established.” In 
fact, such liberal optimism falls radically short. 
They fail to recognize the socio-historically conditioned character of their 
claims. Bioethicists act as if they could establish moral and bioethical truth and 
as if they were experts regarding that truth. The view that bioethics is grounded 
in a common human morality is core to Beauchamp and Childress’ highly 
influential textbook (Principles of Bioethics, 1979). This textbook, throughout its 
many editions, makes such claims…45 
 
 
Far from any aspirational political structure, the Western democracies typically 
appealed to in bioethics do not operate upon any agreed upon, canonical rationality. 
That Enlightenment dream has passed. Rather, implicitly or explicitly, bioethics exists 
within an inevitably political space that is all too often motivated and “encouraged” 
through the “seductive rhetoric of mass media democracies.” What remains is a socio-
political struggle not over ideals that are first-order theories; the struggle is much less a 
content-full engagement of moral visions but rather of sophistry and politics. Modus 
vivendi in this sense reveals the deep veins of biopolitics at work within bioethics. 
At the most, there can be empirical judgments, educated guesses, regarding the 
likely political stability of some versus other forms of modus vivendi. The culture 
                                               
45 Engelhardt, 2017: 195. 
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wars now also reflect disputes regarding the acceptability of a particular form of 
governance as a modus vivendi.46 
 
 
Rather than search for some theoretical fault or some explanation of where things went 
wrong through a logical or rational misstep, Engelhardt is honest in identifying the 
tangible agents of change employed in concrete, every-day life. Engelhardt’s modus 
vivendi hence functions as a key tool of analyzing the way things actually are in 
bioethics. As with Wittgenstein’s later focus particularly on language as it is oriented 
within concrete, every-day life rather than stemming from “philosophical thought” (PI 
298), so Engelhardt looks to the actual conditions that affect bioethics more than 
discursive reason. Such a posture, moreover, agrees with Koch’s critique of cognitivist 
and principlists approaches that seek to address bedside dilemmas through 
philosophical thinking. No one, Koch argues, actually brings Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason to a clinical consultation.47  
 
As another way to understand the trend in bioethics to look “internally” or within 
“principles” for the way forward—and hence the challenge and relevance of 
Engelhardt’s modus vivendi and Wittgenstein’s Lebensformen—we should remember the 
longstanding tendencies in traditional Western philosophy to exist with the 
metaphysical “regime of thinking.” Wittgenstein’s later work specifically challenges this 
metaphysical tendency that Kerr aligns with notions of Gnostic dualism and 
Cartesianism where the human ideal arises above the body, presenting a mentalism that 
Wittgenstein ardently denied. Kerr remarks that Wittgenstein’s therapy is essential to 
                                               
46 Engelhardt, 2017: 195. 
47 Koch, 2012. 
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helping free us from tendencies to look “within” and rather to note the historical and 
social conditions that reacquaint us with embodiment. Hence, “Wittgenstein’s later 
writings are key texts in subverting the entire metaphysical tradition which is 
constituted by rancor against the physical and historical conditions of human life.”48  
 
Wittgenstein and Engelhardt both should be viewed as contesting exactly this 
metaphysical tradition, and both pursue their respective analysis of politico-cultural 
modus vivendi and the roots of language in forms of life for the sake of uncovering what 
is genuinely at work beyond the troubled language of principlism and theoretical 
philosophy. The point is not to discount entirely principles (for Engelhardt) or 
language (for Wittgenstein) as much as the goal is to recount the inevitable connections 
between these discursive activities and the facts of living that are commonly obscured 
within the logic of the secular. Hence Savicky notes that Wittgenstein’s grammatical 
investigations bring to attention “the fact that the speaking of language is a part of a 
form of life, and imagining a language means imagining a form of life (PI 23, 19).” In 
other words, for Wittgenstein “forms of life (or facts of living) are what have to be 
accepted. They are the given.”49 Wittgenstein furthers this point by stating:  
“So what you are saying is that human agreement decides what is true and 
false?” --What is true or false is what humans say; and it is in their language that 
human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of 
life (PI 241).  
 
To this we can align Engelhardt’s principles of permission and beneficence that 
function as principia. These principia do not uncover some pure, secular, crystalline 
                                               
48 Kerr, 1997: 188.  
49 Savickey, 1999: 112. 
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position within bioethics derived through “rational argument or common belief” but 
rather principia function as “the minimum grammar for secular moral discourse.”50 
 
So where does this leave us? Admittedly, some may object to the possibility of 
Engelhardt salvaging anything from the project of secular morality, for such a move 
seems to grant some justification or rationality for (some) ethics from within the 
secular. If the ontology of the secular, after all, leads only to a politics of power and 
violence, how can we expect any desirable bioethics to emerge from the ruins? A 
similarity here may be drawn with Wittgenstein’s critique of language that maintains a 
form of consensus through communal language games. In a theological way, 
Wittgenstein seems to bracket some transcendent meaning—even the existence of 
God—as a way of justifying communal language, and one could proceed to think even 
that Wittgenstein falls prey to his own charge of metaphysics. Such a concern for 
Wittgenstein would indeed be incisive for plumbing the meaning and reality below the 
surface methodology Wittgenstein employs. Yet it is the nature of methodology in 
particular that seems to answer such a concern for Wittgenstein bracketing God or 
some other transcendental meaning. I have argued earlier that Wittgenstein notably 
emphasizes methodology, and this is a focus and task that inherently limits the scope of 
his overall work. Simply put, Wittgenstein will not be satisfying for those seeking to go 
beyond methodological clarity and into philosophical speculation. Hence, in a sense, it 
is right to think Wittgenstein brackets God in his philosophical method without ever 
really unpacking that grounding assumption. Equally, however, we should note that 
Wittgenstein does address this bracketed grounding for his methodology even if in a 
                                               
50 Engelhardt, 1996: 123. 
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mysterious way evidenced in the concluding aporias of the Tractatus and throughout the 
Investigations. Wittgenstein declines to speak philosophically or theoretically of that 
which surpasses speech, and his focus with philosophy hence pursues the practice of 
clarity. For Wittgenstein, “the work of the philosopher consists in assembling 
reminders for a particular purpose” (PI 127). 
 
Here Engelhardt follows a similar path. As Wittgenstein traced a phenomenology of 
language for a particular purpose within a conditional landscape, Engelhardt engages 
the possibilities for bioethics from within a landscape of postmodern, pluralistic 
skepticism that characterizes contemporary Western societies. Unlike Wittgenstein, 
however, Engelhardt is far more explicit in identifying the limits of such a purpose; the 
current task of ethics and bioethics within the contemporary public square of Western 
society is often far from conversations about the Good or even conversations amongst 
authentic moral communities—be they traditional Confucian, Jewish, Muslim, or 
Christian communities—about what is the good life. Without God, there is no ultimate 
good to be found anywhere, and hence Engelhardt does not celebrate the limited 
consensus of permission amidst “the chaos, or even much of the diversity, and surely 
not the moral perversity and vacuity of this landscape.” Instead, Engelhardt seeks a 
“secular means for coming to terms with the chaos and diversity of postmodernity. The 
means are meager and offer no transcendent fulfillment. But they are all that is 
available in general secular terms.”51 
 
                                               
51 Engelhardt, 1996: 10. 
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In short, Wittgenstein and Engelhardt both present an aporia of simultaneously 
employing a critique of secularism while nevertheless engaging in the available 
possibilities of the secular. Doubtless this is a puzzle, and for some the puzzle seems 
something of an inevitability for life in the wake of Enlightenment modernity.52 
Contrary to those who may appeal to an utilitarian argument or some version of 
substantive liberalism, by tracing the methodology of language and the principle of 
permission in a secular society, Wittgenstein and Engelhardt seek a particular purpose 
in the engagement of immanent language and permissive means. Considering the 
phenomenological side of Wittgenstein, language stands to reveal something of the 
Ethical (LE 43-44) and to serve as an ascetic practice that forms the person to see the 
world rightly, looking through the deflation of theoretical metaphysics towards das 
Mystische. Considering the pragmatic side of Engelhardt, admitting difference in 
bioethics amidst postmodernity stands to expose the limits of any secular good for all 
its vacuity and dissatisfying immanence. 
 
 
 
4.3 Secular Bioethics & Reasonable Discourse  
If one wants more than secular reason can disclose and one should want more, then one should join a 
religion and be careful to choose the right one. Engelhardt53 
 
Beyond this staunch critique of secular bioethics, however, some have 
questioned what hopes remain for any non-Christian discourse within the post-
Christian public square. Has Engelhardt’s Kantian-Hegelian critique left us with moral 
                                               
52 Ruping Fan argues that the complete lack of “substantive conclusions” in any version 
of “substantive liberalism” renders “an Engelhardtian non-substantive (or procedural) 
liberalism…morally unavoidable.” Fan, 1997: 233. 
53 Engelhardt, 1996: XI. 
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silos that cannot speak with one another amidst any shared discursive grounding? We 
turn now to this question of reasoning—in both a Christian and a non-Christian 
idiom—in the following with a two-fold goal: first, to identify a few particular critiques 
from those who think Engelhardt has overly limited the possibilities for reasonable 
discourse amidst differing moral communities. The second goal takes us beyond 
Engelhardt’s critical analysis of secular bioethics to understand the possibilities for 
discourse in the public square from Engelhardt’s perspective as a traditional Christian. 
This second goal brings us to Engelhardt’s nuanced consideration of natural law and 
the possibilities for shared language and idioms amidst staunch moral strangers. 
 
Turning to those who challenge Engelhardt’s strict limits on discourse amidst differing 
communities, we may consider Lucie-Smith’s narrative analysis that he brings to 
reading Engelhardt. As Lucie-Smith details, narrative is bound together with a choice 
to start not with abstract, deductive principles but from within a particular story that is 
more inductive in nature—inductive in that one can trace the meaningful account of 
reality through and in consideration of a community’s traditions, mythology, and 
rituals. In contrast, starting with abstract first principles assumed to be universal leads 
to a more scientific, theoretical model, and this is the Enlightenment approach for 
justifying morality that Engelhardt argues is fundamentally flawed. 54  Lucie-Smith 
summarizes Engelhardt’s narrative methodology: 
Thus what often presents itself as a purely philosophical view (one seemingly 
backed by abstract argument) is nothing of the sort, but rather the reflection of 
the person who holds his position as a member of this or that community, this 
or that tradition, and a product of their particular lived history. In other words 
belief is something that comes to us as narrative, not as something that can be 
                                               
54 Lucie-Smith, 2007: 1, 47-72. 
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sustained through seemingly universal rational categories…[hence, every moral 
statement] is not ever merely a statement: it carries with it a commitment to a 
certain way of life…a vision about the whole of life. The moral statement is the 
tip of the iceberg, and what lies beneath the surface is the whole story, perhaps 
a whole raft of views on family life, God, the role of women and Church 
discipline and authority, in other words, a narrative.55 
 
 
Narrative for Engelhardt plays out in at least two ways: first, Engelhardt denies any 
such thing as a freestanding statement or claim to impartial and abstract reasoning. 
Narrative contexts are undeniable, and hence any philosophical maneuvers seeking 
autonomous universals and rationally discoverable content-full morality are 
fundamentally flawed. Secondly, Engelhardt grasps the reality of his own narrative.56 
Engelhardt explicates his distinctively religious “view from somewhere”—namely, as a 
“Texan Orthodox Catholic.” 57  The “Texan” qualifier may seem remote from 
Engelhardt’s claims on the necessity of a particular moral narrative, and yet his dry-
humored Texan roots seem to function as a heuristic more than an eccentric or 
rhetorical style. One’s place, era, and heritage are deeply formative and matter more 
than many academic philosophers may be willing to admit, and in this spirit 
Engelhardt’s persistent reminders of “being Texan” seem to function intentionally as a 
                                               
55 Lucie-Smith, 2007: 49. Cf. Engelhardt, 1996: 14. 
56 Engelhardt interweaves his personal narrative with his philosophical and theological 
arguments: “If one wants more than secular reason can disclose—and one should want 
more—then one should join a religion and be careful to choose the right one…I 
indeed affirm the canonical, concrete moral narrative, but realize it cannot be given by 
reason, only by grace. I am, after all, a born-again Texan Orthodox Christian, a convert 
by choice and conviction, through grace and in repentance for sins innumerable…My 
moral perspective does not lack content. I am of the firm conviction that, save for 
God’s mercy, those who willfully engage in much that a peaceable, fully secular state 
will permit (e.g., euthanasia and direct abortion on demand) stand in danger of hell’s 
eternal fires” (Engelhardt, 2000: xi).   
57 Engelhardt, 1996: xi. 
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thorny prod in the side of liberal “cosmopolitan ecumenists.”58 Personalities, character, 
and the virtue of persons matter. Picking up on this and noting Wittgensteinian 
overtones, Nash comments: 
We humans do not share a common rational human ethic, but instead we 
behave and have proclivities due to a variety of factors. Engelhardt’s exhibition 
of Lebensform also provides a corrective for overly progressive Christians who 
try to assume that there is a standpoint from nowhere. This cannot be 
conceded. After all, Christ was born in Palestine, and not in Palestine, Texas.”59 
 
 
Through reminders of Engelhardt’s Texan roots or through his narratival critique of 
crystalline Enlightenment rationality, Engelhardt does not veil the tradition and 
narrative that underscores his moral vision. To clarify, this is not to say that Engelhardt 
presumptively champions his narrative as though others simply need to acknowledge 
its superiority over other narratives on an equal playing field. The narrative approach 
Engelhardt holds to is not a re-issuing of meta-criteria to be evaluated by autonomous 
rationalities as though one were seeking to re-do the Enlightenment process by 
examining which narrative is clearly the “rational” choice. Advancing narrative in such 
a naïve way misses the corrective and clarifying intent of narrative that cautions us 
                                               
58 Engelhardt largely follows MacIntyre’s use of the term cosmopolitan in After Virtue. 
Cosmopolitan ecumenists are “rootless and eclectic individuals” (Wildes, 1997: 89) who 
believe strongly in the possibility of secular reasoning while denying the real diversity 
among moral perspectives. “Such cosmopolitan ecumenists hold that men and women 
share enough in common so that a concrete and authoritative moral consensus can be 
discovered in societal undertakings that will allow them to justify a particular bioethics 
and to direct health care polity with moral authority…in addition, cosmopolitans often 
live their lives far from the substantive moral convictions that guide committed 
Orthodox Jews, Orthodox Catholics, Roman Catholics, Protestants, Moslems, and 
others who understand themselves within enduring and concrete moral traditions. It is 
difficult for cosmopolitan ecumenists to understand life within the embrace of 
traditional communities framed by transcendent commitments or to fathom the gulfs 
that separate different communities of the ideologically committed (Engelhardt, 1996: 
ix).  
59 Nash, 2014: 273-74.  
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against a presumptive theorizing, seeking a view from nowhere. However, moving 
from this qualification, Lucie-Smith is concerned that Engelhardt over-emphasizes the 
gulf between the narrative of a content-full moral community—which Engelhardt 
labels a “moral enclave”60—and the secular sphere. Lucie-Smith points to MacIntyre 
and Hauerwas as two others who emphasize the importance of narrative, community, 
and tradition, and yet for Lucie-Smith Engelhardt mistakenly turns to a mystical, 
liturgical interaction between the two spheres rather than following MacIntyre’s call for 
“necessary dialogue” in their midst. 61  This critique stems from Lucie-Smith’s 
understanding of Engelhardt as denying “intrinsic rationality or irrationality” in some 
acts. If there is no genuine bridge between moral enclaves, if each is a “closed fortress,” 
we are left to MacIntyre’s blunt choice between Aristotle’s virtue and Nietzsche’s 
nihilism with Engelhardt falling into the latter.62 Hence, for Lucie-Smith, Engelhardt’s 
narrative falls into a dualistic trap as (1) the failure of the Enlightenment project leaves 
us with a content-less procedural ethic and (2) content-full ethics exist only within 
moral enclaves.  
If we are to accept narrative as the fundamental category in ethics and moral 
theology, and by extension the idea that narrative is only nurtured in specific 
communities and traditions, then, it seems, we are abandoning any idea of 
morality as being universally valid. If the Enlightenment Project has failed (and 
it may well have done so) are we forced to admit the uselessness of discursive 
rational argument? Engelhardt, perhaps more clearly than MacIntyre and 
Hauerwas shows us the consequences of doing so.63 
 
 
                                               
60 Engelhardt, 1996: 82. 
61 Lucie-Smith, 2007: 54.  
62 Lucie-Smith, 2007: 56. 
63 Lucie-Smith, 2007: 60. 
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What is clear is that Lucie-Smith reads Engelhardt’s narrative as being advanced in 
“contradistinction to reason, not in harmony with it; narrative as a replacement to 
failed reason, not as a help to a still viable reason.”64 Seeking a peaceable secular 
grounding of some sort, Engelhardt’s principle of permission is chosen through a will 
to morality not arrived at through any rational process. The “bogey of coercion” is 
hence replaced by the “specter of self-coercion,” and the possibility of moral friendship 
seems far from reality.65 Lucie-Smith’s assessment of Engelhardt is persuasive on a 
number of points, and yet what is not included in Lucie-Smith’s challenge is a critical 
distinction between modes of knowledge. The discursive rationality that Engelhard sees 
at work within bioethics as an Enlightenment offspring is but one mode of rationality 
that is engaged in Engelhardt’s work. Lucie-Smith is correct to identify the narrative 
nature of Engelhardt, and yet to critique the limits of discourse in Engelhardt’s 
principle of permission, Lucie-Smith should at least engage Engelhardt’s hierarchy of 
rationality.66 Noetic rationality, in particular, remains as a persistent theme throughout 
Engelhardt’s work such that it is not helpful simply to point out that Engelhardt’s 
modus vivendi harms discourse for there are multiple modes or layers of possible 
discourse assumed in Engelhardt beyond the monolithic discursive rationality of the 
Enlightenment. 
 
Similarly, Kevin Wildes reads Engelhardt in terms of the relationship between different 
communities, and yet he challenges the notion that communities should be marked by 
                                               
64 Lucie-Smith, 2007: 72. 
65 Lucie-Smith, 2007: 69. 
66 As discussed below, Goss and Vitz (2014) exemplify a such a nuanced critique of 
Engelhardt that appreciates his distinctions on modes of knowing. 
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the differences or space between themselves. 67  Engelhardt is a “communitarian” 
thinker who navigates the postmodern condition through a political framework 
centered on the distance between moral friends and moral strangers,68 and, as intimated 
above, this is a mapping strategy, an attempt to understand the value-less procedures 
that are possible between communities that possess different visions of content, 
authority, and how ideally to relate to other communities. Wildes has no issue accepting 
Engelhardt’s clarifying focus on community narratives, but rather than seeing the space 
between communities as antagonistic he suggests moral similarities may exist. In other 
words, rather than classifying the postmodern populace into moral friends and 
strangers, there are “moral acquaintances” who may work together. 69  Doubtless, 
Engelhardt would counter that Wildes has largely underestimated the nature of the gap 
between communities. When moral strangers share moral similarities as Wildes 
suggests, the question remains why these similarities are shared, and when the answer to 
that question also acknowledges sincere metaphysical differences, the relationship of 
moral acquaintances as a qualification for the moral friends-strangers paradigm is 
challenged. Engelhardt admits the fact of some shared moral visions and common 
premises as “loyalties” are indeed “divided among different moral communities,”70 and 
this explains within his framework the occasions when moral strangers seem closer 
                                               
67 Wildes, 1997: 77-78, 91. 
68 Wildes, 2010: 100-01. Wildes suggests three models of communitarian thinking: the 
exclusive community that sees moral knowledge as rooted in the community itself such 
that “morality is simply part of its way of life;” the inclusive community aligns with 
Karl Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” where the religious truth of the community is a 
public truth for all; the pluralistic community offers no hierarchy but supposes all 
communities may equally learn from others. Wildes sees Engelhardt as mapping the 
landscape of postmodern bioethics all the while having an exclusive community model 
in mind.  
69 Wildes, 1997: 90-91. 
70 Engelhardt, 2010: 295.  
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than their rival foundations may imply. Exceptions granted, Engelhardt’s focus on 
particular, substantive, moral communities within the dominant secular cosmopolitan 
culture makes sense as he points, for example, to the reality of life within the Apostolic 
Christian community where the “Epistle to Diognetus” records that Christians “dwell 
in their own fatherlands, but as if sojourners in them; they share all things as citizens, 
and suffer all things as strangers. Every foreign country is their fatherland, and every 
fatherland is a foreign country.”71  In light of such substantive moral difference, Wildes’ 
reading seems to offer more of a subtle nuancing than a critique. 
 
A related and more significant question for Engelhardt’s principle of permission, 
however, is formulated by Griffin Trotter.72 Trotter has no problem accepting the 
majority of Engelhardt’s assessment regarding the theoretical foundations of secular 
bioethics, but he argues that the space between moral friends and strangers can be a 
middle ground for a discursive “intermediate” bioethics. Intermediate bioethics follows 
the assumption that any attempt to rule out discursive inquiry is simply inexpedient, 
and that a discursive compromise is possible between religiously thick traditions and 
communities such as Buddhists and traditional Christians. “Intermediate bioethics is an 
instrumental ethics that mediates moral controversies between divergent moral 
communities and aims at peaceful coexistence” primarily by extending Engelhard’s 
principle of permission from the action of consent into the sphere of agreeing to rules 
and practices that will govern relations between individuals and communities in a 
                                               
71 “Epistle to Diognetus” as quoted in Engelhardt, 2010: 301. Cf. Grant & Graham, 
1965: 359, 361. 
72 Trotter, 2010: 203-227. 
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normative mode of generating content.73 In short, Trotter further specifies Wildes, and 
both can be seen questioning the nature of reasoning and speculation amidst 
metaphysically and morally distinct communities. Trotter advances an understanding of 
reason that seeks to assimilate noetic theology and experience, and it is interesting that 
he compares hypotheses derived from noesis to other hypotheses, including scientific 
hypotheses, that are “reproducible” and hence observed to follow some type of 
ordered, natural paths. Further, in addition to discursive reasoning from within the 
Christian community sharing properties with scientific thinking, Trotter posits that 
traditional Christian knowledge needs to be further developed into categories such as 
bioethics. This may seem obvious, and yet Trotter’s point is that to move from 
Christian theology/doctrine to Christian bioethics is to move within a discursive 
rationality that is not relegated, as Engelhardt maintains, solely to the moral enclave of 
Traditional Christianity.74  
 
Here it is that we can summarize a challenge to Engelhardt’s position on the possibility 
of moral discourse amongst moral strangers. Taken together, Lucie-Smith, Wildes, and 
Trotter all appreciate Engelhardt’s critique of the grounding for secular, theoretical 
bioethics, and yet they maintain that his critique more or less runs aground through a 
fundamentalist dualism regarding discursive rationality. They share a common critique 
that Engelhardt has taken a helpful insight on the nature of non-secular morality 
embedded within communities and narratives too far and mistakenly ruled out hope 
for any substantive common morality via some degree of shared discursive rationality. 
                                               
73 Trotter, 2010: 209, 207-10. 
74 Trotter, 2010: 210-17. 
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Or, at the least, he has stopped short by seeing the principle of permission as a value-
less procedure that should extend into a middle ground of intermediate bioethics 
amidst moral acquaintances. Lucie-Smith, Wildes, and Trotter agree with Engelhardt 
that the fullness of truth is embodied within the Christian community, and this claim 
entails an exclusivity that is scandalous (I Cor. 1.23).75 What they contest in Engelhardt, 
however, is the way that he has overly limited the possibilities for rational discourse 
outside of the Christian community. Seemingly, Engelhardt has removed any possibility 
for non-Christian moral idioms in the public square, hence relegating bioethics into a 
segregated, non-discursive system of communes that never connect outside of the thin 
constructs of consent/permission detailed above.  
 
This reading of Engelhardt seems confirmed by Engelhardt’s “Recent History of 
Christian Bioethics” (2014) where he decries particularly the early Christian theologians 
turned bioethicists who sought to function well in “an increasingly secular context” by 
employing a post-Christian discourse. As noted earlier in this thesis, these theologians 
sought to present “Christian bioethics within an idiom they hoped would be open to 
                                               
75 In differentiating the ways of securing moral content within traditional Christianity 
from that of the secular mind, Engelhardt freely admits the scandal of his particularist 
claims. Christian and secular bioethics vary essentially, and this particularity is 
“troublesome” for the secular mind. “It has a sectarian character offensive to an 
ecumenical spirit. The personal character of the Christian narrative, which is attractive 
to many, is for this reason also disturbing. Traditional Christianity promises to locate all 
moral concerns, all encounters with moral and natural evil, within a very particular 
history of creation, the fall, and redemption. Though this account does not avoid any 
of the particulars of the human drama, it excludes competing non-Christian 
understandings, which may be similar but not the same. The very thickness of 
Christianity’s moral power is tied to its exclusiveness…how can a bioethics be 
Christian unless it differs at least in some respect from a secular bioethics, unless it is in 
some sense sectarian” (Engelhardt, 2000: 1)? 
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all,” hence accepting a morality from the humanities that would substitute for God.76 
Roman Catholic theologians such as McCormick arguably most exemplify this collapse 
of traditional Christian language by accepting the “conceits of natural law” and aspiring 
to establish “moral views” through what was deemed to be “purely philosophical 
arguments.”77 Seemingly, Engelhardt’s point is that any common discourse amongst 
moral strangers lacking a common moral vision is a meaningless endeavor. Boaz Goss 
and Rico Vitz, however, disagree with such a reading of Engelhardt and suggest a more 
nuanced understanding.  
 
Goss and Vitz point out that Engelhardt himself engages in a broad array of 
“acceptable kinds of moral discourse,” and they point to Engelhardt’s endorsement of 
“therapeutic deceit” as one such example.78 When a physician purposefully lies to his 
patient in certain circumstances to achieve the necessary therapeutic treatment, such a 
“meritorious” or even “obligatory” discourse is certainly flexible and adapted towards 
seeking a common ground. Similarly, Goss and Vitz point to other instances where 
Engelhardt appeals to the “concept of a person” as a reasonable grounding for 
understanding medicine, and they conclude that it is mistaken to see Engelhardt’s 
critique of secular bioethics as a simplistic call to shun ethical dialogue outside a 
community of moral friends. To clarify Engelhardt’s true point, Goss and Vitz discuss 
the two-fold manner in which Engelhardt addresses natural law. On the one hand, 
Engelhardt is strikingly critical of natural law “as understood by the Stoics or later by 
                                               
76 Engelhardt, 2014: 152. 
77 Engelhardt, 2014: 149.  
78 Goss & Vitz, 2014: 284. 
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the Scholasticism of the West: an impersonal legislation, discursively available.”79 Such 
a natural law is not acknowledged explicitly as a “gift” to the human heart “coeval with 
creation” but rather as an epistemology grounded in “human inclinations or biological 
functions.” This is a natural law apart from God where medical ethics can be discerned 
primarily by looking to biology and nature itself,80 and this natural law can even be 
viewed as an “independent moral framework,” something beyond God that constrains 
both creation and the Creator.81 Goss and Vitz, moreover, carefully connect this 
understanding of natural law to later Scholastic philosophers such as Grotius and not 
to Aquinas, for on Aquinas’ account, “natural law is fundamentally grounded in the 
eternal law” whereas for Grotius and others, the natural law is “fundamentally 
grounded in human nature.”82 This move to present an account of natural law apart 
from God is consistent with the New Natural Law Theory popularized by Germain 
Grisez, John Finnis and others in the 1960s, ironically around the same time that 
bioethics was emerging in academic and social spheres. Goss and Vitz hence draw out 
that the New Natural Law Theory articulates an account of natural law that brackets 
religion as a basic human good, but this human good is “attenuated” in that it pursues 
thin questions of natural theology addressing the order and freedom of humanity 
within the cosmos. Such a natural law amounts to “a kind of Kantian postulate about 
                                               
79 Engelhardt, 2000: 172. 
80 Engelhardt points to Charles McFadden’s Medical Ethics, 5th ed. (Philadelphia: F.A. 
Davis, 1961) as an example of medical ethics derived from “biological or physicalist” 
guidelines. Similarly, he points to Kant’s moral rationality in Metaphysical Principles of 
Virtue (AK VI 422-26; Kant, 1995) that offers detailed moral constraints on “matters 
such as masturbation, the sale of body parts, and smallpox inoculation” (Engelhard, 
2000: 218-19). 
81 Engelhardt, 2000: 173. 
82 Goss & Vitz, 2014: 286-87. 
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transcendent harmony” or perhaps a “Sartean postulate about transcendental 
responsibility.”83 
 
Clearly, this is a natural law that Engelhardt decries, and dialogue within the parameters 
of this understanding of nature yields little hope for furthering moral agreements in 
bioethics. “One must have standards by which to judge whether what is is normatively 
natural or good in order to derive moral implications from nature.”84 But there is a 
deeper way to understand natural law that helps to explain Engelhardt’s approach to 
the possibilities of dialogue amidst moral strangers. Natural law “properly understood” 
encompasses the “precepts taught us by God through our being and through the world 
around us, rendering a window to God.”85 Here Engelhardt leans notably on St. Isaac 
the Syrian who speaks of two powers of sight for man: the “bodily eyes” that gaze 
upon sensory objects and the “eyes of faith” that gaze by faith upon “hidden 
treasures.” The possibilities for seeing nature rightly are found within mankind, yet this 
natural law within man is incomplete and “noetically opaque” apart from God.  As St. 
Isaac states: 
The intellect is spiritual perception that is conditioned to receive the faculty of 
divine vision, even as the pupils of the bodily eyes in which sensible light is 
poured. Noetic vision is natural knowledge that is used [by power] to the 
natural state and is called natural light.86 
 
 
Engelhardt is persistent that a primary issue with natural law is that nature is 
“ambiguous,” meaning that nature can be understood in reference to God or in 
                                               
83 Goss & Vitz, 2014: 287.  
84 Engelhardt, 1996: 56. 
85 Engelhardt, 2000: 176. 
86 St. Isaac the Syrian, 2011: 250-51; Engelhardt, 2000: 173-74. 
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reference solely to humans as humans. Genesis 6:6 for example details how the human 
heart is subject to “continual brooding over evil,” and when the eyes of (natural) 
spiritual perception are dim, so, too, the eyes gazing upon the natural world are 
dimmed. 
The world seen through wicked eyes confirms the naturalness of natural evil 
and of evil inclinations. This view of reality is further strengthened as nature is 
resituated within the expectations of modern physics and biology. Everything is 
defined in terms of possibilities for discursive analysis, examination, study, and 
reasoning, but not for prayer. Construed within the truncated terms of post-
Newtonian physics and post-Darwinian biology, nature becomes an all-
inclusive sphere of immanence closing man off from God. As a consequence, 
neither physical nor biological nature is recognized as gesturing beyond itself to 
the Creator.87  
 
 
In this way, Engelhardt rejects natural law theories—and other such discourses—in 
bioethics that posit the existence and nature of God as inessential to ethics. Natural law 
“properly understood,” however, necessarily entails a “distinctively Christian ethic,” 
and Goss and Vitz refer to this as the principle metaethical thesis.88 But there is more 
to consider beyond solely positing the existence of God for within the movements and 
transitions of how natural law is understood, we can glimpse important epistemological 
differences. Here Goss and Vitz refer to a “principal moral-epistemological thesis of 
natural-law ethics” that differentiates between different natural law approaches to how 
one knows happiness and morality. Aquinas, for instance, argued for a natural and 
supernatural human telos—a natural and divine beatitude—with the understanding that 
the natural was incomplete and an “imperfect happiness” without the supernatural.89 
                                               
87 Engelhardt, 2000: 175. 
88 Goss and Vitz, 2014: 288. 
89 In a number of places, Engelhardt is critical of Aquinas’ “philosophical 
commitments” (Engelhardt, 2017: 72, 84) that influenced the later Scholasticism of 
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This two-fold account of human happiness for Aquinas follows an understanding of 
created nature as necessarily participatory, where the natural is suspended from and 
participates in the supernatural to achieve its fullness. This participatory view of nature, 
however, changes in the later Scholastic centuries (15th-17th C) as Grotius and others 
effectively separate the two spheres of human happiness, creating space for natural 
beatitude apart from the supernatural. Moving forward, Goss and Vitz then point to a 
further transition in the Modern period (17th-18th C) when the “theory and practices” 
aimed at human ends pertaining to God became clearly distinct and separated from 
those aimed at human ends as they pertain to humans and the natural world.90 From 
amidst this false dichotomy, one can then divide theology and ethics respectively as 
modern disciplines where the two are no longer essentially interwoven. Hence the 
Scholastic and modern academic approach moves ever more into deflated, 
immanentized pursuits of philosophy as the domain of natural reason, discursive 
rationality, with theology likewise focusing not on prayerful illumination but perhaps 
on logical pursuits such as soteriology deciphered by natural theology. Within this 
framework, the very “sources and objects of moral epistemology” departed from 
traditional Christianity, paving the way for a Cartesian and Kantian grounding of ethics 
entirely outside of God. Summarizing these vast transitions, Goss and Vitz point to 
four attributes of modern, moral epistemology, particularly exemplified in the New 
Natural Law Theory: this theory enacts first a moral epistemology that is distinctively 
                                                                                                                                    
Scotus, Grotius, Ockham and others, he elsewhere points to readings of Aquinas (e.g. 
Denis Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good, Washington DC: Catholic University 
Press, 1997) that “separate him from the Scholastics who followed him” (Engelhardt, 
2000: 220). Regardless the connection between Aquinas and his followers, the two-fold 
account of human happiness is a helpful distinction regarding the differences in moral 
epistemologies surrounding natural law. 
90 Goss & Vitz, 2014: 289. 
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irreligious, “proceeding methodologically as if knowledge of God were not a benefit for 
knowledge of the moral law.”  Second, this theory is nonnoetic or non-experiential and 
hence primarily available through pure rationality and self-evident principles. This New 
Natural Law Theory is also nonascetic, “proceeding methodologically as if the seeking 
purity of heart were insignificant for attaining moral knowledge.” Fourthly, this theory 
is ecumenically egalitarian, “in the sense that it posits what moral norms are, and ought to 
be, justified by public reasons that are equally accessible to any rational agent.”91  
 
In short, Goss and Vitz argue for an important distinction between Engelhardt’s 
criticism and affirmation of natural law thinking. Natural law that denies the principal 
metaethical thesis and/or misconstrues the principal moral-epistemological thesis 
summarized above will inevitably lead to confusion in bioethics. Natural law rightly 
understood, however, offers a “window to God” through nature, and yet this 
encounter with nature entails a full-orbed understanding of philosophy as the love of 
wisdom that comes “not by learning, study, or deep analysis” on a theoretical level but 
through “faith, ascesis, and prayer.” Furthermore, this natural law  
is not the knowing of a mere set of external moral constraints. It is a knowing 
along with God about how to approach God. Like the old English term “inwit” 
for conscience, it involves an internal knowledge that is not solitary. This 
knowing grows as we free ourselves from passion and turn to God through 
keeping His commandments…In all of this, the commandments, the law 
taught us by nature, are not external or empirical, but integral to bringing us to 
union with God.92 
 
 
                                               
91 Goss & Vitz, 2014: 290. 
92 Engelhardt, 2000: 176. 
	 209 
Within the ordo described by St. Maximus, the above type of natural knowing is 
“philosophical” in the qualified sense of theoria where theoria is preceded by the 
practiced virtues (practike) and then together theoria and practike end properly in theology 
(theologia). This philosophical approach employs a highly nuanced view of philosophy 
that is antithetical to the autonomous theorizing over nature in the Scholastic mold. St. 
Maximus’ use of “philosophy” assumes philo and sophia such that Divine Sophia is 
known through ascetic virtues and nature understood through the spiritual depth of 
theoria. Necessarily, this three-fold path for St. Maximus is enfolded within the rich 
assumptions of deification or theosis in Jesus Christ, and within this context, theology 
and philosophy aiming at theosis are essentially integrated spiritual practices that cannot 
be reproduced formulaically. St. Maximus hence rephrases practike, theoria, and theologia 
as ascetic philosophy, natural philosophy, and theological philosophy.93 Within this 
particular context, Engelhardt freely embraces discourses and “laws” on nature, and yet 
he is forthright in acknowledging and presupposing the non-static epistemology of 
traditional Christianity whereby “as man repents he is illumined by God and then 
united to God.”94 
 
Within the ontologically rich commitments of this pre-modern metaethics and moral 
epistemology, it may seem that public discourse—or other discursive reasoning such as 
within the academy—has little to no place within Engelhardt’s paradigm for ethical 
knowing across the divides of moral strangers. After all, when created nature is defined 
essentially in reference to the transcendent Creator, what degree of hope remains for 
                                               
93 St. Maximus the Confessor, 1981:161–63. 
94 Engelhardt, 2000: 177. 
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authentic dialogue amongst those who separate nature from the supernatural? This 
supposition seems logical, and yet Engelhardt clearly practices a philosophical and 
public discourse aimed at securing some common ground amidst moral friends and 
strangers. It is not difficult to see how Engelhardt’s moral strangers are strange in 
terms of ontological, moral and other commitments, and yet that strangeness does not 
necessitate enmity. Pointing out that strangeness is an honest and therapeutic 
maneuver; it is honest in admitting authentic difference, and it is therapeutic in seeking 
to map out the space between Engelhardt’s pre-modern assumptions on theological 
moral meaning and the modern assumptions on morality accessible via universal, 
discursive rationality. In this vein, Engelhardt is not primarily Kantian or Hegelian even 
as he employs an internal critique of universal rationality via those archetypes of the 
modern mind. Hence, it is difficult to emphasize enough the “lamentable” possibilities 
within Engelhardt’s secular bioethics that are revealed through the game or puzzle of 
thin moral meaning created through agreement or consensus. Such a “foundation” via 
the principle of permission and beneficence is impoverished indeed.  
 
Impoverished though it may be, however, that strangeness enables the possibility of 
battleground as common ground. Again following Goss and Vitz, we can see 
Engelhardt not advocating for insular moral silos of silence but for a shrewd 
engagement across the vast ontological, epistemological and moral differences evident 
in bioethics.95 Hence, Goss and Vitz identify three different conceptions of reasoning 
                                               
95 To further this point on the constructive role of reason in Christian bioethics, Goss 
and Vitz point to an analogy in the Confucian approach to dialogue advocated by 
Ruping Fan: 
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within the public square. The “restrictive view of public reason” follows the notion that 
common ground exists ideally between members of a just society on the basis of 
citizenship. This entails that any distinctive sectarian postures amongst citizens must be 
bracketed. Such a restriction may be narrowly focused on “constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice” or it may be construed in broader degrees as any “coercive 
activity” of the state or any social activity/morality affecting one’s fellow citizens. 
Within such a view, the only acceptable political engagement or discourse is one that 
subverts “private” or “personal” beliefs in favor of purportedly “proper” public 
reasoning.96 The challenge to this restrictive view exists in the difficulty and shifting 
nature of defining what is the public good? Without some more fixed and transcendent 
starting point, the grounding behind “public good” is inevitably fluid and transitory. 
Hence, defining the language and actions of “tolerance” that support public good 
versus “discrimination” remains elusive. 
 
The second “aspirational view of public reason” allows for members of a just society to 
speak and to persuade others from their “distinctive sectarian” rationalities for the 
benefit of their fellow citizens. In this viewpoint, motives on end-goals matter greatly 
                                                                                                                                    
Confucian views are certainly not neutral views…[A neutral stance from which 
to start moral reasoning] does not exist. Any moral view is from somewhere 
and is held by somebody. Attempting to derive a substantive stance solely form 
pure reason is illusory because pure reason is not substantive. Reason can play a 
constructive role in a moral system only through close combination with certain 
fundamental, content-full moral assumptions and premises, from which 
concrete bioethical views and visions are deuced, induced, or stimulated. Such 
fundamental, content-full assumptions and premises can only be found in 
particular moral traditions, such as Confucianism. However, it is impossible to 
unite basic assumptions from different traditions to make a coherent moral 
doctrine as cosmopolitans expect. These assumptions are mutually 
incommensurable” (Fan, 2012: 3). 
96 Goss and Vitz, 2014: 293. 
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even while different understandings of the means remain in contention. A physician 
may, for instance, advocate for his patient to avoid hastening death through medical-
technological means for the good of the patient’s spiritual soul, even while the patient 
may deny spiritual realities. Apologists within this vein “ought to strive to develop a 
rationalistic, universally accessible ethical theory to both ground their moral views and 
to guide their social-political discourse.”97 
 
The third “rhetorical view of public reason” most particularly aligns with Engelhardt’s public 
discourse. This approach “posits no secular procedural restrictions on the ethical 
reasoning” nor does it encourage people “to aspire to ground their publicly relevant 
moral views and their social-political discourse in a rationalistic, universally accessible 
ethical theory.”98 Instead, this viewpoint emphasizes persuasive rhetoric as a way to 
cross content-full lines of sectarian difference in a prudential manner. Employing a full 
range of ethos, pathos, and logos, such a rhetoric aims to encourage Christian philosophers 
to speak boldly and without compromise of content or methodology. In short, Goss 
and Vitz see Engelhardt encouraging 
Christian bioethicists [to employ, as able] public reasons rhetorically to bring 
about Christ’s ends, provided they recognize that any agreement obtained by 
these means does not trump the robust, traditional Christian teachings that 
have been revealed to the saints by noetic, liturgical ascetic encounters with the 
living God. 
 
Further, the final purpose of Engelhardt’s critical yet therapeutic mapping of bioethics 
aims to direct Christian bioethicists 
away from a kind of philosophy that, on [Engelhardt’s] account, results in little 
more than a series of unwinnable games of puzzle play, and back toward the 
                                               
97 Goss and Vitz, 2014: 293. 
98 Goss and Vitz, 2014: 293-94. 
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true philosophy, a liturgical ascetic way of life that requires a genuine love of 
Divine Wisdom and leads towards the fullness of human flourishing that is 
manifest in the lives of Christian saints.99 
 
 
What Engelhardt’s foundational approach seeks to embody is not a restrictive 
antagonism but prudential caution when engaging in public discourse on bioethics 
across lines of moral and ontological strangeness. Engelhardt is not furthering a 
Tertullian model of “resistance and rejection” between Christian and non-Christian 
communities where a type of logical consistency and “manifest fervor” eliminates 
dialogue with anyone who does not acknowledge the supremacy and significance of 
Christ over all things.100 A more fitting model is seen in Clement of Alexandria or St. 
Justin Martyr who allow for discerning and intelligent cooperation amidst Christians 
and non-Christians while maintaining the thick particularity of Christianity. What 
undergirds this discerning engagement, Fr. Trader notes, is a theological commitment:  
that there is only one unified created reality in time and space from which the 
uncreated energies of the Triune God are never absent. This presence of God 
historically in His Church and naturally in his creation enable the fathers to 
make use of material gained from empirical knowledge about the workings of 
God’s world (“natural” or general revelation through created being) and God’s 
working in the world (“supernatural” or special revelation in history). [In short] 
the Church and the world form an organic unity, which means that ‘everything 
is potentially the Church and called to sanctification.’ Thus, when frail and 
moral thought opens up into the immensity of Christ the God-man, the whole 
panorama of creation and history are beheld from the elevated point of the 
mind of Christ.101 
 
 
Such an openness moves well beyond “an isolationist Tertullian ghetto” that some may 
see in Engelhardt, moving instead towards an explicitly hierarchical relationship where 
                                               
99 Goss and Vitz, 2014: 295. 
100 Trader: 2011, 13. 
101 Trader, 2011: 17. 
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theology is given a “place of logical priority over secular knowledge,” and where 
Christian bioethics can engage “natural discourses” within an explicit framework of 
“deeper meaning and ultimate significance.” The relationship is akin to envisioning the 
context of “a sentence governed by the rules for grammar and a group of words 
defined by the rules of lexicography.”102 Such a theological framework grants meaning 
to discerning openness over “nature” and her laws that otherwise cannot exist within 
the logic of the secular. This model of openness from Clement or St. Justin is a fitting 
analogue for Engelhardt’s critical mapping, and such a context is helpful for 
understanding why Engelhardt stresses the critical importance of methodology for 
approaching morality and bioethics: “If reason is at the center of theology, one will 
rationally reconstruct the content of any Christian bioethics in the image and likeness 
of secular moral rationality.”103 Discursive reason does not accord within Christianity as 
a source of moral norms to be identified outside the infinite God. As such, any account 
of natural law “outside of a proper religious life” misconstrues theology as “faith 
seeking understanding rather than faith seeking holiness.” Hence Engelhardt reminds 
us: 
The Christian tertium quid is the very energies of God himself…[and in this way] 
theology seeks union with God through experiencing Him, not through 
reasoning to Him or about Him. This is not to say that reasoning is useless or 
bad, but rather that it is peripheral to holiness.104 
 
 
Despite the clarifications such as the above, Engelhardt remains a controversial figure 
to many who see him advocating “against philosophy” when what is needed are 
                                               
102 Trader, 2011: 18. 
103 Engelhardt, 2000: xv. 
104 Engelhardt, 1997: 280. 
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distinctions and proper nuances regarding what we mean by philosophy. This chapter 
has argued that Engelhardt’s foundational approach to philosophy and bioethics in the 
public square parallels Wittgenstein’s method of philosophy that seeks clarity and a 
change in the form of questions. This is a methodology that reverses the high ground 
where secular discursive reasoning is considered the “common ground” or neutral 
place from which bioethics is predominantly determined. Within such a secular 
framework, religious or theological bioethics becomes something aberrant, or 
something to be tolerated within the democratic pluralism of the 21st century West. 
Against this secular framework, Wittgenstein and Engelhardt have left their mark 
through language and bioethics respectively as philosophers who question the impulse 
of philosophizing itself within the secular. Hence, Edwards notes of the later 
Wittgenstein that his critiques of philosophy come from “a perspective not itself 
philosophical,”105 and much the same can be said of Engelhardt. His critique is that 
bioethics largely functions as an extension project of the Enlightenment hope in 
autonomous rationality, and it is this theoretical impulse to secular philosophizing that 
is countered in part via Wittgenstein’s general religious perspective and more robustly 
via Engelhardt’s particular appeals to traditional Christianity.  
 
In the following chapter, this thesis turns from a Wittgensteinian comparison to a 
contrast where Julian Savulescu offers an example of bioethics engaged within an 
immanent and utilitarian language game. 
 
                                               
105 Edwards, 1982: 7. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
WHY BIOETHICS HAS FAILED SAVULESCU: CHALLENGING 
“SLAVISH MORALISM” WITH A NEW LANGUAGE GAME 
 
 
This chapter takes up Julian Savulescu’s position that there are in principle no 
philosophical or moral objections to the use of genetic and other biomedical means for 
moral enhancement. After briefly summarizing Savulescu’s position on bio and moral 
enhancement, I turn to Savulescu’s strong critique of mainstream, principlist bioethics 
that tends to “scientify” morality, assuming that evidence is sufficient to inform 
persons morally. Savulescu’s attack upon bioethics stems from his utilitarian thinking 
that follows a radical hope in the possibilities of science and technology to balance 
flawed human moral psychology. On the one hand, Savulescu’s philosophical roots 
may be seen within the Enlightenment tradition; however, as Savulescu critiques 
bioethics for its “slavish moralism” bound within temporal, cultural principles, we can 
glimpse a sort of Nietzschean prophecy that challenges bioethics to embrace implicitly 
a new cybernetic ontology and technosapien anthropology. In the final section, I will 
argue that despite Savulescu’s desire to transcend bioethics’ pseudo-moralism, he 
himself remains ensconced in a puzzle of recast Enlightenment values and Nietzschean 
attempts at transcendence through the will. In short, Savulescu has changed the 
language game without escaping self-referential, immanentized ethics. 
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5.1 Bioethics Denying Scientific Progress—And Good Philosophy? 
A means can be justified by its end. But the end in its turn needs to be justified. Leon Trotsky 
(Their Morals and Ours, 1938)  
 
By his own admission, Savulescu paints a gloomy picture whereby we 20th and 
21st century humans are too smart for our own good. The scientific and technological 
advances of the modern world have made immediate, global annihilation possible. For 
Savulescu and his frequent co-author Ingmar Persson, “Ultimate Harm” is possible, 
even likely, from a number of fronts including (1) the possibility of intentional misuse 
of science, (2) omission of aid to the developing world, and/or (3) failure to cooperate 
globally, leading to the further collapse of the environment.1  As a result of this 
problem, Persson and Savulescu argue five primary points that summarize the 
predicament of technologically-empowered humans who are endowed with a flawed 
moral psychology:  
1. It is much easier, as a rule, to harm than to benefit. 
2. As scientific advances increasingly progress—sped further by cognitive 
enhancements—so increases the possibility for mass destruction from a few. 
3. Even if those immoral enough to cause mass destruction are few in number, it 
is likely that those immoral few live within huge human populations, with the 
ability to effect great harm. 
4. Moral enhancement of such magnitude to counteract mass destruction is not 
scientifically possible currently, nor in the near future. 
5. Therefore, “the progress of science is in one respect for the worse by making 
likelier the misuse of ever more effective weapons of mass destruction, and this 
badness is increased if scientific progress is speeded up by cognitive 
enhancement, until effective means of moral enhancement are found and 
applied.”2 
 
 
                                               
1 Persson & Savulescu, 2010: 662-65. 
2 Persson & Savulescu, 2008: 174. 
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What lies within Persson and Savulescu’s gloomy picture is a certain evolutionary 
hypothesis or anthropological narrative. They assume that human moral psychology is 
currently adapted for life within technologically limited, small communes where the 
consequences for disaster exist on a small scale. This is a simple, yet enormously critical 
assumption that the authors unfortunately do not develop at length but rather assert as 
a touchstone. Fundamentally, it seems, nature has not equipped our moral psychology 
for life after the mid-20th century when technological and scientific progress surpassed 
human capacities for morality. The scales have tipped, and ironically the only way past 
this modern problem is to look for a solution further and deeper within the very 
scientific, technological powers that helped to create the problem.3 In short, Persson 
and Savulescu’s narrative depends upon an assumption of inadequate biology or 
genetics, a worldview of materialism where evolutionary progress has failed or lagged in 
the face of the remarkable new powers of techne. Embracing this techne through 
biomedical means of moral enhancement may not necessarily be the cosmos saving 
agent,4 but the authors make this their focus over familial, economic, educational 
                                               
3 Persson & Savulescu, 2012: 10-11. 
4 Persson & Savulescu do not attempt to identify exactly to what degree biomedical 
moral enhancements are necessary. There is an “imperative” that scientific research 
explore “moral bioenhancement” as a “compliment” to traditional means of moral 
enhancement such as education. Beyond research, however, they argue less for a 
specific policy of what types of biomedical enhancement must be done when and to 
whom. Rather, they paint in broad-strokes to argue for neglected possibilities with 
biomedical enhancement, whatever those may be. When they do speak of the balance 
amongst enhancements, they imagine “an interplay between biomedical and 
social/political techniques rather than the former alone being in the driver’s seat” 
(Persson & Savulescu, 2012: 124). What seems clear is that humans possess a duty to 
enhance, but the means should involve some nexus of traditional and biomedical 
forces.  
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reforms to make a point: “many people reject [biomedical enhancements] out of hand 
for untenable reasons.”5 
 
This last sentence reveals a notable element in Savulescu’s work. As he argues for 
headline-grabbing, controversial conclusions, he frequently challenges and critiques the 
field of bioethics for failing to follow “good” (his) philosophical analysis and argument. 
What is needed, Savulescu argues, is the insight to move beyond a “slavish moralism” 
characteristic of bioethics. In Savulescu’s account, confusions in bioethics arise when 
Hume’s “fact-value” or “is-ought” distinction is ignored at the intersection of science 
and ethics. Science and ethics are entirely different for Savulescu, and to think that the 
natural facts of science will answer questions of how we should live confuses the 
distinction between (scientific) facts and (ethical) values. In Savulescu’s own words:  
The tendency today is to roll over and ‘scientify’ everything. Evidence will tell 
us what to do, people believe. But what constitutes sufficient evidence is an 
ethical decision when we make up our minds about what to do. What level of 
blood pressure, cholesterol and glucose is safe, or healthy, is like what the speed 
limit or blood alcohol ought to be. It is an ethical judgment about weighing risk 
and benefit.6 
 
 
What Savulescu does next is to push this distinction between fact and value upon 
natural humanists such as Leon Kass, Michael Sandel and Jürgen Habermas who object 
to genetic selection and cloning. The core of their objection centers on generations and 
the concern of “genetic despotism” (Kass) from one generation to the next that effects 
a “hyperparenting” (Sandel) and removes the child’s freedom when his or her desires 
                                               
5 Persson & Savulescu, 2012: 11. 
6 Savulescu, 2015a: 30. 
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for life may not accord with the parents’ expectations.7 For Savulescu, their line of 
reasoning follows a conceptual confusion. How can one coerce another who has yet to 
exist? An exception may arise when a parental action might entail that the child’s 
existence is a “life not worth living,” and yet, for Savulescu, it is de facto senseless to 
deny the “metaphysical fact” that offspring who owe their existence to their 
genetic/biological parents might lose autonomy and freedom due to the parents’ 
actions. Kass is well known for coining the phrase “the wisdom of repugnance,”8 
where following one’s moral intuition is thought to serve as an ethical compass. Not 
surprisingly, in some ethics circles Kass’ phrase was soon discounted and labeled the 
“yuck factor” precisely because those such as Savulescu only value quantifiable, 
utilitarian measures of benefit and harm. Intuition or conscience for Savulescu means 
little except to hold back the trajectory and promise of true science.  
 
Kass sees a meaningful connection amidst generational relationships that posits a value 
scale beyond materialism or mere biology. On his scale of value, the actions of parents 
do affect genetically modified children who are yet to exist biologically. But this is 
precisely the sort of value scale that Savulescu critiques in bioethics. Kass speaks of 
“repugnance” as a natural reaction when facing the factual genetics scenario of human 
cloning, but Savulescu gains some high ground in the argument by simply denying 
Kass’ description of “natural.”  
 
                                               
7 Savulescu, 2015a: 28. 
8 Kass, 1997. 
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Kass’ “repugnance” is not the only one of Savulescu’s targets. Appeals in bioethics to 
human “dignity” mean nothing on his utilitarian scale. Likewise, gaining the consent of 
human subjects of research for the sake of protecting privacy and confidentiality 
amounts for Savulescu to little more than a “lethal and widespread malaise.” Why? 
These principles possess no inherent value but rather are subject to analysis against the 
possibility of massively enhancing knowledge to save and improve lives. What is the 
greater benefit? To save one’s privacy or to save a life? With this logic, we can even see 
how Savulescu takes head on the rhetorical minefield of Nazi eugenics. Savulescu 
openly favors eugenics and denies that the argument—“eugenics: this is what the Nazis 
did”—possesses any staying power. After all, Savulescu argues that our culture’s liberal 
social acceptance of testing for Down syndrome, Fragile X, systic fribrosis, etc. is 
eugenics, and so again, he critiques shallow arguments within bioethics by positing a 
materialist, utilitarian scale of greatest harm/benefit to define what ought or ought not 
to be socially accepted. 
 
What Savulescu is primarily addressing is the “faith” that the field of bioethics places in 
mid-level principles as proposed by Beauchamp and Childress.9 To be sure, there are 
other approaches to bioethics, but appeals to “dignity,” “autonomy,” and even 
“consent” constitute the majority approach that Savulescu sees in the “winning 
moralists” who are “philosophically naïve.”10 In place of “good philosophy,” bioethics 
is enslaved to a principles-based moralism and functions more like a pseudo religion 
rather than philosophy via sound argumentation.  
                                               
9 Beauchamp & Childress, 2013. 
10 Savulescu, 2015a: 31-32. 
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According to Savulescu, bioethics has failed, and he does not hesitate to ridicule this 
failure. 11  Moreover, without any more substantial grounding for principles-based 
bioethics, Savulescu’s utilitarian critique proves an earnest challenge for bioethics not 
unlike Wittgenstein’s critique of theorizing as “a kind of general disease of thinking 
which always looks for (and finds) what would be called a mental state from which all 
our acts spring as from a reservoir” (BB 143). This is a challenge that reveals how mid-
level principles can only be useful when there is some shared moral vision or 
understanding of the good within which the principles may be defined.12  Hence 
Savulescu sees bioethics as “scientifying” ethics, ignoring the distinction between 
scientific fact and ethical value, and this failure enslaves bioethics to moralism when 
Savulescu instead pines for an ethics that embraces the open possibilities in a “true” 
science and medicine that favors calculations for enhancement.  
 
This gloss of Savulescu sets up an interesting scenario: doubtless many in bioethics 
seek to marginalize Savulescu for the wide array of his currently unpopular positions 
such as challenging the therapy-enhancement distinction, welcoming PEDs in sports, 
advocating for pharmaceutical moral enhancements, and openly embracing eugenics. 
Savulescu comes to these positions by staunchly denying the “natural” principlist 
values that undergird mainstream bioethics, and within this theorizing debate on how 
bioethics will be grounded, Savulescu’s utilitarian bioethics is surely as legitimate as 
principlism. Both sides present claims to be rationally self-evident. For Savulescu, good 
                                               
11 Savulescu, 2015b. 
12 Engelhardt, 1996: 56.  
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philosophy is utilitarian philosophy, and his mentor Peter Singer would seem a model 
utilitarian philosopher. In short, while I could not differ more with the foundational 
commitments of Savulescu’s utilitarianism—and it may be said that we stand on 
opposite sides of an ontological chasm—Savulescu remains helpful in pointing out the 
errors of secular, scientific theorizing that assumes natural principles. Principlist 
theorizing in this mold exists within the shallow language game of bioethics birthed in 
the second half of the 20th century with seemingly little awareness of the need to 
consider its own philosophical and biopolitical commitments.  
 
The notable irony is that Savulescu’s utilitarianism also exists within a system of 
philosophical and biopolitical commitments that he neglects to acknowledge. Savulescu 
does not begin with mid-level principles but rather with an assumption of consensus or 
agreement on how to rank or compare consequences. Following Engelhardt, 
consequentialist and utilitarian accounts of rationality presuppose an antecedent and 
even an “authoritarian means of judging, ranking, or comparing benefits and harms.” 
The “fact” that Savulescu can point to a greater benefit is not decisive given that the 
issue centers not on “facts” but on the judgments and evaluations of those “facts.” 
What must be stressed is that “science is not an ahistorical deliverance of the gods. 
Scientific truth, as all human truth, is historically and culturally shaped.”13 Or, recalling 
Wittgenstein’s admonition, our “craving for generality” stems from our “preoccupation 
with the method of science,” and even while Savulescu criticizes bioethics for ignoring 
the fact-value distinction, what he assumes is a factual utilitarian judgment that 
functions as a pseudo-metaphysical starting point.  Hence Wittgenstein reminds us: 
                                               
13 Engelhardt, 1996: 39; cf. 37-65. 
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Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness (BB 18). 
 
 
For all of Savulescu’s critiquing of bioethics’ “scientifying” and slavish moralism, he 
falls prey to his own scientific confusion, and this enacts something of a 
methodological impasse: Savulescu’s good philosophy is utilitarian while the 
principlism he confronts is purportedly faith-based moralism. Yet is Savulescu’s 
challenge anything more than one additional theoretical approach forcefully proposed 
amidst the competing theoretical spheres of postmodernity? We must ask why 
Savulescu’s justification of a secular, content-full ethics ought to out-rank other 
approaches? Why utilitarianism in place of intuitionist accounts, casuistic accounts, 
hypothetical-choice theoretical accounts, rational choice and discourse theoretic 
accounts, game-theoretical accounts, natural law accounts, or mid-level principlist 
accounts? Each account “presupposes exactly what it seeks to justify: a particular moral 
content.”14 Within the amorphous postmodern world, Savulescu’s account inherently 
assumes a rational-moral content, and such moral content will be secured either with 
“the price of particularity” or universality. 
To have moral content, one must endorse particular moral premises or rules of 
moral evidence as a point of departure, thus endorsing one from among the 
class of available moralities. On the other hand, universality is approached at 
the price of content. For a morality to have content, it must be particular. But 
which particularity, which moral content, should be endorsed on what basis? 
Again, to answer such questions, one either begs the question or submits to 
infinite regress. In the face of these difficulties, no particular moral vision or 
bioethics, in general secular terms, can be shown to be better than any other.15 
 
                                               
14 Engelhardt, 1996: 42. 
15 Engelhardt, 1996: 59. 
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Savulescu’s judgments and valuations of greatest benefits and harms rely upon some 
greater moral vision that he fails to identify. To grasp more of Savulescu’s assumed 
greater moral vision, it is helpful to look first into the Enlightenment roots of 
transhumanism and enhancement.  
 
 
 
5.2 Transhumanism’s Enlightenment Roots 
We live in a society exquisitely dependent on science and technology, in which hardly anyone knows 
anything about science and technology...Science is much more than a body of knowledge. It is a way of 
thinking. Carl Sagan16 
 
Enhancement and transhumanism are distinct, and yet they are similar in terms 
of philosophical grounding and assumptions. For the purposes of this thesis, I argue 
that enhancement and transhumanism share a common moral vision.17  Naturally, 
enhancements may be minor and relatively non-intrusive (e.g., caffeine), and in general 
                                               
16 Sagan, 1990.	
17 Savulescu has advocated specifically for “moral transhumanism” (Persson & 
Savulescu, 2010) and yet does not call himself a transhumanist. “I have some sympathy 
for [transhumanists] and I think it’s great that they’re out there pushing that line of 
argument. I’m not a transhumanist or a post-humanist. I think it starts to take on 
characteristics of a religion and is a kind of belief in itself. But the ideas are interesting 
and need to be taken seriously. I wouldn’t put all my eggs in their basket, but I’d put 
some eggs in their basket. The capacity for technology to increase in power is 
exponential; the capacity of humans to control it doesn’t increase exponentially. We 
have to realize that the technology we’ve created has reached a point of being runaway 
(as quoted in Paulson, 2016). While Savulescu may not consider himself formally a 
transhumanist, I contend that he has enough “eggs in their basket” to align broadly 
with the philosophical assumptions in transhumanism that seek through radical 
enhancements to transcend the limits of the human body and brain. Likewise, we may 
notice the overlap between Savulescu’s understanding of moral enhancement and 
Fukuyama’s assertion that the fundamental tenant of transhumanism is “that we will 
someday use biotechnology to make ourselves stronger, smarter, less prone to violence 
and longer lived” (Fukuyama, 2009). In short, I propose to consider radical 
enhancement and transhumanism carefully to avoid false caricatures but rather to 
uncover the philosophical stance that I contend undergirds Savulescu’s enhancement 
and transhumanism. 
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the term can be remarkably “elusive” and “conceptually ambiguous” as Michael Bess 
has argued.18 While not ignoring these conceptual challenges, I am addressing scientific 
and technological enhancements such as pharmaceuticals, deep brain stimulators, 
genetic therapy, and other biological-technological interfacings that may at least by 
popular consensus be understood principally or radically as bio-enhancements and a 
means to transhumanism. Hence, any strong separation of enhancement and 
transhumanism is unnecessary, and it is arguably best to frame transhumanism as 
something of an end goal for radical enhancement.19 That said, Persson and Savulescu 
have also invoked transhuman and posthuman technologies as a potential means 
towards moral enhancement, reflecting their prioritization of “moral humanity” over 
“biological humanity.” For humans to leave behind their human biology is a worthy 
transition if it effects Persson and Savulescu’s vision for a moral humanity.20  
 
Following James Hughes—co-founder with Nick Bostrom of the Institute for Ethics & 
Emerging Technologies—transhumanism espouses the belief that science and 
technology can be used to enhance and “transcend” the limits of the human body and 
brain. According to Bostrom, “transhumanism has roots in secular humanist 
thinking,”21 and he defines transhumanism as “the intellectual and cultural movement 
that affirms the possibility and desirability of improving the human condition through 
                                               
18 Bess lists six types of conceptual ambiguity with the term enhancement: “normal or 
species-typical functioning, therapeutics or healing, natural functioning, human nature, 
authenticity and the ambiguity between “more” and “better” (Bess, 2010: 641, 641-55). 19	Moreover, if one agrees with Fukuyama’s well-known assertion in 2004 that 
transhumanism was one of the world’s most dangerous ideas, the stakes are raised for 
both transhumanism and radical enhancement.	
20 Persson & Savulescu, 2010: 668. 
21 Bostrom, 2003b: 493.  
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applied reason, especially by developing and making widely available technologies to 
eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological 
capacities.”22 Describing transhumanism’s appeal to reason, Hughes notes: 
One of the main transhumanist blogs is Less Wrong, started at Oxford 
University under the aegis of transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom, 
dedicated to “the art of refining human rationality.” One of the frequent 
contributors there is Eliezer Yudkowsky, an autodidact writer on artificial 
intelligence and human cognitive biases who also is the founder of the 
Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence. Yudkowsky has said that one of 
his goals is to lead a “mass movement to train people to be black-belt 
rationalists.”23 
 
 
Addressing the question “what do we mean by ‘rationality’?” Yudkowsky states: 
We mean: (1) Epistemic rationality: believing, and updating on evidence, so as 
to systematically improve the correspondence between your map and the 
territory. The art of obtaining beliefs that correspond to reality as closely as 
possible. This correspondence is commonly termed “truth” or “accuracy”, and 
we’re happy to call it that. (2). Instrumental rationality: achieving your values. 
Not necessarily “your values” in the sense of being selfish values or unshared 
values: “your values” means anything you care about. The art of choosing 
actions that steer the future toward outcomes ranked higher in your 
preferences…we sometimes refer to this as “winning.”24 
 
 
This hope in the rational powers of science aligns transhumanism well within the 
framework of Enlightenment optimism for human progress and belief in the supreme 
power of reason. This link, however, Hughes admits, also implies that transhumanism 
stands to inherit the “internal contradictions and tensions” of the Enlightenment 
                                               
22 Bostrom, 2003a: 2. Bostrom further defines transhumanism as “the study of the 
ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of technologies that will enable us to 
overcome fundamental human limitations, and the related study of ethical matters 
involved in developing and using such technologies.” 
23 Hughes, 2010a: 625. 
24 Yudkowsky, quoted in Hughes, 2010b.	
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tradition.25 Simply put, reason is not self-legitimating. The project of reason qua reason 
rules out all foundational premises, including the premise that reason is superior to 
unreason. “Consequently transhumanists, like Enlightenment advocates in general, 
need to defend our values with nonrational a prioris. Unfortunately, some transhumanists 
continue to advocate a naïve conception of pure rationality as an end in itself.”26 Any 
attempt to clear all nonrational a prioris out of the way inevitably leads to a 
“philosophical dead end” and leaves one within a circle of self-referential appeals to a 
methodology (rationalism) when facing foundational, ontological questions. 
 
Further, such a hope in the supremacy of reason fails to account for the numerous 
challenges to rationalism that followed on the heels of the Enlightenment—or from 
within the Enlightenment era with Rousseau’s prioritization of primitive nature. Early 
19th century Romanticism, the Counter-Enlightenment movement and others contested 
the supremacy of rationalism, and of course various strands of post-rationalist thinking 
continued on into the 19th and 20th centuries, notably including Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, 
Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Derrida, all of whom in their respective ways “represent 
the implosion of Enlightenment reason.”27 
 
Beyond scientific rationalism, this alignment of transhumanism with the Enlightenment 
project may be seen on a number of levels. The primary point for now is Hughes’ 
contention that transhumanism is a direct “product” of the Enlightenment, hence 
reflecting a “myriad of tensions and contradictions” primarily inherent within 
                                               
25 Hughes, 2010a: 622, 622-40. 
26 Hughes, 2010b.	
27 Hughes, 2010a: 624.	
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Enlightenment rationality. But as Fabrice Jotterand notes, the continuum between 
Enlightenment thought and transhumanism needs clarification for there is much more 
than an extreme optimism in rationality at stake in transhumanism. Transhumanism has 
“reformulated” key tenets rejected by Enlightenment philosophers, including questions 
on:  
(1) Theology:  scientific or materialist theology replaces traditional theology 
(2) State power: technocratic authoritarianism operates as a new form of state 
power 
(3) Teleology: self-directed evolution toward a technocratic future replaces 
teleology 
(4) Moral authority: the UN Declaration of Human Right replaces traditional 
sources of moral authority, that is church authority 
(5) Immortality of the soul: the hope to be able to upload the brain on a 
computational substrate represents a new conceptualization of the religious 
notion of the “immortality of the soul.” 
[Hence] transhumanism is not only an heir of the Enlightenment but also a 
radical move away from one of its core values: the autonomy of reason.28 
 
 
In short, while Hughes firmly contends that transhumanism is a product of the 
Enlightenment, Jotterand points out that the “tensions” and “ideological variants” that 
Hughes describes in transhumanism qualify how we ought to describe the 
Enlightenment rationalism of transhumanism. Transhumanism cannot be said to 
adhere fully to the core Enlightenment value of the autonomy of reason but rather holds 
to an essential rationality—and as the five qualifications above make clear, this rationality 
is embedded within a core set of philosophical assumptions and practices. 
Foundational values, presuppositions, cultural practices and historical context always 
surround and intermingle with “pure rationality.”  
 
                                               
28 Jotterand, 2010: 618. 
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Interestingly, as Hughes emphasizes transhumanism’s attempts at pure rationality, a 
sermon he delivered to the Unitarian-Universalist Society in 2012 offers an example of 
the inevitability that scientific reason exists within some greater life context or 
Lebensform. Hughes speculates on the notion of “morality in a pill?”, wondering how 
clearly our scientific rationality might guide our ethics. Taking up neuroscience as a 
concrete, modern appropriation for “age-old religious questions about what it means to 
be a good person,” Hughes asks if the whole idea of virtue, vice and sin is now 
anything but “old-fashioned and intolerant,” or if the project of optimistic moral 
enhancement using neuroscience simply hides the essential question. Following 
MacIntyre seemingly implicitly, Hughes ponders if such moral neuroenhancement can 
avoid the question: whose version of morality will we be enhancing? Hughes takes up 
Anders Brevik as an example. The Norwegian mass killer Brevik insisted that his use of 
terror to “awaken Norway to the dangers of Muslim immigration” was sane and moral. 
For late liberals, the question is how to evaluate competing language and rival 
definitions from others who also claim a reasonable morality. Hughes identifies in 
liberalism two central moral intuitions—“don’t hurt people and don’t cheat”—and yet 
what of rival moral intuitions supporting nepotism, racism, nationalism, fear of strange 
immigrants, all of which may be understood as natural within a Darwinian impulse for 
self-preservation? 
 
In these ways, Hughes questions the universality of moral intuitions or rational moral 
definitions, but in the end he returns to the liberal safe ground of “some areas” of 
agreement such as self-control, regulating behavior, etc. This remains inconsistent with 
his initial challenge, and the closing suggestion of his sermon is that Unitarian 
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Universalism is a “fertile ground for the exploration of ways that these new tools [of 
neuroenhancing morality] can be used within a liberal model of virtue and the good 
life, and as a place to stand against the inevitable efforts to use these tools to close 
down the free and responsible search for truth and morality.”29 In a highly confusing 
manner, Hughes embraces transhumanism’s appropriation of Enlightenment rationality 
while simultaneously challenging liberalism’s attempt to hide its moral biases. Amidst 
this confusion, however, he raises questions that Savulescu fails to even acknowledge in 
his equivocation that utilitarianism is good philosophy.  
 
 
 
5.3 Savulescu’s Nietzschean Language Game 
We can now state Nietzsche’s ethic. I think what follows is a fair analysis of it: Victors in war, and 
their descendants, are usually biologically superior to the vanquished. It is therefore desirable that they 
should hold all the power, and should manage affairs exclusively in their own interests. Bertrand 
Russell30 
 
Savulescu begs the question he should answer—the question of foundational 
moral content—by repeatedly positing his philosophical method as good philosophy. 
In order to select the best possible outcome for benefits over harms, Savulescu must 
already know which outcomes are more beneficial and which are more harmful. In 
other words, “consequentialist ethics presupposes a nonconsequentialist ethics,”31 and 
here we can easily see how the later Wittgenstein’s language games offer a clarifying 
therapy for Savulescu. 
                                               
29 Hughes, 2012. It is worth noting the irony in the rhetorical occasion of a sermon for 
addressing the possibilities of stand-alone scientific rationalism. That said, the irony is 
largely lost within authentically liberal religions that speak in Biblical or theological 
language to support whatever the culturally relevant values of the age. 
30 Russell, 1996: 695.  
31 Engelhardt, 1996: 47.	
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We want to say that there can’t be any vagueness in logic. The idea now 
absorbs us that the ideal ‘must’ occur in reality. At the same time, one doesn’t as 
yet see how it occurs there, and doesn’t understand the nature of this “must”. 
We think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there (PI 
101). 
  
One predicates of the thing what lies in the mode of representation. We take 
the possibility of comparison, which impresses us, as the perception of a highly 
general state of affairs (PI 104). 
 
 
In PI 101, Wittgenstein is pointing to an ideal order for language, a standard or norm 
that we presume “must” exist because of our use of language. This does not necessarily 
preclude any such standard, but Wittgenstein’s first point is to examine “why” we think 
such a norm exits, and how that norm may align with language. Savulescu employs a 
certain logical sequencing and assumes that the moral content will be revealed through 
his logical methodology. Is his methodology logical? Certainly, but that is not the 
question; the question remains as to how we ought to rank the scale of values. PI 104 
takes us closer to the point by bringing to attention the “general state of affairs.” How 
do we determine the general state? Wittgenstein would have us begin by removing the 
“preconception of crystalline purity” in logic and language (PI 108), and following this 
touchstone of humility in the sphere of human knowledge, we can then seek not new 
“explanations” or “hypothetical” theories but rather “to assemble what we have long 
been familiar with” (PI 109). Following Wittgenstein’s language games hence may be 
taken as a gesture to something mystical or noetic, but before we pursue that depth, we 
must understand more of the hidden preconceptions and presuppositions within 
Savulescu’s language. What are the reference points upon which his scale of utilitarian 
values is fixed? Or, to capture another of Wittgenstein’s aphorisms, what is the 
“picture” or image that holds Savulescu captive and confused (PI 115)?  
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Savulescu’s core presuppositions are best seen in transhumanism’s postmodern 
offshoots, stemming from transhumanism’s Enlightenment roots.32 Here it is helpful to 
recall Jotterand’s five clarifications where transhumanism reconfigures Enlightenment 
values. Jotterand mentions the way transhumanism posits a scientific or materialist 
theology vs. traditional theology, a new technocratic authoritarian state power, a self-
directed evolutionary teleology, a moral authority such as the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights vs. traditional sources of moral authority, and a hope for immortality via 
uploading the brain on computational substrate vs. the immortality of the soul.33  These 
morphing tenets of transhumanism may be taken as examples of late modernity 
morphing into postmodernity. As Charles Taylor describes it, the modern era from the 
17th century on is marked by the transition into “modern freedom” that breaks loose 
from “older moral horizons.”34 Similarly, Brent Waters characterizes this “late modern 
landscape” by first tracing two cultural shifts: the shift into modernity that can be 
described as a transition from “providence to progress” while the shift into 
postmodernity can be described as a transition from “progress to process.”35 Clearly, 
                                               
32 Here again, following Wittgenstein’s gestures, we can read Savulescu’s radical 
enhancement as a search for uncovering true nature and humanity. A common 
argument is that enhancement does not take away from humanity but rather enhances 
humanity. All well and fine, but such an argument is further evidence of a self-
referential language game. Such an argument traces the “frame” of the picture while 
ignoring the question of “nature” itself. 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (4.5): “The general form of propositions is: This is 
how things are.” –That is the kind of proposition one repeats to oneself 
countless times. One thinks that one is tracing nature over and over again, and 
one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it (PI 114). 
33 Jotterand, 2010: 618. 
34 Taylor, 1992: 3. 
35 Waters, 2006: 11-18. It is helpful to specify further Water’s descriptions of modernity 
as progress-oriented and postmodernity as process-oriented. Engelhardt’s explication 
	 234 
these are broad strokes to summarize enormous paradigm shifts and changing 
discourses of theology, science, technology, but by the mid-nineteenth century we can 
home in on a particular cultural sense that the Enlightenment’s “most prized legacy” of 
progress had come to an end. As Waters points out, the marriage of Baconian utopian 
thought with a refined Cartesian methodology arguably spurred “rapid 
industrialization” that fundamentally changed cultural expectations for applied science; 
beyond progress, a new expectation led to ontologically-charged notions of processing 
nature into something beyond the natural. Equally, we could look to the “corrosive 
effects” of the “pliable and adaptive” Darwinian natural world as well as the new 
complexity and instability stemming from Freudian psychology. The external and 
internal worlds of late modernity were shifting, and in both spheres what was emerging 
was a haunting specter. 
Evolution was an account of continuous and violent competition…The drama 
of evolutionary ascent was predicated on a subplot of death, and the 
omnipresent threats of pain and misery accompanying it. Moreover, humans 
were not spared a role in this bloody spectacle, but were shaped by it. As 
psychoanalysis revealed, humans carried within their subconscious a host of 
virulent instincts and murderous impulses that the rational mind was hard 
pressed to keep under control.36 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
of modernity identifies two senses of the term “modernity.” First, in the period after 
the Middle Ages—specifically after the Renaissance and Reformation—Western 
European culture asserted its “powers over the ancient world with a self-confidence 
born of its successes in exploration, astronomy, anatomy, physics, chemistry, and art.” 
Modernity in this first sense is identified chiefly with the Enlightenment as well as 
Immanuel Kant’s proclaimed “motto of the Enlightenment:” Sapere aude! “Have 
courage to use your own reason!” The second sense of the term modernity connects 
with the term postmodernity. Particularly from Nietzsche forward, modernity indicates 
a “strongly adversarial culture” that was primarily anti-Christian and brings “reason 
itself into question.” “With postmodernity the West becomes posttraditional—it 
abandons central elements of some fifteen hundred years of its culture” (Engelhardt, 
1996: 23).  
36 Waters, 2006: 16.	
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Amidst these shifting discourses, morality no longer was seen as a noble goal for 
human rationality but was one additional adaptive mechanism for survival. 
Enlightenment optimism in progress shattered before the human will and growing 
technological power to direct human evolution into new frontiers. As Taylor describes 
it, these were disenchanted frontiers staked out through “instrumental reason” that 
prioritized individual lives apart from any broader vision, leaving Nietzsche’s pitiable 
“last men” as the comfort-seeking nadir of modernity’s decline. On the political level, 
Taylor points to de Tocqueville’s assessment of “soft” despotism where individuals are 
“enclosed in their own hearts” and prefer to stay at home rather than actively 
participate in self-government. Filling this vacuum, “institutions and structures of 
industrial-technological society” arise that severely influence the course of society, 
limiting liberties and enabling moral and environmental disasters such as the ones that 
Savulescu includes in the alarmist rhetoric of his narrative. But where Savulescu calls 
for processes of moral enhancement, Taylor harkens to a pre-modern “ethical 
authenticity” that sees human beings as necessarily united to “God” or to the Idea of 
the Good as the essential way to full being.37 
 
Connecting these themes of late modernity into postmodernity, we can see how 
Nietzsche aligns with Savulescu’s transhumanist vision—presenting an implicit but 
critical reference point within his language game. Savulescu will always be identified as 
an utilitarian, but on a more fundamental level he operates within a postmodern world 
that fully accepts processes of willful becoming.  
                                               
37 Taylor, 1992: 26.  
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As Darwinism makes clear, there is no fixed human condition given the radical 
nature of change over time. The fundamental fact of human life is its 
historicity. Yet philosophy has tried perennially to demonstrate some 
permanent aspect of human nature. According to [George] Grant, this is 
precisely the point Nietzsche rejected, insisting that any sense of permanence 
must be expunged from any vantage point claiming to be 
modern…Consequently we are forced to accept the “finality of becoming.”38 
 
 
Waters proceeds to note Nietzsche’s insistence that studying nature yields no moral 
purpose or “progressive trajectory” for there is no permanence to be discerned through 
reason. To this, we can align Savulescu’s desire to move beyond what he calls the 
traditional modes of enhancement such as education, opting to change nature rather 
than study it. Nietzsche’s historical sense undercuts traditional senses of morality as the 
only meaningful life is one that confronts and overcomes the “historical horizons”—
horizons representative not of “providential or progressive order” but of values 
constructed by human will.39 God is dead, and so, too, objective horizons are lost 
before historical horizons. “Untruth” is a condition of life for Nietzsche as “the 
falseness of a judgment” is no inherent objection to the judgment. What is supreme 
over truth, judgments, and any touchstone is the “life-promoting, life-preserving, 
species-preserving” awareness that logic and synthetic a priori judgments are fictional 
realities. Moving beyond such “value feelings” is the move beyond good and evil.40 
Truth stems from the will, and the will produces unspeakable violence as Nietzsche’s 
“last men” seek revenge upon nobility while nihilists lash out against a world “where 
                                               
38 Waters, 2006: 24. 
39 Waters, 2006: 25. On Nietzsche’s historicism, Waters states: “There are two general 
meanings of the term history. One is a study of the past, while the other connotes a 
form of existence. In the later instance, humans are historical beings in that they are 
shaped by the temporal processes they construct. To be historical in this sense means 
that past, present, and future are collapsed into a single mode of being” (23).  
40 Nietzsche, 1992 (1886): 201-202. 
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there is nothing noble to will.”41 The possible way between these two poles lies with 
the hope of the Übermensch who embraces fate (amor fati) to move beyond revenge and 
despair to courageously remake the world. 
 
How realistic this hope is for Nietzsche is a question beyond this thesis, but the 
primary point to draw from Nietzsche’s prophetic critique is the postmodern embrace 
of process and flux that is mastered and perpetually remade by willful humans. This 
postmodern world enables the transhumanist ambitions for materialist theology, 
technocratic states, a self-directed evolutionary telos and more. The synthesis of science 
and technology perpetually furthers this orientation of “radical plasticity,” and here we 
can discern a difference between Nietzsche’s hopeful Übermensch and transhumanism’s 
self-directed telos.  
To will, rather than love, a fabricated fate is accompanied by a recreation of the 
one who is willing. There is no need to wait for the Übermensch to evolve, for a 
similar being is to be created or engineered…The radical plasticity of the 
postmodern orientation is attained because its telos is also its techne. The future 
will largely be what we make of it; what it is willed to be. The postmodern telos 
of no telos is in fact a telos of techne. 42 
 
 
Moreover, this telos of techne is ontologically charged as the postmodern world creates 
and is shaped by a cybernetic reality. As our technological dependence grows, the 
distinctions between “natural” and “technological” dissipate, and humans morph into 
cybernetic organisms. Stephen Garner suggests that under the influence of a 
technological society, one need not have technology physically embedded within one’s 
body to be considered a cybernetic organism. Rather, the boundaries between organism 
                                               
41 Waters, 2006: 26. 
42 Waters, 2006: 30. 
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and machine are fluid within today’s social spheres. Hence the term “cyborg” operates 
on a biological and cultural level, highlighting that “technology can no longer be 
thought of as simply tools to be applied, but rather is the environment in which we live 
and breathe and have our being.” 43 As Waters notes, “to cross the postmodern divide 
is also to enter the posthuman terrain,” and this characterization can be further 
described under three attributes or headings: subjectivity, malleability, and mastery. The 
postmodern subject, existing within a cybernetic order, is marked by the primacy of 
mind. Within this mentalist prioritization, postmoderns are “embodied minds.” 
Personhood and autonomy within the late liberal tradition exists on a spectrum of 
rationality, and this modernist spectrum is expanded further in transhumanism. Within 
a cybernetic reality, the boundaries of time and space are compressed, and self-directed 
enhancements such as psychopharmacology, prosthetics, and even neural implants are 
options for upgrading the body as well as uploading and updating the mind. The net 
result is that “the person is defined and expressed through self-referential experience 
that transcends the body in order to maximize the range and quality of one’s potential 
                                               
43 “The biological cyborg, in which human beings are literally fused with their 
technology, is a powerful and often violent portrayal of human beings in their 
relationship with their own technological proclivity, and one that generates immediate 
response. The cultural representation of the cyborg seems more benign because it does 
not shock through forcing a confrontation with that human agency. However, this less 
common cultural use of the term highlights the extremely complex network of 
relationships between human beings and the products of human agency, which is 
sometimes obscured by the core common imagery of the biological cyborg. The image 
of the cyborg, both biological and cultural, and the hybridity it represents, is an 
ambivalent one in the world of shifting boundaries, where technological manipulation 
of the world relies upon there being some kind of consistent structure or order to 
affect, and yet in doing so existing notions of some kind of fixed ordering of the 
natural world are challenged or rejected.” (Garner, 2011: 89-90). 
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subjectivity.” 44  To understand the posthuman attributes of malleability and self-
mastery, we need only further trace the implications of prioritizing information and 
virtual reality over materiality. If information and data trump materiality, the body is 
perpetually a hindrance and a poor substitute for other superior computer mechanisms 
that offer a “superior substratum.” Biological embodiment is not essential but 
accidental as “the autonomous person is not a given, but a socially constructed 
individual with malleable, rather than definitive borders.” Reshaping malleable persons 
will always take place within some particular set of goals. Hence, nature is a raw 
resource (Bestand) awaiting mastery by the human will. 
 
What is clear in Savulescu’s arguments for radical enhancement and the above 
descriptions of transhumanism is that both share a common moral vision. Savulescu 
can be confusing as he calls for “citizen norms” to increase the “prosperity of a world 
community,” but then under the conviction that such efforts are too little too late, he 
places his hope in any possible pharmaceutical, biomedical, or other moral 
enhancement. Savulescu critiques principlist, “scientified” bioethics but then employs 
his own scientific rationalism. He prioritizes “moral humanity” over “biological 
humanity,” embracing transhumanism as a likely way to achieve greater benefit.45  In 
these ways, Savulescu exhibits a mixture of modern and postmodern elements as he 
vacillates between whatever means are available. “Postmodernity is simultaneously the 
                                               
44 Waters, 1996: 37; 33-40. Responding to Habermas’ late liberal society, Waters points 
out that “embodied personhood is no longer a defining boundary, but an unfortunate 
limitation on the scope and quality of subjectivity; a limitation which should be 
overcome, not honored…What Habermas fails to recognize is that late liberal society is 
no longer comprised of embodied persons but populated with persons who happen to 
have bodies” (39). 
45 Persson & Savulescu, 2010: 667-668. 
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affirmation and negation of modernity,”46 and Savulescu seems precisely at home in 
such a mangle.  
 
Navigating these enhancement and transhumanist moral visions is challenging, for it is 
not always clear exactly what conceptual claims are being made. What is the specific 
teleology of process-driven, self-directed transhumanism? Who defines the harms and 
benefits available through evolutionary moral transhumanism?  The central irony is that 
amidst these ambiguities, Savulescu is the one leveling claims of “conceptual 
confusion” against his colleagues in bioethics who fall prey to principlism as a “lethal 
and widespread malaise.”47 For the purposes of this paper, Savulescu is helpful in 
pointing to the errors of scientific theorizing, but he remains ensconced in a self-
referential logic. He has challenged principlist bioethics with little more than a new 
language game. 
 
 
5.4 Moral Enhancement Serving the Posthuman God 
It was [Bacon’s] The New Atlantis that first canvassed the possibility of a joint series of operations 
that would combine a new system of scientific investigation with a new technology. At a moment when 
the bitter struggle within Christianity between contentious doctrines and sects had come to a stalemate, 
the machine itself seemed to offer an alternative way of reaching Heaven. The promise of material 
abundance on earth, through exploration, organized conquest, and invention, offered a common 
objective to all classes. Lewis Mumford48 
  
Drawing together these themes, what emerges is a transhumanist vision 
possessing a strong Nietzschean “sense of dismay” that humans may not grow into 
something greater, willing themselves beyond the historical horizons. At the same time, 
                                               
46 Waters, 2006: 49. 
47 Savulescu, 2015a: 28. 
48 Mumford, 1967: 283. 
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as Gerald McKenny notes, transhumanists depart from Nietzsche when they 
acknowledge that technology enables a human future beyond what can be conceived of 
as human. Hence McKenny imagines Nietzsche asking: “what could motivate us…to 
pursue such a good, except some debilitating form of human self-hatred?”49 In this 
way, the Übermensch is a helpful comparison to the ideal transhuman, but where the 
Übermensch accepts fate as furthering a more powerful humanity, the transhuman vision 
wills beyond bodily boundaries in an effort to realize the next step in human evolution 
from ape to human to posthuman. 50  In place of homo sapiens formed within 
traditional boundaries of flourishing, the goal is to transition beyond boundaries into 
some sort of techno-sapien identity. These posthumans would cease to resemble 
humanity in any meaningful way as they imagine “completely synthetic artificial 
intelligences” or other “profound augmentations of a biological human.” In short, 
transhumanists 
yearn to reach intellectual heights as far above any current human genius as 
humans are above other primates; to be resistant to disease and impervious to 
aging; to have unlimited youth and vigor; to exercise control over their own 
desires, moods, and mental states; to be able to avoid feeling tired, hateful, or 
irritated about petty things; to have an increased capacity for pleasure, love, 
artistic appreciation, and serenity; to experience novel states of consciousness 
that current human brains cannot access.51 
 
                                               
49 McKenny, 2011:187. 
50 Hauskeller has suggested further qualifications for the aligning Nietzsche with the 
posthuman, leading to his conclusion that Nietzsche is not “a major inspiration for 
transhumanism.” Hauskeller points to (1) Nietzsche’s disdain for “anyone seeking to 
improve the human condition”; (2) transhumanism’s desire to reevaluate “certain” and 
not all aspects of our existence; (3) contra Nietzsche, transhumanism continues to see 
our humanity seated primarily in the mind; (4) transhumanism seeks immortality while 
Nietzsche decries such optimism. These qualifications for a close connection aside, 
Hauskeller admits there may be some common ground, and for the purposes of this 
chapter the association described by McKenny (2011), Bishop (2010), and Waters 
(2006) is more than reasonable (Hauskeller, 2010: 5-8). 
51 Bostrom, 2003: 5-6. 
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Admittedly, these claims can seem farcical, and, as Bishop has noted, a “pitfall” danger 
is to take these seemingly “Polly-Anna-ish” claims too seriously. Transhumanists such 
as Bostrom and Hughes, however, are far from insincere as they take seriously “the 
spirit of Bacon’s statement that the purpose of knowledge (and its technological fruits) 
is to relieve the human estate…to transcend human frailties, not by relieving the 
human condition of its frailties, but by relieving us of the human condition itself.”52  
 
Within this transition to the posthuman, what most notably emerges for the purposes 
of this thesis is an ordering theology, a theology that Bishop explicates in light of 
Heidegger’s ontotheology. 53  Ontology is the search for ousia, for whatness, while 
theology searches for a more particular existence, for thatness, and for Heidegger the 
passing of each historical epoch is best understood in terms of the interplay between 
asking (and confusing) questions of ontology and theology. 
[E]ven Nietzsche, who is much less concerned with being and more concerned 
with becoming, thinks theologically when he “thinks the existentia of the 
totality” by proclaiming the “eternal return of the same;” after all, eternal 
recurrence is not just “the way that the totality of entities exists…but also their 
highest mode of existence (as the closest the endless stream of becoming comes 
to being).” 
Thus, for Heidegger the history of metaphysics is a history of founding 
ontotheologies, which were unable to secure their own ground. The history of 
metaphysics, then, is a history of swinging between foundation and abyss, with 
the overturning of a previous ontotheology by the next ontotheology. In other 
words, for a time ontotheologies give “a perhaps necessary appearance of 
ground.”54  
 
                                               
52 Bishop, 2010, 701. 
53 Heidegger’s analysis of ontotheology is well known. Ontotheology names “two 
stalks” of metaphysics as ontology—that which names the ousia, the protosubstance, 
that takes on various historical modes—and theology—that which asks for some 
particular understanding of ousia as “which” entity or in “what sense” it is (Bishop, 2010: 
704). 
54 Bishop, 2010: 704. Bishop is quoting and interacting with Thompson, 2015. 
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Nietzsche’s Dionysius, the god of Chaos, represents the struggle for power, and yet 
while Nietzsche thinks theologically in some ways, the will to power is not “conscious 
agency” aimed at a certain end but rather exists as a “nonmentalist or nonconscious 
becoming—will without agency.”55 But we inevitably seek out rational reasons for why 
we are the way we are, which amounts to a confusion of “attributing final causes” 
where only the “being of entities” exists for Nietzsche. This illustrates a point where 
transhumanism seeks to depart from the “will without agency” analysis and to overstep 
the “natural” processes of evolutionary selection as rational beings, beings who seek to 
discern and willfully remake nature into the ever-becoming. Here the telos of techne 
synthesizes with the human will, and in turn “the human will, an evolutionary 
achievement, turns to order the chaos of creative ontology, and thereby enacts an 
ordering theology.” In short, the ordering force of the human will operating upon the 
powers of creation is transhumanism’s theology. 
[T]he god of these transhumanist philosophers is the god that orders the 
creative power toward a new being, a new god, that is to say toward the 
posthuman. Transhumanist philosophies, in my opinion, are the coincidence of 
eternal and creative forces of becoming just as they turn in the conscious 
moment toward control, toward mastery. Transhumanism seeks to differently 
embody the Übermensch.56  
 
 
This theological point is critical. Building upon an analysis of language games in 
theoretical bioethics, we can now glimpse within radical enhancement and 
transhumanism a theological impulse that is far from Savulescu’s naïve calls for “good” 
secular philosophy. This is a post-secular landscape where theological thinking is 
                                               
55 Bishop, 2010: 705.  
56 Bishop, 2010: 707. 705-07.	
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revealed within all ethics that must admit to some moral vision that grounds the system 
of language employed within various strands of bioethics.  
 
As Heidegger’s ontotheological critique shows, a confusion exists amidst unidentified 
strands of philosophical and theological thinking. Moreover, following George Grant 
and Simone Weil, Waters comes to this same point in a differing way. Proponents of a 
posthuman future assert a “religious claim on philosophical and ideological grounds” 
by confusing the difference between necessity and goodness. Necessity represents 
normative requirements for human life such as air, water, food, movement, shelter, 
reproduction, etc., and these necessarily elements are “formative” in our cultural 
(cultus—systems of worship) habits. As this last sentence evidences, the tension 
between the ontological and theological already arises. Moreover, as Waters argues, 
necessity presents two problems in that our necessary elements (1) reveal creaturely 
finitude and temporality, and (2) these necessary elements that are acquired, used, and 
consumed are equally finite and temporal.57 Meeting the essential necessities for human 
existence and cultivating habits amidst and beyond the barest necessities are features 
we recognize in homo sapiens, and yet beyond necessity humans are moved by visions of 
the Good. Hegel and Marx stand as examples of philosophical strategists who 
synthesize the necessary and the good as historical phases and economic classes move 
forward towards realizing some greater good through dialectical progress. Attempts to 
transform necessity into goodness frequently lead to a “cavalier attitude toward evil, for 
acts of cruelty and violence are justified by historical necessity.”58  
                                               
57 Waters, 2006: 70, 69-79. 
58 Waters, 2006: 71.	
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Within this distinction of the necessary and the good we can see radical enhancement 
and transhumanism standing in opposition, even denial, to necessity. Limitations and 
inherent boundaries are aspects of the main problem for transhumanism, and if the 
solution lies in abolishing the formerly-held understanding of finite human nature, we 
may easily see where immense violence and abuse will be justified under the aegis of 
posthuman progress. With this assumed posthuman goodness emerging from necessity, 
an ambiguous telos of “some” future good, once established, will almost certainly judge 
any opposition as antiquated, sentimental conservativism.59 Indeed, this last claim is a 
full broadside against those such as Leon Kass who wish to conserve a sense of human 
dignity based on intuition of what is natural. Such appeals to “dignity” may have taken 
some rooting within a time and place where some consensus of flourishing nature 
could be found within the word. Without some more shared moral vision, however, as 
Savulescu’s critique of bioethics has already revealed, human dignity means little. 
 
                                               
59 A fundamental ambiguity lies beneath the surface of transhumanist visions. What is 
the nature of the end goal? Ray Kurzweil envisions a future Singularity by 2045 where 
technology will irreversibly transform human life into a “single mind” that will be a 
billion times more powerful than human intelligence today. This Singularity will 
simultaneously remain human yet be nonbiological. Audrey DeGray is a computer 
scientist who seeks to engineer a therapeutic, anti-aging “negligible senescence,” a 
being who does not age. Nick Bostrom focuses on philosophical arguments for radical 
enhancement. His vision of posthumanism is flexible, and his main opponents are 
natural humanists such as Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kass, and Bill McKibben who see 
humanity and nature as things to be preserved within their current boundaries. James 
Hughes focuses on social transformations that we may expect from enhancement. Cf. 
Agar, 2010. Amidst these different strategies of transhumanism, how are we to discern 
the difference between “varying prognostications that run the gamut from utopian 
dream to apocalyptic nightmare” (Waters, 2006: 69)? 
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What is meaningful is the authentic and explicit admission of theological thinking 
where a vision of the good is particular and where attempts to name “thatness” within 
ousia are not hidden within secular philosophy. Here advocates of a posthuman future 
fall short, and as they seek to further Enlightenment modes of rationality and human 
flourishing, they create an “image and likeness” of their own choosing.  
In appealing to a humanistic pedigree, transhumanists betray hidden religious 
convictions shaping their agenda, for the humanistic tradition they claim as 
their own cannot bear the heavy, transformative burden they place upon 
it…Aspiring to become posthuman is tautological, because it seeks to 
annihilate both the measure and what is measured…To assert that humans 
should become posthuman requires the invocation of a higher or transcendent 
good that trumps the anthropocentric standard…what is the source of the 
“trans” that justifies its affixation to “humanist”?60 
 
 
The fundamental issue up to this point has centered on the confused intersection of 
science, religion, and theology. Transhumanists start within purportedly neutral 
scientific reason, yet justify many of their claims on implicitly religious and theological 
grounds. Further, the Nietzschean moral vision within radical enhancement and 
transhumanism functions as a “power theology, a subtle theology of the Übermensch.”61 
A similar, inverse confusion, however, can be seen stemming from explicit theological 
figures who seek to further theological claims on scientific and technological grounds. 
Burdett points to Francis Bacon, N. F. Fedorov, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin as 
figures within Christian history stemming from the sixteenth to twentieth centuries 
who affirm technology and enhancement within their Christian visions.62 Bacon is 
often held up as a key figure within an overly simplistic narrative that sees technology 
                                               
60 Waters, 2006: 78. 
61 Bishop, 2010: 713. 
62 Burdett, 2011. 
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arising or following from the advances of the scientific method. For some, Bacon’s 
“knowledge is power” is a scientific statement that has been adopted by others in 
support of unrestrained technocratic utopias, but a closer look reveals a more nuanced, 
intermingled relationship between technology and science. Bacon’s science was 
technology, and technology and theology both lie within the heart of Bacon’s 
crystallization of the modern scientific method. The Instauratio Magna contains six 
parts—The Division of Sciences, The Novum Organon, The Phenomenon of the Universe, The 
Ladder of the Intellect, The Forerunners, and The New Philosophy—and the title likely alludes 
to the Vulgate’s instauratio or to the “restoration” of Solomon’s temple and “spiritual 
edification.” The term instauratio carries a long, multi-layered history, and yet even if 
some of Bacon’s use of the term stems from the Vulgate, we can see a typology or 
symbolism of instauration in the prophetic rebuilding of Israel as well as an 
instauration of the cosmos in the apocalypse.63 For Bacon, both supernatural and 
ecclesial means are necessary to bridge mankind’s alienation from God, and yet the 
relationship between humanity and creation operates on a different plane. On the 
natural horizon, human dominion is a capacity belonging to Adam, and the Novum 
Organon is the instrument to curb man’s temptations towards four “illusions and idols” 
of fallen human senses, personal prejudices, the marketplace, and false systems of 
belief. Bacon’s vision of instauration sought to employ information to build new 
technologies that would transform humanity “from a species confined by ancient myth 
into one that broaches upon the divine.”64 In short, the Baconian method enacts 
religion, science, and technology as powerful humans form a new “priesthood” with 
                                               
63 Whitney, 1989: 371-90. 
64 Burdett, 2011: 22, 20-25. 
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unlimited resources available within the book of creation as raw material. Knowledge is 
power within the Baconian vision, and yet this power stems from a theological vision 
of the cosmos. 
 
In a related way, Nicolai Fedorov’s ideas may have inspired to some degree the 
resurrection scene at Ilyusha’s grave in The Brother’s Karamoazov, although it does not 
seem fitting to over-align Dostoyevsky with Fedorov given Fedorov’s focus on how 
humanity may scientifically, even chemically, participate in the resurrection of the dead. 
Fedorov’s primary work, The Philosophy of the Common Task, responds to the lack of 
harmony he saw between people and nature as well as the unbrotherly tension between 
fellow human beings. He critiqued theoretical philosophers such as Kant for neglecting 
the needed “action in the world,” and he pictured death as the proper enemy of natural 
and human energies. Many of Fedorov’s scientific and cosmological notions pushed 
the known limits of his age, including weather manipulation to further crop harvests 
and circumnavigating the globe with immense cables to manipulate magnetic fields. 
Fedorov’s most notable aim, bizarrely, was to combat monophysitism by asserting that 
Christ’s human nature opens the possibility for humans to participate mechanically and 
physically in the resurrection. Trinitarian love remains the central impetus for the 
resurrection, but man’s “technological manipulation of matter” presents a synthesizing 
possibility for Fedorov. Hence “Fedorov’s entire project hinges upon the utilization of 
science and technology for the universal and material resurrection of all humanity.”65  
 
                                               
65 Burdett, 2011: 28, 25-28. 
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A third figure worth noting, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, is no stranger within writings 
on transhumanism. Here Burdett points to Teilhard’s eschatology that focuses on 
“social unification,” continued future “mechanization”—relating symbiotically 
technology and consciousness—and a heightened “vision for mankind.” Through the 
processes of “Noogenesis” mankind aims at singularity where the Noosphere is a 
collective mind of humanity. In a strong gnostic turn, Teilhard’s vision of the cosmic 
Christ entails an abandonment of the material world as the Noosphere develops into 
full maturity. Naturalistic evolution is deemed a “necessary precondition” for further 
“divinization” beyond all matter where the “Ultra-human” penultimately appears in 
glory.66 
 
These three explicit theological accounts may seem radically distinct from the implicit 
theological move within transhumanism, a move that directs the power of the will to 
order the chaos of eternal becoming and process. In reality, however, the difference 
between them is not as clear as one may expect. The accounts from Bacon, Fedorov, 
and Teilhard seek to exist within some specificity of three distinct strands and eras of 
specifically Christian theology, and yet it is an immense stretch to connect their 
technological visions of enhancement to the concerns of traditional Christian theology 
that remains grounded outside discursive rationality.67 Whereas the ancient Church 
fathers spoke of theosis or deification as the way of mankind’s participation and 
unification with the Triune God, and other authentic religions seek transcendent 
                                               
66 Burdett, 2011: 32, 29-32. 
67 Here I would understand “traditional” Christian theology as a prayerful way of life—
including the inseparable tapestry of Liturgy, mysticism, spirituality, moral rules, art, 
and more. This tradition may be seen in the conciliar and ecclesial theology of the first 
millennium Church. 
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communion with the gods and beyond human mortality, the path of transhumanism is 
a self-enacting transition or transformation of the human self where there no longer is 
a clear picture of what remains as human. Bacon, Fedorov, and Teilhard maneuver 
their theological ends around their self-authenticating visions of the posthuman in a 
way that places them well outside traditional Christianity and more in the transitional 
mode of either “self-aggrandizement” or as a cog within bio-political machinations. As 
Bishop notes:  
[O]nce we understand beings as the concatenations of forces in our 
contemporary ontology, one does not transgress, but only transcends human 
frailty. Yet, the turning of power in the human will to direct these creative 
evolutionary forces is the theological grounding of our epoch. The greater 
power of the ordering force must be brought to bear on the chaotic forces. 
Transitional beings are really directed at some other higher good, whether one’s 
own self-aggrandizement or that of a political power. Bodies, humans are 
transitory things ordered by a human will with a greater telos, and like all 
transitory things, these things will become materials to achieve that goal. If 
nothing else, our history has taught us that.68 
 
 
As the transhuman leaves behind humanity, he simultaneously remains caught between 
the idolatry of self—a self-directed, autonomous Tower of Babel for every individual—
and the external power forces that shape and remake the self into the image of the 
Zeitgeist of becoming. Bishop furthers the point by noting that Foucault’s biopolitics—
subtle forces cycling between bodies and politics—removes the real possibility of 
individuals as such seeking transformation within a free society. The “univocity of 
Being for our time is that power circulates,” which leaves transhumanism afloat amidst 
historical, social, and political willing, all the while seeking to order the chaos of 
                                               
68 Bishop, 2010: 716-17. 
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coercive forces: “power ontology becomes power theology.”69 To this we may add 
Lewis Mumford’s prophecy that the fourth stage of human-technological invention 
would lead to an evolved techno-humanity where the “practical benefits” of machines 
cannot be accepted without accepting the “moral imperatives and aesthetic forms” of 
the machine.70 Whether we trace the effects of external political and social forces, or 
the new interiority of technologized bodies, what remains evident is that radical 
enhancement and transhumanism imparts no simple narrative of “good” philosophy or 
universal principles of bioethics that are effective within secular society. The notion of 
discrete, autonomous human beings who may be cleanly furthered in their humanity by 
moral enhancements via pharmaceuticals, neural implants, or some other as yet 
unknown nanobiotechnological remedy is a phantom and impossibility. What remains 
is a philosophical and theological interplay amidst these questions that is multivalent 
and far more complex than Savulescu’s call for “good” philosophy to curb the 
immanent dangers of the environmental collapse or global terrorism.  
 
Rather, what is at stake is a matter of rival Weltanschauungen and competing theological 
modes of thinking on biology, technology, and humanity. These questions are essential 
to bioethics, and it seems increasingly likely that the future of bioethics will continue to 
embrace enhancement as therapy, regenerative medicine as traditional, and the health-
satisfaction of Juvin’s “new body” as the telos of medicine rather than the care of the 
                                               
69 Bishop, 2010: 717. 
70 Mumford, 1934: 355. Mumford’s first stage is eotechnics where water, wood, and other 
forces of nature were employed; the second stage is the paleotechnic phase marked by use 
of coal and iron in the industrial revolution; the third is the neotechnic era where 
electricity and the birth of synthetic compounds came into common usage. Our current 
biotechnological era Mumford calls the biotechnic period is denoted by a “completer 
integration of the machine with human needs and desires” (Mumford, 1934: 353).	
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sick and dying. In such a context, understanding the materialistic and scientific theology 
that centers on a posthuman god is essential to understanding bioethics. Moreover, this 
focus on theological thinking necessarily embedded within ethical thinking is a fitting 
transition to the final focus of this thesis that addresses an ethical way of seeing that 
moves beyond the conceptual confusions and coercive power forces in service to the 
posthuman god.  
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CHAPTER 6  
 
BIOS AND VIOS: A PEDAGOGICAL CHANGE TO THE FORM OF 
BIOETHICS  
 
  
The aim of this thesis has been to place Wittgenstein’s way of thinking into 
conversation with the foundations of bioethics. The majority of the argument to this 
point has been critical, and in this final chapter I turn to examine what Wittgenstein’s 
thinking may offer constructively, or redemptively, to the conversation on the 
foundations of ethics and bioethics. This constructive aim is not systematic nor will it 
seek here to offer answers to particular cases in bioethics. Wittgenstein’s constructive 
turn, rather, is relevant to the foundations of ethics and bioethics as a first-level, 
metaethics before one may pursue particular topics and instances.  
 
Moreover, the constructive turn in Wittgenstein here is theological, and in a real sense 
this last chapter is more a theological reflection that reframes ethics rather than a guide 
to practical questions and cases. This reframing is largely anthropological and 
epistemological as Wittgenstein’s ethical approach begins with noting finite human 
capacities for ethical knowing. In short, where foundational approaches to bioethics 
such as common morality or utilitarianism appear deeply confused and embedded 
within modern assumptions of Cartesian personhood and theoretical ethical 
knowledge, this chapter offers to bioethics a profoundly different, pre-modern 
approach. This chapter seeks to change the form of ethics and bioethics in two ways. In 
the first, I examine Wittgenstein’s religious point of view (RW 94) that calls upon ethics 
and bioethics to admit the existence of sacred and transcendent realities beyond 
scientific thinking and materialism. Wittgenstein may be seen in this way as one who 
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challenges modern individuals to look beyond reductionist efficient causality to see the 
world as a miracle imbued with wonder.  
 
In the second way, Wittgenstein’s thinking parallels or exhibits an ancient method of 
apophatic epistemology that guides one towards an understanding of ethics itself as a 
form of apophatic and embodied knowledge. In this way, Wittgenstein offers a way to 
change the form of our thinking, leading us towards a radically different view of ethics 
not as theoretical application of values—easily manipulated by man—but as ascetic 
formation into transcendent life and values. This change in the form of ethics is 
profound for all of life, both bios and vios: “we feel that even if all possible scientific 
questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of 
course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer” (TLP 6.52). 
 
These two concluding themes are hardly the only way to approach the foundations of 
bioethics, but these themes lie very much “within the grain” of Wittgenstein’s thinking, 
and as such these may be seen as important aspects of tracing Wittgenstein’s vision of 
ethics and life (Lebensanschauung). As a further point of relevance, I would contend that 
these themes are of sincere pedagogical importance for the teaching of ethics and 
bioethics in this postmodern era. The work of psychologist Jordan Peterson gives 
testimony to this contemporary need as he points to looming consequences when the 
moral self is governed by autonomous or scientific thinking: 
It has become more or less evident that pure, abstract rationality, for example, 
ungrounded in tradition – the rationality which defined Soviet-style 
communism from inception to dissolution – appears absolutely unable to 
determine and make explicit just what it is that should guide individual and 
social behavior…Some patterns of interpersonal interaction – which constitute 
the state, insofar as it exists as a model for social behavior – do not produce the 
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ends they are supposed to produce, cannot sustain themselves over time, or 
even produce contrary ends, devouring those who enact them and profess their 
value. Perhaps this is because planned, logical and intelligible systems fail to 
make allowance for the irrational, transcendent, incomprehensible and often 
ridiculous aspect of human character…1  
 
 
In an age where the sciences, medicine, and bio-technology are expanding rapidly in 
technical knowledge and power, bioethics may serve a pedagogical purpose as much as 
it may function as a guide and arbitrator in clinical consultations, scientific research, 
and related policy endeavors. Since the late 1960s, the literature of bioethics has raised 
foundational questions that on the one hand should be seen as variations of 
Anscombe’s withering critique: can modern moral philosophy maintain the moral 
“ought?” At the same time, these questions are distinct in that they are being taken up 
in a new field that is approaching 50 years of activity as “bioethics.” The cultural and 
social impact growth of bioethics is undeniable and does not seem to be slowing. 
Moreover, this concluding chapter addresses bioethics from the Wittgensteinian 
posture of seeking clarity, and recalling Kopelman’s analysis of bioethics as a second-
order discipline, these closing reflections address particularly the first two aspects: 
A second-order discipline has members who (1) generally do not seek to make their 
subject matter narrower; (2) envision the problems they address as complex and 
profiting from the views of people of different professions, disciplines, and 
academic fields, and seek to broaden the perspective and expertise available to 
address those problems; and (3) rely in part upon the primary professions, 
disciplines, or academic fields to set their own relational or other standards of 
competency for their members.2 
  
 
                                               
1 Peterson, 1999: 22. 
2 Kopelman, 2012: 152.  
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Considering these two aspects of a second-order discipline, Wittgenstein’s ethical 
vision serves as a reminder to bioethics to recall the deeper and mysterious nature of 
ethics. Before the proposed scientific and theoretical processes of bioethics are 
unquestionably accepted, bioethics must address the problem solvers—finite human 
beings—and the possibility of the ethical. If we accept bioethics as a second-order 
discipline, bioethics then is “constructed from” but is not “reducible to” the 
professions or fields it addresses. In this vein, the argument of this thesis is that for 
bioethics to function authentically, the meta-ethical questions that are inherently 
anthropological, epistemological, and religious must be engaged. Bioethics should not 
seek to narrow its scope or methodology within one of its existing professions or fields 
but rather to expand beyond them. Within a theological mode of bioethics, this entails 
envisioning ethics as a process for human formation within end goals and ideas on the 
Good. In short, this final chapter’s analysis is not aimed at denying the practical 
possibilities with ethical tools such as Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade’s “four-boxes” 
method3 but rather seeks to balance the popularity of such instrumental, modern 
techniques in bioethics with a reminder to examine some modes of human knowing 
relevant to bioethics. In this way, Wittgenstein’s ethical vision explored in this last 
chapter may be compared to a Socratic questioning and dialogue relevant to bioethics. 
As the quest to understand virtue comes to life through dialogue with Gorgias’ student, 
Meno, so Wittgenstein may be taken as a pedagogue amidst the perplexities (aporia) and 
puzzles (narkē) exhibited in the foundations of bioethics.  
                                               
3 Jonsen, Siegler, Winslade, 2010. This popular medical ethics tool extrapolates upon 
principlism to evaluate clinical situations based upon four criteria: medical indications, 
patient preferences, quality of life, and contextual features. 
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6.1 Identifying Scientific Bioethics: Trans-Science and the Form of Bioethics 
The inconsistency of a science professing that it can explain all human action without making value 
judgments, while the scientist’s private actions are said to be often motivated by moral motives, can be 
more simply demonstrated the other way round. If the social scientist can explain all human actions by 
value-free observations, then none of his own actions can claim to be motivated by moral values. Either 
he exempts himself from his own theory of human motivation, or he must conclude that all reference to 
moral values—or any values—are meaningless: are empty sounds. Michele Polanyi4 
 
 
For Wittgenstein, the human ambition of scientific theorizing is no small thing. 
The aim of scientific theorizing is “to solve its problems by bringing out into the open 
what once was hidden. (The ‘analysis of concepts’ is supposed to be a primary means 
to this end.)” The assumption within this process is that philosophical and ethical 
problems are inherently “logical” and hence are “solved by the discovery of objective 
and eternal philosophical (logical, conceptual) truths.”5 As has been argued in previous 
chapters, these epistemological assumptions are visible within modern ethics and 
bioethics, and the modus operandi of scientific theorizing in bioethics is to assume some 
ethical content that is held in common—i.e. common morality—and then apply those 
principles through a moral calculation (e.g., Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). Others in 
bioethics employ theoretical methods such as utilitarianism, deontology, feminism, 
professionalism, etc., and yet both common morality and theories in bioethics share a 
similar status of being suspended amidst propositions disconnected from any explicit 
ontological or theological grounding. As Anscombe, MacIntyre, Hauerwas, Engelhardt 
and others have articulated, ethics must first make sense of moral foundations before 
                                               
4 Polanyi, 1969: 34. 
5 Edwards, 1982: 112. Edwards further describes three key features of the “scientific 
model” of philosophy: 1) this model “stresses the explanatory aim of philosophy” and 
“attempts to explain particular facts or problems by the construction of general 
theories or analyses;” 2) the scientific model emphasizes discursive argumentation as 
the way through which “philosophical truths are discovered and made known;” 3) this 
model of philosophy naturally appraises philosophical claims in terms of “truth and 
falsity, plausibility and implausibility, correctness and error” (112-13).  
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pressing on with any applied ethics. Bioethics predominately ignores this, and hence 
the relevance of Wittgenstein’s call to move past scientific thinking to engage ethics 
more authentically. 
 
Moreover, the parallels between Wittgenstein’s scientific thinking and secular thinking 
are not difficult to see. Wittgenstein’s use of “scientific thinking” is technical in the 
sense of extending beyond observations with nature to the moral and ethical sphere of 
human life, and in so far as secularism seeks a generalized view from nowhere, 
scientific theorizing assumes in some sense an ethical objectivity and universality apart 
from history and narrative. In tracing Wittgenstein’s move beyond this scientific 
theorizing, we come to a religious form of thinking that stands to change drastically the 
form of bioethics.6 Before turning to Wittgenstein’s religious thinking, however, it is 
helpful to note a further element of scientific thinking on natural science that pertains 
to scientific thinking on ethics.  
 
Scientific thinking for Wittgenstein entails a broad “analysis of concepts,” and many 
today no doubt will find it difficult to accept Wittgenstein’s description of scientific 
thinking as it runs contrary to the spirit of modernity. More likely, they would agree 
with the social expectation that science primarily exists—and is capable—to remedy 
conflicts that arise between the natural world and society. Science is seen as the agent 
                                               
6 This change in the form of ethics and bioethics does not entail an immediate claim of 
a particular religious or theological tradition; such a claim, moreover, would not be 
fitting with Wittgenstein’s sincere and longstanding—yet generalized and non-
committal—interest in religion. With Wittgenstein, it seems fitting in a therapeutic way 
to first note the need for religious thinking before entering discussions of which religion 
or what theological particularity is at hand.  
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responsible for addressing practical or real-world problems, and then society itself will 
decide politically how or whether to act on the available scientific knowledge. Science 
produces some ability, and politics does or does not act on that ability. The scientist 
describes if it is possible to withdraw oil in the Antarctic while politicians decide if that 
is acceptable. Such a generalization of science and politics, as nuclear physicist Alvin 
Weinberg (1915-2006) notes, is helpful and yet “oversimplifies” the line between means 
and ends in that such an example is not exact. “What is thought to be a political or 
social end turns out to have numerous repercussions, the analysis of which must also 
be assessed in moral and political terms; or what is thought to be a scientific means has 
non-scientific implications which also must be assessed in these terms. The relationship 
between the scientist and the politician is thus far more complicated than the simple 
model described [here].”7 
 
That said, the tension or space between science and politics is helpful for making an 
important point that moves beyond simplistic explanations for science and politics 
respectively: namely, “many of the issues which arise in the course of the interaction 
between science or technology and society—e.g., the deleterious side effects of 
technology, or the attempts to deal with social problems through the procedures of 
science—hang on the answers to questions which can be asked of science and yet which 
cannot be answered by science.”8 Weinberg labels these questions that cannot be answered 
by science “trans-scientific” questions for these questions epistemologically transcend 
                                               
7 Weinberg, 1974: 210. As the leader of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (TN) and 
participant in the Manhattan Project, Weinberg was well occasioned to contemplate the 
boundaries of scientific knowledge and moral/political action.  
8 Weinberg, 1974: 210. 
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science. These questions involve facts and data and can be stated in the “language of 
science,” and yet by the nature of science these questions move beyond the possible 
answers science may offer. As an example of this, Weinberg considers the biological 
effects of low-level radiation insults on mice that scientists can correlate to acceptable 
levels of radiation exposure for the environment. The experiments and calculations on 
the scale of mice produces a probable scale or ratio for safe radiation exposure, and yet 
the assumption remains that the safe exposure for mice will correlate to a safe exposure 
rate when expanded greatly. In Weinberg’s calculation, however, to adequately test this 
scientific correlation, 8,000,000,000 (!) mice would be needed, hence rendering the 
question beyond complete scientific investigation. Similarly, calculating a probability 
equation for extremely improbable events such as the failure of the Colorado River 
Hoover Dam requires an immense series of assumptions regarding statistical 
possibilities for errors. The total probabilities and conditions—including testing ion 
chambers, transistors, control rod bearings, etc.—are so vast that testing and observing the 
conditions for failure are scientifically impossible. These observations are not to 
devalue the science behind such examples but rather to point out the inevitable 
trajectory from “pure science” to a trans-scientific thinking as the meaningful 
possibilities and implications for humanity rapidly spill over scientific equations.  
 
Weinberg continues by describing the whole of engineering as trans-science, for there 
can be no exact testing or replica of the Golden Gate bridge before it is deemed 
structurally sound. One may test smaller scale projects such as a jet engine, but the 
discernment involved with large-scale engineering is officially known as “engineering 
judgment,” and this prudence or judgment extends beyond crystalline scientific 
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knowledge neatly into Wittgenstein’s language games. Another way to see this is to 
note the line between what is “researchable” and what is “not researchable,” and how 
something is deemed scientific based on that answer. Is the contemporary fight against 
the Western obesity “epidemic,” for instance, something to be handled by science, and 
if so, what scientific or medical interventions will resolve obesity? Where does science 
begin and end when we view individuals and societies as willful, desiring, and emotive 
human beings? Consider for example Nobel Peace Prize laureate Norman Borlaug who 
has been called the father of the 1960s Green Revolution for his work in the agriculture 
and biotechnology that saw cereal production rise exponentially, offering a possible 
answer to the global hunger “crisis.” Man’s “war against hunger” is often framed as a 
biotechnological problem, and debates arise between enthusiastic agriculturalists and 
conserving environmentalists over what constitutes “sustainable agriculture.” Yet how 
much of this issue is “purely” scientific? In the 20th century, the world population 
increased three times more than in any previously known era, spiking from 1.5 to 6.1 
billion in the 20th century alone.9 Can science create a global food “model” when such a 
model must admit enormous fluidity in the factors affecting world population?10 Pure 
science cannot address the variables in future population possibilities as (nuclear) wars, 
(undiscovered) pestilence, and (genetic monoculture) famines always remain as 
possibilities. Historically these factors have been great levelers for human population, 
and contemporary Westerners in particular experience great stability and peace when 
                                               
9 Roser & Ortiz-Ospina, 2017. 
10 Borlaug testifies to the phenomenon of trans-science in terms of global hunger: 
“Most certainly, agricultural scientists have a moral obligation to warn the political, 
educational, and religious leaders about the magnitude and seriousness of the arable 
land, food, population and environmental problems that lie ahead. These problems will 
not vanish by themselves. Unless they are addressed in a forthright manner future 
solutions will be more difficult to achieve” (Borlaug, 2000).  
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measured against other times, but assuming a perpetual stasis seems the height of 
hubris and presumption. What is clear is that one must either accept the inherent limits 
of scientific knowing qua science or one must accept with faith what science indicates 
and promises but cannot quantify on its own terms.  
 
Additionally, another important example of trans-science may be seen in choices or 
values based on “priorities” within science. This was an important matter for Michele 
Polanyi who greatly cared for selection bias in scientific research. In the midst of a 
purportedly neutral and objective search for knowledge, how do we understand the 
aesthetic or social element of scientific interest or taste in research? How does this tacit 
element of human persons affect science when science is purported to be a neutral, 
objective endeavor?11 For Weinberg, this scientific choice runs parallel to the different 
styles of science—e.g., “pure verses applied, general versus particular, spectroscopy 
verses paradigm-breaking, search versus codification”—for these “scientific values” 
reflect “taste rather than scientific truth.” Additionally, this trans-scientific thinking can 
be seen as social priorities are established through scientific elements. In the case of 
Brown vs. Board (1954), for instance, Weinberg notes that the Supreme Court called 
upon a “scientific doctrine” to claim that “educational deprivation caused psychological 
damage to the individual as an important argument for its decision to order 
desegregation.”12 Science is fundamentally biased and historically conditioned. 
 
                                               
11 Polanyi, 1974.   
12 Weinberg, 1974: 214. 
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In addition to reminding us of the very personal and human borders around scientific 
thinking, trans-science aligns well with Polanyi’s “republic of science,” an establishment 
presence for science that only accepts as truth the scientific results from those with 
proper credentials. The boundaries of respectability within the republic are stringent, 
and a “corpus of science” is established by the predetermined rules. 
[The] function of professional standards in science is but the logical outcome 
of the belief that scientific truth is an aspect of reality and that the orthodoxy of 
science is taught as a guide that should enable the novice eventually to make his 
own contacts with this reality. The authority of scientific standards is thus 
exercised for the very purpose of providing those guided by it with 
independent grounds for opposing it. The capacity to renew itself by evoking 
and assimilating opposition to itself appears to be logically inherent in the 
sources of the authority wielded by scientific orthodoxy.13  
 
 
In essence, a sort of a language game is played as (1) science is proclaimed valid by 
virtue of being credentialed or “co-ordained” within the scientific, “coordinating” 
community and (2) this community is distinct as an “elite” sector within the larger 
society. Within these rules of the republic of science, only a highly credentialed scientist 
may speak on the qualities of radioactive wastes, but within the broader “republic of 
society,” for instance, any citizen—such as property owners near the waste site—may 
speak with vested interests. Again, trans-science emerges clearly in such an instance, 
and this leads to Weinberg’s call for honesty and transparency regarding this boundary. 
The dynamic line between science and trans-science is of utmost importance to identify 
not for the sake of claiming one can create a perfect model for navigating the 
immediate space on both sides of the line but rather for the sake of deflating the image 
of science as a source of truth outside quantified observations in the natural world. As 
                                               
13 Polanyi, 2000: 6.  
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scientists such as Polanyi and Weinberg attest, the nature of science itself leads one to 
the edges of science, and we are compelled to a trans-scientific mode of questioning 
that at the very least must be identified outside the “crystalline purity” of scientific 
thinking (PI 107 & 108) that so easily extends to modern philosophy as well as to 
natural science. 
 
What does this trans-scientific thinking then mean for bioethics? To answer this we 
must remember the different ethical postures that arise from different conceptions of 
how man relates to nature. For example, in a hierarchical, Aristotelian view of nature, 
we can discern a teleology whereby the nature of the world entails a just order of things 
in the world. Aristotle’s view of nature assumes a perpetual movement from 
potentiality to actuality, and this change is “intelligible” in a theological way as 
Metaphysics Lambda makes clear. Hence Bouyer notes that “becoming”—understood as 
the move from potentiality to actuality—assumes “the presence in matter of its future 
form,” and yet the form is not “already” in matter as the process of “becoming” is by 
definition dynamic. Equally, however, the forms are not existing “independently” and 
so are present “in a cosmic intelligence, visualized as ‘thinking thought’ (noesis noeseos), 
which Aristotle considers the prime mover (itself motionless) of the universe.”14 In 
other words, within an Aristotelian view of the world, it is fitting to consider ethics as a 
practice of living within the cosmos for the cosmos is orderly.15 The relationship 
between science and ethics is harmonious, and while the modes of knowing will change 
                                               
14 Bouyer, 1988: 80. 
15 Such a vision of harmony between ethics and the world can be seen respectively in 
Jahr and Potter’s articulations of bioethics as opposed to the technical emphasis for 
Hellegers.	
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depending on the scientific or moral matter being pondered, the method and end will 
be theological as science and ethics alike are co-operative within an orderly, teleological 
cosmos.  
 
By strong contrast particularly visible in the last 150 years, the predominant mythos and 
scientific narrative now denies “nature as a hierarchy” in favor of “nature in a 
taxonomic schema.” Within such a neo-Darwinian materialist world, the order or scale 
of nature is not fixed but rather exists more as a “vast and complex family-tree,” and to 
trace an ethical “ought” from within this flux one is almost inevitably left within the 
wake of Julian Huxley’s materialist-evolutionary synthesis of ethics and eugenics. 
“What Nature is, and how it has reached its present state, [Huxley] tells us as a 
biologist; and from there he goes on in his capacity as a prophet, to tell us both where 
Nature is going and more…that it is our job to help her along.” 16  Within an 
Aristotelian or teleological framework, the trans-scientific border would lead a 
bioethicist to seek harmony, perhaps in the spirit of Ravaisson or Jahr; the whole of 
biological nature is animated and imbued from within by a meaningful ethical purpose. 
                                               
16 Toulmin, 1982: 56. Toulmin goes on to quote Huxley at length to demonstrate how 
he progresses from science to ethics: “When we look at evolution as a whole, we find, 
among the many directions which it has taken, one which is characterized by 
introducing the evolving world-stuff to progressively higher levels of organization and 
so to new possibilities of being, action, and experience. This direction has culminated 
in the attainment of a state where the world-stuff (now moulded into human shape) 
finds that it experiences some of the new possibilities as having values in and form 
themselves; and further that among these it assigns higher and lower degrees of value, 
the higher values being those which are more intrinsically or more permanently 
satisfying, or involve a greater degree of perfection…we can say that this is the most 
desireable direction of evolution, and accordingly that our ethical standards must fit into its 
dynamic framework. In other words, it is ethically right to aim at whatever will 
promote the increasingly full realization of increasingly higher values” (Huxley as 
quoted in Toulmin, 1982: 59). 
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Within the new mythos of flux, when one moves beyond the borders of science, the 
result is a turn to dialectic process and the will to power. 
 
Trans-science draws out that science is inherently limited in what it may suggest ought to 
be done in light of what it observes is true in nature, and one’s view of nature is of the 
greatest importance in this equation. Moreover, this brings us to a critical point: in a 
real sense, bioethics can mute the border within Weinberg’s trans-science when 
bioethics is adopted as a confirming “moral stamp” upon some human subjects 
research, clinical trial, or some other scientific activity. Bioethics that ignores biopolitics 
veils the implication of Polanyi’s “republic of science” that science is hardly as neutral 
and objective as many expect. In other words, the chief danger Weinberg and Polanyi 
both identify is to expect or ask too much from science, and then the stakes are raised 
when bioethics helps cover over the transition from what science can and cannot say.  
 
Ironically, amidst this debate on how to frame our approach to nature, it can seem 
“natural” to follow a scientific mode of thinking with natural science into a similar 
scientific mode of thinking with ethics—seeking analysis of ethical concepts, pursuing 
ethical matters as logical problems to be solved. This is precisely a methodological 
extension from modern science into modern ethics. Post-Baconian modern science 
seeks technical power by discovering objective and eternal physical truths, and 
bioethics can enact the same hubris by seeking moral, universal principles.17 Weinberg’s 
                                               
17 This view assumes (1) that the fundamental reality of the world is comprised of 
material objects, and (2) bioethics then applies the methods of materialism as the way 
to approach morality as though moral “truths” correlate to material “objects.” The 
irony is that a materialist, objectivist view of the world hardly supports inherently any 
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trans-science hence can serve as a significant parallel representation for scientific 
thinking with morality and bioethics, and the problem of bioethics expertise discussed 
earlier in this thesis is a perpetual reminder that something is off. The presumed 
“clarity of science” view is flawed, and the presumed clarity of ethical transcendentals 
or intuitions equally falls short. How does one justify expertise in moral theories when 
the foundation for these theories is unknown? Weinberg quotes the late Professor 
Harold Laski to make a similar point: 
Special knowledge and the highly trained mind produce their own 
limitations…Expertise sacrifices the insight of common sense to intensity of 
experience…It has a certain cast-spirit about it, so that experts tend to neglect 
all evidence which does not…belong to their own ranks…[and] where human 
problems are concerned, the expert fails to see that every judgment he makes 
not purely factual in nature brings with it a scheme of values which has no 
special validity about it.18 
 
The primary point is that the scientist can have no “monopoly” on wisdom or moral 
knowledge in trans-science, and in the same way, we may question how the scientific 
moralist can justify any claim to “wisdom” when the grounding of bioethics is scientific 
theorizing. However, noting these limits is not a suitable ending point. Admitting these 
limits is a therapeutic threshold and point of transition for further examining a holistic 
and cooperative ethics (and science!). Following Wittgenstein’s gestures, a move 
beyond scientific thinking invites us to embrace an anthropology and theology where 
humans are embodied beings imbued with wonder and moral purpose in a divinely 
energized cosmos. Whereas an ethics by scientific thinking is conceptually inferred and 
                                                                                                                                    
understanding of moral values. The animal kingdom within nature exhibits a law of 
instinct and factual realities whereby some dominant males eat their young offspring, 
and survival is an absolute life reality, not a value that may undergird beauty, goodness, 
humility, and mercy.	
18 Weinberg, 1974: 222. 
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calculated from within a theoretical paradigm of purportedly objective and eternal 
truths, ethics as an aesthetic or mystical mode of thinking is embodied and experiential. 
The former is discursive and transcendental in its rationality whereas the latter may be 
seen as ascetic and incarnational in its rationality.  
 
 
 
6.2 Beyond Scientific Bioethics: Wittgenstein’s Religious Way of Thinking 
I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view (RW, 
94). 
 
Believing means submitting to an authority. Having once submitted, you can’t then, without rebelling 
against it, first call it into question and then once again find it acceptable (CV 45e). 
 
Here at this point, we can return to Wittgenstein’s constructive vision that 
moves past the trappings of scientific thinking, and for Wittgenstein this move 
interweaves non-theoretical ethics with religious thinking. This is not to say that 
Wittgenstein is an effective guide for seeking a particular, richly dogmatic theological 
ethics. Rather, the figure of Wittgenstein—his thinking and lived life—presents a 
pedagogical example well suited to the discussions surrounding the foundations of 
ethics and bioethics. Wittgenstein remains a religious generalist who presents puzzles 
and practices of clarity to deflate scientific thinking. For whatever the biographical 
reasons we may know or suspect, Wittgenstein seemed unable to move beyond his 
prescribed practices of clarity such that even while admitting that the framework or end 
of his philosophical practices is the mystical (T 6.522, 6.53), he did not seem to apply 
the hints of the transcendent within his writings to find some form of personal, 
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spiritual conclusions. 19  Thus far in this thesis, Wittgenstein’s critique has been 
prominent, and yet the whole of that critique belongs within “the fundamental 
intention of Wittgenstein’s thinking…to incarnate a vision of the healthy human life; 
the transmission of a moral vision.”20 Moreover, in a real sense, this moral and religious 
vision is a poetic and ascetic endeavor as Wittgenstein seeks to move past re-presenting 
the world in theoretical language but rather to present the world and to live in it. 
Edwards draws attention to this Heideggerian connection in Wittgenstein: 
The world—manifold, indefinitely various, self-concealing, and self-revealing—
is there in the poems itself, but not literally in the images that constitute them. 
The poet wants to present the world not re-present it. He wants to get us to see 
ourselves in all our seeing, to break the grip of the self-forgetfulness of 
representation. The poet’s images are not statements; they are reminders, 
reminding us, putting us in touch with all the images through which we see, 
deliteralizing our perceptions.21 
                                               
19 Kallenberg reminds us of the importance in considering Wittgenstein’s lived life as a 
way to read his writings in the right spirit, and Kallenberg especially points to 
Wittgenstein’s “hermetic existence, the giving away of his share of the family fortune, 
his serious consideration of becoming a priest or monk, his retreat from academics to 
teach schoolchildren in Austria” all as features that help explain long-standing 
attraction to the Christian gospel as he encountered it through Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief.  
Much, much more stands to be considered in theological terms of what might 
constitute communion with the mystical, but for Wittgenstein it is clear that much of 
his life—at least since 1914—was lived searching (Kallenberg, 2001: 172). Consider 
also Wittgenstein’s own words in Culture and Values: “What inclines even me to believe 
in Christ’s Resurrection? It is as though I play with the thought. – If he did not rise 
from the dead, then he decomposed in the grave like any other man. He is dead and 
decomposed. In that case he is a teacher like any other and can no longer help; and once 
more we are orphaned and alone. So we have to content ourselves with wisdom and 
speculation. We are in a sort of hell where we can do nothing but dream, roofed in, as 
it were, and cut off from heaven. But if I am to be REALLY saved, – what  I need is 
certainty – not wisdom, dreams or speculation – and this certainty is faith. And faith is 
faith in what is needed by my heart, my soul, not my speculative intelligence. For it is my 
soul with its passions, as it were with its flesh and blood that has to be saved, not my 
abstract mind” (CV 33). Likewise, Monk’s biography offers many helpful insights into 
Wittgenstein’s influences and fascinations with music, poetry, duty, sexuality, 
Catholicism, monasticism, etc. See especially Monk 1990: 3-27; 551-575. 
20 Edwards, 1982: 203. 
21 Edwards, 1982: 214, 203-16. Edwards continues to note that the later Wittgenstein’s 
“philosophical therapy is not exactly poetry” but rather that “both flow from the same 
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This poetic dimension in Wittgenstein further reinforces the need to understand the 
whole of his life and work. Wittgenstein noted that “the philosophical remarks in [the 
Philosophical Investigations] are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were 
made in the course of these long and meandering journeys” (PI p. 3e).  His work is an 
“ethical deed” and an aid both to “thinking and living,” and the point that draws all of 
this human understanding together is Wittgenstein’s regard for das Mystiche and the 
essentially religious thinking that is needed to engage sublime truth beyond the scientific. 
For Wittgenstein, scientific thinking within limits is hardly problematic, and as one who 
studied and valued engineering and architecture, we should not take a simplistic view of 
Wittgenstein. As with trans-science, however, the problem arises when scientific 
thinking progresses beyond its natural sphere and misses the proper religious mode of 
thinking for truths that transcend quantitative observations. Hence in PI 110 it is ironic 
that Wittgenstein points out that “superstitions” are found in metaphysical 
philosophers who seek theoretical truths out of the forms of language, assuming a 
“depth” of meaning where it is not present. “The problems arising through a 
misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth” (PI 111), and in 
this way superstition arises not in ritual, religious practice but rather in metaphysical 
philosophy. As Edwards notes, ritual sees and appreciates a broad and deep Pathos 
(impressiveness and formation) within liturgical or traditional actions whereas the 
metaphysical philosopher thinks reductively by claiming ritual as mere superstition. 
                                                                                                                                    
deliteralizing sensibility. The metaphysical philosopher is susceptible to being captured 
by grammatical pictures interpreted as literal representations of the superfacts 
underlying language. To be freed from such captivity it is necessary to be freed from 
the literalizing sensibility that promotes it” (214).  
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Hence, in the presence of das Mystiche, the scientific philosopher’s pathological 
superstition is to seek an explanation by drawing on a mental reservoir of assumed 
meaning (BB 143) whereas the ritual commoner responds with deep mythos.22 
 
For Wittgenstein, it is pathological to create explanations via philosophical language to 
explain the world before us. “It is not how things are in the world that is mystical (das 
Mystiche), but that it exists” (T 6.44), and this religious point is intimately connected to 
ethics. The scientist views the world as a series of “facts” whereas the ethical view of 
the world is to view it as a miracle.  
And there, in my case [when seeking absolute or ethical value] it always 
happens that the idea of one particular experience presents itself to me which 
therefore is, in a sense, my experience par excellence…I believe the best way of 
describing it is to say that when I have it I wonder at the existence of the world. And I 
am then inclined to use such phrases as “how extraordinary that anything 
should exist” or “how extraordinary that the world should exist” (LE 10-11).  
 
…it is absurd to say “Science has proved that there are no miracles.” The truth 
is that the scientific way of looking at a fact is not the way to look at it as a 
miracle (LE 16-17).  
 
 
Calling attention to science, miracles, and ritual, Wittgenstein seeks to turn the form of 
our thinking from philosophical propositional thinking to a type of religious thinking 
that we can now investigate more fully. 23 Here it is helpful to consider Norman 
                                               
22 Even the tossing of spilled salt is an occasion to note the difference between the 
scientific materialist who cries “superstition!” and the ritualist who sees Pathos. 
“Perhaps in this case the Pathos is connected to our awareness of salt as savor and 
preserver: as easily as we carelessly let spill these valuable crystals, so easily can we let 
spill the things that give our life savor and that preserve us from spoilage; and the 
throwing ritual is a way of acknowledging our carelessness and our determination to do 
better. But whatever the source of the Pathos, the important consideration is that in the 
ritual is a response to some deep feeling” (Edwards, 1982: 232).  
23 Drawing attention to the religious dimensions in Wittgenstein is not a new 
suggestion, and yet the goal in tracing this religious thinking is to examine a pattern of 
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Malcolm’s four analogies between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and religious thinking. 
After reviewing Malcolm’s analogies below, I will then probe further into Malcolm’s 
first analogy by contrasting “intellectualism” with religious thinking, and in the third 
point I draw attention to the way that Wittgenstein’s thinking does not inaugurate a 
theoretical philosophy of religion but rather supports an important pre-modern view of 
reasoning in relation to authority.  
 
For Wittgenstein’s follower Malcolm, Wittgenstein’s philosophical outlook is analogous 
to religious thinking. Malcolm does not see a “resemblance” between the two, but 
rather sees analogies particularly, the first of which relates to “explanation,” or how 
explanation “reaches a limit, and when pressed further loses its sense.”24 The term 
explanation here is key for the way that it relates to Wittgenstein’s critique of 
philosophy as a seemingly limitless process of scientific theorizing. Wittgenstein reacted 
strongly against the idea that philosophy is capable of explaining everything and believed 
that in place of endless “rational justification” that philosophy should be seen within 
                                                                                                                                    
thinking that is relevant for the foundations of ethics and bioethics. “It is almost 
platitudinous to state that there is a profound religious dimension to the work of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, this attribution of a religious quality may seem 
bizarre when one is confronted with his two masterpieces – Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
and Philosophical Investigations – which seem to have little application to life, let alone to 
affairs of the spirit. Yet Wittgenstein’s work became associated with religion when 
sympathetic philosophers applied his notions of ‘language-games’ and ‘forms of life’ to 
religious belief and practice. Closer attention to Wittgenstein’s philosophy (and how he 
perceived it) then revealed that much of his writing was conditioned by religious 
considerations” (Clack, 1999: 3). Further, others move beyond Wittgenstein’s allusions 
and passing comments on Christianity in particular to draw strong parallels and 
conclusions between Wittgenstein’s thought and Christian theological discourses 
proper (cf. Barrett, 1991 and Labron, 2009). General, analogical thinking may be 
helpful, but theological particularity certainly does not stem from Wittgenstein himself. 
24 Malcolm, 1994: 84. 
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the context of gift.25 As God grants the gift of faith—a gift yielding its own rationality 
or internal logic, so to speak—the expectations for rationality shift from a discourse of 
physical and material causality to the language of acknowledging God’s will whatever 
that may be. Acknowledging that “God wills it” is not to say that such is a sufficient, 
final answer, say, to Job’s suffering; such words are not uttered as an “explanation” for 
Job’s suffering but rather as a functioning language to address some profound, 
unexplainable state of reality, and within a Wittgensteinian way this reality may be 
called the nature or form of the matter (PI 654). Malcolm notes: “The function of the 
words, ‘It is God’s will’, when said religiously and seriously, in time of trouble, is not to 
offer the final explanation at all. Instead, they are an attempt to bring to an end the 
torment of asking ‘Why did it have to happen?’ – an attempt to give the tormented one 
rest, to provide peace.”26  
 
Malcolm’s aim with the example of suffering is to illustrate the fundamental need “to 
accept” the way many things are. This is not a call to omit critical thinking and 
reflection on mysterious realities,27 but rather to note the mystery that pervades reality 
and alters our mode and approach for knowing reality. Malcolm’s point draws attention 
                                               
25 Malcolm, 1994: 84. 
26 Malcolm, 1994: 86. 
27 Though not necessarily an attempt to short cut critical thinking where it is due, I will 
discuss further below the tendency in Malcolm’s first analogy to promote a validation 
of belief because philosophical explanation is inherently flawed, or to assert that “religion 
is a form of life” that disallows those outside the form of life to carry on rational 
discussions with those inside, say, Christian religion. This latter “Wittgensteinian 
fideism” is problematic if for no other reason than it often serves as a caricature and 
misses the point of Wittgenstein’s Lebensformen. Cf. Kerr, 1997: 28-31; Incandela, 2004: 
33-35.  
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to the theme of “description” over “explanation” throughout the Philosophical 
Investigations. 
Wittgenstein regarded the language-games, and their associated forms of life, as 
beyond explanation. The inescapable logic of this conception is that the terms 
‘explanation’, ‘reason’, ‘justification’, have a use exclusively within the various 
language-games. The word ‘explanation’ appears in many language-games, and 
is used differently in different games. My explanation of my motive, for 
example, is a different conception of ‘explanation’ from my explanation of your 
motive. An explanation of why your car won’t start will be radically different in 
kind from an explanation of why a friend of yours is avoiding you. 
 
An explanation is internal to a particular language-game. There is no explanation 
that rises above our language games, and explains them. This would be a super-
concept of explanation – which means that it is an ill-conceived fantasy.”28 
 
 
In this way Wittgenstein’s language games are analogous to religious thinking that 
humbly accepts facts or reality as the “way things are,” and this attitude carries 
implications not only for the limits of philosophy but also for natural science and 
medicine. For instance, are we “explaining” reality when stating that gravity is the force 
that draws bodies to fall towards the earth, or are we—in certain words within a 
concrete language-game—describing one way of addressing this reality? Are we 
explaining the reality of the body and cancer when discovering that a certain 
chemotherapy slows down the spread of the cancer? Likewise, Malcolm questions what 
we can explain essentially about the existence of sports, or of musical composition.29 
“Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to regard the facts as 
‘proto-phenomena’. That is, where we ought to say: this is the language game that is being 
played” (PI 654). Viewed in this way, Wittgenstein’s language games are less susceptible 
to charges of asserting reality that is ontologically “created” by language games—a sort 
                                               
28 Malcolm, 1994: 77-78. 
29 Malcolm, 1994: 85. 
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of philosophical metaphysics from grammar—for the simple reason that language 
games are a description, and description is a polyphonic way of engaging reality. A 
scientific language game is hardly “flawed” for its particular attention to natural 
phenomena but rather for its tendency in modernity to claim exclusive explanations of 
the essence of a thing supposedly hidden somewhere “behind” or “within” the thing 
(PI 435-43). “The truth is that the scientific way of looking at a fact is not the way to 
look at it as a miracle” (LE 17). Likewise, logic is problematic when the “hardness of 
the logical must” trumps all other modes of apprehending reality (PI 437). Language 
games are not an exhaustive philosophical structure or metaphysical grounding but 
function more in a critical way for understanding some of the ways things are as they 
simply unfold in human ways of language and descriptions of reality.  
 
Building upon Malcolm’s analogy, we may align Wittgenstein’s language games as 
religious thinking with patterns of Patristic economic language in seeking to understand 
the incarnation.  Without anticipating too much the discussion to follow below on 
apophasis, here we do well to remember the distinction between theology proper 
(theologia) that seeks union with God particularly in asceticism, prayer, and liturgy and 
economic theology that contemplates and speculates on the Scriptural and other 
descriptions of Christ. The sufferings of the divine Word in Christ are rightly spoken 
of according to the economy (kat’ oikonomian) whereas such language would be 
blasphemous “according to the deity” (kata theoteten).30 To be sure, the reference point 
for Wittgenstein’s language games is far from the particular Trinitarian language of 
Patristic theological discourse, and yet Malcolm’s first analogy draws attention to the 
                                               
30 McGuckin, 2004: 112. 
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way Wittgenstein’s clarifying language games escape philosophical metaphysics by 
adhering to a religious mystery that might truly ground philosophical thinking.31 All 
language, contemplative descriptions, and other claims exist in a suspended, 
relationship according to the economy of this mystery. Wittgenstein never names the 
mystery with dogmatic particularity, but the important thing to note is the pattern of 
his thought that pushes beyond the secular to the religious, allowing for a type of 
authentic philosophical thinking and language as description rather than explanation of 
das Mystiche. 
 
Malcolm’s second analogy furthers the first by focusing on the sense of “wonder” that 
properly arises from “seeing the world as a miracle” (LE 17).  Beyond scientific, 
cosmological, theoretical speculations regarding “the first state” of the universe, 
Wittgenstein recognized a deeper layer of questions that science cannot address: 
namely, why anything exits at all.32 The only proper stance to those questions of deepest, 
theological meaning for Wittgenstein is wonder. “Man has to awaken to wonder—and 
so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again” (CV 5). 
Moreover, Malcolm does not hesitate to point out the relationship between that 
profound, cosmological wonder and the wonder of certain language games. 
In the Investigations and other late writings, Wittgenstein sometimes expressed a 
kind of wonder at the existence of the various language-games and their 
                                               
31 Wittgenstein’s use of the term “metaphysics” carries a technical meaning: 
“‘metaphysical’ indicates an invalid move within a language game—an attempt to 
express what can either not be expressed at all, or not in the given way. Such futile 
efforts, according to Wittgenstein, spring from misunderstanding the grammar of our 
language. The dualist construal of sensation as a mental object is the product of 
misunderstanding the grammar of the mental and an example of such (bad) 
‘metaphysics’” (Sidiropoulou, 2015: 58-59, fn. 11). 
32 Malcolm, 1994: 87. 
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contained forms of human action and reaction. ‘Let yourself be struck by the 
existence of such a thing as our language game of: confessing the motive of my 
action’ (PI, p. 224).33 
 
 
It is important to note that Malcolm’s point on Wittgenstein’s wonder does not mean 
that language games themselves are in some way sacred, but rather that the religious 
sense of seeing the world as a miracle and a gift opens the way for philosophical 
conceptions that embrace simple and profound astonishment. In a poetic way, 
Wittgenstein states: “Now I am tempted to say that the right expression in language for 
the miracle of the existence of the world, though it is not any proposition in language, 
is the existence of language itself” (LE 17).34 The point is to accept a feeling of wonder 
and religious sense of miracles within philosophical activities. The practices of language 
owe much to wonder as a way to move beyond communication as a bare mechanism: 
I’d like to say: you regard it much too much as a matter of course that one can 
communicate anything to anyone. That is to say, we are so much accustomed 
to communicating in speech, in conversation, that it looks to us as if the whole 
point of communicating lay in this: that someone else grasps the sense of my 
words—which is something mental—that he, as it were, takes it into his own 
mind. If he then does something further with it as well, that is no part of the 
immediate purpose of language (PI 363). 
 
 
The third analogy is one Malcolm nuances so as not to overstate. It is an analogy 
between the sickness of the spirit—a religious concern—and the intellectual diseases of 
theoretical philosophy. The commonality in both is a view that “something is wrong 
                                               
33 Malcolm, 1994: 87. 
34 On a related note, Wittgenstein saw philosophy done well as a “poetic composition”: 
“I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really 
to be written only as a poetic composition [Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur DICHTEN]. It 
must, as it seems to me, be possible to gather from this how far my thinking belongs to 
the present, future or past. For I was thereby also revealing myself as someone who 
cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do (CV 24). 
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with us,” and this view of an “illness” and “disease” (Krankheit) informs the activities of 
religion and philosophy for Wittgenstein.35 Deep within the practice, thinking, and 
emotions of religion must be some recognition of human imperfection and need for 
healing from some ancestral sickness. Within philosophy, a similar motivation prompts 
a search for explanations, and the process goes awry when we search for explanations 
from a sort of metaphysical “reservoir” from which flow reasons and rationale. 
Malcolm notes that: 
This same movement of philosophical thinking is sometimes described by 
Wittgenstein as the postulating of ‘intermediary steps’. 
We are treating here of cases in which, as one might roughly put it, the 
grammar of a word seems to suggest the ‘necessity’ of a certain 
intermediary step, although in fact the word is used in cases in which 
there is no such intermediary step. Thus we are inclined to say: ‘A 
person must understand an order before he obeys it’, ‘He must know 
where his pain is before he can point to it’, ‘He must know the tune 
before he can sing it’, and suchlike.  
(BB, p. 130) 
The craziness of much of philosophical theorizing comes from yielding to the 
temptation to explain everyday actions, reactions, abilities, by inventing 
‘reservoirs’ of mental states, intermediary steps, underlying mechanisms.36 
 
 
For Wittgenstein, a philosopher must fight hard against seeking to invent “hidden 
states” or “processes” to explain what only may be described. “The philosopher treats 
a question; like an illness” (PI 255), and “Our illness is this, to want to explain” (RF 
333). Therapeutic philosophy for Wittgenstein is an activity that begins with a desire 
for healing, and this is contrasted with the ambition to uncover a non-existent, 
autonomous metaphysical reservoir. Therapeutic philosophy exists with a formative, 
                                               
35 Malcolm, 1994: 87-90. 
36 Malcolm, 1994: 88. 
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ascetic purpose aimed at a final good, and such a philosophy blurs the lines with 
theological thinking. 
 
The fourth analogy addresses what we might call Wittgenstein’s concern with natural 
theology. Wittgenstein saw little value in intellectual proofs for God’s existence, and 
this led him typically to emphasize the role of acting and doing rather than reasoning 
and interpreting. Hence Malcolm supposes that Wittgenstein would very much have 
favored St. James’ particular message that “Faith, without works, is dead” (James 2: 
17).37  When speaking once with M. O’C. Drury on the latter’s intentions to seek 
ordination, Wittgenstein cautioned Drury against a way of thinking in many parsons 
that—along with Bertrand Russell—had “done infinite harm, infinite harm.” 
Wittgenstein explained: 
I would be afraid that [Drury] would try and give some sort of philosophical 
justification for Christian beliefs, as if some sort of proof was needed. You 
have intelligence; it is not the best thing about you, but it is something you 
mustn’t ignore. –The symbolisms of Catholicism are wonderful beyond words. 
But any attempt to make it into a philosophical system is offensive (RW 117). 
 
 
In that same conversation, Wittgenstein urged Drury not to forget the existence of the 
Eastern Orthodox Church and remarked that there had only been “two great writers in 
Europe of recent times, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky” (RW 117). What is common 
amongst these strands of thought is Wittgenstein’s aim to see actions and deeds 
existing primarily “at the base of our concept of human being, of a being with mind 
and soul.” Continuing on with the point, Malcolm notes Wittgenstein’s persistent 
attempt “to locate the basis of our concepts in pre-linguistic, pre-rational actions and 
                                               
37 Malcolm, 1994: 90. 
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reactions. It is not from intuitions, nor convictions, nor any kind of reasoning, that our 
language-games emerge—but from ‘our acting’” (OC 204). 38  In short, Malcolm’s 
analogies draw out a vision of Wittgenstein as a philosopher of meaningful, ascetic or 
formative embodiment who employs a critique of autonomous theorizing where 
religious thinking is more fitting.    
 
Moreover, here it is helpful to return to Malcolm’s first analogy as a way to contrast 
“intellectualism” with religious thinking, especially in reference to Wittgenstein’s 
Remarks on Frazier’s Golden Bough. In this work Wittgenstein does not hide his 
dissatisfaction in secular theorizing about religious modes of knowing. To reduce the 
depth of religious rituals and myths into explanatory theories is to miss the depth of 
religious thinking. Frazer’s secular presupposition is that religious and magical views of 
mankind share a bald commonality: both are erroneous before the primacy of science 
and naturalism (RF 119). Wittgenstein challenges Frazer’s secular sociology:  
Was Augustine in error, then, when he called on God on every page of the 
Confessions? But—one might say—if he was not in error, surely the Buddhist 
holy man was—or anyone else—whose religion gives expression to completely 
different views. But none of them was in error, except when he set forth a 
theory (RF 119). 
 
In a real sense, Wittgenstein is operating within a religious mode that runs directly 
contrary to religious studies, at least religious studies understood as the normativizing 
and theorizing of religious rituals from the vantage point of the secular academy. To 
seek out the “aims” and rationale for rituals is to miss the nature of what we may call 
Wittgenstein’s anthropology of homo ritualis (RF 129).39 
                                               
38 Malcolm, 1994: 92. 
39 Cf. Kerr, 1997: 69-76, 156-60. 
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Burning in effigy. Kissing the picture of one’s beloved. That is obviously not 
based on the belief that it will have some specific effect on the object which the 
picture represents. It aims at satisfaction and achieves it. Or rather: it aims at 
nothing at all; we just behave this way and then we feel satisfied (RF 123). 
 
 
Wittgenstein laments Frazer’s simpleton thought that savages did not think technically 
and scientifically when facing technical needs: “The same savage, who stabs the picture 
of his enemy apparently in order to kill him, really builds his hut out of wood and 
carves his arrow skillfully and not in effigy” (RF 125). Wittgenstein’s aim here is to 
change the form of how Frazer and other theorists see scientific and technological 
thinking within a dualistic schema of (mechanistic) “reality” vs. magical, superstitious 
mythos. One of Frazer’s chief downfalls, for Wittgenstein, is not the lack of a spiritual 
life, but rather the “narrowness” of his spiritual life that moves in accord with the self-
proclaimed superiority of Victorian cultural secularism. “As a result: how impossible it 
was for him to conceive of a life different from that of the England of his time! Frazer 
cannot imagine a priest who is not basically a present-day English parson with the same 
stupidity and dullness” (RF 125). The great irony is that Wittgenstein sees Frazer’s 
clinical intellectualism as the more pernicious savagery: 
Frazer is much more a savage than most of his savages, for they are not as far 
removed from the understanding of a spiritual matter as a twentieth-century 
Englishman. His explanations of primitive practices are much cruder than the 
meaning of these practices themselves (RF 131). 
 
 
Wittgenstein further notes that Frazer’s explanations are but one possible way of 
assembling the reality of the matter, and Frazer is limited by subjugating all other 
transcendent myths and contexts under the temporal hypothesis of his one scientific 
theory that inevitably hinges on some “secret law” (RF 133). Hence, Frazer’s 
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condescending assessment of religious rituals and magic is not that they are entirely 
devoid of rationality, but rather that they exhibit a childish rationality that has yet to 
mature. As Clack describes it, “the central tenet of Frazer’s account is clear: both magic 
and religion are elementary and erroneous theories of the nature of the universe, 
pathfinders for science.”40 With this presupposition in mind, the essence of Frazer’s 
religion becomes its theoretical foundation—whatever theory that may be—and all 
rituals become practices to be quantified and measured according to the presumed 
theory at hand.  
 
Here we can discern a connection between rituals and ethics for within the secular 
paradigm both fall prey to reductivism under the mantle of “theoretical application.” 
The progression from theory to ritual or from theory to ethics both draw upon a 
Cartesian tradition of “mentalist-individualist” anthropology.41 In contrast, as Kerr 
points out, Wittgenstein draws attention to the animality rather than to res cogitans of 
human beings, and as an example of this, Kerr suggests that this embodied focus 
carries implications for the status of embryos for research and abortion. Whereas Peter 
Singer challenges the rights of human embryos—lacking full mental capacities, perhaps 
consciousness—above other conscious animals on the grounds that we lack “evidence” 
that embryos experience pain, Kerr proposes a Wittgensteinian consideration where 
Lebensformen as the natural a priori for human existence alters the form of the debate.  
The embryo already exists in the closest relationship of physical dependence on 
an adult member of our species. Our being human has to be redescribed as our 
being animals of a certain kind, sharing from the beginning certain possibilities 
of interaction and response at the very physical level of vital functions. 
                                               
40 Clack, 1999a: 11. 
41 Kerr, 1997: 174. 
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Paradoxically enough, the more animal we remember ourselves to be, the 
weightier the theological objections to abortion and embryo experimentation 
might become.42 
 
 
The third point that exemplifies Wittgenstein’s religious way of thinking brings us to 
the matter of authority, and here it is relevant to clarify a point related to Malcolm’s 
first analogy. Drawing out features of Wittgenstein’s attitude towards explanation, 
Malcolm states that “religious practice itself is a language-game,”43 and we do well, 
following Incandela, to note the tendency in Malcolm and others to hold up one 
element of Wittgenstein’s thinking—in this instance, language games—as an 
ontological grounding of some sort. 44  Incandela compares this misapplication of 
Wittgenstein to readings of Aquinas’ Five Ways as “proofs” or reasons for God 
“before one believes in God.” The difference here lies between two viewpoints of 
Aquinas’ Five Ways: in the first, the Five Ways are a “requirement” of discursive 
reasoning that is antecedent to faith; in the second, the Five Ways are a postcedent 
practice of “retrospective justification.”45 For Incandela, much is at stake here, for if 
one reads Aquinas in the former way, Aquinas becomes a type of philosopher relying 
                                               
42 Kerr, 1997: 176-77. 
43 Malcolm, 1994: 85. 
44 As an example of how some read Wittgenstein’s Lebensformen for ontological 
grounding, Saidel compares Agamben’s understanding of Lebensformen from that of 
Wittgenstein. “…Agamben reads [Wittgenstein on the difficulties of speaking of ethics 
or wonder in theoretic language], maintaining that what Wittgenstein calls ‘the mystical’ 
is not a psychic reality beyond language, but infancy: the only possible non-linguistic 
(and so pre-subjective) experience for human beings as the transcendental condition of 
the acquisition of language. What Agamben is trying to do is to turn what has been 
thought in Cacciari’s reading of Wittgenstein as a negative foundation (the mystical, 
sygetics) as a positive condition of pure potentiality he names infancy” (Saidel, 2014: 163-
86).  
45 Incandela, 2004: 32. In articulating this point, Incandela points especially to ch. 4 of 
Victor Preller’s Divine Science and the Science of God (2015). 
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upon formal arguments “apart from a distinctively Christian telos, rather than a 
theologian who appealed to the authority of God, and hence the gratuity of God in 
revealing and redeeming, to bring all things under and to Christ.”46 In a comparable 
way, language games may be misapplied to justify religion or to deconstruct philosophy 
“to make room” for faith. Contesting this shallow reading, Incandela and Clack 
amongst others have argued against extending language games into a philosophy of 
religion when Wittgenstein surely would have contested such a systematic 
construction.47 Rather than reading Wittgenstein systematically—risking the frictionless 
pseudo-objectivity he frequently contested (PI 107)—we ought to remember 
Wittgenstein’s call for the philosopher to assemble “reminders for a particular 
purpose” (PI 127). In this spirit, we can see that much of Wittgenstein’s purpose is 
aimed at therapeutic reminders in this scientific age of the impossibility of “ideal 
exactitude given to us a priori” for “at different times we have different ideals of 
exactitude; and none of them is supreme” (CV 37e). In place of such exactitude, 
Wittgenstein points to finitude, contingency, and the end of justification (PI 217) as 
essential qualities that apply to scientific, philosophical, and theological modes. Hence 
Incandela notes a problem: 
[T]hose who use Wittgenstein for some wholesale justification of religious 
belief have not followed him in abandoning that project. Nor, despite 
appearances, have the attempts to insulate religious belief from criticism by 
hermeneutically sealing it into separate language-games or forms of life. The 
quest for universal intelligibility does not disappear with such attempts. It just 
gets franchised out, with each franchise sharing the values of the parent 
                                               
46 Incandela, 2004: 32. 
47 Cf. Clack, 1999b: 78-105 & Incandela, 2004. Incandela summarizes: “When Aquinas 
and Wittgenstein are used to resolve various epistemological crises, they inevitably get 
misread. It’s like doing a spell check on a text of a play. The point lies not in a scrutiny 
of a sort that its authors would regard as peculiar. The point lies in the performance” 
(44-45).  
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company, but now imbued with its own local flavor and insisting on its own 
autonomy.48 
 
 
As some seek to justify religion after Wittgenstein’s critique of language, they almost 
surely remain grounded in the mode of critique that Wittgenstein himself saw as a 
practice of clarity, not a final content-creating proposal. For this reason, Wittgenstein 
contested the notion of a “school” or system of thought that would follow in his steps 
(CV 61e). A Wittgensteinian school or system that would ground a system of religion 
or any other system misses the point; Wittgenstein is more concerned with the nearness 
or immediacy of practices of life that surpass theoretical systems in the way that the 
narrative of a story or the reading of a poem surpasses literary theorizing. As Incandela 
notes, aligning Wittgenstein’s lived philosophical practices with narrative is precisely 
the way Hauerwas emphasizes the “grammar of language used by believers” amidst the 
formative thickness of community rather than the thinness of “some general account 
of ‘human experience.’”49 Pace Malcolm, the point is not to see religion as a language 
game but rather to see the practices of language directing one to the more robust reality 
of life itself beyond theories (or the individual pages/paragraphs/spelling in a book). In 
this way we are correct to note that language games for Wittgenstein do not support a 
religious system as much as they direct one towards a religious view of life itself. Hence 
                                               
48 Incandela, 2004: 35. Furthering this passage, Incandela then quotes Clack: “Far from 
defending religion from attack, the Wittgensteinian is stripping it of any substantial 
content. Viewed in this manner, Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion is not a 
protective strategy but a full capitulation to positivism. Accepting that after Hume and 
Ayer there can be no way of justifying the metaphysical claims made by religion, 
Phillips and others of his ilk choose, from some kind of nostalgic yearning, to preserve 
the language of religion while rejecting the objects to which that language had formerly 
been believed to refer” (Clack, 1999b: 101). 
49 As quoted in Incandela, 2004: 39-40 (emphasis added). 
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the point Incandela makes so well is that we misread Wittgenstein to think of language 
games epistemologically rather than morally. To conceive of language games as an 
epistemological structure, one may then see language games as a way for protecting and 
guaranteeing some internal consistency for small communities. Questions must be left 
at the door, for the sense of things is internal. Viewing language games in a moral way, 
however, we are better able to understand this quote from Wittgenstein: 
Christianity is not based on a historical truth; rather, it offers us a (historical) 
narrative and says: now believe! But not, believe this narrative with the belief 
appropriate to a historical narrative, rather: believe, through thick and thin, 
which you can do only as the result of a life. Here you have a narrative, don’t take 
the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives! Make a quite different place 
in your life for it. –There is nothing paradoxical about that! (CV 32e). 
 
 
Wittgenstein speaks here of religious faith that deeply values authority, a critical 
element of life that is lost on secular reasoning. For Wittgenstein, no doubt thinking in 
accord with Kierkegaard, this authority in religious thinking takes the form of trust 
over fear. “Religious faith and superstition are quite different. One of them results 
from fear and is a sort of false science. The other is trusting” (CV 73e). Incandela 
summarizes: 
This is why it must be a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein to put religion 
forward as a self-enclosed language-game or form of life. For he is elsewhere 
clear that the trust about which he speaks is a ‘passionate commitment’ (CV 
64e). As Dallas High reminds us, passions tend to be absorbing. They get in the 
way of other things, and hence are not generally the kinds of things susceptible 
to tidy enclosure. High also appropriately draws attention to how thoroughly 
Kierkegaardian this is. That is appropriate because Kierkegaard, an Augustinian 
through his Lutheranism, was considered by Wittgenstein ‘by far the most 
profound thinker of the last century’. And certainly, submission to authority is 
at the heart of Kierkegaard’s discussion of Abraham. The teleological 
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suspension of the ethical and the paradoxes of Abraham’s faith require an 
exalted notion of authority, or else they are not in the least bit compelling.50 
 
 
From this point, it is a short move to then see the importance and necessity of tradition 
in Wittgenstein’s pre-modern thinking: “Tradition is not something a man can learn; 
not a thread he can pick up when he feels like it; any more than a man can choose his 
own ancestors. Someone lacking a tradition who would like to have one is like a man 
unhappily in love” (CV 76e). Talal Asad elaborates on this point:  
For Wittgenstein, in other words, tradition represents for someone who doesn’t 
have it the object of an unattainable longing: the condition of belonging to 
another, being accepted as such by him or her, and of hoping to learn (and 
construct) through friendship who one is. Of course the language and practice 
of tradition can and must be learnt (people do enter traditions they have not 
inherited) but Wittgenstein’s emphasis is on the fact that what is learnt is not a 
doctrine (rules) but a mode of being, not a thread one can pick up or drop 
whenever one feels like it but a capacity for experiencing another in a way that 
can’t be renounced.51 
 
 
Autonomous, atomistic thinking lacks rootedness, and this brings to question the 
possibilities and nature of crystalline, secular reasoning. Language games critique the 
secular reasoning that seeks freedom from the moral touchstones of tradition and 
authority, and when we do step into the questions of epistemology, we must remain for 
                                               
50 Incandela, 2004: 40. Further, Wittgenstein held that: “In religion every level of 
devoutness must have its appropriate form of expression which has no sense at a lower 
level. This doctrine, which means something at a higher level, is null and void for 
someone who is still at the lower level; he can only understand it wrongly and so these 
words are not valid for such a person. For instance, at my level the Pauline doctrine of 
predestination is ugly nonsense, irreligiousness. Hence it is not suitable for me, since 
the only use of it I could make of the picture I am offered would be a wrong one. If it 
is a good and godly picture, then it is so for someone at a different level, who must use 
it in his life in a way completely different from anything that would be possible for me” 
(CV 32e). 
51Asad, 2017. 
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Wittgenstein rooted and dependent, whether that dependency be upon the “favour of 
Nature that one knows something” (OC 505) or experience (OC 169, 170) or trust: “I 
really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did 
not say “can trust something”)” (OC 509). The challenge in this scientific age lies in 
understanding the limited and thin possibilities of knowledge in scientific thinking 
alone, whereas the favorable possibilities for scientific thinking in all its empirical 
search for precision may be found within a context such as Wittgenstein’s religious way 
of seeing things (RW 94) that requires belief or a received “world-picture”—hence 
enabling the possibility for any balanced empirical observation or hypothesis (OC 167).  
Instead of “I know it” one may say in some cases “That’s how it is—rely upon 
it.” In some cases, however “I learned it years and years ago”; and sometimes: 
“I am sure it is so.” 
What I know, I believe (OC 176, 177). 
 
What is evidenced here is a prioritization, an ordo of authority that precedes proof. 
Hence Incandela states:  
Justification is inherently retrospective here, as a particular ‘world picture’ 
formed through reliance on authority ‘is the substratum of all [Wittgenstein’s] 
asserting’. 
This essentially Augustinian reliance upon authority implies that philosophy will 
always ask more questions than it answers. Its task remains incomplete if for no 
other reason than its task remains ongoing, just as anyone with children knows 
that one never finishes cleaning the house.52 
 
 
As a way of drawing these strands together, we can conclude that Wittgenstein’s 
religious thinking is a firm step beyond scientific and secular reasoning. Wittgenstein’s 
thought does not move in a systematic or genealogical way, and so his puzzles, 
aphorisms, and “practices of language” methodology can pose a hermeneutical 
                                               
52 Incandela, 2004: 42. 
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challenge. For the purposes of this thesis, however, calling upon Wittgenstein’s 
“assembly of reminders for a particular purpose” (PI 127) presents a critique of 
scientific theorizing that helps to uncover the striking lack of foundation for ethics or 
bioethics based in theory.  Bioethics remains deeply confused when seeking to deduce 
concrete moral claims when the nature of moral concepts themselves is unclear; the 
contradictions of modern moral philosophy arise time and again as various theories 
swirl amidst a fundamental confusion over the possibility of right and wrong in the first 
place. Moreover, the steady insistence of Wittgenstein’s generalist, religious point of 
view (RW 94) discussed here aptly draws Wittgenstein’s critique of theoretical 
philosophy into the terms of discourse between secular and religious ethics. For every 
challenge Wittgenstein presents to the crystalline purity of logic, the formal unity of 
sentences and language (PI 107), the scientific precision of explanation (PI 108) and 
more, we can discern through these gestures his sincere conviction that some other 
mode of epistemology—and certainly of ethics—beyond discursive rationality is 
needed to secure something meaningful. Wittgenstein’s writings are peppered with 
hints of his certainty in religious, psychological, even noetic, modes of moral knowing. 
On this point, Monk draws attention to the character of Fr. Zossima who seems to fit 
neatly Wittgenstein’s notion of psychological insight: 
It was said by many people about the elder Zossima that, by permitting 
everyone for so many years to come to bare their hearts and beg his advice and 
healing words, he had absorbed so many secrets, sorrows, and avowals into his 
soul that in the end he had acquired so fine a perception that he could tell at 
the first glance from the face of a stranger what he had come for, and what he 
wanted and what kind of torment racked his conscience.53 
 
In a conversation with Drury on Fr. Zossima, Wittgenstein remarked: 
                                               
53 Monk, 1990: 549. 
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Yes, there really have been people like that, who could see directly into the 
souls of other people and advise them. Now what would really have interested 
me would be to have seen how a character like Smerdyakov could have been 
saved rather than Alyosha.54 
 
 
The latter half of Wittgenstein’s remark on Smerdyakov may or may not be taken with 
any reference to Wittgenstein’s admitted inability to loosen his knees so as to pray (CV 
56e), but what is clear in the reference to Fr. Zossima is Wittgenstein’s insistence on 
“imponderable evidence” as an example of the need to go beyond attempts at 
universalizing, rational norms. Wittgenstein’s imponderable evidence challenges secular, 
cosmopolitan rationality by appealing to a variety of human faculties that Wittgenstein 
lists at random, seemingly at a loss to put words (PP 356) on such an “other” non-
theoretical mode or modes of knowing. “Imponderable evidence includes subtleties of 
glance, of gesture, of tone” (PP 360), and it can be gleaned not through a “course of 
study” but through experience: “What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns 
correct judgments. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only 
experienced people can apply them rightly. Unlike calculating rules” (PP 355). As 
Monk implies, abstractions and generalities, laws and principles, and the like that stem 
from theorizing and intellectualism are staunchly opposed to imponderable evidence 
that defies the categorizations involved in theorizing norms.55 “Hence also there can be 
no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express anything higher” (TLP 6.42). 
 
In short, what Wittgenstein offers is a critique of scientific thinking, and this critique of 
scientism carries with it an essential critique of secular thinking. From within the 
                                               
54 Rhees, 1981: 123. 
55 Monk, 1990: 548. 
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bounds of a scientific culture, the relationship between the scientism and secularism 
may not be apparent, but in one sense, an implication of Wittgenstein’s attempts to 
practice “religious thinking” may be seen as a Wittgensteinian attempt to look beyond 
both the scientific and secular. When secular thinking is understood as crystalline, 
cosmopolitan, discursive rationality as devoid as possible of ties to particularity, 
embodiment, or to concrete communal practices, we have entered a space that admits 
tradition-full cultures and communities—as well as sincere religions and theologies—
only as “private” values not to be admitted into the scientific norms that purportedly 
govern secular space. Wittgenstein finds this impulse confusing and pathological, and 
bioethics would do well to trace his gestures that point to a more fitting method and 
way of morality. The norm in bioethics is to bracket off meta-inquiry in favor of 
accepting and existing within the theoretical boundaries of modern moral philosophy 
when the foundations for this discipline itself remain awash in the uncertainty of 
postmodernity. Wittgenstein’s religious thinking pushes us beyond the secular and 
beyond the reduction of morality as a series of moral calculations on the level of 
common morality and theories. This is a grave challenge to the form of ethics and 
bioethics. 
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6.3 Ethics as Apophatic Knowledge & Asceticism 
It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one.) 
(TLP 6.421). 
 
The whole sense of [the Tractatus] might be clearly summed up in the following words: what can be 
said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence (TLP, 3).  
 
 
The last theme of this thesis builds upon Wittgenstein’s aesthetic, ethical, and 
religious way of seeing the world. Put simply, this theme is the interplay of ethics as 
apophatic knowledge and asceticism, and it would be misleading to assert that 
apophasis arises from Wittgenstein as an explicit theological category or dogma. 
Wittgenstein does not write as an academic theologian examining concepts traditionally 
rooted in Byzantine philosophy and theology, but rather the aim here is to read 
Wittgenstein theologically. Following Drury, Kerr notes that Wittgenstein’s religious 
point of view includes a deep caution for “saying no more than we know,” and in this 
vein Kerr describes the Tractatus as “an ascetical exercise in learning to acknowledge 
what may be said in order to respect that which is unsayable.” In this way 
Wittgenstein’s work is “a discipline of reticence,” and this duty of apophatic silence 
possesses a strong ethical dimension.56 
                                               
56 Kerr, 1997: 37. To discern apophatic silence in Wittgenstein is not “the sum” of 
Wittgenstein per say, although we may note that such silence occupies a key place 
following the exercises of the Tractatus and Investigations. Similarly, Kerr is hesitant to 
follow Drury to say that the entirety of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is “to show once and 
for all and conclusively that what at first begins as the desire for a metaphysical theory 
is really something deeper, something which can only be satisfied by other than 
speculative constructions” (38). Kerr reminds us of Wittgenstein’s “endless remarks on 
philosophical psychology” as an example of philosophical constructions in 
Wittgenstein. This seems fair, and we need not read Wittgenstein in an unduly 
monolithic way. As discussed earlier in this chapter with reference to language games as 
exercises akin to Aquinas’ theological (vs philosophical) Five Ways (Incandela, 2004: 32), 
Wittgenstein’s primary concern seems to be the context and need for authority with 
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Additionally, as Clark Carlton has noted, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is 
both therapeutic and apophatic—or more aptly, “it is therapeutic because it is 
apophatic.”  
This is the essence of apophaticism. It is not denial for the sake of denial, or 
even intellectual humility for the sake of humility. Its purpose is to redirect our 
attention back toward the demands of the Lebensform by reminding us to play 
the rules of the grammar.57 
 
Carlton’s broader point is to assert that the Lebensform is important to understanding, 
for example, St. Mark the Monk’s engagement with the 5th C Nestorians who persisted 
in asking how God does things. Nestorius’ questions were “impertinent” and suggest a 
lack of belief in God arising from a life-form inconsistent with obedient faith. As 
Carlton employs it, Lebensform is not reduced to a physical life pattern in opposition to 
discursive reasoning—arguably an extension of mind-body dualism—but rather 
Lebensform surpasses such a dichotomy by presenting St. Mark’s life-form as the impetus 
and embodied point of reference for the questions he asks in the first place.58 
                                                                                                                                    
such religious thinking. In this case, examining an apophatic methodology as an integral 
way to read Wittgenstein (c.f. Mitralexis, 2015) seems complementary to Kerr’s primary 
point on Wittgenstein’s post-Cartesian theological turn.  
57 Carlton, 2012: 3. 
58 Carlton proceeds to identify two sources of heresy: the “false prophet” or 
“enthusiast” who claims a special relationship with God (e.g. Montanism) and the 
misplaced “questioner” such as Nestorius.  Addressing this latter example, Carlton 
argues “that most of the major ‘isms’ that have afflicted Christianity over the last two 
thousand years, from Sabellianism to Arianism to Nestorianism to Calvinism, began in 
precisely this way. The need of some homo sapiens to construct an ideological system to 
justify their lives is probably as old as human culture itself. The Greeks were afflicted 
with it, certainly, and there has been no shortage of such afflicted folk throughout the 
Christian dispensation, but it was not until the modern era that this attitude became the 
dominant ethos of the entire “civilized world.” Indeed, I would argue that this is the 
hallmark of modernity and that sham “post-modernism” with its alleged “incredulity 
toward metanarratives” has done nothing to significantly alter this ethos” (Carlton, 
2012: 4).  
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Mitralexis is another who sees Wittgenstein’s “stance” towards knowledge and language 
as apophatic, and in the following I am indebted to a number of the authors Mitralexis 
has drawn together to explore the relationship between Wittgenstein’s analytical 
approach towards philosophy and “the inherently apophatic nature” of his 
“epistemological stance.”59 As Mitralexis notes, this approach may be called an “apophatic 
Wittgenstein” or a “Wittgensteinian apophaticism,” and it seems fair to allow either 
phrase as long as we understand in this approach two key points. First, it is very 
important to note that the via negativa employed here is not a deflecting strategy for 
epistemological questions in ethics. Hopefully a persuasive case has been made by now 
that Wittgenstein’s mysticism is not a failure to answer the important aesthetic and 
ethical questions of life but rather an observation that Wittgenstein insists on noting 
the limits of scientific theorizing while addressing these questions. A move beyond 
scientific thinking is not a move into irrationality but may be a move into supra-rational 
religious thinking, and such a higher, mysterious mode of thinking is needed to 
approach infinite reality. Hence Wittgenstein’s post-scientific thinking embraces 
mythology and religion as more fitting ways to encounter transcendent meaning, and 
                                               
59 Mitralexis, 2015. Mitralexis proceeds to draw from Christos Yannaras’ (Relational 
Ontology, 2011) definition of apophaticism as an epistemology: apophaticism is “(1) the 
denial that we exhaust knowledge in its formulation; (2) the refusal to identify the 
understanding of the signifiers with the knowledge of what is signified; and (3) the 
symbolic character of every epistemic expression: its role in bringing together atomic 
experiences and embracing them within a common semantic boundary marker, a 
process which allows epistemic experience to be shared, and once shared to be 
verified” (Mitralexis, 2015: 9). Further, this definition of epistemology that flows from 
relational ontology does not contradict the earlier discussion of Wittgenstein’s language 
games as a moral practice more than epistemology; epistemology in the bare sense of 
“how one knows” is different from the embodied epistemology Mitralexis discusses; 
such an embodied epistemology is moral.  
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we can reflect upon Plato’s divided line (Republic IV, 509D-513E) an example of the 
noetic faculty required to comprehend the intelligible things beyond the senses. If we 
place a hard emphasis on the line between Plato’s visible and intelligible, we mistakenly 
tend towards a mind-body dualism, and yet the noetic faculty that rightly allows one to 
perceive the intelligible moves beyond such dualism. Hence intellection (νόησις), 
understanding (διανόια), belief (πίστις), and conjecture (εἰκασία) present modes of 
knowing that call for mystery not as an inability to answer Wittgenstein’s aesthetic or 
ethical questions but rather as a higher ability of supra-rationality. Apophaticism that 
directs one towards meaningless silence is not helpful. Hence the goal for ethics and 
bioethics willing to heed Wittgenstein’s scientific and theoretical critique is not inactive 
stupor, but rather the goal is to identify a suitable mode of being and thinking and then 
begin the hard work of practicing and living out such being and thinking. 
 
Secondly, the goal with Wittgensteinian apophaticism here is tied to practices of life 
and ethics. The argument was made earlier that Wittgenstein’s exercises and 
metaphilosophy follow along the lines of phenomenology, and building upon this 
phenomenology Sivrides argues: 
Once we make life itself, i.e., action, the object of our thought we are 
confronted with its limits, meaning that we cannot explain exhaustively the 
object of our thought: we cannot say what it is definitely. Or, to be more exact, 
there is something we can say about it and some other thing to which we 
cannot latch on, something we cannot fetch from our heart to our tongue. Yet 
we couldn’t see the latter if we wouldn’t try to seize it. Moreover, if there is a 
cause to strive to understand the state of things, it must lie on the side of the 
ineffable. Here, we encounter what is known as the theological work of 
Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor and Maimonides as 
“apophatic” methodology.  God cannot be known save through the effect of 
His activities (ενέργειαι) on our world. Therefore in apophatic theology the first 
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name of God is that of summum bonum, of the sovereign Good, denoting ethics 
instead of cosmology.60  
 
 
Apophatic knowledge understood in this way is entirely appropriate for understanding 
Wittgenstein. To misuse language for Wittgenstein is to transgress the limits of 
scientific thinking by seeking to claim a type of ineffable knowledge that transcends 
qualitative and causal theorizing. For psychologist Jordan Peterson, this boundary 
between modes of thinking can be seen every time the human mind and soul 
contemplates anything that extends beyond the mind’s calculating capacity. Imagining 
our solar system, the bright stars in the dark night, or even the layers of another 
person’s emotions and psyche, we are quickly overwhelmed and unable to articulate the 
entirety of these phenomena. In the face of such scientific limits, Peterson sounds 
remarkably similar to Wittgenstein by calling for an entirely different mode of thinking. 
Within the scientific way, the world is viewed as a place of things—the “objective 
world”—but humans are self-conscious and live amidst narratives—the “world of 
value.” This second way allows us to see the world as a “forum for action and 
emotion” that is rightly represented through myth, literature, drama, and poetry. 
Moreover, within narrative, the “unknown” is essential to the unfolding of any story 
and to reject the unknown as unknowable and hence non-existent is to exhibit 
Luciferian pride, which states: “all that I know is all that is necessary to know.”  
This pride is totalitarian assumption of omniscience – is adoption of “God’s 
place” by “reason” – is something that inevitably generates a state of personal 
and social being indistinguishable from hell. This hell develops because creative 
exploration – impossible, without (humble) acknowledgment of the unknown – 
                                               
60 Sivrides, 2015: 108-09. 
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constitutes the process that constructs and maintains the protective adaptive 
structures that give life much of its acceptable meaning.61 
 
 
One of Peterson’s primary aims is to understand myth not as “primitive proto-science” 
but rather as a qualitatively “different phenomenon.” The mythic universe is not a 
place to conceive but rather is a “place to act” amidst categorizations of profound value, 
of what should be. “Action presupposes valuation, or its implicit or ‘unconscious’ 
equivalent. To act is literally to manifest preference about one set of possibilities, 
contrasted to an infinite set of alternatives.”62 Here it is within the tension between 
finitude—human rationalizing—and the infinite—transcendent reality—that action 
becomes the embodied focal point of reality, and this is how Wittgenstein sees ethics 
and religion in the same way. 
This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. 
Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate 
meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. 
What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document 
of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting 
deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it (LE 44). 
 
 
Extrapolating from this, Sivrides makes the point that ethics and religion for 
Wittgenstein are actions of faith not as irrationality but suprarationality. Wittgenstein is 
not interested in the “refined, aseptic God of the philosophers” but rather the “God of 
the everyman” who is personal and relational. “The way you use the word ‘God’ shows 
not whom you mean—but instead what you mean” (CV 50). Moreover, as with the 
friend, spouse or person who is “other” and perpetually knowable yet never defined, 
                                               
61 Peterson, 1999: 14. 
62 Peterson, 1999: 21. 
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God is known personally. He is known definitely but never definitively, and this is 
simultaneously a positive affirmation of God and an apophatic reverence.  
For instance, to designate some action as its very image, namely its project 
describing its means and end (i.e., how to adjust the appropriate means to an 
end), is an affirmative (kataphatic) way to define action. Yet saying that the very 
action is not its image means that it is something more than that. Then the 
image of an action is shown before us as an artifice that occasions action by 
making it possible. The scope of the first, kataphatic method is scientific and 
impartial concerning the knowledge the agent must be equipped with and the 
calculations he must perform. On the other hand, the scope of the second, 
apophatic one, is ethical and personal concerning how one chooses and 
endures the outcome of his choice. It complements the first method by 
underlying it. Thus the apophatic part is the most important one among the 
two since that very action can lead the agent to an end that he had not 
foreseen.63 
 
Sivrides seems to have in mind an architect’s blueprints as an example of the scientific-
kataphatic method that calculates the spaces within a house, and these blueprint images 
are something of a representation of the active lives of those dwelling apophatically 
within the house. The blueprints indicate—but incompletely, with inevitable limits—
the lives within the house. This latter mode is simultaneously religious, apophatic, and 
ethical, and this latter mode is “more important” for the simple reason that the house is 
to be inhabited rather than abstracted and conceived. 
 
An important consequence of Wittgenstein’s apophatic vision is that ethics today may 
once again be reunited with knowledge and rationality. This knowledge and rationality 
is pre-modern in that it is not reduced to scientific categories but remains noetic and 
religious, and this hierarchical rationality restores ethics as an embodied practice of 
knowing. Within the scientific paradigm for ethics, we are abandoned and awash within 
the wake of modern moral philosophy that seeks “moral norms” while ignoring the 
                                               63	Sivrides, 2015: 121-23.	
	 299 
problem of morality itself that Nietzsche, Anscombe and others rightly identified. The 
modernist assumption that moral language may accord in some isomorphic way with 
moral “reality” remains a spurious claim, and Wittgenstein’s practices with language 
recall us to a standpoint of embodied, social, and historical touchstones. Language and 
reality do connect within bodies, societies, and history as the unfolding of creatureliness, 
and contrary to the reductive positivist readings of Wittgenstein as one who constructs 
metaphysical meaning from out of immanent practices, we rather should read 
Wittgenstein as one who sees immanent practices as a way to uncover ontological, 
transcendent reality within and through immanent reality. In the former, the active life is 
an immanent source; in the latter, the active life presences the ineffable transcendent 
within the immanent. 
 
When the ineffable is discerned within the immanent, the discursively rational qualities 
of the mind may be humbled and balanced as our attention turns to the epistemology 
of embodiment, and in so doing we are elevating action, habit, and practice beyond 
non-intellectual materialism. 64  Further, considering language as a parallel to 
embodiment, Kerr notes that in speaking of God we must take care how the word 
“God” is used. This apophaticism recognizes layers and modes of seeing God that 
engage the thinking, acting, worshipping man.  
Faith, in appropriate circumstances, is visible in one’s behaviour; it is not some 
undetectable inner object…Language, the living human being, our life, human 
                                               
64 Here one might benefit in drawing connections between Ravaisson’s 
phenomenological embodiment and Wittgenstein’s phenomenological language 
practices. Further, as Foltz has argued, a parallel may be drawn between Husserlian 
phenomenology and the “noetics of nature.” Within this view of material nature may 
be seen radiating “the beauty and goodness of creation (ktisis) whose infusion with 
divine glories is now becoming manifest (Folz, 2014: xvii). 
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nature: Wittgenstein’s watchwords in the philosophy of psychology are also 
contributions of central importance to a theology that starts where we are; a 
theology for ceremonious animals, so to speak, rather than for cerebriating 
solipsists; a theology that starts from the deep and sinister thing in human 
nature rather than a hypothesis about a deity; theology naturalized, so to speak.65 
 
 
Building upon this view of theology naturalized—so clearly juxtaposed to natural 
theology—Kerr turns to PI 610 where Wittgenstein ponders describing the aroma of 
coffee. “Why can’t it be done? Do we lack words? And for what are words lacking? – 
But whence comes the idea that such a description must after all be possible?” The 
point is not that there are no words to describe such an aroma but rather that words 
are limited and insufficient. It may seem a small point and mere “common sense” to 
accept our limited ability as the ability we need, and that is that, but the process of 
noting, accepting, and exploring these limits is certainly worth our attention. The aroma 
of coffee can indeed be described and yet the kinds of description we employ inevitably 
fall short of experiencing the aroma personally, and that personal experience remains 
the important thing. 
 
Furthermore, Kerr suggests another comparison as Wittgenstein imagines trying to 
count the number of falling raindrops in a storm. As one assesses the limits of 
language, is it correct to become dissatisfied? If so, is one also dissatisfied with the 
limits of vision in not being able to count the raindrops with “exactitude or 
completeness?” Such a comparison seems “deliberately crude,” and the effect is to 
startle us into “realizing that we do have an ideal of exactitude or completeness at the 
                                               
65 Kerr, 1997: 163. 
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back of our minds which very easily imposes itself inappropriately.” 66  These 
illustrations and comparisons, moreover, therapeutically draw us into an awareness of 
our finite engagement with the infinite reality that surrounds us on all sides, and this 
infinitude always surpasses crystalline, scientific knowing. Music or poetry may be 
rightly criticized, and to be sure an art critic’s words have their place as long as the 
commentary remains clearly distinct from the poetic acts of hearing and imagining. The 
enjoyment of these arts is akin to reading a facial expression: no one truly doubts the 
deep meaning embodied within facial-movement-acts,67 but the point is not to possess 
an expectation of certitude that will then lead to despair when words fall short in explaining 
the face before us. For Kerr, the correct response is “to awaken to the possibility that 
our way of life is the incomparable thing that it is, without compulsively contrasting it 
all the time with alien alternatives. The metaphysical picture of what we are, far from 
securing our uniqueness, only obscures it.”68 
 
This embodied anthropology and psychology is post-Cartesian in an important way. If 
we accept Kerr’s contention that the metaphysically structured self is a—if not  
                                               
66 Kerr, 1997: 165. 
67 Ours is an age that places great emphasis on interpreting “body language” as 
evidenced in the attention given to poker games and particularly at ceremonious events 
such as a presidential inauguration, a first-dance at the inaugural ball, etc. The “science” 
of body language became known as kinesics during the mid 20th century. 
68 Kerr, 1997: 166. Kerr sees in Wittgenstein a deep engagement with the “story of the 
soul in the Western metaphysical tradition,” and he quotes St. Augustine on “joy” in a 
sermon on Psalm 32: “At the harvest, in the vineyard, wherever men must labour hard, 
they begin with songs whose words express their joy. But when their joy brims over 
and words are not enough, they abandon even this coherence and give themselves up 
to the sheer sound of singing…And to whom does this jubilation most belong? Surely 
to God, who is unutterable. And does not unutterable mean what cannot be uttered? If 
words will not come and you may not remain silent, what else can you do but let the 
melody soar?” (166-67). 
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the—central concern of Wittgenstein’s later writings, then Wittgenstein has much to 
offer in changing the form of our ethical vision, giving us a rather different expectation 
and methodology for ethics and bioethics. Perhaps the most important part of this 
different vision is to accept human finitude not as a flaw to be overcome but as a 
critical part of the ascetic way of being within the cosmos. Here asceticism is a more 
comprehensive vision of ethics as it places the human not as a “metaphysically 
structured self” who must operate within a theoretical sphere to calculate correct 
actions grounded superficially within a shifting political common morality consensus. 
Instead, the ascetic man is one who lives within the processes of redemption, seeking 
re-union with the ineffable One. This asceticism embraces human formation without 
the presumption of perfection that the metaphysical tradition arguably assumes and/or 
encourages.69 Hence the Genesis creation story perpetually draws our attention to 
Adam and Eve refusing to accept “moral humanity” and “creatureliness” as they crave 
to be “immortal, omniscient, omnipotent.” God as divine creator alone possesses these 
qualities, and the un-bounded Creator-beyond-being creates man who is not divine. In 
this vein Kerr extrapolates upon Schillebeeckx’s argument that belief in God is a 
repudiation of metaphysical dualism: 
The doctrine of creation ex nihilo was historically at the centre of the Church’s 
polemic against Gnosticism (e.g., Irenaeus). For Schillebeeckx, the point of 
Christian belief in the world’s being created from nothing is that it still rules out 
dualistic metaphysics. When we first reflect on the human condition – “Was I 
anywhere, or anyone?” – it remains tempting to succumb to the thought that 
                                               
69 The metaphysical tradition seems bound to assume a perfect nature somewhere 
“outside” humans, and this nature is postured as the object and aim of human being. 
This is an “other” that does not give relational knowledge through intercommunion 
but rather as an ideal that divides the “true” self from one’s self—hence, a relegation of 
one’s self to something less than the metaphysical ideal, whatever that may be. This 
perfection in theory seems equally bound to direct one towards either existential 
despair or to individual delusional hubris and grandeur. 
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the self is out of place in the world, and then bodiless and language-free 
experience, epistemological solitude, and so on, at once become unavoidable 
and even desirable possibilities. Thus we return to the ancient picture of human 
life as essentially exile from our true nature.70 
 
Similarly, drawing further on the aroma of coffee, Sidiropoulou notes that: 
None of us is above space and time. Conditioned as we are by our embodied 
nature, we are embedded in particular and specific contexts of life that give 
shape to different shades of similarity in our mental life or, indeed, to 
completely different experiences. Given this, to ask for a unique and final 
representation of subjective experience (the aroma of coffee) would equal a 
demand to revoke human finitude. For only an infinite and, by definition, 
immaterial being can be above the particularities, the different perspectives, 
viewpoints and situations of life that render the aroma of coffee so unique for 
each one of us.71 
 
 
Ethics as asceticism embraces both a subjective and objective aspect as individuals are 
not united through a cosmopolitan rationality but rather through individual experiences 
amidst a communal way of life.72 This way of life, moreover, remains for Wittgenstein 
an active, ritual, and liturgical experience that allows the embodied person to seek 
union and to participate corporately within the ineffable transcendent One.73 The 
                                               
70 Kerr, 1997: 185. 
71 Sidiropoulou, 2015: 69. 
72 By “common way of life” here we may think of the aroma of coffee as an action that 
can be shared concretely. This concrete experience itself, however, is not the answer to 
the Cartesian error. The aim is not simplistically to suggest that such a simple act or 
way of life itself is the remedy to metaphysical dualism by retreating from cognativism 
into praxis. Rather, the aim is to follow a Wittgensteinian therapy to see a more 
embodied epistemology—the interconnectedness of theoria that transcends scientia.  
73 This broad vision of asceticism is very much in line with the traditional Christian use 
of paideia as wisdom. “The Old Testament uses and develops the theme of wisdom is a 
number of ways: as empirical knowledge and intuitive understanding, as formation or 
paideia, as cosmological principle and mediator, as active divine subject, and as a means 
of expressing God’s transcendence and immanence. In looking at the patristic 
understanding of wisdom we also need to keep an eye on the classical hinterland. While 
far from being a univocal concept in classical antiquity, wisdom, with its cognate terms, 
rapidly emerged as one way of describing the character of the enquiry into the nature 
and meaning of things. The limits to this enquiry were soon recognized by this sense of 
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temptation towards perfection in metaphysical dualism leads one to seek transcendental 
moral categories whereas ascetic embodiment leads towards practices of union with the 
ineffable transcendent God. We need not see in this emphasis on embodied practices a 
“crypto-behaviorism” as though religious actions and the “dancing out” of life are 
aimed at “people’s lives and imaginations” more than at the deity to which they refer. 
Such a concern is “mutatis mutandis, the same kind of apprehension as the one 
regarding the ineffability of the coffee’s aroma; a fear of losing one’s own innermost 
self…[it is] a fear of having to give up God Himself, through reducing him to the pure 
immanence of social practice.” However, as Sidiropoulou notes, this collapses again 
into a dualistic metaphysics of ineffable presence when one assumes that “God” (a sort 
of an object or concept) logically precedes any embodied, liturgical response to “it.” 
Liturgy in this way is linked as a “causal outcome” to the concept of God rather than as 
an “internal link” or deep union. In short, for those who see liturgy as an outcome of 
God, “practice must not be a constitutive part of what is involved in the concept 
“God,” and hence in seeking to avoid a “reduction of the ‘beyond’ to external acts” the 
way of dualistic metaphysics is re-opened.74 
 
Sidiropoulou suggests that critics of Wittgenstein miss the point with the aroma of 
coffee when they seek an esoteric description for experiences-beyond-words or when 
                                                                                                                                    
the fallibility of human conclusions was to some degree balanced by an appeal to the 
divine source of such wisdom and knowledge as humans might possess. This explicitly 
theological approach was also not infrequently bound up with a mystical and 
moral/ascetic dimension…” (Plested, 2009: 240). 
74 Sidiropoulou, 2015: 71.	
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they seek to picture exactly what is invisible. 75  Wittgenstein’s apophaticism instead 
directs us to see that human description or pictures are not in fact able to contain 
adequately ineffable transcendence. Does this then imply that the via negativa lacks any 
kataphasis, and is there an understanding of the ineffable that is non-dualistic and non-
metaphysical? The answers are “no” and “yes” respectively for as Wittgenstein 
describes it when directly addressing ethics, both finitude and the ineffable are present, 
though present as a paradox.  As the “Lecture on Ethics” intimates, it is an ethical 
paradox that is humbly kataphatic, embracing finitude, and yet when Wittgenstein 
speaks of yearning “to go beyond the world” and “say [what is] beyond significant 
language” he is describing the deep tension between the kataphatic and apophatic, and 
“the whole tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk about ethics or religion 
was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our 
cage is perfectly, absolutely, hopeless” (LE 18-19).  
 
Moreover, these creaturely limits in our morality call for a persistence in practice and way 
of life while never ignoring the eschatological union of future and present (Heb. 2:8-9; 
Eph. 2:6). On the one hand, as described above, such a paradox or antinomy should be 
taken as Wittgenstein’s critique of culture and an attempt to challenge “the pervasive 
disease in the culture of his times, namely, the obsession with scientific progress.” This 
entails that Wittgenstein’s apophasis challenges the “spirit” underlying philosophy in 
the modern era that is tied to the way people live (Lebensweise).76 On the other hand, 
                                               
75 Here we may contrast “pictures” that result from capturing some visible thing with 
“images” (eikon) that draw one in to contemplate the invisible through the illumined 
visible image. 
76 Ip, 2015: 101, 100-05. 
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beyond Wittgenstein’s cultural application, Sidiropoulou directs us to St. Gregory of 
Nyssa’s Life of Moses (II.3) for aid in understanding how one may balance the tension 
between practices of “going beyond the world” while admitting the limits of language. For 
St. Gregory, the unity of this paradox may be seen as soul—the beloved moved 
towards the Lover—is drawn into a loving participation with the divine source of all 
being. From the moment the soul glimpses the loveliness it sees to when it is drawn 
into that transcendent love, we glimpse a participation like that of “an image” (eikon) 
that is fulfilled in “the archetype.” As St. Paul writes in I Cor. 13:12, we move from 
seeing dimly in a mirror to then seeing face to face. Hence while we are perpetually 
“limited” in our embodied and social being, we are nevertheless enabled to see through 
mirrors and “representations of God as the object of our desire.” 
These representations we share with others, for after all, they arise within our 
common life and in interdependence with our culture. A representation of God 
is not elusive in the Cartesian sense of conceptual privacy. Where it remains 
elusive, though, is in its radically “incomplete” character. Even the use of the 
term “incomplete” here is regrettable for it seems to suggest that a completion 
may be possible.77 
 
Moreover, in terms of language, this process of representation is both affirmative and 
negative: 
Human language has the means to talk about God and has been doing so for 
thousands of years. Our words, expressions, and concepts of the divine are fine 
as they are. This means: they are not incomplete and second best in lack of 
better ones that could offer an all-encompassing representation of God. For 
such a thing to be possible, not only God but also we would have to transcend our 
human embodied condition and our creaturely nature. Such an effort, as Gregory of 
Nyssa straightforwardly warns us, borders idolatry.78 
 
 
                                               
77 Sidiropoulou, 2015: 73. 
78 Sidiropoulou, 2015: 75-76. 
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A further key point regarding the interplay between the apophatic and kataphatic is to 
avoid contrasting simplistically the divine darkness with the divinely dazzling light, or 
through a sleight of hand to enact a simple “positive” from out of a “negative.” To 
misjudge the tension between apophatic and kataphatic as discussed here is akin to 
reading Wittgenstein’s language games as a strategy for enacting metaphysical 
immanence. In both cases respectively, a practice of uncovering humble limits with 
discursive language does not automatically “create” light out of darkness. Instead, the 
practice of negation is formative and even liturgical, whereby there is no causal moment 
of separation between negative and positive but rather a seamless movement of the 
finite loving soul into infinite Love. Hence in the way that Dionysius addresses divine 
names, the truth is sought through the divine names of the sacred scriptures not on the 
terms of plausible human wisdom but by the power of the Spirit granted to the writers 
of the scriptures. This employment of language moves beyond language into a “union 
superior to anything available to us by way of our own abilities or activities in the realm 
of discourse or intellect” (Divine Names, 585B). Dionysius maintains that the Deity is 
invisible and incomprehensible as well as unsearchable and inscrutable while also not 
being “incommunicable” to everything (588C). What is required is a movement of the 
entire human being to be raised “firmly and unswervingly upward into the direction of 
the ray which enlightens them. With a love matching the illuminations granted them, 
they take flight, reverently, wisely, in all holiness” (589A).  
 
Hence, the dynamic interplay between negation and affirmation is a working of “divine 
enlightenment” (theurgy—592B), and the Dionysian approach for speaking of God is 
first to employ analogies and symbols (592C). This is the founding theme of Dionysius’ 
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Symbolic Theology that leads to the Divine Names and then to the apex of Theological 
Representations (Mystical Theology, 1033A-B). Moreover, following Him Ip’s suggestion 
that apophasis is a hermeneutical key to unlocking Wittgenstein’s Lecture of Ethics, we 
can easily see Wittgenstein resonating with Dionysius’ language on “climbing higher” 
to the supreme, ineffable Cause of conceptual beings Who is not himself conceptual: 
There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it. Darkness and light, 
error and truth—it is none of these. It is beyond assertion and denial. We make 
assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it, for it is both beyond 
every assertion, being the perfect and unique cause of all things, and, by virtue 
of its preeminently simple and absolute nature, free of every limitation, beyond 
every limitation; it is also beyond every denial (1048A-B). 
 
 
In particular, the notion of making “assertions and denials of what is next to it, but 
never of it” seems a remarkably apt description for Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
practices. He remains revered by many for his analytical insights, and yet for 
Wittgenstein there was little joy in “how little had been done” as he set out to “throw 
away the ladder” after he had climbed it (T 6.54). Wittgenstein hence gestures and 
speaks of das Mystiche beyond his assertions and denials of what is next to it, and one is 
left with something of a “what if” had Wittgenstein sustained further his deep interests 
in the mystical reality that he sensed beyond his clarifying practices. Dionysius in 
particular would have seemed a fitting starting point for Wittgenstein given his 
theological call to the via activa in liturgical practice. Whereas many read Dionysius as a 
philosopher, the stronger case seems to be for reading him liturgically as he calls on the 
divine names to end in “hymns” of praise (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, 429 C), and this 
ecclesial, liturgical context serves arguably as the touchstone for all his works. Indeed, 
in Mystical Theology I.3, Moses’ ascent mirrors Dionysius’ three-fold theological 
methodology of affirmation, negation, and ascent into darkness, and within this 
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darkness is a union beyond mind, knowing and unknowing. Who is the likely audience 
for this except the “laity” as those who contemplate the liturgical acts within which 
they are bound? Within this liturgical way, we can glimpse something beyond an 
intellectual exercise but more of a sculpting of persons where the stripping away of 
something (knowledge) is not simply negative but reveals instead a higher, inner beauty 
that only the sculptor initially imagines. In short, for Dionysius, the apophatic and 
kataphatic are not sequential but rather held together, and the consummation of his 
theology points to an active, theurgic life.79 God is not chiefly to be “thought of” or 
“gazed upon” but rather called upon and worshiped. 
 
                                               
79 Indeed, the theurgic life, or theosis, avoids the trappings both of immanentism and 
radical transcendence. In the postscript to Theology After Wittgenstein, Kerr responds to 
Russell Reno’s concern that “Christian attempts to express the delicate balance (or 
violent tension) of the ordinary and the extraordinary in the life of pilgrimage always 
fall by the weight of their concepts and the inner desire for escape into…radical 
transcendence” (Reno, 1995: 159). Reno’s concern is that Kerr is “so suspicious of the 
language of transcendence” that Kerr has given rise to a “spiritual extrinsicism in which 
ordinary life becomes separated from the goal and aspirations of God’s extraordinary 
offer of love” (199). Kerr generously allows for such a critique while pointing to the 
tension of being human by quoting Nichomachean Ethics: 
We should not heed those who counsel us that, being men, we should think 
human, and being mortals, we should think mortal. But we ought, so far as is in 
us lies, to make ourselves immortal, straining every nerve to life in accordance 
with the highest thing in us (1177b 31-34; Kerr, 1997: 189). 
Further, within the mystical path of the Egyptian ascetics, theurgy as embedded within 
katharsis (purification of the soul), theoria (contemplation of the divine energies), and 
theosis (divinization and union with God) presents a way to move beyond the tensions 
of immanentism and radical transcendence. It is not possible here to do more than 
allude to the rich theology of theosis, but it is helpful as Lossky notes to see the 
“objective nature of grace” as one aspect of the Church, particularly manifest “in the 
sacraments, in theurgic actions, the hierarchy and the power that it wields, the Church’s 
worship, the sacred symbols…” This objective nature illustrates the Christological 
aspect of the Church, and interwoven to complete this objective aspect is the 
pneumatological aspect that is “personal.” The Christological aspect is a more “external 
and functional presence of grace” whereas the pneumatological is “appropriated by the 
person, becoming personal.” Together, these two aspects undergird the harmony and 
union within theosis (Lossky,1976: 190-91). 
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Much more could be said of this apophatic and ascetic turn, and this thesis does not 
purport to address the finer issues and distinctions on these ancient modes of life. 
Moreover, the point of this final chapter has not been to provide a practical guide to 
bioethical issues by way of Wittgenstein but rather (1) to continue with Wittgenstein by 
tracing his gestures towards the apophatic nature of ethics and (2) to lay some 
groundwork for understanding how a non-scientific, non-theoretical ethics may exist. It 
is with this second aim that we are led to an immensely important pedagogical theme 
for modern moral philosophy and the scholarly discussions on the foundations of 
bioethics. The growing impact of bioethics—from its practical clinical and research 
mechanisms to the theoretical debates over common morality and various ethical 
theories—over nearly the last fifty years has fed a steady conversation on how this field 
is foundationally grounded, and this is where a vision of ethics as apophatic knowledge 
and asceticism turns the form of bioethics past a scientific vision of the world.  
 
To be sure, there are other non-scientific or pre-modern visions of the world that may 
guide the moral life, and the approach taken here with Wittgenstein opens the door to a 
wide variety of religious ways of life. A central aim of this work has been to follow 
Wittgenstein therapeutically beyond the trappings of scientific thinking to the threshold 
of next level questions. Here many may agree that a religious view of the moral life 
within a divinely ordered cosmos is true and then disagree strongly on Who the divine 
God is. Jews, Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Confucians, and more may find 
Wittgenstein’s ascetic moral vision helpful amidst the 21st century theoretical Zeitgeist. In 
this way, Wittgenstein paves the way for rediscovering the necessity of pre-modern, 
religious thinking in a secular, scientific world. His tactic is post-modern in its critique 
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of immanent language, and yet his post-modernity is strategic as his greater allegiance 
lies with pre-modern view of philosophy as a way of life. 
 
Finally, any discussion on the foundations of bioethics inevitably raises the question of 
“what is next?” or how practically is this foundation for ethics manifest? Even while 
that question extends beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that as the 
next question. Moreover, as a closing salvo to that question, we do well to consider two 
final points. First, an ethical vision such as the one described here aligns well with the 
communitarian praxis and asceticism in the context of Hellenistic and Roman schools 
of philosophy. Hadot speaks of such a transformed ethics as “spiritual exercises,” 
exercises that:  
correspond to a transformation of our vision of the world, and to a 
metamorphosis of our personality. The word “spiritual” is quite apt to make us 
understand that these exercises are the result, not merely of thought, but of the 
individual’s entire psychism. Above all, the word “spiritual” reveals the true 
dimensions of these exercises. By means of them, the individual raises himself 
up to the life of the objective Spirit; that is to say, he re-places himself within 
the perspective of the Whole (‘Become eternal by transcending yourself’).80 
 
 
Even while Hadot differentiates analogically his generalized assessment of spiritual 
exercises from asceticism such as that practiced within traditional Christianity, his pre-
modern stance and analysis of ancient philosophy as a “supra-ethical” practice is 
helpful for changing the form of ethics and bioethics. Such a turn, moreover, brings us 
full circle to the first chapter of this thesis where Jahr and Potter’s spiritual and cosmic 
articulation of bioethics challenges Helleger’s effective reduction of bioethics into 
medical ethics solely as an applied project. In contrast, one can see in the Stoics a 
                                               
80 Hadot, 1995: 82.  
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supra-ethics of “learning to live” not by values dependent upon our “passions” but 
upon “the perspective of universal nature.” Similarly, the Stoics saw “learning to 
dialogue” as well as “learning to die” and “learning to read” as self-formation, paideia, 
to guide learners not “in conformity with human prejudices and social conventions [e.g. 
politically-grounded common morality]…but in conformity with the nature of man, 
which is none other than reason.”81 Such a praxis-rationality is fundamentally embodied 
as it seeks freedom of the self from “worries, passions, and desires” to “attain to 
wisdom.” In striking contrast to the autonomy approach of euthanasia “rights” in the 
modern era, these spiritual exercises are examples of what bioethics could do if 
embedded within the presuppositions of ancient philosophy. Contrary to the 
fundamental puzzle of modern moral philosophy and the theoretical calculations within 
principlist bioethics, Wittgenstein’s approach supports philosophy “in its original 
aspect: not as a theoretical construct, but as a method for training people to live and to 
look at the world in a new way. It is an attempt to transform mankind.”82 
 
Furthermore, beyond the Hellenic and Roman schools of philosophy, Hadot points to 
the “absorption of philosophia” by Christianity—especially in monasticism—that stands 
to reframe ethics even further. It is within this spirit that Engelhardt unapologetically 
presents “Christian bioethics” and the way of life within the Eastern Orthodox 
tradition as relevant and of interest not only for baptized Christians but for those who 
wish to see a model of pre-modern bioethics as a Lebensform. The rhetoric of 
Engelhardt’s Christian Foundations of Bioethics is provocative for those who embrace a 
                                               
81 Hadot, 1995: 102. 
82 Hadot, 1995: 107.  
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cosmopolitan progressive vision of reality, but even for those who have not 
experienced Christian katharis by accepting Christ as the Son of God and second 
Person of the undivided Trinity, the Christian Foundations explicitly presents an example 
of bioethics that escapes the immanent theorizing of modern bioethics. In these 
ways—aligned with either Hadot’s spiritual exercises or Engelhardt’s communitarian 
bioethics—Wittgenstein’s ethics persist in reminding us of the inevitability and 
importance of attending to methodology. Rather than resorting to ethical visions that in 
effect reduce all of reality within the limits of scientific thinking, Wittgenstein’s ethical 
praxis is a therapeutic exercise aimed at nothing less than the transformation of the 
person.83 Wittgenstein does not seek to create a list of proper applied ethical actions 
but rather offers a corrective meditation on the ethical person who lives—in bios and 
vios—within both sides of the tension between immanence and transcendence, finitude 
and the infinite. In this regard, it may be that Wittgenstein’s most pertinent 
contribution to bioethics is the inexorable reminder that there can be no bioethics in 
abstraction without concrete, moral human creatures who are acting and experiencing 
beings amidst a world of wonder. 
 
                                               
83 It is notable in this context that Hadot draws from Düring the insight that Aristotle 
did not intend to set forth “a complete system of reality” but rather “wished to train his 
students in the technique of using correct methods in logic, the natural sciences, and 
ethics.” Hadot quotes from Düring on Aristotle to make what can be taken as a very 
Wittgensteinian observation: 
‘the most characteristic feature in Aristotle is his incessant discussion of 
problems. Almost every important assertion is an answer to a question put in a 
certain way, and is valid only as an answer to this particular question. That 
which is really interesting in Aristotle is his framing of the problems, not his 
answers. It is part of his method of inquiry to approach a problem or a group 
of problems again and again from different angles’ (Düring as quoted in Hadot, 
1995: 105; 104-05, emphasis added).   
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As a second way to answer the question “what is next,” we do well to note that an 
ethical vision that is ascetic and apophatic is distinctly personal. It is not focused on 
external coalitions or factors that can be easily framed in universal formulas. This 
ethical vision is particularly internal and paradoxically this internality should also be 
seen in a cosmic way.84 Solzhenitsyn grasps this by noting that the good and evil of the 
world is a matter of personal responsibility. That is, Solzhenitsyn discovered powerfully 
amidst the horrors of the Stalinist Gulag that he possessed personal responsibility for 
the barbarism surrounding himself. This paradox or antinomy stems from a conviction 
that “the Universe has as many different centers as there are living beings in it…each 
of us is the center of the Universe…” The entirety of the world around is cosmically 
interwoven within us and we within the world. Morally, this is a vision that is practical 
not in formulas or procedures but in manifestation of every individual cosmic-moral 
person. In a way Wittgenstein surely would appreciate, Solzhenitsyn speaks of the 
mystery of morality that is ineffable yet immanently active and personal: 
If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds, 
and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy 
them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every 
human being.85 
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
84 Peterson, 1999: 336. 
85 Solzhenitsyn, 1974: 13, 168.  
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